Judgment This second appeal is focussed by the original plaintiff, animadverting upon the judgement and decree dated 01.06.2006 passed in A.S.No.29 of 2006 by the 3rd Additional Subordinate Court of Coimbatore, in reversing the judgement and decree of the trial Court, namely, 3rd Additional District Munsif Court at Coimbatore, in O.S.No.796 of 2003. For convenience sake, the parties are referred to hereunder according to their litigative status before the trial Court. 2. The plaintiff filed the suit O.S.No.796 of 2003 seeking the following reliefs: "(a) To declare that the order of the defendants passed in proceedings in Na.Ka.No.19116/2002-A-6 dated 10.04.2003 is null and void and does not bind the plaintiff as the same is highly arbitrary, excessive and against the provision of law and natural justice; b) declare that the act of defendants in imposing of the B Memo for the suit property as null and void as it is highly arbitrary, one sided, without any basis and against law and the natural justice; c) decree for mandatory injunction directing the defendants not to evict the plaintiff from the suit property on the basis of the impugned order passed in Na.Ka.No.19116/2002/A-6 dated 10.04.2003, except hearing the plaintiff and after holding an enquiry according to law, except due process of law; d) decree for a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to fix the sale price according to the provision of law and considering the provision of the privileges of the Ex-service men by considering the guideline and market value; e) direct the defendants to pay to the plaintiff the costs of the suits; and f) grant such other and further reliefs as may be deemed just, necessary, fit and proper in the circumstances of the case and thus render justice." on the ground that he as an ex-service man applied for allotment of land in his favour during the year 1986; however, there was no express order, but orally he was permitted to occupy the suit property measuring an extent of 2.75 acres in S.F.Nos.1174/5 and 1174/6; the plaintiff was paying money to the revenue officials and in turn they have given receipts and belatedly he came to understand that those receipts were nothing but B memos; the first defendant issued Ex.A1 dated 10.04.2003 vide the proceedings in Na.Ka.No.19116/2002/A-6. Animadverting upon such action of the defendants, the suit was filed. 3. Animadverting upon such action of the defendants, the suit was filed. 3. Per contra, the defendants remonstrating and refuting, challenging and gainsaying the averments/ allegations in the plaint, filed the written statement to the effect that the plaintiff encroached into the suit property and that by way of allotting the said land for him, he was asked to pay a sum of Rs.1,40,000/-towards double the market value of the said land as per rules and norms, but he failed to pay the same. Absolutely he is having no right to occupy the same. 4. During trial, the plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.A1 to A16 were marked. On the side of the defendants, M.Ganesan was examined as D.W.1 and Exs.D1 to D9 were marked. 5. Ultimately, the trial Court rejected the prayers of the plaintiff, however, granted a decree to the effect that on payment of Rs.1,40,800/-by the plaintiff in favour of the Government within a period of two months, the defendants should execute the necessary deed as otherwise, the plaintiff could be evicted by the defendants. As against such order of the lower Court, an appeal was filed by the plaintiff and the appellate Court modified the judgment and decree of the trial Court by reducing the sale price from Rs.1,40,800/- to Rs.70,800/- after giving due deduction to Rs.70,000/-which the plaintiff had spent towards reclamation of the suit property. Being disconcerted and aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court, the Second Appeal is filed on various grounds and by suggesting the following substantial questions of law: "1. Whether the respondents can fix an amount, doubling the market rate for a poromboke land which was already allotted to an ex-serviceman. 2. Whether the respondents can fix an amount to the land which was handed over to an ex-service man 18 years before. 3. Whether the learned first Appellate Judge while reversing the order of the 3rd Additional District Munsif Judge and given his finding that the land was allotted to the appellant and the same was developed by him by spending Rs.70,000/- is justified to fix the payment of Rs.70,000/- on the Appellant." 6. Despite printing the name, the appellant has not appeared, however, the learned Government Advocate appeared and submitted her arguments. 7. Despite printing the name, the appellant has not appeared, however, the learned Government Advocate appeared and submitted her arguments. 7. A plain poring over and perusal of the typed set of papers including the copy of the judgment of both the Courts below would display and demonstrate, exemplify and evince that there is a finding of fact based on factual evidence that the plaintiff was treated as encroacher by the Government and accepting his status he himself paid penalty as evidenced by the B memos issued by revenue officials. 8. It is a common or garden principle of law that as against the finding of fact, no Second Appeal would lie unless there is perversity in entertaining evidence. In view of the fact that the Government itself has come forward with the plea that on payment of Rs.1,40,800/- by the plaintiff, the Government could execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, the lower Court passed the aforesaid decree so as to enable the plaintiff to make use of the opportunity and the appellate Court reduced the quantum as set out supra. 9. In the proposed substantial question of law No.1 the plaintiff would question the fixing of the market value. Fixing the market value of the suit property is purely an official act on the part of the revenue officials and there is nothing to indicate that the standing order of the Board of revenue, which the official relied on for fixing the sale price was illegal or ultra vires the constitution or unconscionable or unreasonable. In the written statement itself the defendants clearly and categorically pointed out that taking into consideration the rules and regulations concerning fixing of the market value of the Government land, the said amount was fixed. The lower Court considering Ex.A9, the relevant Government file, would give its finding that the Government before fixing the value analysed the matter in various angles and also gave opportunity to the petitioner to make representation. In paragraph 17 of the judgment of the lower Court, it clearly pointed out that between pages 1 to 123 of Ex.A9, the records evinced and expatiated that the plaintiff was given opportunity to make representation. In paragraph 17 of the judgment of the lower Court, it clearly pointed out that between pages 1 to 123 of Ex.A9, the records evinced and expatiated that the plaintiff was given opportunity to make representation. The Government officials also gave a finding in that file that the plaintiff had no right to claim free patta from the Government and based on the then existed market value, the sum of Rs.1,40,800/-was fixed as double that of the market value as per the relevant standing order of the Board of revenue extracted in the I Appellate Courts judgment. The I Appellate Court showed over-brimming and over- whelming equities and concessions, liberality and indulgence in deducting the sum of Rs.70,000/-which was assessed by the appellate Court as the amount spent by the plaintiff towards reclamation of the suit property. 