JUDGMENT Ranjan Gogoi, J. 1. This appeal under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), by the Revenue raises the following substantial question of law: Whether, on the facts and in the circumstance of the case, the Tribunal was correct in law in holding that interest under Sections 234B and 234C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, cannot be charged on the ground that the direction to charge such interest is not mentioned in the assessment order though the same is charged as per tax calculation sheet forming part of the assessment order? 2. The relevant facts may be briefly noticed at the very outset. 3. Pursuant to an order dated June 26, 2002, passed by the learned Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Gauhati Bench (hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal") under Section 254 of the Act, the Assessing Officer finalised the assessment of the respondent for the year 1992-93 by an order dated December 23, 2003. By the said order the Assessing Officer determined the total income of the assessee for the year in question at Rs. 25,24,155. No specific order levying interest was recorded by the Assessing Officer. However, in the computation sheet (Form No. ITNS 150) annexed to the assessment order interest under Sections 234B and 234C of the Act was computed while determining the total sum payable by the assessee. Aggrieved by the levy of interest, the assessee filed an appeal before the learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) who by order dated July 2, 2004, deleted the interest charged under Sections 234B and 234C of the Act. Against the aforesaid order of the first appellate authority the Revenue moved the learned Tribunal. The learned Tribunal by order dated July 20, 2006, upheld the order of the first appellate authority giving rise to the present second appeal under Section 260A of the Act. 4. We have heard Sri U. Bhuyan, learned standing Counsel, Income Tax appearing for the Revenue and Sri U. K. Borthakur, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-assessee. 5. Placing the impugned order dated July 20, 2006, passed by the learned Tribunal, Sri Bhuyan has urged that reliance was wrongly placed on the decision of the Patna High Court in Uday Mistanna Bhandar and Complex v. CIT reported in [1996] 222 ITR 44 and the decision of this court in River Valley Tea Co. 5. Placing the impugned order dated July 20, 2006, passed by the learned Tribunal, Sri Bhuyan has urged that reliance was wrongly placed on the decision of the Patna High Court in Uday Mistanna Bhandar and Complex v. CIT reported in [1996] 222 ITR 44 and the decision of this court in River Valley Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Taxes reported in [2004] 266 ITR 383 (Gauhati). Sri Bhuyan has argued that the aforesaid two decisions will not apply to the present case inasmuch as, in Uday Mistanna Bhandar and Complex [1996] 222 ITR 44 the sum payable by the assessee was determined for the first time in the demand notice issued under Section 156 of the Act. It is in such a situation that it was held that "notice of demand under Section 156 of the Act cannot go beyond the assessment order". However, in the present case, the tax payable along with interest was computed in the computation sheet prepared in the prescribed form (ITNS 150) which was appended to the assessment order itself. Placing the decision of the apex court in Kalyankumar Ray v. CIT [1991] 191 ITR 634 (SC), Sri Bhuyan has contended that in the facts of the present case it should be held that the computation sheet is a part of the assessment order which was duly served on the assessee. The said computation having clearly shown the basis for levy of interest under Sections 234B and 234C the Act, according to Sri Bhuyan, the learned Tribunal has gone grossly wrong in coming to the impugned finding. Sri Bhuyan has also placed reliance on a decision the apex court in the case of CIT v. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala reported in [2001] 252 ITR 1, to contend that levy of interest under Sections 234B and 234C of the Act is mandatory in law. 6. In reply, Sri Borthakur, learned Counsel for the respondent-assessee has argued that the assessment order though purports to be under Section 254 of the Act is really under Section 143(3). Placing the provisions of Section 143(3) of the Act, Sri Borthakur has pointed out that while finalizing an assessment under the provisions of the Act, the Assessing Officer has to determine the income or loss of the assessee, as may be, for the year under consideration and also the sum payable on the basis of such assessment. Placing the provisions of Section 143(3) of the Act, Sri Borthakur has pointed out that while finalizing an assessment under the provisions of the Act, the Assessing Officer has to determine the income or loss of the assessee, as may be, for the year under consideration and also the sum payable on the basis of such assessment. Thereafter, under Section 156 of the Act a demand notice is required to be issued. Sri Borthakur has submitted that the demand notice under Section 156 requires the specific sum payable by an assessee to be demanded in the prescribed form and such sum