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2009 DIGILAW 734 (GAU)

Kynremri Lyngdoh v. State of Meghalaya

2009-10-21

TINLIANTHANG VAIPHEI

body2009
JUDGMENT Tinlianthang Vaiphei, J. 1. Both the writ petition and criminal petition virtually involving the same parties and are inter-connected on material facts were taken up together for hearing and are now being disposed of by a common judgment. 2. Coming to the facts of the writ petition first, the case of the petitioner is that he had purchased a plot of land situate at Mawrie-Madan ling Syiem, Mylliem Syiemship, East Khasi Hills District from one P. Kurkalang by the registered sale deed dated 27.3.2006 and also obtained permission from the Deputy Commissioner, East Khasi Hills District on 29.11.2006 for setting up a petrol pump thereon. Thereafter, he obtained permission from the Revenue Department for leasing the said land in favour of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vide the notification dated 5.3.2007 whereafter the lease deed dated 27.4.2008 was executed by him in favour of the Corporation. He had earlier obtained no-objection certificate (NOC) dated 20.2.2006 from the respondent No. 6, who is the Headman of Madan ling Syiem, for setting up the petrol pump as he was under the impression that the plot in question fell within his village. But when he started construction of the petrol pump, the respondent No. 5, who is the Headman of Mawrie village, lodged a verbal complaint before the Mawngap Police Station, which prompted the Executive Magistrate to register C.R. Case No. 21(A) of 2007 and passed the order dated 26.6.2007 drawing up proceedings under Section 107/145(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The In-Charge, Mawngap Police Outpost had, however, reported that the dispute was purely a dispute of civil nature and pertained to a boundary dispute between the villages of the respondent Nos. 5 and 6. In the meantime, the petitioner, as a matter of abundant caution, also approached and obtained another NOC from the respondent No. 5 on 23.6.2007 for setting up the petrol pump. While the construction of the petrol pump was going on the said plot, the respondent No. 7, claiming to be the clan elder of Kurkalang Kseh clan, instituted Title Suit No. 6 of 2007 against the petitioner before the Subordinate District Council Court for declaration of title, etc. In the connected Misc. Case No. 6 of 2007 filed by the respondent No. 7, the trial court by the order dated 6.8.2007 granted an interim injunction against the petitioner. In the connected Misc. Case No. 6 of 2007 filed by the respondent No. 7, the trial court by the order dated 6.8.2007 granted an interim injunction against the petitioner. The matter was taken in appeal by the petitioner before the learned Additional Judge, District Council Court in M.C.A. No. 2 of 2007. Ultimately, in Civil Revision No. 50 (SH) of 2007, this Court by the order dated 24.8.2007 remanded the appeal to the appellate court for re-hearing, and the appellate court thereafter remanded the case to the trial court for re-hearing of the injunction matter. The respondent No. 7, however, withdrew the suit on 24.9.2007. 3. It is also the case of the petitioner that the respondent No. 7 in the meantime abruptly issued the letter dated 16.8.2007 revoking the NOC for setting up the petrol pump granted to him earlier on the purported ground that T.S. No. 6 of 2007 and M.C. No. 6 of 2007 filed by the elders of Kurkalang Kseh clan against him were pending before the District Council Court and he did not want to get involved in court cases. It is alleged by the petitioner that the respondent No. 5 and the respondent No. 7 thereafter lodged another complaint with the Officer-in-Charge, Mawngap Police Station alleging that the respondent No. 6 had erected a Notice Board in the disputed land and trespassed on his land including of the disputed plot. Based upon the police report, the learned Executive Magistrate drew up proceedings under Sections 107 / 145, Cr. PC in connection with C.R. Case No. 28(A) of 2007. It may be noted here that the police in their report had stated that the dispute was purely a civil dispute and pertained to boundary dispute between the two villages but they nevertheless pointed out that the dispute could occasion breach of the peace as the situation obtaining there was tense and dangerous. The respondent No. 7 also instituted Title Suit No. 40(T) of 2007 along with Misc. Case No. 76(T) of 2007 against the petitioner and others before the learned Assistant to Deputy Commissioner, Shillong for declaration of title and permanent injunction. In the connected Misc. Case, the learned Assistant to DC passed the order dated 5.10.2007 granting ex parte injunction restraining the petitioner from carrying out further construction in the suit land. Case No. 76(T) of 2007 against the petitioner and others before the learned Assistant to Deputy Commissioner, Shillong for declaration of title and permanent injunction. In the connected Misc. Case, the learned Assistant to DC passed the order dated 5.10.2007 granting ex parte injunction restraining the petitioner from