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2009 DIGILAW 726 (KAR)

Lakshmamma v. Honnamma

2009-09-11

V.JAGANNATHAN

body2009
Judgment : V. JAGANNATHAN, J: 1. The defendants in the Trial Court are the appellants herein and the challenge is to the judgment of the Trial Court decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs, the respondents herein, and declaring the respondents as the owners of the suit schedule property by virtue of adverse possessions and the consequent order of permanent injunction restraining the appellants herein from interfering with the respondents” peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. 2. The facts as could be seen from the pleadings of the parties to a considerable extent are not in dispute and so also the relationship among the parties interse. In shorts, the plaintiffs sought for the declaration to the effect that they are the absolute owners in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property which measures 28 acres and 9 guntas of land situated at Chikkellor Village, Tavarekere Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk, situated in S.Nos. 72 to 75, 82 and 83, and it was their case before the Trial Court that originally the suit schedule property belonged to one Basavaiah @ Besave Gowda, father of plaintiffs-3 to 6 and father=in-law of plaintiff-1 and grand-father of plaintiff-2, and he said Basavaiah had agreed to sell the suit land to one Hanumaiah, father of defendants-2 to 8 and father-in-law of defendant-1, and the said Hanumaiah filed the suit in O>S.No.39/1969for specific performance against the aforesaid Basavaiah and the suit came to be decreed on 30.3.1971 and in the execution proceedings viz, Execution Case No.343/1971, said Hanumaiah sought for execution of the sale deed and accordingly, the sale deed was executed on 15.11.1971 in favour of aid Hanumaiah through the Court and Hanumaiah was in possession of the suit land thereafter, following delivery of possession to him. 3. Later, the plaintiffs filed a suit in O.S.No. 133/1974 seeking setting aside of the judgment and decree passed in O.S.NO. 39/1969 and the said suit was dismissed and so was the appeal preferred by the plaintiffs in R.A.NO. 3. Later, the plaintiffs filed a suit in O.S.No. 133/1974 seeking setting aside of the judgment and decree passed in O.S.NO. 39/1969 and the said suit was dismissed and so was the appeal preferred by the plaintiffs in R.A.NO. 8/1978, however, the Court recorded a finding while dismissing the suit as well as the appeal that the plaintiffs have been in possession of the suit land from 1974-75 to 1975-76, the plaintiffs, therefore, contended that, following the death of Hanumaiah, Basavaiah took possession and thereafter, the plaintiffs have been in continuous but unauthorized open possession and enjoyment of the suit land exercising all the rights adverse to all others and by virtue of continuous possession, the plaintiffs had perfected their title to the suit property by adverse possession. 4. While admitting the fact of defendants-1 to 8 having executed a sale deed in favour of defendants-9 and 10, the plaintiffs contended that the defendants tried to interfere with their possession of the suit property leading to police complaints being lodged and criminal cases also being filed against the plaintiffs and contending further that the plaintiffs were in continuous possession for a period of 12 years next before filing of the suit, and also stating that in the suit land, they have raised certain crops, a prayer was made to declare them as the absolute owners by contending that the cause of action arose after the death of Hanumaiah and also after dismissal of the appeal in R.A.Nos. 8/1980 and 8/1978 as well as on 30.4.2000 when the appellants herein tried to interfere with the plaintiffs’ possession of the suit schedule property. In addition to the relief of declaration, the plaintiffs also sought an order of permanent injunction against the appellants herein. 5. Defendants-9 and 10 filed their written statement in common, which was adopted by the other defendants and, while admitting the relationship interse between the parties to the suit and also the factum of the father of defendants-2 to 8 and father-in-law of defendant-1, it was contended that said Hanumaiah had filed the suit in O.S.No.39/1969, which ultimately led to the sale deed being executed in favour of Hanumaiah on 15.11.1971 and he suit filed by the plaintiffs in O.S.No.133/1974 being dismissed and so was the appeal is R.A.No.8/1978. But, however, the possession of the suit schedule property by the plaintiffs was not admitted. But, however, the possession of the suit schedule property by the plaintiffs was not admitted. But, on the other hand, defendants-9 and 10 contended that they were the absolute owners of the suit schedule property having purchased the same under a registered sale deed from defendants-1 to 8 on 24.7.1996 and since the said date, the said defendants-9 and 10 were put in possession of the suit schedule property. 6. The defendants also contended in their written statement that three of the plaintiffs viz, Parameshappa, Nanjudappa and Channabasaiah, who are the brothers interse filed an application in Form-7 before the Land Tribunal in 1979 for grant of occupancy rights and obtained an ex-parte order behind the back of defendants-1 to 8 by the order passed by the land Tribunal on 3.2.1982 and this led to defendants-1 to 8 approaching this Court in Writ Petition No.1013/1983 and ultimately, the writ petition, which was renumbered as W.P.No. 20360/1992, was allowed by holding that plaintiffs-3 to 6 were not entitled for grant of occupancy rights and this order of this Court dated 9.4.1996 was questioned by plaintiffs-3 to 6 in Writ Appeal No. 1524/1996 and the appeal was allowed and the matter was remanded to the Land Tribunal. 7. The Land Tribunal, in turn, again considered the matter afresh after remand and rejected the claim of plaintiffs-3 to 6 and this again led to another round of litigation in the from of writ petitions filed by the aggrieved plaintiffs-3 to 6 against the order of the Land Tribunal and the said Writ Petition Nos.25403/1999 and 25444-445/1999 were also dismissed and the writ appeals filed against the said decision also met with the same fate and thereafter, the said plaintiffs-3 to 6 approached the Apex Court by preferring S.L.Ps. and the said S.L.P.Nos. 10170 to 10174/2000 also came to be dismissed by the Apex Court on 24.7.2000. 8. It was therefore contended by defendants-9 and 10 in particular that, having lost the two rounds of litigation both before this Court against the order of the Land Tribunal and once before the Apex Court, plaintiffs-3 to 6 joined the other plaintiffs and filed the present suit and, under these circumstances and particularly in the light of the judgment of this Court in Writ Petition Nos. 25403 and 25444-445/1999 having clearly observed that the possession of the land was delivered to Hanumaiah and he said possession being a lawful one and the plaintiffs possession being an imaginary one, the defendants, therefore, sought for dismissal of the suit. 9. The learned trial Judge, in the light of the pleadings on record, raised the following issues for consideration. i) Whether the plaintiffs prove that they are in possession of suit schedule property since 1974-75 till today hostile and adverse to the interest of defendant for more than 12 years? ii) Whether the plaintiff prove about the alleged interference? iii) Whether defendants-9 and 10 prove that they have purchased the property on 24.7.1996 and that they are in possession since then? iv) Whether the defendants further prove that the entries in RTC extracts from 1974-75 till 1996 in the name of plaintiff is illegal as decided by Hon’ble High Court? v) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of declaration and injunction as prayed for? vi) What order or decree? 10. On an appreciation of the evidence let in by the parties and taking note of the documents produced by both sides, the learned trial judge answered issue-1 in the affirmative and so was issue-5 and issues-3 and 4 were held against the appellants herein, which are all the material issues and the suit of the plaintiffs was decreed as mentioned earlier. Aggrieved by the suit being decreed, the defendants are before this Court in this appeal. 