JUDGMENT HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MOHIT S. SHAH These appeals are directed against the judgment and decree dated 29.10.2005 passed by the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad in Civil Suit No.859 of 1996 and Civil Suit No.1506 of 1993 filed by the in-laws and parents of Smt. Ushaben Bhagwatprasad Rao, who died at the age of 34 years in an air crash near the Ahmedabad airport on 19.10.1988 involving the aircraft of the Indian Airlines Corporation in which the deceased was travelling as a passenger along with her husband Bhagwatprasad Rao and two minor sons Jaykrishna aged 7 years and Jeet aged 6 years. While parents of Bhagwatprasad Rao filed four separate suits being Civil Suit No.858 to 861 of 1996 for claiming compensation as the heirs and dependents of each of the above-named four family members, the parents of Ushaben filed Civil Suit No.1506 of 1993 claiming compensation on account of the death of Ushaben and her two minor sons. 2. Section 5 of the Carriage by Air Act, 1972 under which the above-numbered proceedings were filed, provides that the rules contained in the First Schedule and in the Second Schedule of the Act determine the liability of the air carrier in respect of the death of a passenger and that the liability shall be enforceable for the benefit of such of the members of the passenger's family as sustained damage by reason of his death. As per the definition of ?member of a family? given in the Explanation of Section 5(2), the expression includes spouse, parent, child and grand-child. Sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) of Section 5 read as under :- (3) An action to enforce the liability may be brought by the personal representative of the passenger or by any person for whose benefit the liability is under sub-section (2) enforceable, but only one action shall be brought in India in respect of the death of any passenger, and every such action by whomsoever brought shall be for the benefit of all such persons so entitled as aforesaid as either are domiciled in India or not being domiciled there express a desire to take the benefit of the action. (4) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (5), the amount recovered in any such action after deducting any costs not recovered from the defendant, shall be divided between the persons entitled in such proportion as the Court may direct. (4) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (5), the amount recovered in any such action after deducting any costs not recovered from the defendant, shall be divided between the persons entitled in such proportion as the Court may direct. (5) The Court before which any such action is brought may, at any stage of the proceedings make any such order as appears to the Court to be just and equitable in view of the provisions of the First Schedule or of the Second Schedule, as the case may be, limiting the liability of a carrier and not of any proceedings which have been or are likely to be commenced outside India in respect of the death of the passenger in question.” (emphasis supplied) 3. In view of the above provisions, the in-laws of Ushaben filed application Exh.82 for joining them as parties in Civil Suit No.1506 of 1993 and also requesting that the plaintiffs in Civil Suit No.1506 of 1993 (parents of Smt. Ushaben) may also be joined as parties in Civil Suit Nos.858 to 861 of 1996. The City Civil Court, Ahmedabad granted the said application which order was challenged by the parents of Smt. Ushaben in Special Civil Application No.11847 of 2002. The said petition was disposed of by order dated 11.10.2004 and with the consent of the parties, this Court directed that all the five civil suits shall be consolidated and that before disbursing any amount of compensation, the Court shall hear the parents as well as in-laws of Smt. Ushaben. 4. In view of the above provisions of Section 5(3), we have decided all the appeals arising from the claim in respect of each of the four family members by a separate judgment. 4.1 The parents of Bhagwatprasad Rao claimed compensation of Rs.78.10 lakhs against which the trial Court awarded compensation of Rs.21 lakhs with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. This Court by judgment dated 14.10.2009 in First Appeal No.1576 of 2007 and connected appeals arising from Civil Suit No.858 of 1996 has awarded compensation of Rs.19,72,000/- with interest at 9% per annum. 4.2 As far as minor Jaykrishna is concerned, for his death, the trial Court awarded compensation of Rs.12.60 lakhs and apportioned the compensation in the ratio of 50 : 50 in favour of paternal grand-parents and maternal grand-parents respectively. 4.2 As far as minor Jaykrishna is concerned, for his death, the trial Court awarded compensation of Rs.12.60 lakhs and apportioned the compensation in the ratio of 50 : 50 in favour of paternal grand-parents and maternal grand-parents respectively. We are rendering separate judgment today in First Appeal No. 135 of 2009 and connected appeals and awarding compensation of Rs.5,00,000/-in the same ratio of 50 : 50 in favour of two sets of grand-parents. 4.3 As far as minor Jeet is concerned, for his death, the trial Court awarded compensation of Rs.12.60 lakhs and apportioned the compensation in the ratio of 50 : 50 in favour of paternal grand-parents and maternal grand-parents respectively. We are rendering a separate judgment today in First Appeal No. 136 of 2009 and connected appeals awarding compensation of Rs.4,00,000/-in the same ratio of 50 : 50 in favour of two sets of grand-parents. 