carrying out further construction in the suit land. On appeal filed by the petitioner, the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner by the order dated 22.10.2007 in F.A.O. No. 6(T) of 2007 stayed the interim injunction dated 5.10.2007. Subsequently, the learned Executive Magistrate passed the orders dated 26.11.2007 and dated 4.12.2007 in the said O.K. Case No. 21(A) of 2007 restraining the petitioner from further construction in the disputed plot. This led the petitioner to file two criminal petitions being Criminal Petition No. 13(SH) of 2008 and Criminal Petition No. 14(SH) of 2008 before this Court for quashing the two proceedings, namely, C.R. Case No. 21(A) of 2007 and C.R. Case No. 28(A) of 2007 respectively. This Court thereafter passed the order dated 12.5.2008 in connection with the miscellaneous case in Criminal Petition No. 13(SH) of 2008 staying the proceedings in C.R. Case No. 21(A) of 2007. According to the petitioner, the respondent Nos. 5 and 7 then approached the Meghalaya State Electricity Board not to extend power supply to his petrol pump, which has now been completed and waiting for its commissioning. In Criminal Petition No. 25(SH) of 2008, the petitioner is questioning the legality of the aforesaid orders dated 26.6.2007, dated 26.11.2007 and dated 4.12.2007 passed by the learned Executive Magistrate, Shillong in C.R. Case No. 21(A) of 2007. 4. The writ petition and the criminal petition are opposed by the respondent Nos. 2, 5 and 7. These respondents separately filed their respective affidavits-in-opposition in the writ petition. The respondent No. 6 also filed his affidavit-in-opposition. But from the tone and tenor of his affidavit, it is obvious that he supports the case of the petitioner. In his affidavit-in-opposition, the respondent No. 2 maintains that there was likelihood of breach of the peace between the parties and it was with a view to avoid breach of the peace in that area that the In-charge, Mawngap Police Outpost recommended to the Executive Magistrate concerned to draw up proceedings under Section 107/145, Cr. PC against the both the rival parties. PC against the both the rival parties. The respondent No. 5 in his affidavit-in-opposition categorically asserts that the petrol pump in question has been constructed at Mawrie village and denies that the same lies within Madan Ing Syeim village. According to him, when the petitioner started to construct the petrol pump in the disputed plot without the permission of the Dorbar Shnong, he along with members of his Dorbar approached the petitioner, who produced the NOC issued by the respondent No. 6 whereupon verbal complaint was lodged by him with the police. It was only after the complaint that the petitioner applied for and obtained the NOC dated 23.6.2007 from him, but when it was brought to his notice that a civil suit concerning the disputed plot was pending that he revoked the NOC issued to him. It is contended by the answering respondent that the writ petition is not maintainable as it involves serious disputed questions of fact, which cannot be adjudicated upon by this Court in a summary proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution and that the writ petition questioning the revocation of the NOC on 23.6.2007 is also barred by the principle of laches. The respondent No. 5 also maintains therein that the petitioner is further barred from simultaneously prosecuting F.A.O. No. 6(T) of 2007 before the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner, Shillong and this Court over the same subject-matter. It is, thus, contended that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 5. The stand taken by the respondent No. 7 in his affidavit-in-opposition is that the disputed plot is the ancestral land of Kurkalang Kseh clan in terms of the confirmation deed dated 17.12.1923 issued by the Office of the Syiem of Hima Myilliem and no outsider is allowed to purchase such clan land. 5. The stand taken by the respondent No. 7 in his affidavit-in-opposition is that the disputed plot is the ancestral land of Kurkalang Kseh clan in terms of the confirmation deed dated 17.12.1923 issued by the Office of the Syiem of Hima Myilliem and no outsider is allowed to purchase such clan land. It is claimed by the answering respondent that the grandmother of Smt. P. Kurkalang, being a clan member, on mutual understanding, had been allowed to cultivate a plot of land as she had no land of her own; that the said P. Kurkalang in her letter dated 18.1.2006 informed the Secretary of the clan that she would lease out the said plot for 50 years even though she knew that the land belongs to the clan; that notices were issued to her on 2.6.2007 and 12.6.2007 to appear before the Executive Committee of the clan for resolving the issue, but she never appeared on both occasions; that subsequently the clan members were surprised to know that the petitioner began constructing the petrol pump without their knowledge or consent and that upon enquiry, it came to light that the said P. Kurkalang had surreptitiously and illegally sold the disputed plot to the petitioner. The petitioner was thereafter