11. I have heard the learned Counsel Shri V. Lakshminarayan for the appellants and the learned senior Counsel Shri S. Sreevatsa for the respondents and perused the entire record of this Court. Both sides argued at great length and placed reliance on a number of decisions of the Apex Court, Privy Council and other High Courts as well. 12. 11. I have heard the learned Counsel Shri V. Lakshminarayan for the appellants and the learned senior Counsel Shri S. Sreevatsa for the respondents and perused the entire record of this Court. Both sides argued at great length and placed reliance on a number of decisions of the Apex Court, Privy Council and other High Courts as well. 12. The learned Counsel for the appellants, by referring to the plaint averments, submitted at the outset that the plaintiffs have taken the stand that the suit schedule property is the ancestral property of the plaintiffs’ family and nowhere in the plaint it is pleaded as to the point of time from which possession of the plaintiffs became adverse and referring to the stand taken at paragraph-7 of the plaint, it is submitted that the plaintiffs themselves admit of interference by the defendants and, therefore, when there were several interferences and several rounds of litigation being fought between the parties, the question of the plaintiff being in continuous and uninterrupted possession, therefore, does not arise. 1. 13. It is then argued that with every interference, the continuity gets broken and the plaintiffs will have to once again establish a fresh period of twelve years from each period of interference and, in the instant case, the very pleading of the plaintiffs do not establish that the plaintiffs being in uninterrupted possession for over a period of twelve years. Therefore, in the absence of the actual date, from which the plaintiffs’ possession adverse to the interests of the defendants, having been mentioned in the plaint, it is not possible to accept the plaintiffs’ case that they have perfected their title by way of adverse possession. That apart, it is contended that the plaintiffs have nowhere pleaded about their possession being hostile to the interest of the true owners and the claim for ownership on the basis of adverse possession has been made by the plaintiffs only based on the findings recorded by the Trial Court in O.S.No. 133/1974 (Ex.P.48) and in R.A. No. 8/1978 (Ex. P-49) and, as such, the plaintiffs cannot be said to have established their title by way of adverse possession. 14. Referring to the evidence on record, a submission was made that the witnesses for the plaintiffs have also admitted that the plaintiffs could not recover possession from the defendants. P-49) and, as such, the plaintiffs cannot be said to have established their title by way of adverse possession. 14. Referring to the evidence on record, a submission was made that the witnesses for the plaintiffs have also admitted that the plaintiffs could not recover possession from the defendants. Particular reference was made to the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 also of P.W.3. 15. The next limb of argument of the learned Counsel for the appellants is that, pursuant to the sale deed executed in favour of defendants-9 and 10 as per Ex.D-1 dated 24-7-1996 defendants-9 and 10 were in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property and the said sale deed as well as the sale deed that was executed in favour of Hanumaiah earlier through the Court have not been challenged by the plaintiffs and, in the absence of a prayer in the suit seeking declaration of the said two sale deeds being not binding on the plaintiffs, the Trial Court could not have decreed the suit of the plaintiffs. It is also submitted that subsequent to the sale deed as per Ex.D-1, the names of defendants-9 and 10 appeared in the records. It is, therefore, contended that the suit itself is barred by limitation as the suit was not filed within three years of the execution of the sale deed in favour of defendants-9 and 10. 1. 16. Referring to the judgments of the Courts below, it is argued that the entire thrust is on Exs.P-48 and P-49, which are the judgments of the Trial Court in the suit filed by the respondents herein in O.S.No.133/1974 and R.A.No.8/1978 and the learned trial judge has gone on to decree the suit of the plaintiffs only on the footing that by virtue of the finding recorded in the above mentioned suit and appeal, the plaintiffs have been in illegal possession of the suit schedule property and the Trial court, in the instant case, has accepted the plea of adverse possession put forward by the plaintiffs, but the it did not examine as to whether the necessary ingredients of adverse possession were established or not. In this connection. it is submitted that the plaintiffs have failed to establish the ingredients of they holding possession of the suit schedule property hostile to the interests of the true owners. 2. 17. In this connection. it is submitted that the plaintiffs have failed to establish the ingredients of they holding possession of the suit schedule property hostile to the interests of the true owners. 2. 17. Another contention put forward by the learned Counsel for the appellants is that when three of the plaintiffs were pursuing the litigation by challenging the order of the Land Tribunal before this Court on two occasions and the writ appeals and finally before the Apex Court, it cannot be said that the plaintiffs have been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the suit schedule property and when the litigation is pending, it cannot be said that the plaintiffs had established the element of continuity. Apart from this, analogous to the situation of coparceners, each coparcener cannot assert his individual without ousting the other coparceners. 3. 18. Referring to the plaint averments, it was also argued that though there is no bar for taking an alternate plea, yet, the pleas so taken should not be inconsistent and, therefore, the plaintiffs cannot say in the same breath that they are the owners of the suit schedule property by virtue of they being members of a joint family and, at the same time, claim adverse possession. As far as the application of Section 27 of the Limitation Act is concerned, the learned Counsel argued that though the said section provides that at the determination of the period limited to any person for instiuting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property stands extinguished, the submission made is that it is only after the period is determined by the Court that the question of the right of the true owner getting extinguished will arise and not otherwise and, therefore, the sale deed executed as per Ex.D-1 by defendants-1 to 8 in favour of defendants-9 and 10 remains to be a valid document until it is declared void by a Court of law or cancelled. Therefore, the plaintiffs cannot take the help of Section 27 of the Limitation Act. 1. 19. The learned Counsel also pointed out that even in the judgments rendered in O.S.No. 133/1974 and R.A.No.8/1978 (Ex. P-48 and P=-49 respectively), there is no finding to the effect that the plaintiffs herein have established independent possession over the suit schedule property and referring to the suits filed by the plaintiffs which came to be dismissed. 1. 19. The learned Counsel also pointed out that even in the judgments rendered in O.S.No. 133/1974 and R.A.No.8/1978 (Ex. P-48 and P=-49 respectively), there is no finding to the effect that the plaintiffs herein have established independent possession over the suit schedule property and referring to the suits filed by the plaintiffs which came to be dismissed. The submission made is that the finding recorded therein also acts as res judicata and the previous judgment, therefore, become admissible in evidence in view of the provisions contained in the Evidence Act. 2. 20. The submission made is that the finding recorded therein also acts as res judicata and the previous judgment, therefore, become admissible in evidence in view of the provisions contained in the Evidence Act. 2. 