K. M. THAKER, J. ( 1 ) IN this group of appeals preferred under Section 54 of the Land acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the "act") read with Section 96 of Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the "code") the Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board (hereinafter referred to as the "appellant") has challenged common judgment and award dated 28. 8. 1998 passed by 2nd Joint District judge, Ahmedabad Rural in Land acquisition Reference Case Nos. 188 of 1989 to 206 of 1989 whereby the reference Court has granted additional compensation at the rate of Rs. 30 per sq. mtr. , over and above the compensation awarded by the Land acquisition Officer (hereinafter referred to as the "lao" ). The reference Court also granted other statutory benefits over the said additional compensation. In view of the pursis (Exh. 21) submitted by the parties the proceedings of the reference Cases were consolidated and lar case No. 196 of 1989 was treated as main reference wherein the proceedings and evidence were recorded. Since all the captioned appeals arise from the common judgment and award dated 28. 8. 1998 and the Claims as well as disputes and issues involved in all these appeals are common, the captioned appeals are decided by this common judgment. ( 2 ) THE above referred LAR cases nos. 188 of 1989 to 206 of 1989 arose from LAQ case No. 23 of 1984 wherein the LAO passed award on 20th september, 1988 in respect of the acquired lands and awarded Rs. 5. 50 and Rs. 6. 00 per sq. mtr. for the acquired lands. 2. 1 The original land owners (hereinafter referred to as the "claimants") were aggrieved by the market price assessed by the LAO and also with the quantum of compensation allowed by the LAO and they Claimed that the compensation awarded in respect of the acquired land was, considering the quality and potential of the lands in question, inadequate. 2. 2 The Claimants, citing the details of the location of lands in question and the surrounding development and the potential, asserted that the market price should be assessed at Rs. 50/- per sq. mtr. and the compensation amount should be determined and granted accordingly. 2. 2. 2 The Claimants, citing the details of the location of lands in question and the surrounding development and the potential, asserted that the market price should be assessed at Rs. 50/- per sq. mtr. and the compensation amount should be determined and granted accordingly. 2. 3 The Claimants, with such grievance and Claim, demanded reference under Section 18 of the Act and the competent authority accepted the demand and made reference cases which culminated into the above mentioned group of reference cases. After completion of the proceedings and upon consideration of the material on record, the Reference Court passed the impugned judgment and award and granted Rs. 30/- per sq, mtr. as additional compensation together with 30% solatium with interest at the rate of 19% for first 12 months from the date of taking over of the possession of the acquired lands and thereafter at the rate of 15% per annum till the date of payment. The Reference Court also granted 12% increase on the market value from the date of notification (i,e. 13. 2. 1986) to the date of award by lao. The appellant is aggrieved by the award of the Reference Court and has, therefore, approached this Court with captioned appeals. ( 3 ) THE lands in question are situate in the village Dholka, District ahmedabad. The lands came to be acquired at the behest of the Executive engineer, Public Health Department vibhag No. 1, for the purpose of construction of underground drainage system and oxidation pond. The notification under Section 4 of the Act for the aforesaid purpose was, initially, published on 13. 2. 1986. However, it became necessary to make certain modifications, including addition of 8 survey numbers, and therefore, another/modified notification under Section 4 of the Act was published on 2. 5. 1987. The notification under Section 6 of the act was published on 2. 5 1987. The claimants field their objections before the LAO who, after considering the objections and the material brought on record before him by the Claimants to justify their objections and Claim determined by his award dated 20. 9. 1988 the market price in respect of the lands in question at the rate of Rs. 5. 50 per sq. mtr. and Rs. 67- per sq. mtr. i. e. in certain cases the LAO fixed the market price at Rs. 5. 50 per sq mtr. 9. 1988 the market price in respect of the lands in question at the rate of Rs. 5. 50 per sq. mtr. and Rs. 67- per sq. mtr. i. e. in certain cases the LAO fixed the market price at Rs. 5. 50 per sq mtr. and in other cases at Rs. 6/- per sq. mtr. The possession of the lands in question was taken by the acquiring body, on the same date i. e. on the date of LAO's award. 3. 1 After the reference was made by the competent authority at the behest of the Claimants, oral and documentary evidence was brought on record by both the sides. From the side of claimants deposition of witnesses mr. Naranbhai Patel (Exh. 26) Mukeshbhai patel (Exh. 94) Hiralal Patel (Exh. 95)and S. L. Patel (Exh. 97) was recorded while the appellant examined Mr. H. M. Zala, Deputy Engineer and Mr. S. A. Patel, Chief Officer of the Nagarpalika, as its witnesses. Besides this, various sale instances (e. g. Exh. 79, Exh. 96, Exh. 98 to 100, Exh. 75 to 77 Exh. 79) were placed on record by the Claimants to justify their Claim. The Claimants also placed on record Exh. 41 and Exh. 132 being the copies of lease deeds executed by GIDC and Exh. 43. The said Exh. 43 is a copy of the judgment passed by the Reference Court in respect of the lands situate in the same village which were earlier acquired for gujarat Mousing Board. The Reference court, upon conclusion of evidence and arguments of both sides passed the impugned judgment and award on the basis of earlier judgment and award of reference Court in respect of acquisition of lands (for housing board)of same village and granted additional compensation at the rate of Rs. 30/- per sq. mtr. ( 4 ) MR. J. R. Nanavati, learned advocate with Mr. M. H. Rathod learned Advocate has appeared for the appellant and Mr. Saurabh Amin learned Advocate has appeared for the claimants. We have heard the advocates of the respective parties at length. ( 5 ) MR. Nanavati, learned Advocate appearing for the appellants assailed the award and submitted, inter alia, that the Reference Court has determined and granted the rate for additional compensation without any basis or any material and the rate has been determined arbitrarily by the Reference court. 