which may be on account of tax, interest, penalty, fine, etc., must become payable pursuant to an order passed under the Act. It is further argued that the determination of the income of the assessee and the sum payable on the said basis either as tax, interest, penalty or fine are two independent facets and levy of interest in the computation sheet determining the sum payable cannot be substituted for an order levying/imposing interest. In the present case, no order for levy of interest had been passed in the assessment order. The learned Counsel has also argued that though the levy of interest under Sections 234B and 234C of the Act is mandatory, the said mandate cannot be enforced without following the parallel mandatory requirement of levy of interest by means of the assessment order itself. 7. Sri Borthakur, learned Counsel has also pointed out the pre-conditions stipulated by Sections 208and 210 of the Act to attract the liability to pay advance tax in order to further demonstrate the requirement/necessity of an order levying interest in a case of alleged failure to pay advance tax. The learned Counsel has contended that no finding or conclusion has been recorded in the assessment order passed in the present case to the effect that the necessary conditions precedent for levy of interest are present. 8. We have carefully considered the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties. The learned Counsel has contended that no finding or conclusion has been recorded in the assessment order passed in the present case to the effect that the necessary conditions precedent for levy of interest are present. 8. We have carefully considered the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties. In Uday Mistanna Bhandar and Complex v. CIT [1996] 222 ITR 44 (Patna) the view expressed by the Bench of the Patna High Court that "a notice of demand cannot go beyond the assessment order" was recorded in a situation where the sum payable by way of tax, interest, fine or penalty was for the first time determined in the notice of demand issued under Section 156 of the Act. In the present case, as already noticed, such determination was made in the computation sheet (Form No. ITNS 150) which was appended to the assessment order. The decision of the Patna High Court in Uday Mistanna Bhandar and Complex v. CIT [1996] 222 ITR 44 (Patna) and the reliance placed on the one by this court in its decision in River Valley Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Taxes [2004] 266 ITR 383 (Gauhati), therefore, does not appear to be squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. Rather, a reading of the judgment of the apex court in Kalyankumar Ray v. CIT [1991] 191 ITR 634 (SC) would seem to indicate that the computation sheet in the form prescribed (Form No. ITNS 150) signed or initialled by the Income Tax Officer is an order in writing determining the tax payable within the meaning of Section 143(3) of the Act and, therefore, has to be treated as a part of the assessment order though the apex court has qualified the same to be in a wider context. The conclusion of the apex court in Kalyankumar Ray [1991] 191 ITR 634 to the effect that the Income Tax Officer having signed the computation sheet in Form No. ITNS 150 had complied with the statutory provisions, therefore, would be more appropriate to govern the facts of the present case. The levy of interest and the basis for arriving at the quantum thereof having been explicitly indicated in the computation sheet in Form No. ITNS 150. The levy of interest and the basis for arriving at the quantum thereof having been explicitly indicated in the computation sheet in Form No. ITNS 150. We do not find any good reason to take the view that the levy of interest in the present case was unauthorized as held by the forums below including the learned Tribunal. 9. The mandatory nature of the interest leviable under Sections 234B and 234C of the Act stands concluded by the judgment of the apex court in Anjum M.H. Ghaswala [2001] 252 ITR 1. Such levy of interest, as held by the apex court, could not have been dispensed with by the Settlement Commission in exercise of its power under Section 245D of the Act save and except to the extent that the exemption notification in force may permit. As we have already held that in the present case the levy of interest was recorded in the computation sheet which formed a part of the assessment order, we do not see as to how the respondent-assessee can escape its liability to pay such interest. The contention advanced by Sri Borthakur, learned Counsel for the respondent-assessee that the assessment order does not mention the existence of the pre-conditions stipulated by Section 210 of the Act to attract levy of interest not only remains unsubstantiated on our finding that the computation sheet in Form No. ITNS 150 is an integral part of the assessment order, the said argument also raises questions not earlier raised before the forums below. 10. In view of the foregoing discussions, we are of the opinion that this appeal deserves to be allowed which we hereby do. The impugned order dated July 20, 2006, passed by the learned Tribunal in I.T.A. No. 137(Gau) of 2004 is hereby set aside.