20. In support of the above contentions put forward, the learned Counsel for the appellants placed reliance on the decisions reported in (2006) 11 SCC600, AIR 1971 SC 376 , (1990) 1 SCC 345 , (2001) 10 SCC 434 , AIR 1966 SC 470 , (2008) 5 SCC 449 , (2004) 1 SCC 271, (1995) 2 SCC 543 , (1995) 6 SCC 523 , (1990) 1 SCC 345 , AIR 1955 Nagpur 221, AIR 1966 SC 470 , AIR 1957 SC 314 , (1971) 2 SCC 28 , (1971) 2 SCC 438 , JT 1999 (9) SC 105, AIR 1984 SC 589 , 109 Indian Cases 296, AIR 1917 PC 197 IR 1922 PC 181, (1995) 4 SCC 496 , 1996 Suppl (3) 724, (2004) 7 SCC 391 , (2002) 8 SCC 87 , (1996) 3 SCC 331, 1902 Indian Appeals 29, AIR 1929 Calcutta 518, (1974) 2 SCC 393 , AIR 1962 SC 214 , AIR 1960 SC 335 , AIR 1964 SC 136 (1971) 2 SCC 438 , AIR 1920 Bombay 368, (2007) 3 SCC 569 , (2009) 5 SCC 478 , (2009) 4 SCC 271 , (2007) 3 SCC 569 , AIR 1948 PC 76, (1992) 2 SCC 13 , JT 1999 (9) SC 105, AIR 1964 SC 1254 , AIR 1995 SC 895 , AIR 1957 SC 314 , AIR 1996 SC 369, AIR 1920 Bombay 368, (2007) 3 SCC 569 , (2009) 5 SCC 478 , (2004) 1 SCC 271, AIR 1996 SC 1003 , AIR 2008 SC 346 , AIR 1980 Bombay 369, (2009) 3 Civil LJ 540, (1996) 7 SCC 767 , (1995) 1 SCC 198, AIR 2006 SC 3608 , (2009) 5 SCC 713 , AIR 1952 Mysore 797, (1996) 7 SCC 767 , AIR 2006 SC 3608 , (2008) 2 SCC 507 , (2005) 5 SCC 548 , (2009) 2 Supreme 77 , AIR 1963 SC 677 , (1976) 3 SCC 107, (1995) Suppl. 4 SCC 158, AIR 1965 Orissa 76, AIR 1960 Kerala 31, 2007 AIR SCW 326, ILR 2006 Karnataka 2853, (2007) 6 SCC 59 , (2005) 8 SCC 330 , (2004) 1 SCC 271, ILR 2009 Karnataka 1099, AIR 2008 SC 346 , AIR 1975 SC 1674 , AIR 1935 Bombay 326, AIR 1942 PC 64 and 2007 AIR SCW 1560. 1. 21. Relying on the aforesaid decisions and to the law laid down therein, the learned Counsel for the appellants argued that the Trial Court was in error in decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs and hence this appeal be allowed. 2. 22. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondents supported the judgment of the Trial Court with all force by submitting that the finding recorded by the Court in Exs.P-48 and P-49 would go to show that the plaintiffs have been in possession of the suit schedule property and if the period is reckoned from 10-7-1991 when R.A.No. 8/1978 was disposed of, the plaintiffs have established that they have perfected their title to the suit schedule property by adverse possession as the plaintiffs is also mentioned in this context that even though the Trial Court, by its impugned judgment, had declared the plaintiffs as the absolute owners of the suit schedule property by having perfected their title by adverse possession, the said conferment of title on the defendants goes back to the date when the plaintiffs have perfected their title over the suit schedule property. As the sale deed was executed subsequent to the plaintiffs’ title having been perfected on completion of twelve years period, no validity can be attached to the sale deed Ex.D-1 and, therefore, no infirmity can be found in the case of the plaintiffs merely because they did not seek for the relief of either declaring the sale deed Ex.D-1 as void or seeking cancellation of the same. It is, therefore, argued that following the right of the defendants having got extinguished on the expiry of twelve years by virtue of Section 27 of the limitation Act, it has to be inferred that the defendants had no authority to execute the sale deed in favour of defendants-9 and 10, and, as such, the plaintiffs need not seek a prayer to et aside the sale deed. Have been in possession of the suit schedule property for over twelve years as on the date of filing of the present suit and the possession being continuous, and the defendants also being aware of the findings recorded in O.S.No. 133/1974 and R.A.No.8/1978, the necessary ingredients of adverse possession have been established by the plaintiffs and, as such, the findings recorded by the learned judge of the Trial Court cannot be termed as erroneous or contrary to the settled position in law. 1. 23. Referring to the findings recorded by the appellate Court in R.A.No.8/1978, the submission made is that the said Court has held that the plaintiffs are in illegal possession and consequently, by virtue of Section 27 of the Limitation Act, the right of the appellants herein got extinguished once the period of twelve years got over. Therefore, Hanumaiah himself had lost whatever right he had over the suit schedule property by virtue of Section 27 of the Limitation Act and consequently, no weight can be attached to the subsequent sale deed executed in favour of defendants-9 and 10 by defendants-1 to 8 and, as such, the question of or the necessity for the plaintiffs to challenge the sale deed Ex.D-1 as void does not arise. 2. 24. Referring to the averments in the written statement filed by defendants-9 and 10, it is argued by the learned senior Counsel that there is no plea taken by the defendants about the suit schedule property being a joint family property and no plea is also there to the effect that the sale deeds are binding on the plaintiffs or for that matter, the possession was taken back after 10.7.1999. It is, therefore, contended that the plaintiffs, who are the respondents herein, have satisfied the requirements of adverse possession and, therefore, the Trial Court was justified in decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs. 3. 25. It is, therefore, contended that the plaintiffs, who are the respondents herein, have satisfied the requirements of adverse possession and, therefore, the Trial Court was justified in decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs. 3. 25. As far as the applicability of the judgments is concerned, the learned senior Counsel argued that the previous judgments can only bind the parties and not any others and as far as the decisions referred to by the learned Counsel for the appellants are concerned, it is pointed out that the applicability of those decisions will depend upon the facts of each case and a decision can only be an authority in respect of the case in which it is rendered and therefore, the several rulings referred to by the appellants’ Counsel do not have any application to the facts and circumstances of the case before us, although the principles laid down in those decisions are well settled principles of law. 4. 26. In support of the aforesaid submissions, the learned senior Counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the decisions reported in AIR 1935 Bombay 326, AIR 1942 PC 64, AIR 1934 PC 23, AIR 1957 SC 314 , AIR 1005 SC 4407, AIR 1009 SC 103, AIR 1960 Orissa 46, AIR 2000 SC 2587 , AIR 1963 P & H 393, (1904) ILR 26 All 606, (1900) ILR 24 Bom 435, (1896) ILR 24 Cal 77, 2008 AIR SCW 4355, 2007 AIR SCW 1560 and also on AIR 34 PC 23, AIR 2008 SC 690 and AIR 1983 SC 684 and relying on the said rulings, the learned senior Counsel sought for dismissal of the appeal. 1. 27. Since the entire controversy revolves around the plea of adverse possession and as the Trial Court itself has recorded a positive finding in respect of issue-1, the point for consideration is whether the said finding of the Trial Court on issue-1 and the consequent declaration of ownership by the plaintiffs over the suit schedule property by way of adverse possession can be held to be sustainable in law in the light of he facts and circumstances of the case and in the light of the well settled position in law as regards the requirement of establishing a case on the foundation of adverse possession. 2. 28. 2. 28. From what has been pleaded and argued, certain facts are not in dispute and they will have to be mentioned at first so as to focus only on the area of controversy. 3. 29. It is an admitted fact that originally it was Basavaiah @ Basavegowda, who was the owner of the suit land and he agreed to sell it to Hanumaiah, father of defendants-2 to 9 and father-in-law of the first defendant. It is also not in dispute that said Hanumaiah filed O.S.No. 39/1969 for specific performance against Basavaiah and obtained a decree on 30-3-1971. Thereafter, in execution proceedings No.343/1971, a sale deed came to be executed in favour of Hanumaiah on 16.11.1971 (certified copy of which is at Ex.D-53). The possession was also handed over to Hanumaiah on 14.12.1971. The respondents-plaintiffs challenged the judgment and decree by filing a suit in O.S.No.133/1974 and it was for permanent injunction and to stay the execution proceedings. But the said suit was dismissed and thereafter, the respondents herein filed R.A.No.8/1978 and it was also dismissed. 4. 