5. We have heard the advocates of the respective parties at length. ( 5 ) MR. Nanavati, learned Advocate appearing for the appellants assailed the award and submitted, inter alia, that the Reference Court has determined and granted the rate for additional compensation without any basis or any material and the rate has been determined arbitrarily by the Reference court. 5. 1 He also submitted that considering the location arid quality of lands as well as the material on record the additional compensation granted by the Reference Court is excessive and the Reference Court ought not have granted any enhancement over the compensation granted by the LAO, much less at the rate of Rs. 30/- per sq. mtr. which, in appellant's submission, is arbitrary besides being excessive. 5. 2 Mr. Nanavati also submitted that the Reference Court itself discarded various sale instances placed on record by the Claimants and the said sale instances, in any case, had no evidentiary value and could not have been referred to or relied upon by the reference Court. In support of his said submission Mr. Nanavati, learned advocate relied upon judgment of apex Court in case between Special deputy Collector and another v. Kurra shambhashiva Rao ( AIR 1997 SC 2625 ). 5. 3 Mr. Nanavati also submitted that the lands in question were, at the relevant time, situate in agriculture belt and the lands were not converted into non-agricultural land but were agricultural land and that therefore the rate determined by the LAO was just and proper and did not call for any enhancement, more so because there was no development in the surroundings when the lands in question were acquired and therefore also the award enhancing the rate of compensation by additional Rs. 30 per sq. mtr. is arbitrary and excessive, besides being without support of any material. 5. 4 Mr. Nanavati lastly submitted that though the Reference Court determined the additional compensation on the basis of previous judgment of the Reference Court in respect of lands of same village acquired for Gujarat Housing Board, there was in fact no justification for the reference Court to rely on the said previous judgment and the Reference court should not have relied on the said. earlier judgment and that the said earlier judgment by the Reference court was not passed on the basis of good evidence and did not merit consideration. 5. 5 Mr. earlier judgment and that the said earlier judgment by the Reference court was not passed on the basis of good evidence and did not merit consideration. 5. 5 Mr. Saurabh Amin, learned advocate appearing for the Claimants has vehemently opposed the appeals and the submissions of Mr. Nanavati. learned Advocate for the appellants and has supported the judgment and award by the Reference Court. 5. 6 He strongly opposed the submission objecting the reliance placed on the earlier judgment of the reference Court, and submitted that the judgment (Exh. 43) in case of housing board has became final in the sense that it has not been challenged by the housing board and actually it has been accepted and has been even acted upon by making payment of compensation at the rate determined by the Court. The said assertions, with regard to the earlier judgment and award (Exh. 43)of the Reference Court, have not been disputed by the appellant. He also submitted that in present case the reference Court has not committed any error in relying on earlier judgment in respect of lands of same village. 5. 7 He opposed the submissions of the appellant that the sale instances did not hold evidentiary value mainly on two grounds i. e. in light of Section 51a of the Act and also on the ground that the sale deeds dated 13. 2. 1986, 4. 2. 1987 and 6. 1. 1992 were duly established by examining vendor or vendee and the said and other sale instances were even duly exhibited by the Court. He submitted that Exh, 41 and Exh. 132 were the copies of the lease deeds executed by a Public Corporation i. e. GIDC and that Exh. 79, a document which was executed in February 1986, was a contemporaneous document and similarly Exh. 96 was also a contemporaneous document inasmuch as it was executed in April 1987 i. e. close to the date of amended notification under Section 4 of the Act. Mr. Amin contended that the sale instances are best evidence to determine the market price on the date of Section 4 notification. He, however, conceded that the Claimants have not filed cross-objection against the judgment of the Reference Court and/or against the conclusion regarding the sale-instances and has not challenged the decision to not rely on the sale-instances. Mr. Amin contended that the sale instances are best evidence to determine the market price on the date of Section 4 notification. He, however, conceded that the Claimants have not filed cross-objection against the judgment of the Reference Court and/or against the conclusion regarding the sale-instances and has not challenged the decision to not rely on the sale-instances. He further submitted that even the evidence by the witnesses of the appellant conclusively demonstrated that the lands in question were in the vicinity of GIDC and Kheda-Dholka highway and the distance between the lands in question and the lands acquired earlier by housing board is also not more than about 2 kms. and that therefore the appellants' objection with regard to the rate of additional compensation fixed by the Reference Court is without merit and justification. Mr. Amin submitted that the lands in question possessed and enjoyed, on the date of Section 4 notification, very good potential for housing as well as industrial purpose. 5. 