ORDER : K.M. Thaker, J. In this petition the petitioner has brought under challenge an award dated May 4, 1993 passed by the Labour Court, Ahmedabad in Reference (LCA) No. 600/1990 whereby, the Labour Court has directed the petitioner firm to reinstate the respondent with full back wages. 2. The respondent was working in the petitioner firm as a labourer. It appears from the record that the case of the petitioner-firm before the trial court was to the effect that the petitioner-firm was passing through hard times and was short of orders as a result of which it was compelled to 'lay-off the workmen. After continuing the 'lay-off for certain period, the petitioner firm realized that the unit had become unviable and therefore, it decided to retrench some of the workmen. It also transpires that along with the respondent, other 8 workmen were also retrenched. The respondent herein was retrenched with effects from November 14, 1982. Upon being aggrieved by the retrenchment, the respondent raised an industrial dispute. The conciliation proceedings failed. Hence, the appropriate Government,; vide order dated March 19, 1993, made an Order of Reference referring the dispute for adjudication. The said order of reference culminated into above mentioned reference proceedings. During the proceedings, the respondent workman examined herself. Her' deposition was recorded below Exhibit 12. One Mr. Sirishbhai Gordhanbhai was examined as witness of the petitioner firm whose deposition was recorded below Exhibit 19. After the. conclusion of the stage of evidence and upon" hearing the submissions of both sides, the learned Labour Court passed the impugned award. Having come to the conclusion that while retrenching the respondent workman, the petitioner firm had committed breach of Section 25-F(c), the Labour Court directed the petitioner firm to reinstate the respondent with full back wages. It deserves to be mentioned that before the Labour Court, the petitioner firm had placed on record that the manufacturing unit of the petitioner firm was subsequently closed down. 3. Mr. Clerk, learned advocate, has appeared for the petitioner firm and Mr. Rathod, learned advocate, has appeared for the respondent workman. I have heard the learned advocates at length. 3.1 Mr. 3. Mr. Clerk, learned advocate, has appeared for the petitioner firm and Mr. Rathod, learned advocate, has appeared for the respondent workman. I have heard the learned advocates at length. 3.1 Mr. Clerk submitted that the Labour Court has recorded findings in favour of the petitioner firm so far as the allegation about breach of Section 25F(a) and 25F(b) are concerned and it has been held that while effecting the retrenchment, the petitioner did not commit breach of the said provisions, however, on the premise that the provision u/s 25F(c) is mandatory and on erroneous conclusion that the intimation as required under the Act was not given to the appropriate Government, the Labour Court recorded the impugned finding that the petitioner firm had committed breach of Section 25F(c) and based on such view regarding Section 25F(c), the Labour Court has directed the petitioner to reinstate the respondent with full back wages. Relying on the decision of the Apex Court Bombay Bombay Union of Journalists and Others Vs. The State of Bombay and Another, AIR 1964 SC 1617 , and also on the decision of Orissa High Court 1991 II CLR 941, Mr. Clerk submitted that in fact, the petitioner firm had forwarded necessary intimation in accordance with the provisions u/s 25F(c) to the appropriate Government and the Labour Court has committed error in reaching to the conclusion that necessary intimation was not given. He further submitted that assuming against the petitioner firm that such intimation was not given, the provision u/s 25F(c) is not mandatory and at the most it is only directory and the breach thereof would not completely invalidate the retrenchment and/or would not render it ab initio void as it would in the case of breach of Section 25F(a) or (b). Mr. Clerk also submitted that the allegation by the respondent about victimization and/or breach of Section 25F(a) and 25F(b) are not believed by the Labour Court. Mr. Clerk submitted that the petitioner firm has been closed down and the finding of the Labour Court that no evidence about closure of the manufacturing unit of the petitioner firm is produced, is unjustified. 4. Mr. Rathod has vehemently opposed the petition and submitted that though the petitioner claims that the amount was forwarded by the money order, no such money order was received and any payment was not made to the respondent. Mr. 4. Mr. Rathod has vehemently opposed the petition and submitted that though the petitioner claims that the amount was forwarded by the money order, no such money order was received and any payment was not made to the respondent. Mr. Rathod also, submitted that the petitioner is not right in' claiming that provisions u/s 25F(c) are not mandatory but are directory. To support his submission, Mr. Rathod, learned advocate for the respondent relied upon the decision of. the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case between Workmen of Subong Tea Estate Vs. The Outgoing Management of Subong Tea Estate and Another, AIR 1967 SC 420 Mr. Rathod also disputed the submissions and assertions by the petitioner firm that the unit has been closed. 5. At the outset, it deserves to be mentioned that the petitioner has brought on record a copy of Form No. 24 being the notice required to be given, under Clause (c) of Section 25F, by an employer who intends to effect retrenchment. The copy of the notice claimed to have been given is of November 9, 1982. As per the said notice, the petitioner had informed the appropriate Government about proposed retrenchment of 9 workmen on November 9, 1982. 