30. The other admitted facts are that three of he plaintiffs before us i.e., plaintiffs-3 to 6, who are brothers, filed Form-7 for grant of occupancy right and it was granted to them by an order of the Land Tribunal dated 3.2.1982 and, thereafter, defendants-1 to 8 filed a writ petition and it was allowed ultimately by setting aside the grant order in favour of the said plaintiffs-3 to 6. Writ Appeal preferred by plaintiffs-3 to 6 was allowed and the matter was remanded to the Land Tribunal and after remand, the Land Tribunal passed a fresh order on 30.3.1999 by rejecting the claim of said plaintiffs-3 to 6. This led to the writ petition being filed by the aforesaid plaintiffs-3 to 6, which have been already referred to by me earlier while referring to the pleadings of the parties and the said writ petitions were dismissed and so were the writ appeals filed by them and ultimately, the S.L.Ps. filed were also dismissed by the Apex Court on 24.7.2000. 31. It is also an admitted fact that defendants-1 to 8 executed a registered sale deed in favour of defendants-9 and 10 as per Ex.D-1 dated 24-7-1996. filed were also dismissed by the Apex Court on 24.7.2000. 31. It is also an admitted fact that defendants-1 to 8 executed a registered sale deed in favour of defendants-9 and 10 as per Ex.D-1 dated 24-7-1996. Apart from the above admitted facts, the Trial Court has also referred to the findings recorded in O.S.No. 133/1974 and R.A.No.8/1978 and these extracts have been referred to as Exs.P-48 and P-49 respectively. The extracted portion of the judgment in O.S.No.133/1974, which is referred to as Ex.P-48, is as under: Though the plaintiffs are found to be in possession of the suit lands, it is seen that the titles of defendants-2 to 5 have acquired valid title to the suit land. The plaintiffs have come into possession of the suit lands after the death of Hanumaiah and therefore possession is patently illegal.” Ex.P_49 is the portion extracted from the judgment of the appellate Court in R.A.No.8/1978 and it is as under: “But the appellants are found to be in possession of the suit lands without any title to the suit lands. The predecessor in title of the defendants-2 to 5 has acquired valid title to the suit lands. As respondents-2 to 5 have got valid title of the suit schedule properties as against the appellants who are in possession without any valid title to the property in view of the finding of this Court on issue No.1 and 2 they are not entitled for permanent injunction against them.” 1. 32. Keeping the above undisputed facts in view, we will have to proceed to consider the point raised for consideration in this appeal. Before going further, it is also necessary and essential to refer to the law laid down by the Apex Court in respect of the ingredients to be established before seeking ownership based on averse possession. 2. 33. Since the entire controversy revolves around the concept of adverse possession, though learned Counsel for the parties have referred to number of decision in this regard, I am of the view that, as the Apex Court in a recent decision reported in 2008 AIR SCW 6996 has referred to the leading cases wherein principles of adverse possession have been laid down, it is proper to refer to some of those decision at this juncture. 34. In the case of Hemaji Waghaji Jat Vs. 34. In the case of Hemaji Waghaji Jat Vs. Bhikkabbsan Khengarbhai Harijan & others (2009 AIR SCW 6996), the Apex Court has referred to the principles of adverse possession is para 19 onwards and relevant paragraphs which require to be reproduced are paras 12 to 21 and they are as under: 1. 12. In Secretary of State for India Vs. Devendra Lal Khan, AIR 1934 PC 23, it was observed that the ordinary classical requirement of adverse possession is that it should be nee vi, nec clam, nec precario and the possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that it is possession adverse to the competitor. 2. 13. This Court in P. Lakshmi Reddy Vs. L. Lakshmi Reddy, AIR 1957 SC 314 , while following the ratio of Debendra Lal Khan’s case (Supra), observed as under: “But it is well settled that in order to establish adverse possession of non-coheir as against another it is not enough to show that one out of them is in sole possession and enjoyment of the profits, of the properties. Ouster of the non-possessing co-heir by the co-heir in possession who claims his possession to be adverse, should be made out. The possession of one co-heir is considered, in law, as possession of all the co-heirs. When one co-heir is found to be in possession of the properties it is presumed to be on the basis of joint title. The co-heir in possession cannot render his possession adverse to the other co-heir, not in possession, merely by any secret hostile animus on his part in derogation of the other co-heir’s title. It is a settled rule of law that as between coheirs there must be evidence of open assertion of hostile title, coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment by one of them to be knowledge of the other so as to constitute ouster.” “The burden of making out ouster is on the person claiming to displace the lawful title of a co-heir by his adverse possession.” .14. In S.M. Karim Vs. Bibi Sakina, AIR 1964 SC 1254 , Hidayatullah, J. speaking for the Court observed as under:- .“Adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and of plea is required at the least to show when possession become adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. In S.M. Karim Vs. Bibi Sakina, AIR 1964 SC 1254 , Hidayatullah, J. speaking for the Court observed as under:- .“Adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and of plea is required at the least to show when possession become adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. There is no evidence here when possession become adverse, if it at all did and a mere suggestion in the relief clause that there was an uninterrupted possession for “Several 12 years” or that the plaintiff had acquired “an absolute title was not enough to raise such a plea. Long possession is not necessarily adverse possession and the prayer clause is not a substitute for a plea.” .15. The facts of R. Chandevarappa & Other Vs. State of Karnataka & Others (1995) 6 SCC 309 are similar to the case at hand. In this case, this Court observed as under:- .“The question then is whether the appellant has perfected his title by adverse possession. It is seen that a contention was raised before the Assistant Commissioner that the appellant having remained in possession from 1968, he perfected his title by adverse possession. But the crucial facts to constitute adverse possession have not been pleaded. Admittedly the appellant came into possession by a derivative title form the original grantee. It is nee that the original grantee has no right to alienate the land. Therefore, having come into possession under colour of title from original grantee, if the appellant intends to plead adverse possession as against the State, he most disclaim his title and plead his hostile claim to the knowledge of the State and that the State had not taken any action thereon within the prescribed period. Thereby, the appellant” possession would become adverse. No such stand was taken nor evidence has been adduced in this behalf. The Counsel in fairness, despite his research, is unable to bring to our notice any such plea having been taken by the appellant.” 2. 16. In D.N.Venkatarayappa and Another Vs. Thereby, the appellant” possession would become adverse. No such stand was taken nor evidence has been adduced in this behalf. The Counsel in fairness, despite his research, is unable to bring to our notice any such plea having been taken by the appellant.” 2. 16. In D.N.Venkatarayappa and Another Vs. State of Karnataka and others, (1997) 7 SCC 567 this Court observed as under: “Therefore, in the absence of crucial pleadings, which constitute adverse possession and evidence to show that the petitioners have been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the lands in question claiming right, title and interest in the lands in question hostile to the right, title and interest of the original grantees, the petitioners cannot claim that they have perfected their title by adverse possession.” 17. In Md. Mohammad Ali (Dead) by LRs. Jagadish Kalita & Others (2004) 1 SCC 271, paras 21-22, this Court observed as under:- “21. For the purpose of proving adverse possession/ouster, the defendant must also prove animus possidendi. 