8 Mr. Amin, further submitted that the lands in question and the surrounding area was declared as "industrial Zone for non water base industry". Differently put the lands in question were situate in Industrial Zone and that therefore it had industrial potentiality. Mr, Amin relied upon the deposition of the witnesses to support his submission that though the lands in question were, at the relevant time, agricultural lands, the entire surroundings within periphery of one to two and half k. m. was well developed area in view of which the acquired lands acquired good potentiality. He also submitted that the Reference Court rightly and justifiably relied upon the judgment by the Reference. Court pertaining to the lands of the same village which were acquired, for housing board. 5. 9 Mr. Nanavati, learned Advocate for appellant submitted, in rejoinder, that for good reasons - recorded in the impugned judgment and award - the reference Court has rightly and justifiably not accepted and relied on the sale deeds and even the Claimants have not challenged the said decision of the Reference Court and that therefore the sale instances cannot be taken into account at this stage, Except the aforesaid submissions no other submissions have been made. ( 6 ) IN order to substantiate his submission regarding the location of lands in question and the distance between lands in question on one hand and other relevant points/land marks which would establish the geographical proximity of lands, mr. Amin referred to the LAO's awarded, however, his attempt was, at the outset, thwarted by petitioner's counsel on the ground that LAO's award is merely an offer and not evidence, hence it can not be relied upon. Mr. Amin submitted that when the appellant itself, through its witness, had relied upon the award of the LAO in case of acquisition by housing board it does not befit the appellant, which is a Government Corporation, to raise objection against the award of LAO and particularly against the details about the lands and the description about the surrounding area and the details of the development mentioned in the award. 6. 1 Mr. Nanavati, learned advocate for the appellant while opposing the Claimants attempt to rely upon LAO's award so as to substantiate the submissions regarding the location of the land in question and its distance from certain prominent/relevant land marks has also raised a contention that award made by LAO is. only an offer and therefore it cannot be taken as evidence. 6. 2 True it is that the LAO's award is an offer and would not, ipso facto, acquire the character or status of evidence and/or would not bind the claimant. While the award cannot bind the Claimant, since such proposition may, in effect, render the provisions under Sections 18 and 23 of the Act, qua the Claimant, nugatory and also deprive the Claimant of his right to demand reference for additional compensation under Section 18 of the act, however, it would bind the acquiring Authority at least so far as the facts and details about the location of the lands in question, the description and surroundings of the lands, the details regarding distance between the lands in question and other land-marks/comparable points, the details about the construction or absence of construction over the land in question and such other physical or descriptive attributes and characteristics of the lands in questions as mentioned/recorded in the award are concerned. 6. 3 Thus, while we accept the submissions made by Mr. 6. 3 Thus, while we accept the submissions made by Mr. Nanavati that the award made by LAO is merely an offer and it cannot be considered or treated as an evidence and it would not bind the Claimant, we also hasten to clarify that while the award being an offer may not be taken as evidence, however in our view so far as the Acquiring authority is concerned, it cannot disown it or raise objection against the award. The reason for this view is that it is on the basis of such details recorded in award that the quantum of the offer is determined and legislature has by virtue of Section 25 provided that the rate of compensation to be decided by Reference Court can not be less than the Section 11 award. 6. 4 Further, it is clear that in making an award, the Collector acts as an agent of the Government/acquiring body and therefore also it would neither be just nor permissible for the Government/acquiring Authority to disown or challenge the award or the factual details pertaining to the physical description of the lands in question and its surroundings, including the details regarding the development, recorded in the award by the LAO. 6. 5 We derive support for such view from conjoint reading of the proviso of sub-Section (2) of Section 50 and Section 25 of the Act. The proviso of sub-Section (2) of Section 50 reads thus : "provided that no such local authority or Company shall be entitled to demand a reference under Section 18" and Section 25 of the Act reads thus :-"s. 25 Amount of compensation awarded by Court not to be lower than the amount awarded by the collector.- The amount of compensation awarded by the Court shall not be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11. " on conjoint reading of said two provisions In the Act, it becomes clear that as per the scheme of the Act apart from fraud, corruption or collusion the compensation awarded by Collector under Section 11 of the Act may not be questioned by the Government, or the Company or local authority at whose instance the acquisition is made. " on conjoint reading of said two provisions In the Act, it becomes clear that as per the scheme of the Act apart from fraud, corruption or collusion the compensation awarded by Collector under Section 11 of the Act may not be questioned by the Government, or the Company or local authority at whose instance the acquisition is made. (Para 4, AIR 1986 SC 1164 )Our aforesaid view is also fortified by the observations by the Apex Court in Santosh kumar and others v. Central warehousing Corporation and another ( AIR 1986 SC 1164 ) wherein the apex Court, in para 5, has observed: if the collector making an award was in law making an offer on behalf of the Government, it is difficult to appreciate how the Government or any one who could but Claim through the Government would be entitled to question the award, apart from fraud, corruption or collusion. " 6. 