5. The present appeals arise from Civil Suit No.858 of 1996 filed by in-laws of Smt. Ushaben claiming compensation for death of Smt. Ushaben and also part of Civil Suit No.1506 of 1993 in which the parents of Smt. Ushaben had claimed compensation for her death. The trial Court awarded compensation of Rs.10,80,000/-along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of suit till realization. The trial Court held that only the parents of Smt. Ushaben are entitled to get the said amount of compensation and not her in-laws as they are not covered by the definition of the expression “member of a family” as set out in Explanation to sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Carriage by Air Act. In all cases, the trial Court determined the liability of the Indian Airlines and Airport Authority of India to pay the compensation in the ratio of 70 : 30 respectively. First Appeal No.3591 of 2006 is filed by the parents of Smt. Ushaben (plaintiffs of Civil Suit No.1506 of 1993), First Appeal No.1574 of 2007 is filed by the Indian Airlines Corporation and First Appeal No.1319 of 2009 is filed by the Airport Authority of India. 6. In the appeals filed by the Airport Authority, at the time of admission of the appeals, interim stay against execution of the decrees was granted upon condition of depositing the amounts for which the trial Court had fixed its liability. The condition was complied with. 7. 6. In the appeals filed by the Airport Authority, at the time of admission of the appeals, interim stay against execution of the decrees was granted upon condition of depositing the amounts for which the trial Court had fixed its liability. The condition was complied with. 7. As far as the Indian Airlines is concerned, the stand of the Airlines is that under Rules 17 and 22 of the Second Schedule to the Carriage by Air Act, 1972 read with the notification dated 5.7.1980 issued by the Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation, Government of India under Section 8(2) of the said Act its liability for damage sustained in the event of death of or injury to a passenger is limited to a sum of Rs.2 lakhs for passenger 12 years and above and Rs.1 lakh for passenger below 12 years of age. According to the Indian Airlines, in order to obtain any higher compensation the plaintiffs have to prove under Rule 25 of the said Schedule that the damage resulted from an act or omission of the Airline done recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result, so as to render the limit of liability (Rs.2 lakhs/Rs.1 lakh) inapplicable. In view of this stand, the Indian Airlines paid a sum of Rs.2 lakhs for the death of each passenger above the age of 12 years and Rs.1 lakh for the death of each passenger upto the age of 12 years. Most of the plaintiffs accepted the amount under protest and without prejudice to their claim for higher amounts. After the decrees of the trial Court rejecting the defence of the Airlines, the Indian Airlines prayed for interim stay during pendency of the appeals. This Court granted interim stay with a condition to deposit the decretal amounts. The interlocutory orders came to be challenged by the Indian Airlines before the Apex Court. The Apex Court granted unconditional stay and requested this Court to hear the appeals expeditiously. Hence, all the appeals were taken up for final hearing. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION 8. In each of the appeals the following broad issues arose for our consideration : I. Question of negligence and burden of proof -as also applicability of Rule 25 of Second Schedule to Carriage by Air Act, 1972. II. Hence, all the appeals were taken up for final hearing. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION 8. In each of the appeals the following broad issues arose for our consideration : I. Question of negligence and burden of proof -as also applicability of Rule 25 of Second Schedule to Carriage by Air Act, 1972. II. Joint and several liability or not : Whether the concerned defendants are liable to pay the amount of compensation with interest and costs to the plaintiffs under the principle of joint and several liability or whether each of the concerned defendants is liable to pay only such percentage of compensation as is proportionate to the degree of its negligence as may be determined by this Court ? III. Quantum of compensation : What amount of compensation are the plaintiffs entitled to get? IV. Rate of interest : What rate of interest the plaintiffs are entitled to get ? V. Costs : Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get costs of the suit as well as the costs of the appeals from the concerned defendant/s held liable to pay the compensation ? 9. Except the issue of quantum of compensation, all the other issues are the same in almost all the appeals/cross objections and, therefore, we have discussed all those issues in our judgment rendered on 14.10.2009 in First Appeal Nos. 1346 and 1822 of 2004 with First Appeal No. 91 of 2005 arising from Civil Suit No. 5510 of 1992. In order not to burden the judgments in the other appeals, we are not repeating the discussion on those issues. The present judgment is, therefore, confined to the discussion and findings on the issue of quantum of compensation payable by the concerned defendants to the plaintiffs in the suit in question. However, we may only briefly refer to our findings on the other issues for the sake of convenience so as to mould the reliefs accordingly while disposing of these appeals. 