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Jharkhand High Court · body

2009 DIGILAW 736 (JHR)

Narayan Mochi v. Eastem Coal Fields Ltd. , Kolkata

2009-05-08

D.N.PATEL

body2009
Order This petition has been preferred for getting finalization of pension, payment of arrears of pension and payment of arrears of difference of salary, on the basis of New Coal Wages Agreement. 2. Counsel for the respondents submitted that the petitioner had served with the respondents at the State of West Bengal. He was residing at West Bengal, during service period. All respondents are of the State of West Bengal. No respondent is within the State of Jharkhand. Merely because, the petitioner has shifted, after retirement in this State, this High Court has no territorial jurisdiction. 3. Having heard learned counsel for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that the present petitioner was working with respondent no. 4 as "Underground Loader" at Madhabpur Colliery/ Kaj. Area, Eastern Coalfields Ltd., Asansol (West Bengal), and superannuated on June 29, 1998. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that after retirement, petitioner has shifted to the State of Jharkhand and, therefore, this petition is tenable before this Court, whereas, counsel for the respondents submitted that no cause of action has arisen here and, therefore, this petition is not tenable at law within the State of Jharkhand. 4. It has been contended by the' learned counsel for the petitioner in paragraph no. 4 as well as in paragraph no. 11 as under:- "4. That the petitioner is a citizen of India and resides within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court and entitled to protection of fundamental rights guaranteed under Constitution of India." "11. That the petitioner states and submits that although the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of Kolkata High Court but the petitioner resides within this High Court." 5. Thus, it appears that the aforesaid are the only two paragraphs, referred in the petition, for invoking the jurisdiction of this Court. Thus, in fact, no cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of Jharkhand High Court nor any part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial limit of Jharkhand High Court. The petitioner had worked in the State of West Bengal and he was superannuated from the State of West Bengal. As per the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, petitioner was residing in the State of West Bengal, during the course of his services. The petitioner had worked in the State of West Bengal and he was superannuated from the State of West Bengal. As per the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, petitioner was residing in the State of West Bengal, during the course of his services. Salary was also paid to him by the respondents in the State of West Bengal. The respondents are also situated at the State of West Bengal. The petitioner is praying for difference of salary on the basis of National Coal Wage Agreement-V and arrears of pension and finalization of pension amount with 18% interest of the aforesaid amount, which are also to be paid by the respondents in the State of West Bengal. This, a dispute of non-payment of the aforesaid amount has arisen in the State of West Bengal. Thus, no cause of action has arisen in the State of Jharkhand. 6. Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India reads as under:- "226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.- xxx xxx xxx (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories." 7. Thus, as per (Forty-second Amendment) Act, if the cause of action arises, wholly or in part, within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, then a writ against a person or authority, resident within the jurisdiction of another High Court, can also be issued. 8. As a result of the insertion of the aforesaid clause in sub-article (2) of Article 226, a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be presented before any of the High Courts, coming under the following heads:- (a) The High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the person or authority against whom relief is sought resides or is situate. (b) The High Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action in respect of which relief is sought under Art. 226 has arisen, wholly or in part. 9. (b) The High Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action in respect of which relief is sought under Art. 226 has arisen, wholly or in part. 9. A petition under Art. 226 against one State Government cannot be brought before the High Court of another State, if no part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of that High Court, merely because of the residence of the petitioner in that other State. 10. Thus, in the facts of the present case, the only point agitated by the petitioner for invoking the jurisdiction of this Court, is that he resides within the State of Jharkhand, but, as stated hereinabove, as per paragraph no. 11 of the petition also, the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of Calcutta High Court. In these set of circumstances also, the petition deserves to be dismissed, for want of territorial jurisdiction, by this Court. 11. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Aligarh Muslim University vs. Vinay Engineering Enterprises (P) Ltd., as reported in (1994)4 SCC 710 , in paragraph no. 2, as under: "2. We are surprised, not a little, that the High Court of Calcutta should have exercised jurisdiction in a case where it had absolutely no jurisdiction. The contracts in question were executed at Aligarh, the construction work was to be carried out at Aligarh, even the contracts provided that in the event of dispute the Aligarh Court alone will have jurisdiction. The arbitrator was from Aligarh and was to function there. Merely because the respondent was a Calcutta-based firm, the High Court of Calcutta seems to have exercised jurisdiction where it had none by adopting a queer line of reasoning. We are constrained to say that this is a case of abuse of jurisdiction and we feel that the respondent deliberately moved the Calcutta High Court ignoring the fact that no part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of that Court, It clearly shows that the litigation filed in the Calcutta High Court was thoroughly unsustainable."(Emphasis. supplied) 12, It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. Utpal Kumar Basu, as reported in (1'994)4 SCC 711, especially in paragraph no, 12, as under:- "12. supplied) 12, It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. Utpal Kumar Basu, as reported in (1'994)4 SCC 711, especially in paragraph no, 12, as under:- "12. Pointing out that after the issuance of the notification by the State Government under Section 52(1) of the Act, the notified land became vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances and hence it was not necessary for the respondents to plead the service of notice under Section 52(2) for the grant of an appropriate direction or order under Article 226 for quashing the notification acquiring the land. This Court, therefore, held that no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. This Court deeply regretted and deprecated the practice prevalent in the High Court of exercising jurisdiction and passing interlocutory orders in matters where it lacked territorial jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the strong observations made by this Court in the aforesaid decision and in the earlier decisions referred to therein, we are distressed that the High Court of Calcutta persists in exercising jurisdiction even in cases where no part of the cause of action arose within its territorial jurisdiction. It is indeed a great pity that one of the premier High Courts of the country should appear to have developed a tendency to assume jurisdiction on the sole ground that the petitioner before it resides in or carries on business from a registered office in the State of West Bengal. We feel all the more pained that notwithstanding the observations of this Court made time and again, some of the learned Judges continue to betray that tendency. Only recently while disposing of appeals arising out of SLP Nos. We feel all the more pained that notwithstanding the observations of this Court made time and again, some of the learned Judges continue to betray that tendency. Only recently while disposing of appeals arising out of SLP Nos. 10065-66 of 1993, Aligarh Muslim University vs. Vinay Engineering Enterprises (P) Ltd., this Court observed:- "We are surprised, not a little, that the High Court of Calcutta should have exercised jurisdiction in a case where it had absolutely no jurisdiction." In that case, the contract in question was executed at Aligarh, the construction work was to be carried out at Aligarh, the contracts provided that in the event of dispute' the Aligarh Court alone will have jurisdiction, the arbitrator was appointed at Aligarh and was to function at Aligarh and yet merely because the respondent was a Calcutta based firm, it instituted proceedings in the Calcutta High Court and the High Court exercised jurisdiction where it had none whatsoever. It must be remembered that the image and prestige of a court depends on how the members of that institution conduct themselves. If an impression gains ground that even in cases which fall outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court, certain members of the court would be willing to exercise jurisdiction on the plea. that some event, however trivial and unconnected with the cause of action had occurred within the jurisdiction of the said court, litigants would seek to abuse the process by carrying the cause be, fore such members giving rise to avoidable suspicion. That would lower the dignity of the institution and put the entire system to ridicule. We are greatly pained to say so but if we do not strongly deprecate the growing tendency we will, we are afraid, be failing in our duty to the institution and the system of administration of justice. We do hope that we will not have another occasion to deal with such a situation. " (Emphasis supplied) 13. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Addl. General Manager-Human Resource, Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. vs. Suresh Ramkrishna Burde, as reported in (2007)5 SCC 336 , especially in paragraph no. 15, as under:- "15. We do hope that we will not have another occasion to deal with such a situation. " (Emphasis supplied) 13. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Addl. General Manager-Human Resource, Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. vs. Suresh Ramkrishna Burde, as reported in (2007)5 SCC 336 , especially in paragraph no. 15, as under:- "15. Before parting with the case we would like to observe that the order invalidating the caste certificate had been passed by the Scrutiny Committee at Nagpur and, therefore, the earlier two writ petitions filed by the respondent were maintainable before the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court. However, in the third and final writ petition the order under challenge was the order of termination of service which was passed by the appellant on 16.7.2004 at Hyderabad as the respondent was working with Bharat Heavy Electrical Ltd.'s Heavy Power Equipment Plant, Hyderabad. Therefore, the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition wherein challenge was raised to the said order. However, in order to cut short the litigation and settle the controversy we have decided the case on merits." (Emphasis supplied) 14. Thus, in the aforesaid case also, the petitioner of that case was serving at Hyderabad. His services were terminated by the order from Hyderabad and he had filed a petition in Nagpur and it was held that the petition was not tenable at Nagpur. In the facts of the present case also, the petitioner was serving at West Bengal. All the respondents are also from West Bengal. Non-payment of salary and exact amount of pension is also from West Bengal and merely because the petitioner resides in the State of Jharkhand, after his retirement, will not give a territorial jurisdiction to this Court. 15. Thus, in the facts of the present case, no cause of action has arisen within the State of Jharkhand. Looking to the averments, made in the memo of petition, especially paragraph nos. 4 and 11 of the petition, it has been insisted by the petitioner that though the cause of action has arisen at Calcutta, petition in the Jharkhand High Court is tenable, at law, because the petitioner resides within the State of Jharkhand. This Contention is not accepted by this Court for the aforesaid reasons. Residence of the petitioner never gives territorial jurisdiction to this Court. This Contention is not accepted by this Court for the aforesaid reasons. Residence of the petitioner never gives territorial jurisdiction to this Court. The real test is whether any cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen within the State of Jharkhand or not. 16. The expression "cause of action means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove if traversed to entitle him to a judgment in his favour the Court. Cause of action implies a right to sue. The material facts which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove constitute the cause of action. It means every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. Negatively, it would mean that everything which, if not proved gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment would be part of cause of action. For every action there has to be a cause of action, if not, the plaint or petition, as the case may be, shall be rejected summarily. The entire bundle of facts pleaded need not constitute a cause of action as what is necessary to be proved before the petitioner can obtain a decree, is the material facts. The material facts is also known as integral facts. All necessary facts must form an integral part of the cause of action. Unless the facts pleaded are such as have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case, they cannot give rise to a cause of action within the court's territorial jurisdiction. The facts which have no bearing with the lis or dispute .involved in the case, do not give rise to cause of action. 17. Thus, the petitioner, who resides within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, has no bearing with the dispute, involved in the case and, therefore, his situs in Jharkhand is not a cause of action, because it has no bearing with the lis and, therefore, his residence with in the State of Jharkhand cannot confer a jurisdiction to this Court, if it is otherwise not having. 18. In view of these submissions and looking to the tact that the petitioner has worked at Madhabpur Colliery/Kaj. 18. In view of these submissions and looking to the tact that the petitioner has worked at Madhabpur Colliery/Kaj. Area, Eastern Coalfields Ltd., Asansol, situated within the State of West Bengal, and even all the respondents are also staying at present in the State of West Bengal, only because the petitioner has shifted, after his retirement, in the State of Jharkhand, it cannot be said that this High Court has jurisdiction, to adjudicate the grievances, ventilated in this writ petition. No cause of action has arisen within the State of Jharkhand, much less, any part of the action has arisen within the State of Jharkhand and, therefore, only on this ground, the present petition is not tenable before this Court and, therefore, I am not inclined to exercise, extraordinary jurisdiction, vested In this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, for the aforesaid reasons. There is no substance in the present writ petition, for the aforesaid reasons, and, therefore, the same is hereby dismissed, without entering into the merits of the case.