6 While clarifying that merely because the collector, while making an award under Section 11 or in serving notice under Section 12, acts as an agent of the Government it does not necessarily in only that while making reference to the Court under Section 18 he acts as an agent of the government and that the collector, acting under Section 18 is statutory authority exercising his powers under the said Section, the Apex Court, in para 16 of the judgment in mohammad Hasnuddin v. State of maharashtra ( AIR 1979 SC 404 )observed that:-"16. Ameer Ali and Stephen JJ. , in delivering the judgment under appeal, explained the functions of the collector under S. 11 in Ezra v. Secy. Of State for India (1905) ILR 32 Cal 605 (PC) where they said: "throughout the proceedings the collector acts as the agent of government for the purpose of acquisition. . . . He is in no sense of the term, a judicial officer nor is the proceedings before him a judicial proceeding. . . . e is not a Court. . . . The government. . . at whose instance the land is being taken up is not entitled to demand a reference. . . . The reason of this is plain. The Collector acts as the agent of the Government. . . . and they are accordingly bound by the award of their agent. xxx. . . . . . . The government. . . at whose instance the land is being taken up is not entitled to demand a reference. . . . The reason of this is plain. The Collector acts as the agent of the Government. . . . and they are accordingly bound by the award of their agent. xxx. . . . the Collector acts in the matter of the enquiry and the valuation of the land only as an agent of the government and not as a judicial officer; and. . . . consequently, although the Government. . . . is bound by his proceedings, the persons interested are not concluded by his finding regarding the value of the land or the compensation to be awarded" (emphasis supplied)6. 7 We must clarify that (i) all that we say with regard to the award made by the Collector/lao acting under. Section i 1 is that the factual details regarding the lands in question recorded in the award and the other material taken on record, for and while making the award, is collected and placed on record by the Collector/lao as agent of the acquiring body and that therefore at a later stage before the Reference Court it would not be justified or permissible for the acquiring body to Claim that the material on record before the Collector is not acceptable to it or would not bind it, (ii) likewise the acquiring body also cannot run away from the decision of LAO and oppose the market price or rate of compensation determined by the Collector/lao (and offered to the claimants) and can not demand reference under Section 18 of the Act, though the award cannot be taken or considered as evidence and may not bind the Claimants so far the material placed by the LAO and/or the rate fixed in the Section 11 award is concerned. 6. 8 Even otherwise, since we have taken into consideration the earlier judgment and not the LAO's award, in present case LAO's award did not acquire any relevance and in view of the deposition of witnesses, any necessity or expediency to rely on lao's award did not arise. ( 7 ) BEFORE we advert to the earlier judgment in case of acquisition by housing board, it would be appropriate to take note of the sale instances/lease deeds produced on record by the claimants. ( 7 ) BEFORE we advert to the earlier judgment in case of acquisition by housing board, it would be appropriate to take note of the sale instances/lease deeds produced on record by the claimants. The said details thereof may be summarized as mentioned in the following table:- Sr. No. Exh . No. Description of Document Market value Reflected Proved By 1 79 Sale deed of S. No. 222 & 223 of Dholka. Dated 13. 02. 1986 Rs . 48/- per sq. mtr. Deposition of purchaser Jesinghbhai Sonara at Exh. 78 2 96 Sale deed for S. No. 2034/1& 2034/2 dated 04. 02. 1987 Rs . 36/- per sq. mtr. Deposition of Hiralal Patel at Exh. 95 3 98, 99. 100 Sale deeds of S. No. 234, 235,236 dated 06. 01. 1992 Rs . 83. 75. Rs. 119. 60 & Rs. 111. 75 respectively Deposition of vendee Shantilal Patel at Exh. 97 4 75, 76, 77 & 79 Copies of Sale deed of same village Rs . 46 to Rs. 48 5 41 Lease deed by GIDC dated 07. 03. 1988 Rs . 50/- 6 132 Lease deed by GIDC dated 15. 03:1988 Rs . 50/- ( 8 ) WITH regard to the sale instances placed on record by the Claimants, we may first deal with appellant's objections against the sale deeds. 8. 1 It is contended that the sale deeds cannot be taken into account for want of evidentiary value In our opinion the objection is misconceived in view of the material on record and is also unsustainable in light of the judgment of the Apex Court 8. 2 We may first clear the issue in light of the material on record. As can be seen from the details mentioned in the table in respect of Exh. 79, 96, 98 99 and 100 deposition of Mr. Sonara, mr. Hiralal Patel and Mr. Shantilal patel were recorded. Thus,, the documents were proved with aid of evidence of vendor/vendee. This is evident from paragraphs 13. 14 and 15 of the reference Court's impugned judgment: so far as Exh. 41 and 132 are concerned, the Reference Court has itself considered the said documents (being the lease deeds executed by G. I. D. C however, has not relied on the said documents for different reason (viz. that it reflects concessional rate ). 14 and 15 of the reference Court's impugned judgment: so far as Exh. 41 and 132 are concerned, the Reference Court has itself considered the said documents (being the lease deeds executed by G. I. D. C however, has not relied on the said documents for different reason (viz. that it reflects concessional rate ). Thus, the material on record does not support the petitioner's objection made on the ground of absence of evidence or evidentiary value, more so because no rebuttal evidence was placed on record by appellant. 8. 