10. In the judgment rendered on 14.10.2009 in First Appeal No. 1346 of 2004 and two connected appeals arising from Civil Suit No. 5510 of 1992, we have held that the accident took place on account of reckless acts and omissions on the part of the Indian Airlines and its servants with knowledge that damage would probably result and also negligence on the part of the Airport Authority of India and its employees. We have further held that the Indian Airlines and the Airport Authority of India are jointly and severally liable to pay the plaintiffs amounts of compensation with interest and costs as aforesaid. We have also held, for the reasons indicated in the said judgment, that the plaintiffs are entitled to get interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of filing the suit till the date of payment/deposit, instead of interest awarded by the trial Court at the rate of 6% per annum. We have also held that the plaintiffs are entitled to get from the above defendants costs of the suit. OUR FINDINGS IN LEAD APPEAL ? FA No. 1346 OF 2004 PLAINTIFFS' CASE ON QUANTUM 11. The case of the parents of Smt. Ushaben in Civil Suit No.1506 of 1993 is that Smt. Ushaben, her husband and two minor sons were residing in Zambia since 1985 because Bhagwatprasad Rao (husband of Ushaben) was employed by a mining company in Kitwa, Zambia. The entire family of four persons was on a tour to India with air tickets from Andola ? Lusaka -Nairobi ? Bombay ? Ahmedabad and back; that on their way to India, Ushaben and members of her family had stayed at her parental home in Nairobi i.e. at the plaintiffs' place for a few days and they flew from Nairobi to Bombay and were flying to Ahmedabad in the ill-fated air craft on 19.10.1988. 11.1 It was the plaintiffs' case that Ushaben and her three family members were travelling as international passengers and that under Rule 25 of the Second Schedule to the Act, the plaintiffs were entitled to get compensation for the loss of three lives (Ushaben and her two minor sons) at the minimum rate of Rs.50 lakhs per life under Rule 25 of the Second Schedule to the Act aggregating to Rs.1.50 crores or alternatively under Rule 22(1) of the Second Schedule to the Act, the plaintiffs were entitled to get compensation for loss of the above three lives at the rate of 2,50,000 gold francs per life equivalent to Rs.34,03,200/-per life aggregating to Rs.1,02,09,600/-. 11.2 The above valuation was arrived at as per the following formula :- Under Rule 22(5) of the Rules in the Second Schedule to the Act, damages offered in francs are deemed to consist of 65.5 miligrammes of gold each of .90 millesimal fineness. 11.2 The above valuation was arrived at as per the following formula :- Under Rule 22(5) of the Rules in the Second Schedule to the Act, damages offered in francs are deemed to consist of 65.5 miligrammes of gold each of .90 millesimal fineness. In other words, 2,50,000 francs payable for loss of life are equal to (65.5/1000 X 9/10 X 2,50,000 = 14,737.5) grammes of fine gold, the value whereof in Indian currency has to be worked out in accordance with the gold value on the date of the judgment. The plaintiffs i.e. parents of Smt. Ushaben also pleaded that on the date of filing of the suit, the conversion rate of an ounce consisting of 31.1 grams of pure gold was 404.60 American Dollars and the exchange rate of a Dollar was Rs.17.75. Hence compensation under the Act payable for each passenger's death if adjudicated on that day would be ? (404.60 X 17.75 X 14737.5 -:- 31.1 =Rs.34,03,200 or Rs.13.61 per gold franc I.e. Rs.2,50,000 X Rs.13.61 = Rs.34,03,200 for death of each of the three passengers aggregating to Rs.1,02,09,600/-. 11.3 The plaintiffs also prayed for compensation for three-fourth of registered baggage weighing 70 kgs. at 250 gold francs per kg. under Rule 22(2) of the Second Schedule to the Act = 13.125 X 13.61 = Rs.1,78,631/-. The plaintiffs also prayed for compensation for loss of hand baggage at 5000 gold francs per passenger for three passengers under Rule 22(3) of the Second Schedule at Rs.15000 X 13.61 = Rs.2,04,150/-. The plaintiffs also prayed for compensation of Rs.90,877/- for incidental costs and expenses. 11.4 The plaintiffs thus made total claim of Rs.1.50 crores under Rule 25 or in the alternative total claim of Rs.1,06,83,000/- under Rule 22. 11.5 It is pertinent to note that the plaintiffs had also stated in para 21 of their plaint as under :- “21. All the records and documents and information including the air tickets, passports, visas and baggages of the victims are in the possession of the defendant No.1 (the Indian Airlines) and the plaintiffs are at a loss to make detailed averments and actual claims with supporting data. All the records and documents and information including the air tickets, passports, visas and baggages of the victims are in the possession of the defendant No.1 (the Indian Airlines) and the plaintiffs are at a loss to make detailed averments and actual claims with supporting data. The plaintiffs, therefore, crave leave under O.6 R.17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to add to, alter or amend the plaint when requisite information is made available