5.1 Any counter opposing the said document has not been filed in present petition. The petitioner claims that the notice was forwarded, but the learned Labour Court has recorded that any material to show compliance of Clause (c) of Section 25F was not produced on record. As aforesaid, any counter stating that the copy of the said notice was not forwarded to the authority and/or it was not placed on record before the Labour Court, has not been filed by the workmen. 5.2 From the award it does not emerge that the workmen had alleged or given evidence that the notice was not given and/or that any suggestion to that effect was put to company's witness during his deposition. 5.3 The workmen merely alleged that she was not given notice i.e. notice as required u/s 25F(a) was not given to the workmen, but there does not appear allegation made by the workmen that notice to the authority was not given. The said allegation is not believed by the Labour Court in view of Exhibit 20 which is the notice given to the workman. 5.4 The workmen also alleged that compensation was not paid. The said allegation is not believed by the Labour Court in view of Exhibit 20 which is the notice given to the workman. 5.4 The workmen also alleged that compensation was not paid. This allegation is also not believed by learned Labour Court in view of Exhibit 30 (the copies of money order receipts) evidencing that the amount was forwarded by Money Order as she had refused to accept the notice. 5.5 However, as per the details recorded in the award there does not appear to be any allegation or evidence from the side of workmen about notice contemplated u/s 25F(c) and in response to the petition also any counter-affidavit disputing petitioner's assertion is not filed. 5.6 Be that as it may, from the copy of the notice at Annexure-B (page 18) it emerges that at the material point of time i.e. on November 9, 1982, the petitioner firm had informed the competent authority about retrenchment of 9 workmen. In view of the fact that, Exhibit 20 notice was offered but workmen refused and the compensation amount had to be forwarded by Money Order and in view of the admission by the respondent workmen that other 8 workmen (as mentioned in the notice dated November 9, 1982) were also retrenched, there is no reason, to not acknowledge the said notice, more so in absence of any affidavit denying the said factual assertion. 6. Be it noted that the learned Labour Court also has recorded positive and affirmative finding that the respondent was served with one month's notice and she was also offered the amounts payable in accordance with law, however, it was the respondent who refused to accept the payment and therefore, the amount payable to the respondent upon retrenchment was forwarded by money order thus, the action was not in breach of Section 25F(a) or 25F(b). If the petitioner's submission regarding the effect of Section 25F(c) is accepted, then the controversy about the alleged absence of notice will, in any case, pale into insignificance. 7. Since in present case, the controversy has arisen in light of Section 25F(c), it would be appropriate to take a closer look at the said provision, and to also make a comparative study of this provision with Section 25F(a) and (b). 7. Since in present case, the controversy has arisen in light of Section 25F(c), it would be appropriate to take a closer look at the said provision, and to also make a comparative study of this provision with Section 25F(a) and (b). Section 25F(c) reads thus: 25F, Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.-No workman employed in any industry who has been in contiguous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until: (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served and the appropriate Government (or such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). 8. While opposing, the submissions on behalf of the petitioner with regard to Section 25F(c), Mr. Rathod, learned advocate for the respondent heavily relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Workmen of Subong Tea Estate (Indian Tea Employees' Union) v. Subong Tea Estate and Anr. (supra), Mr. Rathod, in particular, relied on the following observations: The true legal position in respect of the industrial law as to retrenchment is not in doubt or in dispute. Section 25F of the Act prescribes the conditions precedent to a valid retrenchment of industrial employees. It provides that no workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until one month's notice has been served on him as prescribed by Clause (a), compensation paid to him as provided for by Clause (b), and notice in the prescribed form is served on the appropriate Government as required by conditions prescribed by Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 25F appear prima facie to constitute conditions precedent before an industrial workman can be validly retrenched. 8.1 Mr. Rathod also relied upon the judgment by the Apex Court in the case between The State of Bombay and Others Vs. 8.1 Mr. Rathod also relied upon the judgment by the Apex Court in the case between The State of Bombay and Others Vs. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha and Others, AIR 1960 SC 610 , and particularly relied on the observations in para 6, which read thus: 6...Clauses (a) and (c) of the said section prescribe similar conditions but we are not concerned with them. On a plain reading of Section 25F(b) it is clear that the requirement prescribed by it is a condition precedent for the retrenchment of the workman. The section provides that no workman shall be retrenched until the condition in question has been satisfied. It is difficult to accede to the argument that when the section imposes in mandatory terms a condition precedent, non-compliance with the said condition would not render the impugned retrenchment invalid. 