ORDER Iqbal Ahmed Ansari, J. 1. The opposite-party herein instituted Title Suit No. 22/2000, with the present petitioner and one Nazrul Hoque, as defendant Nos. 1 and 2 respectively, seeking, inter alia, declaration that the sale deed, whereby the present petitioner has purchased the suit land from defendant No. 2, Nazrul Hoque, was collusive and illegal and also for declaration of the plaintiff's rights, title and interest over the suit property. The opposite-party herein also filed, in the said suit, an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2, read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short, 'the Code'), praying for granting of temporary injunction restraining the defendants, their agents, servants, workmen, etc. from entering into the suit land and disturbing the plaintiff-respondent's peaceful possession of the suit land till disposal of the suit. This application for injunction, filed by the opposite-party herein, gave rise to Misc. (J) Case No. 10/2000, wherein an order was passed directing the parties to maintain status quo until further order. Having received objection to the application for temporary injunction, which the plaintiff had filed, learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bongaigaon, passed an order, on 10-10-2002, making the said interim order absolute, till disposal of the suit, by directing the parties to maintain status quo, as directed earlier, till disposal of the suit. While making the interim order aforementioned absolute, learned trial Court observed that it was an admitted case of the parties that the possession of the land was with the plaintiff. This apart, the order, dated 10-10-2002, was never put to challenge and the order, thus, survived. Thereafter, the plaintiff (opposite party herein) filed a petition under Order 39, Rule 2A of the Code, in the Court of Munsiff, North Salmara, Abhyapuri, alleging, inter alia, that, on 2-10-2008, at about 8-30 a.m. the petitioner herein along with others had, armed with deadly weapons, trespassed into the suit land and started cultivating the same and, on witnessing the same, when the plaintiff and her men rushed to the suit land, they were attempted to be assaulted, and, apprehending danger to their lives, the plaintiff and her men retreated. Thus, the plaintiff-opposite party herein alleged that the present petitioner had violated the injunction, which had been granted by order, dated 10-10-2002, aforementioned. This application, filed by the plaintiff, gave rise to Misc. (J) Case No. 16/2008. 2. Thus, the plaintiff-opposite party herein alleged that the present petitioner had violated the injunction, which had been granted by order, dated 10-10-2002, aforementioned. This application, filed by the plaintiff, gave rise to Misc. (J) Case No. 16/2008. 2. The petitioner herein, upon receipt of notice in Misc. (J) Case No. 16/2008 aforementioned, took adjournments, on 30-7-2008, 15-8-2008, 22-9-2008 and 11-11-2008, to file his objection in the said case. Eventually, on 3-12-2008, a petition was filed by the present petitioner seeking time for filing his objection on the ground that his advocate was lying ill. The learned Munsiff, however, passed an order, on 3-12-2008, rejecting the prayer for adjournment on the ground that repeated adjournments would cause delay in the trial and, therefore, fixed the said case, on 7-1-2009, for hearing. On the date, so fixed, i.e. on 7-1-2009, both the parties submitted that they would not adduce any evidence. The Misc. (J) Case No. 16/2008 accordingly came to be fixed for hearing on 4-2-2009. Thereafter, an application under Section 151 of the Code was filed by the present petitioner stating to the effect, inter alia, that on 3-12-2008, he could not file his objection due to the fact that his counsel had made an incorrect entry in his diary as regards the date of the case and, hence, he may be allowed to file his objection in the said proceeding, or else, he would suffer irreparable loss. The learned Munsiff, vide order, dated 4-2-2009, admitted the petition for hearing and fixed the case on 15-2-2009. An objection was, then, filed by the plaintiff to the prayer so made by the defendant-petitioner. After hearing the learned Counsel for both the parties, the learned Court below passed an order, on 23-6-2009, rejecting the prayer made by the defendant-petitioner. Aggrieved by the order dated 23-6-2009, aforementioned, the defendant has, now, filed this revision petition. 3. I have heard Mr. I. Hussain, learned Counsel for the defendant-petitioner. 4. After hearing the learned Counsel for both the parties, the learned Court below passed an order, on 23-6-2009, rejecting the prayer made by the defendant-petitioner. Aggrieved by the order dated 23-6-2009, aforementioned, the defendant has, now, filed this revision petition. 3. I have heard Mr. I. Hussain, learned Counsel for the defendant-petitioner. 