JUDGMENT 1. The appellants - original plaintiffs have filed this Appeal From Order under Order 43, Rule 1 (r) of Civil Procedure Code challenging the judgment and order dated 06.08.2008 passed by the learned 4th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Surat below an application Exh.5 in Special Civil Suit No.181of 2008 rejecting the application Exh.5 and vacating the ex-parte order of status-quo granted earlier. 2. Civil Application No.9802 of 2008 is filed by the appellants original plaintiffs praying for stay against the impugned judgment and order. The appellants have also prayed for the direction to the respondent No.4 not to transfer the property or to part with the same by way of sell, mortgage, gift or transfer or assigning the same in any manner whatsoever to any one and/or not to create any third party rights therein, and that they should not make any development, construction or continue to make development or construction on the property bearing Revenue Survey No.127/1, Block No.154 which is purchased by the original defendant No.4 pursuant to the document of 05.08.2005 and that a complete status-quo be maintained by the original defendant No.4 as also the defendant Nos.2 & 3 till the pendency and final disposal of the Appeal from Order. 3. Civil Application No.13051 of 2008 is filed by the applicant - original respondent No.4 praying for vacation of interim relief granted by this Court earlier and seeking permission to continue the construction work. 4. Civil Application No.8962 of 2009 is filed by the applicants - original plaintiffs under Order 39, Rule 2 (A) of the Civil Procedure Code praying for the direction against the opponent No.4 with regard to detention, imprisonment and/or to take action for willful breach of injunction granted by this Court. The applicants original plaintiffs have also prayed for the direction for demolition of construction made by the appellants and for appointment of Court Commissioner on the compliance of the demolition to be done under the order of this Court. 5. This Court has passed an order on 22.08.2008 staying the impugned order passed by the learned Trial Judge and continued the order of status-quo prevailing during the pendency of the application Exh.5. This Court passed further order on 17.09.2008 issuing notice for final disposal. 5. This Court has passed an order on 22.08.2008 staying the impugned order passed by the learned Trial Judge and continued the order of status-quo prevailing during the pendency of the application Exh.5. This Court passed further order on 17.09.2008 issuing notice for final disposal. Thereafter, on 02.04.2009, another order was passed by this Court directing the Registry to place this matter before the Hon'ble Chief Justice so that the matter can be listed before any other appropriate Bench at the earliest. The Court (Coram :-C. K. Buch, J.) has passed the said order on the ground that the Counsels for the parties are pressing for expeditious hearing of the appeal and considering the cause list and number of matters pending with the Court, vis.a.vis. working days, it would not be possible for the Court to hear and decide the matter on merits. 6. This order of the Court was challenged by the respondent No.4 before the Apex Court. The Apex Court vide its order dated 17.08.2009 observed that on 25.05.2009, while issuing notice, the Apex Court had permitted the petitioner to complete the construction of the building at his own risk and cost subject to the decision in the petition. However, by subsequent order dated 06.08.2009, the Apex Court has modified its order and the parties were directed to maintain status-quo. The Court in its final order dated 17.08.2009 directed the parties to approach the High Court for an interim arrangement pending the final decision, if there is likely to be any delay in hearing of the matter. The Court further observed that until the matter is heard by the High Court, the petitioner shall not proceed with the construction and the order of status-quo granted on 06.08.2008 shall continue. 7. It is in the above background of the matter, the Appeal From Order as well as Civil Applications are taken up for final hearing. 8. The brief facts giving rise to the present proceedings are that the land bearing Revenue Survey No.127/1 - Block No.154 admeasuring 1 Hectare, 27 Are & 48 Sq. Mts. i.e. 12748 Sq. Mts. situated at village Althan, Tal. City, Dist. Surat originally belonged to one Dahyaji Kanchanji. On 18.04.1961, the said land was purchased by Naranbhai Kalabhai Patel, father of the plaintiffs and defendant No.1 by way of registered sale deed. Mts. i.e. 12748 Sq. Mts. situated at village Althan, Tal. City, Dist. Surat originally belonged to one Dahyaji Kanchanji. On 18.04.1961, the said land was purchased by Naranbhai Kalabhai Patel, father of the plaintiffs and defendant No.1 by way of registered sale deed. On the basis of the said Sale Deed, Entry No.591 was made in the revenue record on 04.08.1961 and the same was certified on 06.08.1961. The said Naranbhai Kalabhai Patel died on 01.09.1987 intestate leaving behind him one Ukabhai Naranbhai Patel (Son) - the respondent No.1 herein, (2) Somiben @ Chimiben (daughter) plaintiff No.1 - appellant No.1 herein and (3) Manuben (daughter) plaintiff No.2 - appellant No.2 herein. On the death of Naranbhai Kalabhai Patel, by way of Entry No.1380, name of Ukabhai Naranbhai Patel was said to have been entered in the revenue record on 23.12.1990. It is the say of the appellants that even if the entry is made in the revenue record, it is only for the physcal purposes and it does not confer any title. The said entry was said to have been certified on 14.01.1991. Chhimiben & Manuben published a public notice in the daily newspaper “Gujarat Mitra” on 24.02.2005 declaring that they have undivided share in the said lands and other lands. No objections were filed by any person including the defendant Nos.1,2 & 3 pursuant to the said public notice. Thereafter on 05.08.2005, Hasmukhbhai Ukabhai and Bhartiben Hasmukhbhai Respondent Nos.2 & 3 executed a Sale Deed in favour of Bhikhubhai Ranchhodbhai Dabhi. On 23.09.2005, Ukabhai Naranbhai Patel gave a public notice in the newspaper stating that he has not given any Power of Attorney with respect to the disputed lands or any other land and that if any person claims to have any Power of Attorney, the same stands cancelled and is not operative. 