22. ……. We may further observe that in a proper case the Court may have to construe the entire pleading so as to come to a conclusion as to whether the proper plea of adverse possession has been raised in the written statement or not which can also be gathered from cumulative effect of the averments made therein.” 18. In Karnataka Board of Wakf Vs. Govt. of India (2004) 10 SCC 779 at para 11, this Court observed as under:- “In the eye of the law, an owner would be deemed to be in possession of a property so long as there is no intrusion. Non-use of the property by the owner even for a long time won’t affect his title. But the position will be altered when another person takes possession of the property and asserts a right over it. Adverse possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of the true owner. It is a well-settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is “nec vi, nec clam, nec precario,” that is peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It is a well-settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is “nec vi, nec clam, nec precario,” that is peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, viable, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period.” The Court further observed that plea of adverse possession is not pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show; (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession. (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession. 19. In Saroop Singh Vs. Banto (2005) 8 SCC 330 this Court observed: “29. In terms of Article 65 the starting point of limitation does not commence from the date when the right of ownership arises to the plaintiff but commences from the date of defendant’s possession becomes adverse. (See Vasantiben prahladji Nayak Vs. Somnath Muljibhai Nayak (2004) 3 SCC 376 )” “30. ‘Animus possidendi’ is one of the ingredients of adverse possession. Unless the person possessing the land has a requisite animus the period for prescription does not commence. As in the instant case, the appellant categorically states that his possession is not adverse as that of true owner, the logical corollary is that he did not have the requisite animus. (See Md. Mohammad All (Dead) by LRs. Vs. Jagadish Kalita and Others (2004) 1 SCC 271)’ 20. This principle has been reiterated later in the case of M. Durai V. Muthu and Others (2007) 3 SCC 114 Para 7. This Court observed as under: “……. (See Md. Mohammad All (Dead) by LRs. Vs. Jagadish Kalita and Others (2004) 1 SCC 271)’ 20. This principle has been reiterated later in the case of M. Durai V. Muthu and Others (2007) 3 SCC 114 Para 7. This Court observed as under: “……. In terms of Articles 142 and 144 of the old Limitation Act, the plaintiff was bound to prove his title as also possession within twelve years preceding the date of institution of the suit under the Limitation Act, 1963, once the plaintiff proves his title. The burden shifts to the defendant to establish that he has perfected his title by adverse possession.” 2. 21. This Court had an occasion to examine the concept of adverse possession in T. Anjanappa & Others Vs. Somanathappa & Another [ (2006) 7 SCC 570 ]. The Court observed that a person who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and unequivocal evidence that his title was hostile to the real owner and amounted to denial of his title to the property claimed. The Court further observed that the classical requirements of acquisition of title by adverse possession are that such possession in denial of the true owner’s title must be peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be open and hostile enough to be capable of being known by the parties interested in the property, though it is not necessary that there should be evidence of the adverse possessor actually informing the real owner of the former’s hostile action. 3. 35. Another decision of the Apex Court which in my opinion also will have to be considered in the context of the contentions put forward by the learned Counsel for the parties is 2008 AIR SCW 5682 in the case of Kurella Naga Druva Vidya Bhaskara Rao Vs. Galla Jani Kamma alias Nacharamma, wherein the Apex Court has held that it is not sufficient for the defendant that his possession is hostile to the plaintiffs title, but he must also show that his possession was also hostile to the title and possession of the true owner. Galla Jani Kamma alias Nacharamma, wherein the Apex Court has held that it is not sufficient for the defendant that his possession is hostile to the plaintiffs title, but he must also show that his possession was also hostile to the title and possession of the true owner. It is to be mentioned hat in the said case, the plaintiff had purchased the suit land under a registered sale deed and the defendant did not claim title with reference to any document, but claimed to have perfected title by adverse possession and the Apex Court in the said context observed that a more claim by this defendant that he had perfected his title by adverse possession does not mean that a cloud is raised over a plaintiffs title and that plaintiff who is the owner who filed a suit for declaration of title and therefore, the Court went on to hold that, unless the defendant raises a serious cloud over the title of the plaintiff, there is no need to file a suit for declaration. 36. The concept of adverse possession is “nec vi, nec clam and nec precario” and these words have been explained by the learned Author U.N.Mithra in his law of Limitation and Prescription, 12th Edition, (2006(2) PAGE 1437), while dealing with Article 65 of the Limitation Act, the said explanation given are as under: “The ordinary classical requirement of adverse possession is that it should be nec vi, nec clam and nec precario, that is, that it should be peaceful, open and continuous. (1) nec vi:-This means neither by force. If the rightful owner of the property is constantly visiting the property, trying to get back possession, but the adverse possessor is throwing him out and is maintaining his wrongful possession by force, then his adverse possession of the wrongful occupier is a guarded secret, and the legal owner cannot be reasonably expected to know of the fact of the loss of possession to the wrongful occupier, then also adverse possession does not begin, (3) nec precario:-This means neither licence or permission. If a person keeps a caretaker in his house and his duty is to take care 24 hours, without the owner being able to visit the property, even then the caretaker does not prescribe. This is because, he does not occupy adversely, but with permission. If a person keeps a caretaker in his house and his duty is to take care 24 hours, without the owner being able to visit the property, even then the caretaker does not prescribe. This is because, he does not occupy adversely, but with permission. The concept of adverse possession is nec vi nec clam nec precario. There must in the first instance be actual possession and secondly there must be open hostile animus; possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that his possession is adverse to the competitor.” 37. Another decision of the Apex Court which also will have a bearing is in the case of Krishnamurthy S.Setlur Vs. Narasimha Setty ( (2007) 3 SCC 569 ) and it was held in the said case thus: “In the matter of adverse possession, the Courts have to find out the plea taken by the plaintiff in the plaint. In the plaint, the plaintiff who claims to be owner by adverse possession has to plead actual possession. The plaintiff has to plead and prove that his possession was continuous, exclusive and undisturbed to the knowledge of the real owner of the land. He has to show a hostile title. He has to communicate his hostility to the real owner.” In the same decision, referring to Section 27 of the Limitation Act, the Apex Court at para 12 has observed thus: “Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963, operates to extinguish the right to property of a person who does not sue for its possession within the time allowed by law. He right extinguished is the right which the lawful owner has and against whom a claim for adverse possession is made, therefore, the plaintiff who makes a claim for adverse possession has to plead and prove the date on and from which he claims to be in exclusive, continuous and undisturbed possession. The question whether possession is adverse or not is often one of simple fact but it may also be a conclusion of law or a mixed question of law and fact. The facts found must be accepted, but the conclusion drawn from them, namely ouster or adverse possession is a question of law and has to be considered by the Court.” 