3 So as to substantiate his submission the appellant's learned counsel relied on the judgment of Apex court in Special Deputy Collector and another (supra) wherein the Hon'ble apex Court has observed in para 8 as follows: 8. In that case, the features required to be present are ; it must be within a reasonable time of the date of the notification; it must be a bonafide transaction; it should be a sale of land similar to the land acquired or land adjacent to the land acquired; and it should possess similar advantageous features. These are relevant features to be taken into consideration to prove the market value of the acquired land as on the date of the notification published under Section 4 (1) of the Act. This would be established by examining either the vendor or the vendee. If it is proved that they are not available, the scribe of the document may also be examined in that behalf. Sect 51-A of the act only dispenses with the production of the original sale deed and directs to receive certified copy for the reason that parties to the sale transaction would be reluctant to part with the original sale deed since acquisition proceedings would take longtime before award of the compensation attains finality and in the meanwhile the owner of the sale deed is precluded from using the same for other purposes vis-a-vis this land. The marking of the certified copy is perse is not admissible in evidence unless it is duly proved and the witnesses, viz. , the vendor or the vendee, are examined. " 8. 4 In this regard we may refer to the larger bench judgment by the hon'ble Apex Court in the case between Cement Corporation of India ltd. v. Purya reported in AIR 2004 SC 4830 . , the vendor or the vendee, are examined. " 8. 4 In this regard we may refer to the larger bench judgment by the hon'ble Apex Court in the case between Cement Corporation of India ltd. v. Purya reported in AIR 2004 SC 4830 . In the said judgment the Apex court has observed in para 29, 31 and 32 as follows:-"29. In V. Narasaiah's case, this court correctly understood the said scope and object of insertion of Section 51a in the LA Act when it held thus : "it was in the wake of the aforesaid practical difficulties that the new section 51a was introduced in the LA act. When the Section says that certified copy of a registered document "may be accepted as evidence of the transaction recorded in such document" it enables the Court to treat what is recorded in the document, in respect of the transactions referred to therein, as evidence. " 31. Thus, the reasoning of this Court in Narasaiah's case that Section 51a enables the party producing the certified copy of a sale transaction to rely on the contents of the document without having to examine the vendee or the vendor of that document is the correct position in law. This finding in narasaiah's case is also supported by the decision of this Court in the case of mangaldas Raghavji Ruparel (supra ). 32. Therefore, we have no hesitation in accepting this view of the Court in the Narasaiah's case as the correct view. (emphasis supplied)Then, in para 35, 37 and 39 of the said judgment the Apex Court observed as under:. "35. A registered document in terms of Section 51a of the Act may carry therewith a presumption of genuineness. Such a presumption, therefore, is rebuttable. Raising a presumption, therefore, does not amount to proof; it only shifts the burden of proof against whom the presumption operates for disproving it. Only if the presumption is not rebutted by discharging the burden, the Court may act on the basis of such presumption. Even when in terms of the evidence Act, a provision has been made that the Court shall presume a fact, the same by itself would not be irrebuttable or conclusive. The genuineness of a transaction can always fall for adjudication, if any question is raised in this behalf. 37. Even when in terms of the evidence Act, a provision has been made that the Court shall presume a fact, the same by itself would not be irrebuttable or conclusive. The genuineness of a transaction can always fall for adjudication, if any question is raised in this behalf. 37. Having noticed the scope of section 51a of the LA Act as understood by this Court in V. Narasaiah's case to be the correct interpretation, we will now consider whether such evidence is mandatorly binding on the authority or the Court concerned or it is only an enabling provision. 39. While it is clear that under section 51a of the LA Act a presumption as to the genuineness of the contents of the document is permitted to be raised, the same can be relied upon only if the said presumption is not rebutted by other evidence. In the said view of the matter we are of the opinion the decision of this Court in the case of Land Acquisition Officer and mandal Revenue Officer v. V. Narasaiah (supra) lays down the correct law. " (emphasis supplied)8. 5. As mentioned earlier in present case the appellant has not produced any evidence in rebuttal or contrary to the sale deeds produced by the Claimants. 8. 6 Further, in present case the claimants had, as recorded in the award in para 13, 14 and 15, examined witnesses (Exh. 78, Exh. 95, Exh. 97)with regard to the sale deeds. 8. 7 Thus, in our view, this contention fails in light of the judgment of the Apex Court in Cement corporation of India Ltd. (Supra), 8. 8 We must, on this count, record the submission of the Claimant that the sale instances would demonstrate that the market price fixed by the Reference court is on much lower scale. 8. 9 However, for the reasons recorded earlier we would not turn to the said sale instances. 8 We must, on this count, record the submission of the Claimant that the sale instances would demonstrate that the market price fixed by the Reference court is on much lower scale. 8. 9 However, for the reasons recorded earlier we would not turn to the said sale instances. It is obvious that when for the reasons considered just and appropriate by the Reference Court (as recorded in the judgment) the sale instances have not been found fit for being taken into consideration and for making them the base for determining the market price, then, unless the conclusion of the Reference Court is set aside, the sale instances cannot be taken into account and in absence of challenge against the sale-deeds by way of cross appeal or cross-objections, we would not be justified in interfering with and therefore, we would not interfere with the conclusions of the reference Court on this point. Hence, the sale-instances are, for aforesaid reason, not taken into consideration by us. ( 9 ) IN this backdrop, what remains available is the earlier judgment of the reference Court in respect of the lands of same village acquired by the housing board on which the Reference Court has relied upon. 9. 