by the defendant No.1.” FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT 12.1 The trial Court held that the tickets were not brought on record and there was no other evidence to point out the exact nature and character of the journey. Therefore, the moment they arrived at Bombay, their international journey from Zambia to Bombay came to an end and thereafter flying from Bombay to Ahmedabad was within India and, therefore, a domestic journey. The trial Court also noted that the parents of Bhagwatprasad Rao had filed Civil Suit Nos.858 to 861 of 1996 wherein no claim was made about international carriage by air. Where a journey is within territory of a single high contracting party to the Warsaw Convention or to the Hague Protocol, it cannot be considered as international carriage for the purposes of rules in Schedule I and Schedule II to the Act. The trial Court also observed that the air tickets were not placed on record and, therefore, there was no presumption that it was international carriage by air. 12.2 The trial Court held that though her parents had claimed that Ushaben had passed examination for lawyer's profession in Zambia, the plaintiffs had not produced any evidence on record with regard to income of deceased Ushaben. Hence her income as a house-wife was considered. The trial Court assessed her income at Rs.15,000/- out of which she would contribute Rs.5,000/-per month to her parents i.e. to Rs.60,000/- per annum. Looking to her age on the date of the accident (34 years), multiplier of 17 was adopted and on that basis the compensation for loss of dependency benefit was computed at Rs.10,20,000/-. The trial Court awarded amounts under various heads as under :-Rs.10,20,000/- for loss of dependency benefit Rs. 50,000/- for pain, shock and suffering undergone by the parents of Ushaben Rs. The trial Court awarded amounts under various heads as under :-Rs.10,20,000/- for loss of dependency benefit Rs. 50,000/- for pain, shock and suffering undergone by the parents of Ushaben Rs. 10,000/- for loss of expectation of life Rs.10,80,000/- 12.3 The trial Court thus considered the question of compensation on the basis of Rule 25 and determined the amount of compensation as under :- Rs.10,80,000/- compensation for death of Ushaben Rs.12,60,000/- compensation for death of minor Jaykrishna Rs.12,60,000/- compensation for death of minor Jeet The trial Court awarded interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the above amounts of compensation. While compensation for death of Ushaben was entirely awarded to her parents (plaintiffs of Civil Suit No.1506 of 1993) the compensation for death of two minor sons was apportioned in favour of the parents of their mother Ushaben and parents of their father Bhagwatprasad Rao in the ratio of 50 : 50. RIVAL SUBMISSIONS 13. The learned counsel for the Indian Airlines and the learned counsel for the Airport Authority have vehemently challenged the quantum of compensation awarded in respect of death of Ushaben and two minor sons. It is submitted that the trial Court has erred in assessing the income of Ushaben at Rs.15,000/- per month without any documentary evidence on record. It is also submitted that the trial Court also erred in adopting multiplier of 17 years. 14. On the other hand, Mr SN Shelat, learned counsel for the parents of Ushaben has submitted that the trial Court erred in holding that Ushaben and her minor sons and husband were traveling as domestic passengers. It is submitted that the plaintiffs' case that Ushaben and her family members were travelling as international passengers from Andola ? Lusaka ? Nairobi ? Bombay ? Ahmedabad was not disputed by the respondents in their written statement at Exh.16. As a matter of fact in paragraph 4 of the written statement, the Airlines had admitted as under :- “In the present case, since the deceased commenced their journey from Zambia, the provisions of Hague Protocol and, therefore, Schedule II would of the Act would apply.” Moreover in reply to para 7 of the plaint also the Airlines had admitted that the statements made by the plaintiffs in para 7 of the plaint “appear to be correct”. 14.1 Mr Shelat vehemently submitted that when all the four passengers of the same family died in the air crash and the plaintiffs were not in a position to produce any air tickets of the deceased passengers, the trial Court could not have rejected the plaintiffs' case about the deceased passengers being international passengers merely on the ground that the plaintiffs were not able to produce the air tickets. it is submitted that the plaintiffs' case that the deceased were travelling as international passengers was not disputed by the Airlines and, therefore, there was otherwise also no need to produce any documentary evidence in support of their case. 15. Mr Shelat has further submitted that moment an international passenger dies in an air crash, his/her heirs are entitled to get compensation of at least 2,50,000/- gold francs without proof of any negligence on the part of airlines or any other person and that the amounts can be higher if the plaintiffs prove recklessness on the part of the Airlines and or its agents and servants with knowledge that damage would probably result. 16. It is submitted that the heirs of a person dying in an accident in the course of international carriage by air will suffer tremendous hardship if they are required to prove actual loss to the plaintiffs. Hence what is explicit in Rule 22(1) as applicable to domestic flights in India should be read as implicit in Rule 22(1) under the Hague Protocol. DISCUSSION 17. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we find considerable substance in the submission of Mr Shelat for the plaintiffs in Civil Suit No.1506 of 1993 i.e. parents of Ushaben that Ushaben, Bhagwatprasad Rao and two minor sons were travelling as international passengers from Zambia to Mumbai and then to Ahmedabad. Since all the four passengers died in the air crash and the plaintiffs were not able to produce the air tickets, the trial Court could not have rejected the plaintiffs case that the deceased were travelling as international passengers merely on the ground that the air tickets were not produced. Since all the four passengers died in the air crash and the plaintiffs were not able to produce the air tickets, the trial Court could not have rejected the plaintiffs case that the deceased were travelling as international passengers merely on the ground that the air tickets were not produced. The specific case in the earlier part of para 5 of the plaint that the four persons were on a tour to India with air tickets from Andola - Lusaka - Nairobi - Bombay - Ahmedabad was not only not disputed, but it was specifically admitted in paragraph 10 of the written statement that the statements made in earlier part of para 5 of the plaint appear to be correct. In para 4 of the written statement, it was stated as under :- “in the present case, since the deceased commenced their journey from Zambia the provisions of Hague Protocal and, therefore, Schedule II of the Act would apply”. It is thus clear that the Indian Airlines had not controverted the plaintiffs' case that the deceased passengers were travelling from Zambia to Bombay and Ahmedabad as international passengers. The father of Ushaben specifically stated in his oral deposition at Exh.33 that the deceased and her family members had travelled from Kitwe to Lusaka and from there they had gone to the place of the witness at Nairobi. He had seen the tickets of the deceased passengers from which he had noticed that they had tickets for the continuous journey from Nairobi - Bombay - Ahmedabad. 18. Sub-rules (3) and 4) of Rule 1 in the Second Schedule to the Carriage by Air Act, 1972 defines the expression “international carriage” as under :- “(3) For the purposes of these rules, the expression “international carriage” means any carriage in which, according to the agreement between the parties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in the carriage or a transhipment, are situated either within the territories of two High Contracting Parties or within the territory of a single High Contracting Party if there is an agreed stopping place within the territory of another State, even if that State is not a High Contracting Party. Carriage between two points within the territory of a single High Contracting Party without an agreed stopping place within the territory of another State is not international carriage for the purposes of these rules. (4) Carriage to be performed by several successive air carriers is deemed, for the purposes of these rules, to be one undivided carriage if it has been regarded by the parties as a single operation, whether it had been agreed upon under the form of a single contract or of a series of contracts is to be performed entirely within the territory of the same State.” 19. In view of the above statutory definition of “international carriage”, it is clear that where the place of departure and the place of destination are situate within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, it is international travel, whether or not there be a break in the carriage. Since the place of departure was Nairobi and the place of destination was Ahmedabad with a break in the carriage at Bombay, the journey in question will have to be considered as international carriage. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 1 also makes it clear that carriage to be performed by several successive air carriers is deemed to be one undivided carriage as it is contracted by the parties as a single operation, whether it had been agreed upon under the form of a single contract or series of contracts and it does not lose its international character merely because the contract is to be performed entirely within the territory of the same State. We, therefore, hold that the four passengers were travelling as international passengers and that they cannot be treated as travelling as domestic passengers merely because the flight in question was from Bombay to Ahmedabad. The finding of the trial Court that the international journey came to an end at Bombay cannot be accepted. It was an international journey from Zambia to Bombay and to Ahmedabad. The journey from Bombay to Ahmedabad was a part of international carriage by air. 20. The next question which arises for consideration is whether 2,50,000 francs is maximum, minimum or fixed amount of compensation to be awarded under Rule 22 (1). Mr Shelat, learned counsel for the plaintiffs has made the following submissions in support of the plaintiffs' case that 2,50,000 francs is the minimum compensation payable under Rule 22. 