10. Indubitably and undisputedly, the petitioner is an ex-service man now working as Senior Clerk or Assistant and earning. Taking into consideration the said fact that his annual income exceeds the limit as contemplated in the aforesaid standing order of the Board of Revenue, the revenue authority fixed double that of the market value correctly. However, the first appellate Court in fact, without actually understanding the legal implication in stricto senso showed leniency in deducting Rs.70,000/- which was alleged to have been spent by the plaintiff for reclamation of the land, forgetting for the moment that it was the plaintiff who wanted to cultivate the land and derive benefit out of it. Accordingly, he spent such amount and he derived benefit all along as per him for about 18 years and he did not pay any rent or licence fee, but he only paid a pococurante and insignificant penalty amount for which the B memos were issued. It is not as though general public or the Government was benefitted by his reclaiming the land, but he benefitted himself by spending that amount. Without considering all these implications, the lower Court felt as though the said Rs.70,000/-was indirectly given to the Government by the plaintiff and deducted that amount from out of the sum of Rs.1,40,800/-. In fact, the Government should have preferred appeal as against such order of the First Appellate Court, but they remained dormant for reasons best known to the Government. In fact, the Government should have preferred appeal as against such order of the First Appellate Court, but they remained dormant for reasons best known to the Government. The plaintiff instead of sagaciously accepting the order of the first appellate Court in getting such enormous benefit, has chosen to file the second appeal unjustifiably. In fact Order 41 Rule 33 of CPC can also be invoked in the facts and circumstances of this case, but taking into consideration the fact the Government itself has not chosen to file any appeal, I would like to simply refrain from entertaining the second appeal. Accordingly substantial question of law No.1 is untenable. 11. Under proposed substantial question of law No.2, the plaintiffs contention that the rate which was prevailing as on the date of entering into possession to be taken into account is totally untenable, as there is no basis at all for that. His occupation before 18 years, i.e., during 1986 cannot be considered as the basis for assessing the market value in view of the discussion supra. As such, I could see no merit in the proposed substantial question of law No.2 also. 12. At this juncture, my mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Honble Apex Court: (i) (2006) 5 Supreme Court Cases 545 – Hero Vinoth (Minor) Vs. Seshammal, certain excerpts from its would run thus:- "17. After the amendment a second appeal can be filed only if a substantial question of law is involved in the case. The memorandum of appeal must precisely state the substantial question of law involved and the High Court is obliged to satisfy itself regarding the existence of such a question. If satisfied, the High Court has to formulate the substantial question of law involved in the case. . . . . . . ." 18. . . . . . It has to be kept in mind that the right of appeal is neither a natural nor an inherenth right attached to the litigation. Being a substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance with law in force at the relevant time. The conditions mentioned in the section must be strictly fulfilled before a second appeal can be maintained and no court has the power to add or to enlarge those grounds. The second appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds. Being a substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance with law in force at the relevant time. The conditions mentioned in the section must be strictly fulfilled before a second appeal can be maintained and no court has the power to add or to enlarge those grounds. The second appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds. The concurrent findings of facts will not be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers under this section. Further, a substantial question of law has to be distinguished from a substantial question of fact. . . . . . 21. . . . . However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law" by sufficing the words "of general importance" as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta v. Ram Ditta the phrase "substantial question of law as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 100 CPC (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case. In Sir Chunilal case the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju(Sir Chunilal case, SCR p.557) "When a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular fact of the case it would not be a substantial question of law." This Court laid down the following test as proper test, for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial:(Sir Chunilal case, SCR pp.557-58) "The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or call for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law." 23. To be "substantial" a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law "involving in the case" there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law his a substantial one and involved in the case or not, the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis.(See Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari). 24. . . . (iii) The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the Courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to "decision based on no evidence", it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding." (ii) 2008(4) SCALE 300 – Kashmir Singh Vs. Harnam Singh And Another, an excerpt from it would run thus- 9. It has been noted time and again that without insisting for the statement of such a substantial question of law in the memorandum of appeal and formulating the same at the time of admission, the High Courts have been issuing notices and generally deciding the second appeals without adhering to the procedure prescribed under Section 100 of the Code. It has further been found in a number of cases that no efforts are made to distinguish between a question of law and a substantial question of law. In exercise of the powers under this Section in several cases, the findings of fact of the first appellate Court are found to have been disturbed. It has to be kept in mind that the right of appeal is neither a natural nor an inherent right attached to the litigation. Being a substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance with law in force at the relevant time. It has to be kept in mind that the right of appeal is neither a natural nor an inherent right attached to the litigation. Being a substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance with law in force at the relevant time. The conditions mentioned in the section must be strictly fulfilled before a second appeal can be maintained and no court has the power to add or to enlarge those grounds. The second appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds. The concurrent findings of facts will not be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers under this Section. Further, a substantial question of law has to be distinguished from a substantial question of fact. This Court in Sir Chunilal v. Mehta and Sons Ltd.v. Century Spg.& Mfg.Co.Ltd.( AIR 1962 SC 1314 ) held that: "The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law." 13. It is therefore apparent and axiomatic that in the absence of any question of law, much less substantial question of law, the probability of entertaining the Second Appeal does not arise. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.