4. It is submitted, on behalf of the defendant No. 1-petitioner, that an application under Order 39, Rule 2A gives rise to a 'proceeding' and the provisions of Order 17, which relates to granting of time or adjournments in suits, are not applicable to a proceeding; and hence, merely because of the fact the defendant (present petitioner) had already obtained, in order to file his objection in the said proceeding, as many as four adjournments in the past, the defendant's (i.e., the present petitioner's) prayer for allowing him time to file his objection, in the said proceeding, could not have been legally rejected. 5. The moot question, therefore, which arises for determination, in this revision is : Whether the provisions, embodied under Order 17 , are applicable to an application under Order 39, Rule 2-A or not? 6. The only way in which Order XVII can be made applicable to an application, made under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A, is if such an application can be treated to be a 'proceeding' within the meaning of Section 141 of the Code and if the word 'proceeding' can be read in place of the word 'suit' in Order XVII, Rule 1. The question, therefore, which, now, arises for consideration is as to what a 'proceeding', within the meaning of Section 141, is? 7. The question, posed above, brings me to the provisions of Section 141, which reads as follows: 141. Miscellaneous proceedings.- The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suit shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction. Explanation: In this section, the expression "proceedings" includes proceedings under Order IX, but does not include any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. 8. The question as to what the word 'proceeding', occurring in Section 141, conveys is not easy to answer, for, Section 141 has a long and, interestingly enough, a tumultuous past. Explanation: In this section, the expression "proceedings" includes proceedings under Order IX, but does not include any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. 8. The question as to what the word 'proceeding', occurring in Section 141, conveys is not easy to answer, for, Section 141 has a long and, interestingly enough, a tumultuous past. In this regard, worth noticing it is that the Code has, as a whole, undergone several amendments since its introduction in the year 1859, the principal amendments being in 1861, 1877, 1882, 1908, 1999 and 2002. 9. In the Code of 1859, there was no provision (as the one, which we have, under Section 141), laying down the procedure for trial of miscellaneous proceedings. It was, for the first time, in the Code of 1861 that such a provision was introduced. The said provisions came to be retained in Section 647 of the Code of 1877 and the Code of 1882 too. Section 647 of the Code of 1877 and 1882 read as follows: The procedure herein prescribed shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of Civil jurisdiction other than suits and appeals. 10. To put an end to the difference of views among the High Courts as to whether a 'proceeding', in execution, falls within Section 647, an Explanation was added to the Section 647 by the CPC (Amendment) Act of 1892, which read thus: "Explanation. This section does not apply to applications for execution of decrees, which are proceedings in suits." 11. Laying down as to what the term proceeding, appearing in Section 647, conveyed, the Privy Council, in Thakur Prasad v. Fakirullah reported in ILR (1895) All 106 (PC), held and observed: their Lordships think that the proceedings, spoken of in Section 647, include original matters in the nature of suits, such as, the proceedings in probate, guardianship and so forth and do not include executions. 12. Though Thakur Prasad (supra) settled the meaning of the word "proceedings" in Section 647(presently, Section 141) by laying down that 'proceedings' "include original matters in the nature of suits", it gave rise to a fresh spate of conflicting views from the various High Courts on the meaning of the words, "original matters" occurring in Thakur Prasad (supra). 12. Though Thakur Prasad (supra) settled the meaning of the word "proceedings" in Section 647(presently, Section 141) by laying down that 'proceedings' "include original matters in the nature of suits", it gave rise to a fresh spate of conflicting views from the various High Courts on the meaning of the words, "original matters" occurring in Thakur Prasad (supra). For instance, while there was one set of decisions taking the view that an application under Order IX, Rules 9 and 13, same as applications made under Order XXI, Rules 89, 90, 91, 97 and 100, are original matters, the other set of views was that these are not original proceedings, for, the applications, made under Order IX, Rules 9 and 13, trace their origin to suits and, similarly, the applications, made under Order XXI, Rules89, 90, 91, 97, 99 and 100, owe their birth to execution proceedings. The reason for the controversy, which so erupted, was that the word "original" was capable of, at least, two different shades of meanings. In its primary sense, the "original matters" would means those matters, which are capable