20. The next question which arises for consideration is whether 2,50,000 francs is maximum, minimum or fixed amount of compensation to be awarded under Rule 22 (1). Mr Shelat, learned counsel for the plaintiffs has made the following submissions in support of the plaintiffs' case that 2,50,000 francs is the minimum compensation payable under Rule 22. (i) What is intended by Rule 22 is to fix minimum in case of death subject to higher limit under special contract. (ii) Though the language of the Rule refers to limit the sum of 2,50,000 francs the intendment of the Act is to relieve the carrier and the deceased heirs from making different persons claiming damages at varied rates, depending upon the earning capacity, longevity or other relevant considerations under the general law. In a given case, where a person is travelling abroad, the accident may take place in a country or place where he has no relatives or friends. If the heirs have to file the suit in such a foreign country and the widow and minor children of the deceased have to go to that other country for lodging the suit and leading evidence, such dependents may find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to go to another country, engage the services of a lawyer and file a suit there. Funds, time and energy which the dependents may be required to invest may prove to be a big deterrent and, therefore, the Court should place such an interpretation on Rule 22(1) that the amount stipulated therein must be treated as a fixed amount of 2,50,000 francs. (iii) The duty imposed by the Statute is for benefit and protection of international passengers. The same cannot be evaded in view of the further provisions of Rule 33 which nullifies any contract relieving the carrier of its liability. (iv) Under Rule 22(3) the object of which the passenger takes charge himself the carrier is liable to 5000 francs per passenger. No further damage is required to be proved. (v) Rule 25 lifts the ban, if it is proved that damage resulting from an act is done with intent to cause damage or the recklessly done. (vi) The Government of India has understood the effect of Rule 22 to be minimum liability by application of Carriage by Air Act to non-international passenger. (v) Rule 25 lifts the ban, if it is proved that damage resulting from an act is done with intent to cause damage or the recklessly done. (vi) The Government of India has understood the effect of Rule 22 to be minimum liability by application of Carriage by Air Act to non-international passenger. (vii) It appears that language in Rule 22(1) is not happily worded as it has been bodily engrafted from Warsaw convention. 21. Before expressing any opinion on the above controversy, we may note that in our judgment dated 14.10.2009 in lead appeal No. 1346 of 2004, we have already held that the air crash took place on account of composite negligence on account of the Indian Airlines and its employees and on account of the Airport Authority and its employees and that the accident resulted from the acts/omissions of the Indian Airlines, their servants, which were done recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result and that the acts / omissions of the pilots were done when they were acting within the scope of their employment. In view of this finding, the plaintiffs would be entitled to get compensation of more than 2,50,000 francs per passenger, if evidence about damage suffered by the plaintiffs is proved. However, Mr Shelat, learned counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that without being required to prove any such damage, the plaintiffs are entitled to get compensation at the rate of 2,50,000 francs per passenger as provided under Rule 22(1) of Second Schedule to the Carriage by Air Act, 1972. 22. We may, at this stage, quote Rule 17, which reads as under (whether in Schedule I, Schedule II or as applicable to domestic flights in India) :- “17. 22. We may, at this stage, quote Rule 17, which reads as under (whether in Schedule I, Schedule II or as applicable to domestic flights in India) :- “17. The carrier is liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.” Now the difference in the language of Rule 22(1) in the Second Schedule to the Act based on the Hague Protocol on the one hand and the provisions of Rule 22 (1) as per the Government of India SO 1855 dated 5.7.1980 is required to be noticed : Having regard to difference of language employed in the two Rules, it is clear that while Schedule II as applicable to the domestic carriage provides for the fixed amount of compensation of Rs.2 lakhs under Rule 22 (1) (as applicable on the date of the accident in question) unlike Rule 22(1) applicable to international carriage where the compensation is limited to 2,50,000 francs. Accordingly, the sum of 2,50,000 francs is maximum and not minimum or fixed liability amount under Rule 22(1). 23. The same view has been taken in Kandimallan Bharathi Devi vs. G.I. Corpn. of India, AIR 1988 AP 361 , where Justice K Rama Swamy speaking for the Andhra Pradesh High Court (as His Lordship then was) held as under :- “It is thus clear that the Act and the Rules are self-contained uniform Code as part of International Code for civil aviation; jurisdiction has been conferred on Courts seized of the case; statutory maximum liability has been prescribed. Circumstances under which the maximum liability operates or inoperates are enumerated; liquidated damages to a maximum of 2,50,000 francs or its equivalent currency has been provided for.” (emphasis supplied) So also a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Smt. Indu Toshniwal since deceased by LRs v. Union of India, 2000 ACC 80 (para 7) speaking through Hon'ble Mr Justice S. Rajendra Babu (as His Lordship then was) has held that the scheme of Warsaw Convention provided the upper limit of liability, whereas while applying it to domestic carriage in India, the liability has been converted into fixed amount. 