requested to meet the clan members to meet them on 14.7.2007 to settle the matter but he attend to do so whereupon they wrote to the Regional Manager on 30.8.2007 informing him of the existence of dispute over the plot in question. Title Suit No. 6 of 2007 was withdrawn by him as a non-tribal entity like Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. was involved in that suit, which could be entertained only by the court of the Assistant to DC for adjudication. According to the answering respondent, there is no reason for the petitioner to approach this Court when the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner is seized with F.A.O. No. 6(T) of 2007 over the same subject-matter. The answering respondent also alleges that the petitioner, using money and muscle power, is illegally trying to grab the land of the Kurkalang clan for which a civil suit is pending in a competent court of jurisdiction. As the disputed land belongs to Kurkalang clan, states the respondent No. 7, he, as the clan elder, has the responsibility to ensure that the same is protected against any encroacher. As the disputed land belongs to Kurkalang clan, states the respondent No. 7, he, as the clan elder, has the responsibility to ensure that the same is protected against any encroacher. It is contended by the respondent No. 7 that the respondent No. 5 has rightly revoked the NOC as the same was obtained by the petitioner by misrepresentation of facts and that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed for non-exhaustion of the civil suit remedy pending adjudication. 6. The case of the respondent No. 6 as projected in his affidavit, however, is that the disputed plot falls within the boundaries of Madan ling Syiem village, of which he is the Headman. He and his Dorbar issued the NOC in favour of the petitioner as the same lies within their administrative jurisdiction. It is asserted by him that the respondent No. 5 has no business to lodge any complaint with the police as the disputed plot is neither his personal property nor is the same lying within his administrative jurisdiction or within the territorial boundaries of the village he administers; he, ipso facto, has no right to disturb the construction work of the petitioner. According to the answering respondent, the respondent No. 7 is driven by greed and utter jealousy in filing a spate of litigations to stop the petitioner from setting up the petrol pump. It is maintained by the respondent that the dispute is purely of a civil nature, and the respondent No. 5 in collusion with and under the influence of the respondent No. 7, instead of availing the alternative remedy provided for under the Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council (Administration of Elaka) Act, 1951 for settlement of boundary disputes, needlessly and repeatedly initiated criminal proceedings under Sections 107/145, Cr. PC. These are the sum and substance of the contentions of the respondent No. 7. 7. There is no dispute that the respondent No. 5, who is the Headman/Rangbah Shnong of Mawrie village, is a statutory authority, and, therefore, has the trapping of other authorities within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, any decision taken by him having civil consequences is amenable to judicial review by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The respondent No. 6 issued the NOC dated 23.6.2007, which is at Annexure-4. Therefore, any decision taken by him having civil consequences is amenable to judicial review by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The respondent No. 6 issued the NOC dated 23.6.2007, which is at Annexure-4. In this NOC, the respondent No. 5 unequivocally granted permission to the petitioner to commence construction of the Petrol Pump on the disputed plot. It is claimed by the petitioner, which is not denied by all the respondents, that the petitioner acted upon this NOC in constructing the Petrol Pump on the disputed plot. The respondent No. 5, however, issued the letter dated 10.8.2007 at Annexure-6 addressed to the petitioner revoking and canceling the NOC dated 23.6.2007 on the ground that the Dorbar Shnong, Mawrie village decided not to get involved in the litigation between the elders of Kurkalang Kseh clan and the petitioner. Though the NOC has conferred a right upon the petitioner to construct the petrol pump on the disputed plot, which he did, this NOC came to be abruptly cancelled/revoked by the respondent No. 5 by the impugned letter. No opportunity of hearing was admittedly given to the petitioner by the respondent No. 5 before revoking the NOC. Ex facie, the impugned letter is arbitrary and contrary to the principles of natural justice. The law is now firmly settled by the Apex Court in a catena of decisions that non-arbitrariness is an essential facet of Article 14 of the Constitution. It has come to be established, as a further corollary, that the audi alteram partem facet of natural justice is also a requirement of Article 14, for natural justice is the antithesis of arbitrariness. In this view of the matter, the impugned letter cannot be sustained in law. That apart, which