of coming into existence on its own and not as derivative to some other suit or proceeding; for example, a proceeding for probate or guardianship comes into existence on its own and these proceedings do not owe their birth to any other proceeding. In contrast, a proceeding, under Order IX, Rules 9 and/or 13, same as proceedings under Order XXI, Rules 89, 90, 91, 97and/or 100, derive their birth from suits and execution proceedings respectively. These proceedings are, strictly speaking, not original in nature, rather, these proceedings are derivatives or off-shoots of either suits or execution proceedings. However, though derivatives or off-shoots, the proceedings, under Order IX, Rules 9 and 13, are nevertheless independent of the suit and take birth on dismissal of the suit or on passing of the ex parte decree. Similarly, the proceedings, under Order XXI, Rules89, 90, 91, 97 and 100, are original proceedings in a limited sense, for, these proceedings too are not really different stages of any execution proceeding, but are independent thereof. Similarly, the proceedings, under Order XXI, Rules89, 90, 91, 97 and 100, are original proceedings in a limited sense, for, these proceedings too are not really different stages of any execution proceeding, but are independent thereof. To put it differently, since these proceedings are not different stages of the suits or of the execution proceedings to which they owe their birth and are, in a limited sense, independent of the suit or the execution proceedings to which they owe their birth inasmuch as none of these proceedings rests on the pendency of the suit or the execution proceeding, these proceedings can be regarded as 'original matters', though in a limited sense. Such conflicting views from the High Courts, therefore, rested on the interpretation of the Privy Council's decision, in Thakur Prasad (supra), revolving around the meaning of the word "original" used therein. 13. When the controversy as to what can be considered as 'original matters' for the purpose of Section 141 was thus on, came the decision of a three Judges Bench in Dokku Bhushayya v. Katragadda Ramakrishnayya AIR 1962 SC 1886 . In this case, a person named Bapiah instituted a suit against Dokku Bhushayya, then a minor, his father and another person on a promissory note executed by the two last mentioned persons. Dokku Bhushayya was represented in the suit, by his maternal grand father as his guardian ad litem. A decree was passed in the suit. The decree-holder put the decree in execution and obtained an order for the sale of certain properties in which Dokku Bhushayya's interest was involved. The properties were sold in due course in favour of a clerk of the decree-holder. Thereafter, Dokku Bhushayya's guardian ad litem made an application, under Order XXI, Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for setting aside the sale. Later, however, the guardian ad litem came to a settlement with the decree-holder and the auction-purchaser. According to the terms of settlement, the guardian ad litem was to give up his contention regarding the invalidity of the sale and withdraw the petition made for setting aside of the sale and also give up possession of the properties sold to the auction purchaser and, in return thereof, the decree-holder and the auction-purchaser agreed to give up their claim for costs of the petition. In pursuance of this agreement, the petition was withdrawn and dismissed by order made on August 12, 1932. After attaining majority, Dokku Bhushayya filed a suit, in the year 1944, to set aside the order of August 12, 1932, and for a re-hearing of the petition, which was dismissed by the order passed on that date. The suit was decreed by the trial Court, but on appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed by the High Court at Madras and the suit was ordered to be dismissed. It was in these circumstances that Dokku Bhushayya came, in appeal, before the Supreme Court. The question, which, thus, came up before the Supreme Court was as to whether the order of August 12, 1932, was voidable under Order XXXII, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, at the instance of the appellant? Order XXXII, Rule 7, it may be noted, forbids the guardian from entering into any agreement or compromise, on behalf of a minor, with reference to a suit without leave of the Court and provides that any such agreement or compromise, entered into without the leave of the Court, shall be voidable against all parties other than minor. 14. Referring to, and relying upon, Thakur Prasad (supra), the Supreme Court, in Dokku Bhushayya (supra), observed and held, "this view has ever since been followed. We have already held that the application by the judgment-debtor to set aside the sale is a proceeding in execution and, therefore, Section 141 of the Code will not apply for two reasons, namely, (1) as execution proceedings were continuation of suit within the meaning of Order XXXII, Rule 7 of the Code, and as the Code provided specifically for suits. Section 141 could not be invoked, and (2) as we have held, an application by a judgment-debtor to set aside a sale, is a proceeding in execution, and, therefore, Section 141, which applies only to original proceedings, does not apply to such proceedings." 