24. 24. The practical difficulties pointed out by Mr Shelat, learned counsel for the plaintiffs are genuine and the concern voiced by him certainly needs to be addressed. But the language of Rule 22(1) in Schedule II as per the Hague Protocol, as already discussed above, makes it difficult for the Court hold that the Rule makes the airlines liable to pay the heirs and dependents of the deceased the sum of 2,50,000 francs without any proof of loss. We can appreciate the plight of the dependents of a person on an international flight who loses life in in an accident in a country other than his home country. The dependents of such deceased passenger would have to go to the country where the accident took place and the investment of funds, time and energy may work as a deterrent. It is precisely for this reason that in Rule 22(1) in Second Schedule as applied to domestic carriage by air in India, the liability of the carrier for death or permanent disablement of a passenger was specifically quantified at Rs.2 lakhs as per Government notification dated 5.7.1980, which has subsequently been revised to Rs.7.5 lakhs for passenger aged 12 years and above, as per Government notification dated 12.1.1998. The Government of India may, therefore, seriously consider taking up the matter with the appropriate organization like the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). It would be a policy decision to consider whether the amount of compensation for death or total disablement of a passenger should be fixed amount like 2,50,000 francs or whether there could be a compensation band e.g. minimum compensation of 1,25,000 francs and maximum compensation of 2,50,000 francs under Rule 22(1), that is without proving that the death resulted because of recklessness on the part of the carrier or its employees. Having regard to the fact that the sum of 1,25,000 francs was stipulated under the Warsaw Convention in the year 1929 and the sum of 2,50,000 francs was stipulated in the Hague Protocol in the year 1955, the amounts may also require revision. However, it will be for the concerned bodies/authorities to bestow serious consideration on these issues. 25. Having regard to the fact that the sum of 1,25,000 francs was stipulated under the Warsaw Convention in the year 1929 and the sum of 2,50,000 francs was stipulated in the Hague Protocol in the year 1955, the amounts may also require revision. However, it will be for the concerned bodies/authorities to bestow serious consideration on these issues. 25. Since we have already held in our judgment dated 14.10.2009 that the accident in question was caused by the reckless acts and omissions on part of the Indian Airlines and its pilots as well as negligence on the part of the Airport Authority and its employees, the plaintiffs are entitled to get compensation without any limit of 2,50,000 francs, but the plaintiffs will have to prove the loss suffered by them and they cannot get compensation of 2,50,000 francs without proof of damage. They can certainly get fixed compensation of Rs.2 lakhs for death of passenger aged 12 years and above and Rs.1 lakh for death of younger passenger, if they want to claim compensation under Rule 22 as applicable to domestic carriage. 26. By separate judgments rendered today, we have determined compensation payable for death of minor Jaykrishna aged 7 years and for minor Jeet aged 6 years at Rs. 5 lakhs and Rs.4 lakhs respectively. In the present case, we are only dealing with the question of quantum of compensation payable for the death of Ushaben daughter of plaintiffs in Civil Suit No.1506 of 1993. 27. As already indicated earlier, the trial Court assessed the compensation on the basis that the deceased was a house-wife but she was aged 34 years and the deceased possessed qualification of B.A. LL.B. and was capable of earning Rs.3,000/-per month. It is true that the plaintiffs were not in a position to produce any documentary evidence in support of this claim, but considering the fact that the deceased was possessing the qualification of B.A. LL.B. and was aged only 34 years on the date of the accident and had settled in Zambia along with her husband, the deceased would have been in a position to secure some employment in not too distant a future because the sons were already aged 7 and 6 years. Taking an overall view of the matter, we are not inclined to disturb the assessment of future income made by the trial court at Rs.15000 per month and, therefore, dependency benefit of Rs.5,000/- p.m. would have been available to the plaintiffs i.e. parents of the deceased, that is, Rs.60,000/- p.a.. 28. Coming to the question of multiplier, looking to the age of the deceased (34 years), the trial Court has adopted multiplier of 17 years. However, we find considerable substance in the submission made by the learned counsel for the defendants that since the plaintiffs are parents of the deceased, the age of the plaintiffs would be required to be considered. The father of the deceased was aged 56 years and mother of the deceased was aged 