8.2 Mr. Rathod, learned Advocate, submitted, in light of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Workmen of Subong Tea Estate (Indian Tea Employees' Union) v. Subong Tea Estate and Anr. (supra), that the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the condition prescribed by Clause (c) of Section 25-F is also a condition precedent, and therefore, mandatory. He further submitted, relying on the decision in the State of Bombay and Ors. v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha and Others (supra), that the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that Clauses (a) and (c) of Section 25F prescribe similar condition as prescribed under Clause (b). He submitted that since the condition prescribed under Clause (b) is held to be a condition precedent it would follow that condition prescribed under Clause (c) also should be treated as mandatory. In his submissions, Mr. Rathod has overlooked that in the case of Workmen of Subong Tea Estate (Indian Tea Employees' Union) v. Subong Tea Estate and Anr. (supra) the Hon'ble Apex; Court has observed that the conditions prescribed by Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 25F appear prima facie to constitute condition precedent... 8.2(a) In the said case of Workmen of Subong Tea Estate (Indian Tea Employees' Union) v. Subong Tea Estate and Anr. (supra), the Apex Court, as explained in the subsequent judgment of Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay (supra), was not dealing with and considering Sub-clause (c) of Section 25F. Similarly, in the case of State of Bombay and Ors. (supra), the Apex Court, as explained in the subsequent judgment of Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay (supra), was not dealing with and considering Sub-clause (c) of Section 25F. Similarly, in the case of State of Bombay and Ors. v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha and Others (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court has, in para 6 of the judgment, clarified that the" Hon'ble Court was not considering and dealing with Clauses (a) and (c) of Section 25F in the said case i.e. in the case of State of Bombay and Ors. v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha and Others (supra) which is clear from observations in para 6 of the judgment, wherein the Hon'ble Court has observed, Clause (a) and (c) of the said section prescribe similar conditions, but we are not concerned with them. The position that the Apex Court was not examining the effect and scope of Clause (c) of Section 25F is highlighted also from the subsequent observations in said para 6 in following words: "on a plane (sic plain) reading of Section 25F(b) it is clear that the requirement prescribed by it...." The said observations clarify that the Hon'ble Apex Court was considering Clause (b) of Section 25F in the said judgment. 8.2(b) The observations by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Workmen of Subong Tea Estate (Indian Tea Employees' Union) v. Subong Tea Estate and Anr. (supra) ox State of Bombay and Ors. v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha and Ors. (supra) have been considered and explained by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay (supra) Wherein, Clause (c) of Section 25F came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court. In the said case the Hon'ble Court also examined earlier decisions. The legal position regarding Section 25F(c) has been settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision in the case of Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay (supra), to which reference has been made hereafter. 9. The issue regarding the effect and scope of Clause (c) of Section 25-F was considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay (supra). Having considered the provisions u/s 25F(c) and also having compared it with the provisions with Section 25F(a) and 25F(b), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that: 9. The issue regarding the effect and scope of Clause (c) of Section 25-F was considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay (supra). Having considered the provisions u/s 25F(c) and also having compared it with the provisions with Section 25F(a) and 25F(b), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that: 9. That takes us to the main point which has been strenuously argued before us by Mr. Bishan Narain with regard to the construction of Section 25F(c). His contention is that just as Section 25F(a) and (b) are both mandatory and constitute conditions precedent for valid retrenchment, so is Section 25F(c) mandatory and a condition precedent. The prohibition contained in Section 25F is put in the negative form and it is coupled with the condition that no retrenchment can be effected until the three conditions specified by Clauses (a), (b) and (c) are satisfied. The negative form adopted by the provision coupled with the use of the word 'until' which introduces the three conditions, indicates that the conditions must be first satisfied before retrenchment can be validly effected. In this connection, Mr. Bishan Narain has referred to the decision of this Court in State of Bombay and Ors. v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha and Others (supra), where it has been held that the requirement prescribed by Section 25F(b) is mandatory and has to be complied with before as industrial employee can be retrenched. Dealing with Section 25F(b), it was observed in that judgment that clauses (a) and (c) of the said section prescribed similar conditions, though it was expressly added that the Court was then not concerned to construe them. Mr. Bishan Narain has also invited our attention to the fact that in Tea Districts Labour Association, Calcutta Vs. Ex-employees of Tea Districts Labour Association and Another, AIR 1960 SC 815 it was conceded that the requirement as to notice prescribed by Section 25-F(c) was mandatory and amounted to a condition precedent. Likewise, it appears that in the case of the Workmen of Subong Tea Estate (Indian Tea Employees' Union) v. Subong Tea