15. Section 141 could not be invoked, and (2) as we have held, an application by a judgment-debtor to set aside a sale, is a proceeding in execution, and, therefore, Section 141, which applies only to original proceedings, does not apply to such proceedings." 15. What, in substance, the Apex Court held, in Dokku Bhushayya AIR 1962 SC 1886 (supra), is that to be a 'proceeding', within the meaning of Section 141, the proceeding must not be a stage and/or continuation of another proceeding or suit since an execution proceeding (same as an appeal) is merely a continuation or extension of the suit, execution proceedings cannot be regarded as proceedings within the meaning of Section 141. In other words, as a stage in a suit, such as, an execution proceeding, or a proceeding, which rests on the pendency of the suit or the appeal, such as, an application for temporary injunction, not being an original and independent proceeding, is not a proceeding within the meaning of Section 141. 16. I may briefly pause here to point out that since an application for injunction, made under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 lies only during the pendency of the suit or appeal, it logically follows that though an application for temporary injunction, made under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, are registered as miscellaneous proceedings, such applications for temporary injunction, do not really give rise to 'proceedings' within the meaning of Section 141, for, application for temporary injunction can neither be treated as a 'proceeding' in the nature of an original suit nor can it be treated as a proceeding; which is independent of the existence of the suit or the appeal. No wonder, therefore, that in Shiv Shakti Co-op. Housing v. Swaraj Developers reported in (2003) 6 SCC 659 : AIR 2003 SC 2434 , while summarizing the effect of the recent amendments to the Code, the Apex Court observed thus: 32. A plain reading of Section 115 as it stands makes it clear that the stress is on the question whether the order in favour of the party applying for revision would have given finality to suit or other proceeding. If the answer is "yes" then the revision is maintainable. But on the contrary, if the answer is 'no' then the revision is not maintainable. If the answer is "yes" then the revision is maintainable. But on the contrary, if the answer is 'no' then the revision is not maintainable. Therefore, if the impugned order is interim in nature or does not finally decide the lis, the revision will not be maintainable. The legislative intent is crystal clear. Those orders, which are interim in nature, cannot be the subject-matter of revision under Section 115. 17. The decision rendered in Shiv Shakti Co-op. Housing (supra), makes it abundantly clear that granting or not granting of injunction does not finally dispose of the suit or the proceeding within the meaning of Section 141. Had an injunction application made, under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, been a 'proceeding' within the meaning of Section 141, granting of temporary injunction and/or refusal to grant temporary injunction could have been taken to have disposed of the 'proceeding' within the meaning of Section 141 and revision against such an order would have, then, been maintainable. However, since an application for temporary injunction, though registered as a miscellaneous proceedings, does not really give rise to a 'proceeding', which is either original or not dependent on the survival of the suit or the appeal, it cannot be regarded and is, in fact, not regarded as a proceeding within the meaning of Section 141. Thus, granting of temporary injunction or refusing to grant temporary injunction and/or affirming temporary injunction by an appellate Court does not end the 'proceeding'; hence, such a temporary order of injunction, in the light of the Shiv Shakti Co-op. Housing (supra), is not revisable. 18. What may, now, be noted is that in Munshi Ram v. Banwari Lal AIR 1962 SC 903 , a two Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held that it was competent for the Court, before which an award by an arbitrator is filed, to pass a decree in terms of a compromise reached by the parties to the arbitration award, though the compromise entered into by the parties may be at variance with the arbitral award. Referring to the decision in Munshi Ram (supra), a two Judges Bench of the Supreme Court observed and held, in Ram Chandra Agarwal v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1966 SC 1888 thus, "Similarly, recently this Court has held in Munshi Ram v. Banwari Lal AIR 1962 SC 903 , that under Section 41 of the Arbitration Act and also under Section 141, CPC, it was competent, for the Court, before which an award made by an arbitration tribunal is filed for passing a decree in terms thereof, to permit parties to compromise their dispute under Order XXIII, Rule 3, CPC. Though there is no discussion, this Court has acted upon the view that the expression "civil proceeding" in Section 141 is not necessarily confined to an original proceeding like a suit or an application for appointment of a guardian, etc., but it applies also to a proceeding which is not an original proceeding." 