38. The facts found must be accepted, but the conclusion drawn from them, namely ouster or adverse possession is a question of law and has to be considered by the Court.” 38. Keeping the above principles as the background, we will have to analyse the facts and circumstances of the case before us. As already mentioned, the parties do not dispute that the suit schedule property came to the hands of Hanumaiah following the suit filed by him in O.S.No.39/69 for specific performance being decreed and the sale deed was executed with the help of the Court in favour of Hanumaiah and the said sale deed is dated 15.11.1971. It is the case of the appellants that ever since the said date, it was first Hanumaiah and thereafter words his LRs namely appellants who have been in possession of the suit schedule property but the respondents plaintiffs on the contrary have taken the stand that it is the plaintiffs who have been in continuous possession of the suit schedule property and according to the plaintiffs, the cause of action arose after death of Hanumaiah and subsequent to dismissal of R.A.NO.8/78 and then on 30.4.2000, the appellants herein tried to interfere with the plaintiffs’ possession of the suit schedule property. As could be seen from the law laid down by the Apex Court that the possession will have to be continuous, open and undisturbed, and as such the evidence will have to be examined so as to find out as to whether the plaintiffs have been able to prove the said fact of they being in possession continuously, and this takes us to the evidence let in by the parties. 39. Plaintiffs have relied on the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 in support of the aforesaid stand as regards they being in continuous possession of the suit property subsequent to death of Hanumaiah. Though in the course of examination in chief, P.Ws. 1 to 3 have stated in support of the above contention taken in the plaint, it is also necessary to look to the cross-examination of these three witnesses. Though in the course of examination in chief, P.Ws. 1 to 3 have stated in support of the above contention taken in the plaint, it is also necessary to look to the cross-examination of these three witnesses. P.W.1 Shivakumar in his cross examination has stated that it was the plaintiffs who were causing trouble to Hanumaiah in respect of the suit schedule property by Hanumaiah and all the three witnesses while denying the sale-deed being executed in favour of defendants 9 and 10 by the defendants 1 to 8, however, say in the cross-examination that the plaintiffs were also giving trouble to the defendants 9 and 10 in respect of said defendants being in possession of the suit property and also admit that in respect of the inconvenience caused by the plaintiffs, the said defendants 9 and 10 also had lodged complaint against the plaintiffs, P.W.1 goes to the extent of denying his signature in the earlier suit O.S.No.133/74 and does not even admit the appeal being filed by the plaintiffs and said appeal being dismissed in R.A.No.8/1978. As far as the plaintiffs taking back the possession from Hanumaiah is concerned, in the cross-examination, P.W.1 has stated that right from the year 1970 onwards till the date of giving evidence, i.e., on 7.11.2005, the plaintiffs have been trying to get back the possession to their family. P.W.2 Muniyappa in the course of his cross examination has gone on to admit that following the death of Hanumaiah, it is the defendants who have been continuing the suit schedule property and further admits that it is the plaintiffs who have been causing trouble to the cultivation of the suit land by the defendants. This witness also confirms the fact of defendants 9 and 10 having purchased the suit schedule property and also giving complaint to the police following the plaintiffs causing interference with the defendants’ possession of the suit property. The last of the plaintiffs’ witnesses is P.W.3 Byrappa and even this witness speaks like the other two witnesses for the plaintiffs by stating that plaintiffs’ father (father of plaintiffs 3 to 6) has been causing trouble and quarreling with the defendants in order to take back possession from Hanumaiah. The last of the plaintiffs’ witnesses is P.W.3 Byrappa and even this witness speaks like the other two witnesses for the plaintiffs by stating that plaintiffs’ father (father of plaintiffs 3 to 6) has been causing trouble and quarreling with the defendants in order to take back possession from Hanumaiah. He further admits that after the suit land was purchased by defendants 9 and 10, the plaintiffs have been causing interference with the possession of the suit property by the defendants and in this connection, even the police had come to the spot. The said witnesses P.Ws. 1 to 3 apart from making the above admission in their cross-examination, however denied of they having any knowledge of out come of the Original Suit No. 133/74 and Regular Appeal NO.8/78 and even they disclosed their ignorance as regards out come of SLP that was filed by three of the plaintiffs. The witnesses for the appellants D.Ws. 1 and 2 however, in the course of their evidenced have stated that defendants have been in possession of the suit schedule property right from the day when the sale deed was executed in favour of Hanumaiah at the first instance and following the death, they continued to be in possession until suit property was sold in favour of defendants 9 and 10. 40. Thus, from the assessment of the evidence of the witnesses before the trial Court, it cannot be said that the plaintiffs through their witnesses P.W.1 to 3 have been able to show that it is the plaintiffs who have been in continuous uninterrupted possession of the suit schedule property but on the other hand, their evidence gives the impression that it was the plaintiffs who was interfering with the possession held by Hanumaiah and there afterwards, defendants and then defendants 9 and 10. Such being the nature of oral evidence adduced by the parties, it is difficult to take the view that the plaintiff have been able to show that they have been in continuous, open and uninterrupted possession of the suit schedule property right from the date of death of Hanumaiah who died in the year 1974 and in the view of admission made by P.W.1 in the course of his cross-examination that ever since the death of Hanumaiah, till the date of giving evidence before the Court i.e., on 7.11.2005, the plaintiffs have been trying to get back the possession of the suit schedule property following the death of Hanumaiah. Another aspect of the case which also will have to be referred in this connection is the factum of the plaintiffs pursuing the matter before the land tribunal. Plaintiffs 3 to 6 filed Form No. 7 in the year 1971 and the said proceeding though initially was in favour of plaintiffs 3 to 6, in view of the land tribunal conforming the occupancy right on them by its order dated 3.2.1982, thereafterwards, we have seen from the admitted facts referred earlier, that the matter found its culmination ultimately by way of remand the matter being reheard by the Land Tribunal consequent to the remand and by this Court, the order dated 30.3.1999 led to the rejection of Form No. 7 filed by the plaintiffs 3 to 6. Thereafterwards, the matter again was taken up before this Court in writ petition, writ appeal and finally, it ended in the Apex Court in the Special Leave Petition and the said petition was also dismissed by the order dated 24.7.2000. All these events which are not in dispute and borne from the documents produced on record therefore, shows that three of the plaintiffs continued to fight for their right over the suit property and it was only after the SLP was dismissed by the Apex Court in the year 2000, that the plaintiffs thought of filing the present suit on 8.6.2000. In other words, right from the day suit schedule property came to the hands of Hanumaiah by virtue of the sale deed executed through the Court, the plaintiffs have been fighting all along to establish their title over the suit property. In other words, right from the day suit schedule property came to the hands of Hanumaiah by virtue of the sale deed executed through the Court, the plaintiffs have been fighting all along to establish their title over the suit property. In other words, the plaintiffs failed establish hostile title to the suit property and though the plaintiffs have placed on record revenue records in the form of Pahanis, it is a settled position in law that revenue documents neither convey nor extinguish title. Once the revenue records are taken out of recknoning, there remains nothing on record to show hostile title held by the plaintiffs as against the title of the defendants which are two sale deeds. 