1 Thus, it is appropriate at this stage to refer to the relevant features of the two notifications i. e. the Section 4 notification in the case of housing board's acquisition and the Section 4 notification for present acquisition. 9. 2 Initially, the notification under section 4 in present case was published on 13. 2. 1986, whereas the notification under Section 4 for Gujarat Housing board's acquisition, was issued on 27. 1. 1983. Thus, there is a gap of about 25 months between the two notifications. 9. 3 In present case the Reference court has, after arriving at a conclusion that it would not be proper to rely upon any of the sale instances obtaining on record, relied on the earlier judgment and award of the Reference Court in the case of housing board's acquisition (pursuant to Section 4 notification dated 27. 1. 1983) wherein the LAO, by his award dated 17/09/1986, had determined the market price at Rs. 7/-per sq. mtr. as on the date of Section 4 notification (i. e. as on 27. 1. 1983) in the said case. 9. 1. 1983) wherein the LAO, by his award dated 17/09/1986, had determined the market price at Rs. 7/-per sq. mtr. as on the date of Section 4 notification (i. e. as on 27. 1. 1983) in the said case. 9. 4 Therefore, in present case the claimants have urged that when the s acquisition of lands in both cases are of same village and present acquisition is subsequent to the housing board's acquisition, the LAO is neither right nor justified in determining the market price of the lands in the same village at a rate lesser than the rate which was fixed by LAO 25 months earlier. 9. 5 The LAO's aforesaid award dated 17. 9. 1986 in case of housing board's acquisition determining the market price at Rs. 7/- per sq. mtr. was opposed by the concerned land owners, therefore reference under Section IS of the Act were made which culminated into LAR case No. 571 of 1987 and 572 of 1987. The Reference Court, by its judgment and award dated 17. 1. 1989, determined the market price @ Rs. 37/-per sq. mtr. The said judgment was challenged by way of First Appeals being First Appeal Nos. 883 and 884 of 1989 in this Court and by judgment and order dated 1. 8. 2000 this Court remanded the proceedings to the reference Court for re-determination after receiving the evidence of vendor and vendee of sale instances which were placed on record of the LAR case no. 571 of 1987 and 572 of 1987. 9. 6 After the remand, the Reference court heard the said reference cases again and during the proceedings evidence of six, persons namely mr. Hasmukhbhai Bhagwanbhai, Mr. J. S. Vaghela, Mr. Zahid Miya mohammadbhai, Mr. Bhailalbhai abdul Rahim Khan and Mr. Navnitbhai chimanbhai in connection with the sale instances were recorded. Upon conclusion of the evidence and arguments, the Reference Court again passed judgment and award dated 30. 12. 2005 in the said LAR case No. 571 of 1987 and 572 of 1987 and determined the rate of additional compensation at Rs. 30/- per sq. mtr. taking the total rate of compensation i. e. the market price for acquisition in 1983 at Rs. 37/- per sq. mtr. (Rs. 7/- fixed by LAO + Rs. 30/- fixed by judgment dated 30. 12. 2005 ). 30/- per sq. mtr. taking the total rate of compensation i. e. the market price for acquisition in 1983 at Rs. 37/- per sq. mtr. (Rs. 7/- fixed by LAO + Rs. 30/- fixed by judgment dated 30. 12. 2005 ). ( 10 ) IN present case the Reference court has relied upon the said earlier judgment of Reference Court which pertains to the acquisition of land from same village, for housing board. As noticed earlier the gap between Section 4 notification in the said case of housing board acquisition and in present case is of 25 months and the said judgment, as per Claimant's assertion, has not been challenged and payments as per the said judgment and award have been made. The said factual assertion by the claimant has not been disputed by the appellant. ( 11 ) NOW, it deserves to be recalled that the lands acquired by the housing board pursuant to the Section 4 notification dated 27. 1. 1983 are of the same village (i. e village Dholka) and consequently the judgment of the reference Court would be "earlier judgment in respect of lands of same village". Further, the gap between the date of Section 4 notification in case of housing board and in present case is of only 25 months. Thirdly, even as per the evidence given by the appellant's witnesses the distance between housing board colony and the lands in question is of about 2 to 2 kms, but in the same village. Fourthly, the said acquisition was by a public corporation/board and in present case also the acquisition is by a public corporation/board. Besides this, the said earlier judgment came to be passed on the basis of evidence of vendor/vendee in respect of the lands acquired by housing board and has been accepted as well as acted upon by the housing board. 11. 1 I In addition to all these features another relevant aspect is that the appellant did not and could not produce any contrary evidence to demonstrate that the rate determined in the said earlier judgment is not just and reasonable or proper. The appellant also did not and could not produce any evidence to establish and justify any other price as just and reasonable market price. 11. The appellant also did not and could not produce any evidence to establish and justify any other price as just and reasonable market price. 11. 