19. It may be carefully noted that the decision in Ram Chandra Agarwal (supra), was rendered without, of course, referring to Thakur Prasad (supra) and Dokku Bhushayya (supra). Be that as it may, what the Supreme Court held, in Ram Chandra Agarwal (supra), was that a proceeding, in order to fall within the meaning of the word 'proceeding' in Section 141, need not necessarily be an original proceeding. 20. What, however, needs to be borne in mind is that though in the light of the decision in Ram Chandra Agarwal AIR 1966 SC 1888 (supra), a 'proceeding', for the purpose of being a proceeding under Section 141, may not necessarily be an original proceeding, such as, an application for probate, yet a 'proceeding', in order to be a proceeding within the meaning of Section 141, has to be nevertheless a 'proceeding', which is not a stage of an already pending proceeding and is also not dependent on the existence or survival of another proceeding, A proceeding under Order IX of the Code falls within the meaning of the word 'proceeding' in this limited sense. No wonder, therefore, that the Explanation to Section 141 specifically makes a proceeding under Order IX of the Code a miscellaneous proceeding within the meaning of Section 141. These proceedings take birth from dismissal of the suit or from passing of an ex parte decree in the suit. No wonder, therefore, that the Explanation to Section 141 specifically makes a proceeding under Order IX of the Code a miscellaneous proceeding within the meaning of Section 141. These proceedings take birth from dismissal of the suit or from passing of an ex parte decree in the suit. Though born out of the suits, these proceeding are not stages of the suit, such as, execution proceeding. 21. Can, therefore, the decision in Ram Chandra Agarwal (supra), be read to mean that every 'proceeding', during the progress of a suit or an appeal, such as, the proceeding arising out of an application for temporary injunction, be treated as a proceeding within the meaning of Section 141? Would such a reading of the decision in Ram Chandra Agarwal (supra) not be an incorrect proposition of law? While answering this crucial question, what needs to be borne in mind is that the decision of the five Judges Bench, in Thakur Prasad (supra), has not been completely overruled and that the decision in Dokku Bhushayya AIR 1962 SC 1886 (supra), has been rendered by a Bench of three Judges, hence, the decision of two Judges Bench, rendered in Ram Chandra Agarwal AIR 1966 SC 1888 (supra), cannot be read to ran wholly contrary to the law laid down in Thakur Prasad (supra), and also Dokku Bhushayya (supra). The decision in Ram Chandra Agarwal (supra), therefore, needs to be read in its correct perspective. When so read, it becomes abundantly clear, as already indicated hereinabove, that a 'proceeding' under Section 141, though may not be original, has to be, nevertheless, a 'proceeding!; which is not really an extension of suit or appeal and though an offshoot from either a suit or an appeal, it has to be independent of the existence of the suit or the appeal in the sense that for its existence and survival, such a 'proceeding' must not depend on the survival of the suit or the appeal. Such a proceeding may, therefore, come into existence, when the suit or the appeal is not pending for disposal. Such a proceeding may, therefore, come into existence, when the suit or the appeal is not pending for disposal. Viewed thus, a 'proceeding', under Order IX,, Rule 4, for restoration of a suit, is a 'proceeding' within the meaning of Section 141, for, a 'proceeding' under Order IX, Rule 4, is, strictly speaking, not an extension of suit and though it may be regarded as an offshoot from a suit, it comes into existence, when the suit is not pending and it is capable of standing on its own. Similarly, an application made under Order IX, Rule 13seeking to get set aside an ex parte decree is a 'proceeding', within the meaning of the expression 'proceeding', occurring in Section 141. Considered in this light, a proceeding, which starts with the filing of an application for restoration or read-mission of appeal under Order XLI, Rule 19, is also a proceeding, for, it is not really an extension of suit or appeal, and though an off shoot therefrom, it is an independent proceeding capable of standing on its own. In short, thus, an application, under order XLI, Rule 19, gives rise to a 'proceeding' within the meaning of Section 141. 