is more important, the doctrine of estoppel is squarely applicable on the admitted positions of the parties. As already noticed, acting upon the representation of the respondent No. 5 in the NOC dated 23.6.2007 issued by him, the petitioner proceeded/continued to construct the Petrol Pump on the disputed plot. The doctrine is embodied in Section 115 of the Evidence Act, 1872. It precludes a person from denying the truth of some statement previously made by him. The section is based on equity and good conscience, the object being to prevent fraud and secure justice between the parties by promoting honesty and good faith. The doctrine is embodied in Section 115 of the Evidence Act, 1872. It precludes a person from denying the truth of some statement previously made by him. The section is based on equity and good conscience, the object being to prevent fraud and secure justice between the parties by promoting honesty and good faith. The section, plainly stated, says that a person, who, by his declaration, act or omission, had caused another to believe a thing to be true and to act upon that belief, must be held to have done so intentionally if a reasonable man would take the representation to be true, and believe that it was meant that he should act upon it. At times even an innocent or mistaken representation may operate as an estoppel. It is not essential that the person making the representation which induces another to act must be influenced by a fraudulent intention. A fraudulent intention is not necessary to create an estoppel. The determining element is not the motive with which the representation has been made, nor the state of knowledge of the party making it, but the effect of the representation as having caused another to act on the faith of it. In other words, you cannot blow hot and blow cold. There has to be consistency in human relationship and it should be all the more so in the functioning of a responsible statutory authority like the respondent No. 5. Therefore, the impugned decision of the respondent No. 5 cannot be upheld or justified in any manner. 8. Coming now to the contention of the respondent Nos. 5 and 7 that this writ petition is not maintainable as a civil suit upon the same subject-matter is pending, I must not lose sight of the fact that the matter directly and substantially in issue in F.A.O. No. 6(T) of 2007 pending before the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner, Shillong, is about the ownership of the disputed plot and the boundary dispute between Mawrie village and Madan ling Syeim village. Here, I am concerned with the legality of the letter dated 10.8.2007 of the respondent No. 5 revoking the NOC dated 23.6.2007 issued by him earlier. The issues seized with by the two courts are not, therefore, one and the same. The question of non-exhaustion of alternative remedy also does not arise on the admitted facts of this case. Here, I am concerned with the legality of the letter dated 10.8.2007 of the respondent No. 5 revoking the NOC dated 23.6.2007 issued by him earlier. The issues seized with by the two courts are not, therefore, one and the same. The question of non-exhaustion of alternative remedy also does not arise on the admitted facts of this case. The question is whether the letter revoking the NOC issued earlier comes within the purview of public law domain as the same is issued by a statutory authority. Whether such NOC has been issued within the four corners of law and whether it has the force of law, are entirely different, for which I am not called upon to adjudicate. On the question of laches raised by the same respondents, as the writ petition was filed by the petitioner within one year and no right of third parties is shown to have been affected in the interregnum, the contention is only to be noted to be summarily rejected. Consequently, I hold that the writ petition is maintainable in the present form. 9. Having discussed the issues involved in the writ petition, I now proceed to examine the legality of the three impugned orders passed by the learned Executive Magistrate in C.R. No. 21(A) of 2007. The relevant portions of the impugned orders are reproduced herein below: Case received on endorsement from the Learned ADM. Perused the C/R. Whereas I am satisfied from the police report that conditions exist that may warrant a breach of the public peace, I hereby drew up proceedings against both the parties and ask them to show good cause as to why they should not be ordered to execute a bond to keep the peace for the period of one year for an amount of Rs. 20,000 each with one surety each for an amount of Rs. 10,000. They are also required to file written statements in support of their claims over the land. Fix 25.7.2007 for their appearance/filing of W/S and show cause. Issue notice accordingly, a copy of this order be served along with it, on both parties. C.R. put up on call. Seen the application of the first party for maintaining status quo on the D/L till the matter is settled. Heard the counsel for the First Party. Fix 25.7.2007 for their appearance/filing of W/S and show cause. Issue notice accordingly, a copy of this