Estate and Anr. Ex-employees of Tea Districts Labour Association and Another, AIR 1960 SC 815 it was conceded that the requirement as to notice prescribed by Section 25-F(c) was mandatory and amounted to a condition precedent. Likewise, it appears that in the case of the Workmen of Subong Tea Estate (Indian Tea Employees' Union) v. Subong Tea Estate and Anr. (supra), Civil Appeal No. 132/1963 D/December 2, 1963 (SC) recently decided by this Court, it has been incidentally stated that the three conditions, prescribed by Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 25F appear prima facie to constitute conditions precedent before an industrial workman can be validly retrenched. In that case, no question arose about the construction and effect of the provisions of Section 25F and the observations are clearly in the nature of obiter observations and even then they indicate that they Court thought that prima facie the three conditions may be similar. No decision of this Court has been cited before us where this question has been directly considered and decided. 10. Mr. Bishan Narain, however, urges, and with some force, that the normal rule of construction requires that if Clause (a) and (b) of Section 25F constitute conditions precedent, Clause (c) in the context must also receive the same construction. Prima facie this argument is no doubt attractive; but a closer examination of the section shows that Clause (c) of Section 25F cannot receive the same construction as Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25F. Section 25F(a) requires that the workman has to be given one month's notice in writing, indicating the reasons for retrenchment, and the period of notice has to expire before the retrenchment takes place. It also provides that the workman can be paid in lieu of such notice wages for the said period. It is the latter provision of Clause (a) which requires careful consideration in dealing with the character of the requirement prescribed by Section 25F(c). It also provides that the workman can be paid in lieu of such notice wages for the said period. It is the latter provision of Clause (a) which requires careful consideration in dealing with the character of the requirement prescribed by Section 25F(c). This latter provision allows the employer to retrench the workman on paying him his wages in lieu of notice for one month prescribed by the earlier part of Clause (a), and that means that if the employer decides to retrench a workman, he need not give one month's notice in writing and wait for the expiration of the said period before he retrenches him; he can proceed to retrench him straightaway on paying him his wages in lieu of the said notice. Take a case where retrenchment is effected under this latter provision of Clause (a); how would the requirement of Clause (c) operate in such a case? If it is held that the notice in the prescribed manner has to be served by the employer on the appropriate Government before retrenching the employee in such a case, it would mean that even in a case where retrenchment is effected on payment of wages in lieu of notice it cannot be valid unless the requisite notice is served on the appropriate Government; and that does not appear to be logical or reasonable. Reading the latter part of Clause (a) and Clause (c) together, it seems to follow that in cases falling under the latter part of Clause (a) the notice prescribed by Clause (c) has to be given not before retrenchment, but after retrenchment; otherwise the option given to the employer to bring about immediate retrenchment of the workman on paying him wages in lieu of notice would be rendered nugatory. Therefore, it seems that Clause (c) cannot be held to be a condition precedent even though it has been included u/s 25F along with Clauses (a) and (b) which prescribe conditions precedent. (emphasis supplied) 10. Subsequently, in the case between Utkal Asbestos Ltd. v. T.S. Rao and Anr. 1993 (Supp) III LLJ 726 (Ori), the High Court of Orissa, while dealing with similar contention with regard to Section 25F(1) after taking into consideration the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay (supra), has observed thus: 5. Subsequently, in the case between Utkal Asbestos Ltd. v. T.S. Rao and Anr. 1993 (Supp) III LLJ 726 (Ori), the High Court of Orissa, while dealing with similar contention with regard to Section 25F(1) after taking into consideration the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay (supra), has observed thus: 5. So far as the first contention of Shri Das is concerned, the same no longer remains res integra. The Supreme Court as early as in the case of Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay (supra), after scrutinizing the provisions of Section 25F(c) of the Act held as follows: In para 11 of the judgment, their Lordships of the Supreme Court also observed that Section 25F(c) cannot be said to constitute a condition precedent which has to be fulfilled before retrenchment can be validly effected. In view of this authoritative pronouncement, Sri Tripathy appearing for opposite party very fairly stated that the Tribunal committed an error of law in coming to the conclusion that non-compliance of notice provided for in Section 25F(c) would vitiate the order of retrenchment. In the premises as aforesaid, the said conclusion of the Tribunal is hereby quashed. The contention of Sri Das is, therefore, upheld. (emphasis supplied) 11. At this stage reference may also be made of the decision in Gurmail Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors., AIR 1993 SC 1388 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed thus: 2...The relevant records showing the despatch of these drafts were also produced in the court. The High Court was satisfied that the State had despatched individual bank drafts in respect of each of the employees well in advance of the date of expiry of the notice period and that the despatch