22. While considering the above aspect of the matter, what also needs to be borne in mind is that the Code stands divided, broadly speaking, into two parts. While the main body of the Code, which consists of Sections, creates jurisdiction for the civil courts, the Rules, framed under various Orders, indicate the procedure for exercise of such jurisdiction. In other words, the Rules, framed under various orders of the Code, lay down the procedure for exercise of the powers conferred on such Courts. Taking note of this prominent feature of the Code, observed the Supreme Court, in Vareed Jacob v. Sosamma Greevarghese reported in thus: the main feature of the Code is its division into two parts. The main body of the Code consists of Sections which create jurisdiction while the rules indicate the manner in which the jurisdiction has to be exercised. 23. Coupled with the above, it is also imperative to note that Section 141 makes applicable to a 'proceeding' (which can be described as a 'proceeding' under Section 141) only procedural part of the Code and not that part, which relates to jurisdiction of the Courts under the Code. 23. Coupled with the above, it is also imperative to note that Section 141 makes applicable to a 'proceeding' (which can be described as a 'proceeding' under Section 141) only procedural part of the Code and not that part, which relates to jurisdiction of the Courts under the Code. It was in this view of the matter that the Apex Court held, in Nawab Usman Ali Khan v. Sagar Mal AIR 1965 SC 1798 , that by virtue of Section 141 of the Code, only the procedure provided for suits in the Code and not the substantive right of the appellant thereunder can be applied to proceeding under the Arbitration Act. In short, only procedural part of the Code will apply to proceedings under Section 141 and not the substantive rights of the parties or the provisions creating jurisdiction of the Courts under the Code. 24. Bearing in mind as to what a 'proceeding' means and conveys, let me, now, turn to Order XXXIX, Rule 2A, which reads as under: 2-A. Consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction.- (1) In the case of disobedience of any injunction granted or other order made under Rule 1 or Rule 2 or breach of any of the terms on which the injunction was granted or the order made, of the Court granting in the injunction or making the order, or any Court to which the suit or proceeding is transferred, may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached, and may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding three months, unless in the meantime the Court directs his release. 25. From a bare reading of Rule 2A of Order XXXIX, it becomes clear that Order XXXIX, Rule 2Aembodies consequences of disobedience or breach of injunction order. It provides that the Court, which made the injunction order, or any Court, to which the suit or proceeding is transferred to, may order for attachment of the property of the person, who disobeys or commits breach of such order. The Court may also order for detention of such a person, in the civil prison, for a term not exceeding three months, unless in the meantime, the Court directs his release. The Court may also order for detention of such a person, in the civil prison, for a term not exceeding three months, unless in the meantime, the Court directs his release. The order, which is made under Rule XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, may be varied, discharged and even set aside by the Court in terms of the provisions contained in Order XXXIX, Rule 4, An order of injunction, made under Order XXXIX, Rules 1and 2, may be set aside even in appeal by taking resort to Order XLIII. Notwithstanding the fact that an order of injunction, passed under Order XXXIX, Rule 1 and 2 may be set aside, varied or discharged, the disobedience of any injunction order granted, or any other order, made under Rule 1and Rule 2 of Order XXXIX, remains punishable, as provided under Rule 2A of Order XXXIX. Thus, an enquiry under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A survives notwithstanding the fact as to whether the order of injunction, or any order, made under Rules 1 and 2 of Order XXXIX has or has not been set aside, discharged or varied. The reasons is very simple, and the reason is that so long as the order of injunction, or any other order, made under Rules 1 and 2 of Order XXXIX, remains in force, such an order cannot be disobeyed or else, the rule of law will be the casualty. Thus, even if an order of injunction is discharged, varied or set aside, disobedience of such an order will remain punishable in accordance with the provisions, as embodied in Order XXXIX, Rule 2A. Thus, an application under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A, does give rise to a 'proceeding' within the meaning of Section 141. 26. Bearing in mind the fact that Order XXXIX, Rule 2A gives rise to a 'proceeding', let me, now, turn to Section 141 of the Code, which is reproduced below: Miscellaneous proceedings.- The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction. 