order be served along with it, on both parties. C.R. put up on call. Seen the application of the first party for maintaining status quo on the D/L till the matter is settled. Heard the counsel for the First Party. Whereas I am satisfied that this matter has not yet come to its conclusion and is sub judice and the application to this effect by the 1st Party is not without any reason, the 2nd Party is hereby ordered not to proceed with any act of construction that might appear to be a violation of the process of law of the land. In fact both parties are hereby forbidden to carry out such act of acts that would amount to willful violation of court orders until such time as this case is finally settled. A copy of this order be served upon the Area Manager, MESEB for the area concerned, the 2nd Party as well as on the 1st Party. Put up C.R. on 28.11.2007. C.R. put on call. Seen the application by the first party filed through his advocate, wherein it is stated that the Second Party is still pursuing activities for construction of a petrol pump in the D/L, despite this Court's order on this matter. The second party is hereby directed to stop all further activities on the D/L till the matter is settled and to comply with the orders of the court, dated 26.11.2007, which was apparently not understood by it, intentionally or otherwise. A copy of this order be served upon the I/C, Mawngap Police Outpost and on both the parties. 10. It is contended by Mr. P. Nongbri, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, that the learned Executive Magistrate improperly exercised his jurisdiction in passing the preliminary order under Section 145(1), Cr. PC as there was no material on record to satisfy him concerning the existence of a dispute over land or boundaries, which was likely to cause breach of the peace between the parties. The learned Counsel further submits that the learned Magistrate has wrongly and unnecessarily dragged the petitioner to criminal proceedings which arose out of purely a boundary dispute between two villages and not with respect to the petrol pump constructed by him. The learned Counsel further submits that the learned Magistrate has wrongly and unnecessarily dragged the petitioner to criminal proceedings which arose out of purely a boundary dispute between two villages and not with respect to the petrol pump constructed by him. He maintains that when the interim injunction dated 5.10.2007 issued against the petitioner by the learned Assistant to DC in Misc. Case No. 76(T) of 2007 (a/o T.S. No. 40 of 2007) has been stayed by the learned Additional Deputy Commission, Shillong in his order dated 22.10.2007 in Misc. Case No. 23(T) of 2007 (a/o F.A.O. No. 6 of 2007), the approach of the learned Magistrate in drawing up criminal proceedings under Section 145, Cr. PC is clearly misconceived and illegal. According to the learned Counsel, the restraint order passed by the learned Magistrate cannot be inconsistent with, or contrary to, the order of a civil court, and the order so passed by the learned Magistrate has the effect of ousting the petitioner from his settled possession of the land in dispute. Per contra, Mr. K.C. Gautam, the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, supports the impugned orders and submits that the learned Executive Magistrate rightly drew up proceeding under Section 107 / 145, Cr. PC as the dispute between the parties over the construction of the petrol pump on the disputed plot, as reported by the police, had the potential of causing bloodshed and breach of the peace between them. He maintains that there were materials on record, based on police report, upon which the learned Magistrate could validly form subjective satisfaction that the dispute between the parties concerning the petrol pump was most likely to result in breach of the peace between the parties: it is the learned Magistrate who is the best person to judge, based on ground realities, the likelihood of breach of the peace between the parties as it is his duty to maintain law and order within his jurisdiction. He, therefore, submits that the impugned orders do not suffer from any jurisdictional error calling for the interference of this Court. 11. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel appearing for the rival parties. Section 145, Cr. PC is the last branch of the preventive jurisdiction of the Executive Magistrate. He, therefore, submits that the impugned orders do not suffer from any jurisdictional error calling for the interference of this Court. 11. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel appearing for the rival parties. Section 145, Cr. PC is the last branch of the preventive jurisdiction of the Executive Magistrate. It relates to disputes regarding possession of land, water or its boundaries, which are bound to be contentious and which can easily lend themselves to breach of the peace. The disputes do not affect the public or community at large; but between the disputants they are fraught with consequences dangerous in themselves. The function of the Magistrate is not to go into questions of title, but to meet the urgency of the situation for maintaining the party in possession. The Magistrate can, therefore, call upon the parties to put in written statements in support of their claim to actual possession. The order is to be served as a summons. The Magistrate is to peruse the statements, hear the parties and weigh the evidence, in order to ascertain who was, in possession at the date of the order. In substance and effect, a proceeding under Section 145 is not for the purpose of evicting any person from any land but is primarily concerned with the prevention of breach of the peace by declaring a party found to be in possession to be entitled to remain in possession until evicted therefrom, in due course of law. In the instant case, there can be no dispute that when the learned Magistrate was passing the preliminary order under Section 145(1), Cr. PC, the petitioner was demonstrably in possession of the disputed plot as he was constructing the petrol pump. The ex parte interim injunction dated 5.10.2007 issued by the learned Assistant to DC in Misc. Case No. 76(T) of 2007 was stayed by the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner on 22.10.2007 in F.A.O. No. 6(T) of 2007 preferred by the petitioner. In my opinion, the impugned orders have the effect of ousting the petitioner from his possession of the disputed plot, which is against the mandate of Section 145 and Section 146, Cr. PC, more so, when there is prima facie case of possession of the same by the petitioner. In my opinion, the impugned orders have the effect of ousting the petitioner from his possession of the disputed plot, which is against the mandate of Section 145 and Section 146, Cr. PC, more so, when there is prima facie case of possession of the same by the petitioner. When an interim order of injunction has been passed by a civil court, this section is not attracted and if at all there is likelihood of breach of peace, the person against whom the interim injunction has been issued should rather be proceeded against under Section 107, Cr. PC. Conversely, when the interim injunction passed against the party in prima facie possession of the disputed plot is stayed by the appellate court, then also the Magistrate must give due weight to the decision of the appellate court. The Executive Magistrate acting under this section ought to respect the decision of the civil court or the appellate court, as the case may be. He should not allow proceedings tantamount to encouraging defiance of the order of a civil court. This is necessary to ensure that there is no conflict between the decision of a Magistrate and a civil court. Though the learned Magistrate did not expressly mention the provision under which he passed the impugned restraint orders, from the tone and tenor of his order, I have no doubt in my mind that what he did was an order of attachment under Section 146(1), Cr. PC as the kind of restraint order passed by him is not permissible under Section 145, Cr. PC. Even if breach of peace is imminent, he must protect the person in possession of the disputed land vis-a-vis the person who seeks to take the law into his own hand otherwise it will send wrong signals to other potential trouble-makers. An impression should not be created that a wrongdoer can deprive a person in possession of a land by raising the bogey of imminent breach of peace to enable a Magistrate to put the disputed land under attachment. That could not have been the intention of the Legislature in enacting Section 146, Cr. PC. Once a person is prima facie found to be in possession of the disputed land, the party who seeks to dispossess him by use of force or otherwise must be bound by the Magistrate under Section 107, Cr. PC. That could not have been the intention of the Legislature in enacting Section 146, Cr. PC. Once a person is prima facie found to be in possession of the disputed land, the party who seeks to dispossess him by use of force or otherwise must be bound by the Magistrate under Section 107, Cr. PC. The Magistrate must also take the assistance of the law enforcement agency to protect the person in possession of the disputed land. This is the only method to prevent breach of the peace provoked by a party not in possession of the disputed land. The law must be enforced to protect a party in possession and to prevent mischief by a party not in possession of the disputed land. In the view that I have taken, the impugned orders must not be allowed to prevail. 12. For the reasons stated in the foregoing, both the writ petition and the criminal petition succeed. Consequently, the letter dated 10.8.2007 (Annexure-6 to the writ petition) issued by the Rangbah Shnong, Mawrie-Mylliem village and the three orders dated 26.6.2007, dated 26.11.2007 and dated 4.12.2007 passed by the learned Executive Magistrate, Shillong, which are at Annexure-4, Annexure-10 and Annexure-11 respectively to the criminal petition, are hereby quashed. The Executive Magistrate, Shillong dealing with this case shall hereafter exercise his jurisdiction strictly in the light of my aforesaid observations and in accordance with law. The parties are, however, directed to bear their respective costs. Petition allowed.