2 In this backdrop (i) when the lands in question in both cases (i. e. in case of housing board's acquisition and in present case) are of the same village and (ii) the gap between the two notifications under Section 4 is of only 25 months, the earlier judgment and award made by the Reference Court in case of acquisition of the lands in same village can be said to be a comparable instance as rightly Claimed by the claimant and, in our view, no fault can be found with the Reference Court, in facts of present case, in relying upon the said earlier judgment of the reference Court concerning the housing board's acquisition for determining the market price. ( 12 ) AT this stage, particularly after coming to the conclusion that the earlier judgment and award by the Reference court in case of Housing Board's acquisition can be considered as comparable instance for the purpose on hand and having held that the Reference court has not committed any error in accepting the said earlier judgment in the case of Housing Board's acquisition as the base and once such conclusion is reached, as a corollary there would be no justification for not relying on and not proceeding on the basis of the rate determined by the Reference Court in said case. We have, however on the basis of material on record, examined the issue : what could be the market price of the land in question of the relevant date i. e. 13-02-1986. Therefore, it is appropriate, at this stage, to examine the evidence on record. ( 13 ) IN present case it has come on record, by way of deposition of Mr. Naranbhai Nagarbhai Patel that there were about 7000/- power looms, cotton ginning units, rice mills, two petrol pumps, three main roads connecting the dholka village with Ahmedabad, seven to eight nationalized banks, two cooperative banks, two hospitals, science and commerce college and also an IT1 and proposed 60 feet road passing through the lands in question, a tea process house just opposite the lands in question were at the distance of about 2 kms. from municipal limit. from municipal limit. Though said Naranbhai Patel has been s subjected to cross examination by the acquiring body, any question or suggestion to disprove the aforesaid description of the development in village Dholka and surrounding lands in question have not been put to the witness and/or any thing contrary has not been elicited. Even the appellant's witness Mr. H. M. Zala (Deputy Engineer in the acquiring body) has, in his deposition, stated that the Dhokla- Bagodara state highway is only at a distance of about 3/4 kms. from the lands in question and that main gate of GIDC industrial estate is about 1 km. away i. e. at a distance of 1 km. from the lands in question. The said witness has also stated that the distance between the lands in question and Dholka municipality is about 600 mtrs. and the housing board colony is at a distance of about 2 kms. ( 14 ) ANOTHER witness of the appellant namely S. A. Patel has stated that the distance, between the municipal limit and lands in question is about 700 mtr. while distance between GIDC industrial estate and lands in question is of about 3/4 of a kms. or at about 1 km. from the lands in question, while the distance between highway and the lands in question is about 600 mtrs. or about 3/4 kms. The description of other developments and infrastructure facilities, as given by the Claimant's witness, is not disproved. ( 15 ) THE appellant has no where disputed the description and details about the physical attributes and characteristics and surrounding of the lands in question as mentioned by the claimants' witnesses or in the LAO's award, ( 16 ) THE above mentioned details, in our view demonstrate that the lands in question were, at the relevant time, situate in geographical proximity of gidc industrial estate at a distance of 3/4 of a km. or 1 km. and at a distance of about 600 mtr. or 3/4 km. of a km. from highway and the Gujarat Housing board Colony was at a distance of about 2 kms. Thus, the Claimants appear to be justified in Claiming that the land in question enjoyed good potential for industrial use or residential purpose. In this backdrop, particularly in light of the fact that housing board's colony is at a distance of about 2 kms. from highway and the Gujarat Housing board Colony was at a distance of about 2 kms. Thus, the Claimants appear to be justified in Claiming that the land in question enjoyed good potential for industrial use or residential purpose. In this backdrop, particularly in light of the fact that housing board's colony is at a distance of about 2 kms. as per appellant's witness (the Reference Court has observed that the distance is of 3 kms.) the housing board's instance is and can be accepted as a comparable instance and provides good base for determining market price in present case. ( 17 ) HENCE, in our opinion there cannot be any hesitation in accepting and treating the earlier judgment of the reference Court in case of housing board's acquisition in same village as a comparable instance and the base for determining the market price for subsequent period, ( 18 ) AS noticed above, once it is found that the Reference Court has not erred in taking the award (exh. 43)made in respect of housing board's acquisition as the base for determining the market price for present case, then, as a corollary there would be, in our view, no justification to interfere with the rate/market price determined or adopted by the Reference Court in present case on that basis, more so when in present case the Reference court has, even-after gap of about 25 months determined the market price at rs. 35. 50 and Rs. 36. 00 per sq. mtr. whereas rate of Rs. 37/- was considered to be the market price for lands acquired 25 months earlier i. e. in 1983. ( 19 ) FOR proceeding on the basis of an earlier instance, the well recognized formula is of granting 10% increase per year so as to bridge the gap between two notifications. 19. 1 In present case the gap is of 25 months, hence applying the, said recognized formula, 20% increase over the market price fixed by the Reference court in the earlier judgment in the case of housing Board's acquisition, will have to be granted. Resultantly, the market price would come to Rs. 44. 40 per sq. mtr. as on the date of Section 4 notification in present case (i. e. 13. 2. 1986 ). 19. 2 The Claimants have, however, urged that in view of the amended notification issued subsequently i. e. 2. 5. Resultantly, the market price would come to Rs. 44. 