52 years on the date of the accident. Hence, the multiplier will have to be adopted on the basis of the age of the mother 52 years. In Sarla Verma's case 2009 (6) SCC 121 after considering leading decisions on the subject, the Apex Court has prepared a table for determining the multiplier and has laid down the following principles in para 42 of the judgment :- “42. We therefore hold that the multiplier to be used should be as mentioned in Column (4) of the table above (prepared by applying Susamma Thomas, Trilok Chandra and Charlie), which starts with an operative multiplier of 18 (for the age groups of 15 to 20 and 21 to 25 years), reduced by one unit for every five years, that is M-17 for 26 to 30 years, M-16 for 31 to 35 years, M-15 for 36 to 40 years, M-14 for 41 to 45 years, and M-13 for 46 to 50 years, then reduced by two units for every five years, that is, M-11 for 51 to 55 years, M-9 for 56 to 60 years, M-7 for 61 to 65 years and M-5 for 66 to 70 years.” [emphasis supplied] On the basis of the above decision, the multiplier of 11 years will have to be adopted. Hence compensation for loss of dependency benefit works out to Rs.60,000 X 11 = Rs.6,60,000/-. 29. Hence compensation for loss of dependency benefit works out to Rs.60,000 X 11 = Rs.6,60,000/-. 29. As regards compensation under the conventional head of loss to the estate, the deceased has to be treated as having survived at least for a few moments after the accident and, therefore, the compensation for loss of expectation of life and for the pain, shock and suffering undergone by the deceased immediately upon the accident has also to be awarded and we quantify the same at Rs.50,000/-. 30. We find that in the plaint, the plaintiffs had claimed various amounts as compensation for loss of baggage, etc. However, there is nothing in the evidence of Mr Navnitlal Barot (plaintiff No. 1 ? father of Ushaben) about the loss of baggage or goods. Therefore, we are not in a position to award any compensation for various other claims made in the plaint. TOTAL COMPENSATION 31. Accordingly, the plaintiffs are entitled to get the following amounts as compensation :- Compensation for loss of dependency benefit Rs.6,60,000/- For loss of expectation of life and for pain, shock Rs. 50,000/-and suffering undergone by the deceased i.e. loss to the estate. TOTAL Rs.7,10,000/- For the reasons recorded in our judgment rendered on 14.10.2009 in First Appeal No. 1346 of 2004, the plaintiffs are also entitled to recover simple interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of filing the suit till the date of deposit/payment. FINAL ORDER 32. The plaintiffs are entitled to recover jointly and severally from the National Aviation of Company India Ltd. (formerly the Indian Airlines Corporation) and the Airport Authority of India compensation of Rs.7,10,000/- (Rupees Seven lakhs and ten thousand only) with simple interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of filing the suit till the date of deposit/payment. The plaintiffs are also entitled to recover their own costs as already determined in the decree of the trial Court in one set. The plaintiffs shall bear their own costs of the appeals. The defendants shall bear the costs of the suit as well as of these appeals. 33. The plaintiffs are also entitled to recover their own costs as already determined in the decree of the trial Court in one set. The plaintiffs shall bear their own costs of the appeals. The defendants shall bear the costs of the suit as well as of these appeals. 33. For the reasons already recorded in our judgment rendered on 14.10.2009 in First Appeal No. 1346 of 2004 and connected appeals, the National Aviation Company of India Ltd. (formerly the Indian Airlines Corporation) and the Airport Authority of India are held jointly and severally liable to pay the aforesaid amount of compensation with interest and costs. 34. The amount of Rs.2,00,000/- paid by the Indian Airlines Corporation to the plaintiffs as well as the amount deposited by the Airport Authority before the trial Court in compliance with the decree of the trial Court giving rise to these appeals shall be adjusted against the amount payable under this judgment. 35. After adjustment of the aforesaid amounts, the balance amount shall be deposited by the National Aviation Company of India Ltd. (formerly Indian Airlines Corporation) and the Airport Authority of India Ltd. before the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad by 31st December, 2009. 36. The entire amount of compensation shall be paid to the parents of deceased Ushaben i.e. Navnitlal Purushottamdas Barot and Premilaben Navnitlal Barot plaintiffs of Civil Suit No.1506 of 1993. 37. Union of India and the Director General of Civil Aviation shall consider the observations in para 24 of this judgment for appropriate action. 38. The appeals are disposed of in the above terms. At this stage, Ms Sonali Desai for Ms Minoo Shah, learned advocate for the Indian Airlines, now National Aviation Company of India Ltd. prays that operation of this judgment and order may be stayed for three months to enable the Company to have further recourse in accordance with law. Since we have already granted time to National Aviation Company of India Ltd. (formerly Indian Airlines Corporation) and the Airport Authority of India Ltd. to deposit the compensation amounts with interest and costs by 31st December, 2009, the prayer is rejected.