27. A careful perusal of the provisions, contained in Section 141, clearly reveals that the procedure, provided in the Code, in regard to suit shall be followed as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings, in any Court of civil jurisdiction. 27. A careful perusal of the provisions, contained in Section 141, clearly reveals that the procedure, provided in the Code, in regard to suit shall be followed as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings, in any Court of civil jurisdiction. Unless, therefore, it can be shown that the procedural provisions, contained in the Code, relating to suits, are not applicable mutatis mutandis to a 'proceeding' within the meaning of Section 141, the procedural provisions, contained in the Code, would be applicable to the 'proceeding' too under Section 141. Consequently, unless there is something in the provisions contained in Order XVII, Rule 1(1), which makes it impossible to apply these provisions to a 'proceeding' under Section 141, such as, the proceeding under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A, the provisions contained, as regards granting of time or adjournment in a suit, must be applied to a 'proceeding' too. 28. In the backdrop of what have been indicated above, I, now, turn to Rule 1(1) of Order XVII, which reads as under: 1. Court may grant time and adjourn hearing.- (1) The Court may, if sufficient cause is shown, at any stage of the suit grant time to the parties or to any of them, and may from time to time adjourn the hearing of the suit for reasons to be recorded in writing. Provided that no such adjournment shall be granted more than three times to a party during hearing of the suit. 29. From a cautious reading of the provisions, contained in Rule 1(1) of Order XVII, what becomes clear is that though the Courts have been given the power to grant adjournment, the Court, while granting adjournment, must assign reason, in writing, for such adjournment, which it may grant. It, therefore, logically follows that the adjournment, in a suit, cannot be mechanically granted and no adjournment shall be granted more than three times unless exceptional circumstances are made out. There is nothing in the Code, nor could anything be submitted, on behalf of the defendant-petitioner, to show that the provisions for adjournment, contained in Order XVII, would not be applicable to a proceeding within the meaning of Section 141. There is nothing in the Code, nor could anything be submitted, on behalf of the defendant-petitioner, to show that the provisions for adjournment, contained in Order XVII, would not be applicable to a proceeding within the meaning of Section 141. Situated thus, it becomes clear that the principles and parameters, governing adjournment of suits, shall be applicable to even a 'proceeding' within the meaning of Section 141, for, there is no reason as to why the provisions of Order XVII, shall not apply to, or, shall be treated as inapplicable to, a 'proceeding' within the meaning of Section 141 of the Code. 30. Turning, now, to the merit of the revision, it needs to be noted that on 3-12-2008, the petitioner, as defendant, had sought for adjournment of the proceeding, initiated under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A, on the ground that his counsel was sick; whereas in the petition, which he filed under Section 151 and which led to the passing of the impugned order, on 23-6-2009, the reason, assigned by the petitioner for not being able to file written objection, on 3-12-2008, was that a wrong entry had been made in the diary of the petitioner's counsel as regards the next date of the case. Thus, two contradictory and inconsistent reasons had been assigned by the petitioner for his inability to file written objection on 3-12-2008. While the reason, assigned by the petitioner, for seeking adjournment, on 3-12-2008, was that his counsel was sick, the petitioner's subsequent application, assigning the reason for his inability to file written objection, on 3-12-2008, was that a wrong entry had been made in the diary of his counsel as regards the next date of the case. The petition, filed on 3-12-2008, was verified by the petitioner and so was the petition filed under Section151 of the Code. This apart, it is also curious to note that the petitioner has not even mentioned, in his application subsequently made under Section 151 of the Code, that the petitioner had earlier made a mistake in mentioning, in his petition filed on 3-12-2008, that his counsel was sick. Situated thus, it becomes clear that the learned Court below was not incorrect in rejecting the petition filed under Section 151 of the Code. This Court, therefore, sees no reason to interfere with the impugned order. 31. Situated thus, it becomes clear that the learned Court below was not incorrect in rejecting the petition filed under Section 151 of the Code. This Court, therefore, sees no reason to interfere with the impugned order. 31. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, this revision cannot be entertained. The revision, therefore, fails and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed. Petition dismissed