40 per sq. mtr. as on the date of Section 4 notification in present case (i. e. 13. 2. 1986 ). 19. 2 The Claimants have, however, urged that in view of the amended notification issued subsequently i. e. 2. 5. 1987, the said date (2. 5. 1987)should be taken as a date of Section 4 notifications in present case. As a result of which gap between two notifications under Section 4 would come to about 40 months. We would, however, not take up the said controversy for consideration and would rather proceed on the basis of the date taken into consideration by the Reference Court i. e. 13. 2. 1986 as the date of notification under Section 4, and such was not the case of Claimants before the Reference court. 19. 3 Now, taking Rs. 44,40 as a market price as on 13. 2. 1986, it would be necessary and appropriate to allow certain deductions so as to take care of the distance and location. 19. 4 In this regard, reference needs to be made to recent judgment by the apex Court in Atma Singh (died)through LRs and other v. State of haryana and another. Though, in the said case the Apex Court has considered the issue of deduction from the prospective of the necessity to make adjustment in the market price which is determined on the basis of a sale instance of smaller parcel of land as compared to larger chunk under acquisition. It has been held by the apex Court in the said case that :-"13. The reasons given for the principle that price fetched for small plots cannot form safe basis for valuation of large tracts of land, according to cases referred to above, are that substantial area is used for development of sites like laying out roads, drains, sewers, water and electricity lines and other civic amenities. Expenses are also incurred in providing these basic amenities. That apart it takes considerable period in carving out the roads making sewers and drains and waiting for the purchasers. Meanwhile the invested money is blocked up and the return on the investment flows after a considerable period of time. Expenses are also incurred in providing these basic amenities. That apart it takes considerable period in carving out the roads making sewers and drains and waiting for the purchasers. Meanwhile the invested money is blocked up and the return on the investment flows after a considerable period of time. In order to make up for the area of land which is used in providing civic amenities and the waiting period during which the capital of the entrepreneur gets locked up a deduction from 20% onward, depending upon the facts of each case. 15. Having regard to the entire facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that a deduction of 10% from the market value of the land, which has been arrived at by the High court would meet the ends of justice. Therefore, the market value of the acquired land for the purpose of payment of compensation to the land owners has to be assessed at Rs. 1,08,000/- per acre. " ( 20 ) IN the facts of the case it would. however, not be necessary to provide for (i. e. make adjustment towards)development charges, etc. inasmuch as the lands in question are acquired for underground drainage system. Thus, considering the aspects relating to distance and the purpose of acquisition, in our view deduction at 15% from the aforesaid market price of Rs. 44. 40/-would be reasonable. ( 21 ) BY the earlier judgment (exh. 43) in respect of housing board's acquisition the Reference Court: determined Rs. 37/- (Rs. 7/- as fixed by the LAO + Rs. 30/-) as the market price as on 27. 1. 1983. As mentioned above, considering the gap of 25 months between the two notifications the market price in February 1986 would be Rs. 44. 40/- and if deduction at the rate of 15%, so as to provide for and take care of the aspects like the distance of the lands in question its location etc. , is allowed the market price would be rs. 37. 74. Even if deduction at the rate of 20% is allowed, the market price would be Rs. 35. 52. Whereas in present case the Reference Court has granted additional compensation at the rate of rs. 30/- per sq. mtr. which means that the Reference Court determined the market price at Rs. 35. 50 to Rs. 36/- (which in fact is Rs. Even if deduction at the rate of 20% is allowed, the market price would be Rs. 35. 52. Whereas in present case the Reference Court has granted additional compensation at the rate of rs. 30/- per sq. mtr. which means that the Reference Court determined the market price at Rs. 35. 50 to Rs. 36/- (which in fact is Rs. 1 less than what the reference Court determined for acquisition made three earlier i. e. in 1983 ). Hence, in our view the additional compensation determined by the Reference Court in present case is just and reasonable and does not warrant interference. Actually in present case the Reference Court has determined almost the same market price or additional compensation for acquisition in 1986 (or rather Re. 1/-less) which was fixed by the Reference court for the acquisition in 1983 in case of Housing Board. ( 22 ) IN view of the above discussion, we find that the Reference Court has not committed any error in taking the earlier judgment as the base for determining the market price in this case and/or in fixing the additional compensation of Rs. 30/-per sq. mtr. Even after considering the matter independently on the basis of the material on record we are of the confirmed view that the market price and/or the rate for additional compensation fixed by the Reference court in present case cannot be said to be excessive, arbitrary or without' supporting evidence as Claimed by the appellant. ( 23 ) HENCE, we are inclined to, and therefore we hereby do, confirm the rate of additional compensation fixed by the Reference Court. ( 24 ) CONSEQUENTLY the appeals fail and deserve to be rejected. So, they are hereby dismissed. There shall, however, be no costs. The decree to be drawn accordingly. The Reference court shall take necessary steps to make the payments in accordance with the judgment and award dated 28. 8. 1998 within 3 months from the receipt of this judgment and decree. The payments shall be made only by account Payee Cheques and only after due and proper verification of each of the Claimants. Appeals dismissed.