41. The learned Sr. Counsel for the respondents strongly contended that the plaintiffs have been in possession of the suit property following the death of Hanumaiah and therefore, the period is reckoned from 10.7.1979 till the date of filing the suit and more than 12 years have elapsed and therefore, by virtue of Section 27 of the Limitation Act, the appellants not only lost their remedy but even the right of the appellants got extinguished. Therefore, the question of plaintiffs seeking cancellation of the sale deed in favour of Hanumaiah and then in favour of defendants 9 to 10 does not arise since they are void documents and as Hanumaiah himself had no right defendants 9 and 10 cannot derive any better title. In support of the above submission, the learned Sr. Counsel for the respondents had placed his reliance on the several decision and they have been referred to by me earlier. The learned Counsel relying on the rulings reported in AIR 1942 Privy Council 64, AIR 1935 Bombay 326, argued that at the determination of the period limited to any persons for instituting a suit for possession, the limitation period starts running and therefore the plaintiffs had established their title to the suit property and also had established completion of more than 12 years period. This therefore takes us to Section 27 of the Limitation Act and the question that would arise for consideration will be as to when the period gets determined. This therefore takes us to Section 27 of the Limitation Act and the question that would arise for consideration will be as to when the period gets determined. Though, learned Counsel for the respondents argued that on completion of 12 years, the period automatically gets determined and right also gets extinguished, in my view the aforesaid contention does not appealed to me because of the law declared by the Apex Court in this regard. 1. 42. In the decision reported in 1990(5) SCC 170, dealing with the word ‘determine’ the Apex Court observed that the very use of the word ‘determine’ implies that there may be a lis between the parties and they have to be heard before a final conclusion is arrived at by the Managing Director. Therefore, the Apex Court in the said case finding that principles of natural justice were not complied with, it was held that the determination of the Managing Director and consequent certificate issued both were vitiated. 2. 43. In another decision reported in (1976) 3 S.C.C. 190 the Apex Court dealt with the word ‘consider’ and ‘determine’ and observed that the word ‘consider’ has been used in contradistinction to the word ‘determine’ and the rule making authority had used the word ‘consider’ deliberately and not ‘determine’ because the word ‘determine’ has a much wider scope. 3. 44. Another decision of the Apex Court which is of a Constitutional Bench is Jaswant Sugar Mills Limited Vs. Lakshmi Chand and others ( AIR 1963 S.C 677 ) and it was held in the said case that the expression ‘determination’ in the context in which it occurs in Article 136 signifies an effective expression of opinion which ends a controversy or a dispute by some valid law for disposal. The Court went on to observe that determination or order must be judicial or quasi judicial. 4. 45. Another decision in which the expression ‘determination’ came up for consideration is in relation to the Industrial Disputes Act in the case of Krishna Kutty Nair Vs. Industrial Tribunal, Trivandrum (AIR 1960 KERALA 31) and this Court held that the expression ‘determination’ in the definition of ‘award’ in the Act indicates only a coming to an end of a dispute. 5. 46. Industrial Tribunal, Trivandrum (AIR 1960 KERALA 31) and this Court held that the expression ‘determination’ in the definition of ‘award’ in the Act indicates only a coming to an end of a dispute. 5. 46. Thus, in the light of the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court in particular, I am of the view that the expression word ‘determination’ found in Section 27 of the Limitation Act can only mean that it is only after a judicial determination of the period of limitation that the question of right of a party getting extinguished will arise. 1. 47. We have seen from the principles laid down by the Apex Court an regards the requirement of adverse possession that the party or person claiming adverse possession will have to establish that the possession was held by him continuously without interruption for a period of 12 years. 2. 48. In the case on hand, from the evidence placed by the parties and more particularly the admissions made by PWs 1 to 3 indicates that there has been frequent interference in respect of the possession of the suit property and in the course of the cross-examination, PWs 1 to 3 have stated that it is the plaintiffs who are interfering with the possession of the suit property by the defendants and in the plaint also it is averred that the defendants interfered with the plaintiffs possession on many occasions. 3. 49. The question therefore for consideration is, whether the period of 12 years will have to be reckoned as inclusive of various interruptions and brakes or at every brakes or interference, a fresh period of 12 years has to follow before exercising the right over the suit property by adverse possession. 4. 50. As far this aspect is concerned, the decision of the Privy Council reported in AIR 1922 S.C 181 throws light. In the case of Moothavar Vs. Kunharan Kutty it was held that adverse possession must be adequate, continuous and exclusive and acts of possession by owner though not continuous will destroy adverse possession. 4. 50. As far this aspect is concerned, the decision of the Privy Council reported in AIR 1922 S.C 181 throws light. In the case of Moothavar Vs. Kunharan Kutty it was held that adverse possession must be adequate, continuous and exclusive and acts of possession by owner though not continuous will destroy adverse possession. It was further held that when the holder of the title proves that he too has been exercising, during the currency of his title, various acts of possession, them the quality of these acts, even though they might have failed to constitute adverse possession as against another, may be abundantly sufficient to destroy that adequacy and interrupt that exclusiveness and challenging which is demanded from any person challenging by possession the title he holds. 52. In the case on hand, not only the evidence placed on record on PWs 1 to 3 and DWs 1 and 2 reveals that there was interruption frequently, but the admission of the plaintiffs witnesses gives an indication that it was the defendants who were in possession and the plaintiffs were making efforts to take back the possession from the defendants ever since the death of Hanumaiah. 1. 53. Another ground urged by the learned Counsel for the appellants concerns the absence of specific date or period from which the plaintiffs have been in possession of the suit schedule property. Though in the plaint while adverting to the cause of action it is averred that the cause of action arose after the death of Hanumaiah in 1974 and after the judgment in R.A.No.8/78 and subsequently in the year 2000, in the entire plaint there is no pleading as to the exact date from which the plaintiffs came to hold possession of the suit schedule property. 2. 54. This Court in a case reported in ILR 2009 KAR 1099 after referring to the Apex Court decision has observed that it is necessary for the plaintiff to plead from what time the possession became adverse. The Apex Court itself in the case of Abubakar Abdul Inamdar Vs. 2. 