of these drafts to the divisional offices constituted a good and valid tender of the compensation amount to the appellants. The court held that this was sufficient compliance with the provisions of Clause (b) of Section 25F. So far as the provisions of Clause (c) of Section 25F were concerned, the High Court was satisfied that the requisite notice in the prescribed form ' P' was sent to the Secretary to Government, Labour Department and the Employment Exchange concerned by personal delivery duly acknowledged in the peon book of the department. So far as the provisions of Clause (c) of Section 25F were concerned, the High Court was satisfied that the requisite notice in the prescribed form ' P' was sent to the Secretary to Government, Labour Department and the Employment Exchange concerned by personal delivery duly acknowledged in the peon book of the department. Pointing out that the requirements of Clause (c) of Section 25F were only directory and not mandatory, the High Court was of the opinion that the notices were not vitiated due to non-compliance with Clause (c) of Section 25F. (emphasis supplied) 12. It also deserves to be noted that the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay (supra) is a subsequent judgment (date of order December 19, 1963) and has been rendered after considering the earlier judgment in the case of Workmen of Subong Tea Estate (Indian Tea Employees' Union) v. Subong Tea Estate and Anr. (supra) (date of order December 2, 1963) on which Mr. Rathod heavily relied. It is pertinent that, upon referring to the judgment in the case of Workmen of Subong Tea Estate (Indian Tea Employees' Union) v. Subong Tea Estate and Anr. (supra) in the aforesaid subsequent case of Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has, clarified, in para 9, that what was stated in the case of Workmen of Subong Tea Estate (Indian Tea Employees' Union) v. Subong Tea Estate and Anr. (supra) was clearly in nature of obiter observations. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also clarified that In that case no question arose about the construction and effect of the provisions of Section 25F... In light of the clarification by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay (supra), reliance put by Mr. Rathod on the decision in case of Subong Tea Estate so as to support the respondent's contention regarding Clause (c) of Section 25F is unsustainable and is of no assistance to the respondent's contention. The Hon'ble Apex Court has clearly held that: Therefore, it seems that Clause (c) cannot be held to be condition precedent even though it has been included u/s 25F along with Clauses (a) & (b) which prescribe condition precedent. The Hon'ble Apex Court has clearly held that: Therefore, it seems that Clause (c) cannot be held to be condition precedent even though it has been included u/s 25F along with Clauses (a) & (b) which prescribe condition precedent. (emphasis supplied) 12.1 It has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay (supra). Clause (c) of Section 25F cannot receive the same construction as Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25F. 12.2 The said position came to be further clarified by the Hon'ble Apex Court in para 12 of the aforesaid judgment wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has further observed, "the object which the legislature had in mind in making; these two conditions obligatory and in constituting them into conditions precedent is obvious. These provisions have to be satisfied before a workman can be retrenched. The hard ship resulting from retrenchment has been partially redressed by these two clauses, and so, there is every justification for making them conditions precedent. The same cannot be said about the requirement as to Clause (c). Clause (c) is not intended to protect the interests of the workman as such. It is only intended to give intimation to the appropriate Government about the retrenchment, and that only helps the Government keep itself informed about the conditions of employment in the different industries within its region...." Therefore, having regard to the object which is intended to be achieved by Clauses (a) and (b) as distinct from the object which Clause (c) has in mind, it would not be unreasonable to hold that Clause (c), unlike Clauses (a) and (b), is not a condition precedent. 13. Thus, in view of the subsequent judgment by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay (supra) wherein the issue pertaining to Section 25F(c) was directly under consideration and in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the judgments relied upon by Mr. Rathod, learned advocate for the respondent, do not assist him. 14. In view of the legal position with reference to Section 25F(c) settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court, as discussed above, the findings by the learned Labour Court with regard to breach of Section 25F(c) cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be set aside. Rathod, learned advocate for the respondent, do not assist him. 14. In view of the legal position with reference to Section 25F(c) settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court, as discussed above, the findings by the learned Labour Court with regard to breach of Section 25F(c) cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be set aside. Even if for the sake of testing the ultimate decision and direction of the trial court, it is assumed that the notice contemplated under Clause (c) was not given, although Annexure-B demonstrates different fact-situation, then also in light of the legal position regarding Clause (c) of Section 25F as settled by Hon'ble Apex Court, the impugned conclusions, decisions and award by the Labour Court are unsustainable in law, hence, they are set aside. Consequently, the impugned award stands quashed. The petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. No costs.