54. This Court in a case reported in ILR 2009 KAR 1099 after referring to the Apex Court decision has observed that it is necessary for the plaintiff to plead from what time the possession became adverse. The Apex Court itself in the case of Abubakar Abdul Inamdar Vs. Harun Abdul Inamdar reported in AIR 1996 SC 112 while dealing with the Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act and there being no plea raised in the pleadings as to the point of time from which the possession became hostile, has held that with regard to the plea of adverse possession no ground of proof can substitute pleadings which are the foundation of the claim of a litigating party and found from the pleadings in the case before it that the appellant therein nowhere had pleaded a single overt act on the basis of which it could be inferred or ascertained that from a particular point of time his possession became hostile and notorious to the complete exclusion of other heirs. 3. 55. In the case on hand also in the entire plaint averment there is no specific date that is mentioned so as to reckon the period of limitation. 4. 56. Coming to the contention urged by the learned Counsel for the parties as regards the limitation is concerned, submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants is that the suit itself is barred by limitation because if the period of reckoned from the date of culmination of the proceedings before the Apex Court, the S.L.Ps were dismissed in the year 2000 and the suit itself was instituted on 13.6.2000 and as such, the period of 12 years had not been completed as on the date of dismissal of the S.L.P. by the Apex Court. 57. From the other angle also, if the matter is viewed with reference to the sale deed executed in favour of the defendants 9 and 10, then also the suit of the plaintiff is barred by limitation because defendant No.1 executed the sale deed in favour of defendants 9 and 10 and it is dated 24.7.96 and the suit therefore sought to have been filed within three years of execution of the sale deed having regard to Article 59 of the Limitation Act. Not only the suit was filed long after the expiry of three years from the date of the sale deed, but there is also no prayer by the plaintiffs seeking a declaration to the effect that the sale deed in favour of defendants 9 and 10 is void. 5. 58. As far as this submission is concerned, learned senior Counsel for the respondents contended that the suit was filed well within the period, yet the very fact that the plaintiffs were litigating the case right up to the Apex Court in respect of grant of occupancy rights, it cannot be said that the period of limitation starts running against the appellants. 6. 59. Another decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the appellant also will have to be touched upon and it is in the case of Thomas Antony Vs. Varkey Varkey (JT 1999 (9) SC 105). Though the said case arose out of Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, the principle laid down is also applicable to the case before us in respect of the order passed by the Land Tribunal under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. 1. 60. The Apex Court at para 22 of the decision after referring to the various provisions contained under Section 125 o the Kerala Land Reforms Act, held that when a question regarding status of a person as a tenant arises in any suit or proceedings before a civil Court, that Court shall refer the matter to the Land Tribunal for decision on that question only and the legislative scheme appears to be that at the trial stage adjudication on the question should be confined to one forum i.e. the Tribunal and the Civil Court should not go into the very same question again after the decision of the Tribunal is received by it. 2. 61. Therefore, in the light of the aforesaid positioning law as regards the determination of the tenancy right, in the case on hand also, so long as the plaintiffs were agitating the matter before various Courts and ultimately before the Apex Court and were fighting for their occupancy rights, it cannot be said that the plaintiffs had established their continuous and uninterrupted possession over the suit schedule property and therefore looked from the said angle also, the question of the plaintiffs having established 12 years of uninterrupted and continuous possession of suit schedule property cannot arise. 1. 62. As far as the owners title is concerned, I have referred in the very beginning of this judgment that the requirement of law is that person claiming title by way of adverse possession must show by clear and unequivocal evidence that his title was hostile to the real owner and thus amounted to denial of the owners title to the property claimed. Not only the defendant will have to show that his possession is hostile to the plaintiffs title, but that his possession was also hostile to the title and possession of the true owner. 2. 63. In the instant case, except producing certain pahanies which are not document of title, the plaintiffs have not placed on record any document indicating owners title to the title of the defendants. 3. 64. On the other hand, the very plaint averments itself shows that the plaintiffs have accepted the title of the defendants over the suit schedule property, but in order to establish adverse possession, the plaintiffs have failed to place evidence indicating owners title being set up by them as against the title of the defendants. 4. 65. In the instant case, the plaintiffs have not questioned the sale deed executed first in favour of Hanumaiah, later by the L.Rs of deceased Hanumaiah in favour of defendants 9 and 10 and there is also no prayer in the plaint either seeking cancellation of he sale deeds or declaration that the said sale deeds are void. 5. 66. In the light of the aforesaid evidence and in the backdrop of various decisions referred to by me, I am of the view that the Trial Court was in error in decreeing the suit only on the basis of Ex.P48 and P49. Though the said documents PWs 48 and 49 are the extracts from the findings recorded by the Trial Court in O.S.No.133/74 and R.A.No. 8/78 regarding the illegal possession of the suit schedule property by the plaintiffs, in the absence of the plaintiffs establishing other ingredients of adverse possession, I am of the view that the Trial Court could not have decreed the suit of the plaintiffs. 6. 67. 6. 67. The other defect noticed from the judgment of the Trial Court is that the Trial Court has observed that it is only three of the plaintiffs who had approached the Land Tribunal and went up to Supreme Court and not the other plaintiffs. But the Trial Court forgot that the suit was filed by all the plaintiffs together and none of them had claimed exclusive claim independently over the suit schedule property. Therefore, the said observation of the Trial Court also is erroneous and contrary to the very material placed before it. 68. Before closing this judgment, it is also very pertinent to refer to the observations of the Apex Court once again in the case of Hemaji Waghaji Jat Vs. Bhikhabhai Keshngarbhai Harijan reported in 2008 AIR SCW 1996 and the relevant paragraphs be referred at this juncture which are as under: “34. Before parting with this case, we deem it appropriate to observe that the law of adverse possession which ousts an owner on the basis of inaction within limitation is irrational, illogical and wholly disproportionate. The law as it exists is extremely harsh for the true owner and a windfall for a dishonest person who had illegally taken possession of the property of the true owner. The law ought not to benefit a person who in a olandestine manner takes possession of the property of the owner in contravention of law. This in substance would mean that he law gives seal of approval to the illegal action or activities of a rank trespasser or who had wrongfully taken possession of the property of the true owner. 35. We fail to comprehend why the law should place premium on dishonesty by legitimizing possession of a rank trespasser and compelling the owner to lose its possession only because of his inaction in taking back the possession within limitation.” In the result, I pass the following order: The appeal is allowed. Judgment of the Trial Court decreeing the suit of the respondents-plaintiffs is set aside. The suit is dismissed. No costs.