9. On 25.04.2007, Shri Hasmukhbhai Ukabhai and Bhartiben Hasmukhbhai filed Regular Civil Suit No.179 of 2007. Thereafter, on 25.09.2007, Shri Hasmukhbhai Ukabhai executed a deed of consent in favour of Bhikhubhai Ranchhodbhai Dabhi stating to be a Power of Attorney and that the sale deed of 05.08.2005 by Shri Hasmukhbhai Ukabhai and Bhartiben Hasmukhbhai is legal and valid. On 01.08.2007, Shri Ukabhai Naranbhai filed written statement through his advocate i.e. defendant No.5 opposing the suit as well as application Exh. 5. The said defendant No.5, namely, Ms. On 01.08.2007, Shri Ukabhai Naranbhai filed written statement through his advocate i.e. defendant No.5 opposing the suit as well as application Exh. 5. The said defendant No.5, namely, Ms. Jayshriben is said to have appeared also on behalf of the present appellants who are defendant Nos.2 & 3 respectively in the said suit. On 21.01.2008, the said suit was withdrawn by Hasmukhbhai Ukabhai and Bhartiben Hasmukhbhai which information was given by advocate Ms. Jayshriben to the defendants of that suit. 10. As stated earlier, on 25.04.2007, Respondent Nos.2 and 3 had filed Regular Civil Suit No.179 of 2007 in the Court of learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Surat against Respondent No.1 and present appellants, inter alia, contending that deceased Naranbhai Kalabhai before his death executed a Will on 28.12.1984 bequeathing property to Respondent No.2 and that he is in possession of the property and that the Respondent No.1 and the present appellants are trying to disturb his possession and there he had prayed for permanent injunction. He has also filed an application Exh.5 in the said suit for ad-interim injunction. In the aforesaid suit, reference was made to the document of 23.10.1990 whereby the appellants had relinquished their share in favour of Respondent No.1. According to the appellants, this was done in collusion with each other. In view of the averments made in the said suit, the appellants made inquiries and on coming to know that Respondent No.2 had sold the land in question by registered sale deed on 05.08.2005 in favour of Respondent No.4, who is resident of Navagam, Tal. Vallabhipur, Dist. Bhavnagar, Special Civil Suit No.181 of 2008 has been filed by the appellants original plaintiffs, inter alia, contending that the land bearing Revenue Survey No.127/1 - Block No.154 admeasuring about 12748 Sq. Mts. Situated at village Althan in Surat city of Surat District belonging to one Naranbhai Kalabhai who had expired on 01.09.1987 without executing any Will and leaving behind him Ukabhai Naranbhai Patel (Son) the respondent No.1 herein, (2) Somiben @ Chimiben (daughter) plaintiff No.1 appellant No.1 herein and (3) Manuben (daughter) plaintiff No.2 appellant No.2 herein. The said Ukabhai has got a son, namely, Hasmukhbhai who is defendant No.2 and Bhartiben Patel as his wife. 11. The appellants original plaintiffs had challenged the document of 05.08.2005 executed in favour of Respondent No.4. The said Ukabhai has got a son, namely, Hasmukhbhai who is defendant No.2 and Bhartiben Patel as his wife. 11. The appellants original plaintiffs had challenged the document of 05.08.2005 executed in favour of Respondent No.4. The appellants had also challenged the alleged consent deed of 27.09.2007 said to have been executed by Respondent No.2 as Power of Attorney of Respondent No.1 in favour of Respondent No.4 - Bhikhubhai Ranchhodbhai Patel, which is according to the appellants, ab-initio, null and void and the same is not binding to the appellants. In the said suit, it was prayed that in any case, they would be the co-owners of the property. The appellants had also prayed for partition and also prayed for a decree for possession of 2/3rd share of the said property. They have also prayed for an injunction and consequential reliefs. The appellants have also filed application Exh.5 for injunction and had prayed for interim relief in terms of paragraph 14 (1). Initially, the learned Trial Judge had granted injunction ex-parte. However, on 06.08.2008, the application Exh.5 was rejected. It is this order which is under challenge in the present Appeal From Order. 12. Mr. D. D. Vyas, learned Senior Counsel appearing with Mr. Dhaval D. Vyas for the appellants raised the following questions for consideration of this Court : a “Did the plaintiffs who have got 2/3rd share jointly in the property lose their rights ? b Whether Hasmukhbhai Patel and Bhartiben Patel, defendant Nos.2 & 3 had any right in the property which could be sold by them to defendant No.4 Bhikhubhai Ranchhodbhai Dabhi of Bhavnagar on 05.08.2005 ? c Whether the right of defendant No.1 was legally transferred to defendant No.2 Hasmukhbhai and defendant No.3 Bhartiben? d Even if right of Ukabhai defendant No.1 is legally transferred to defendant Nos.2 & 3, whether they can sell whole of the property ? 13. The learned Trial Judge has held that the plaintiffs have lost their right in view of Entry No.1380 of 23.12.1990 which is said to have been made in view of the statement of the plaintiffs on 21.12.1990 before the Talati and the Deed of Relinquishment dated 23.10.1990. Mr. Vyas submitted that the learned Trial Judge has overlooked the fact that there cannot be a statement, more particularly, when the notice was not issued by the Talati before making Entry No.1380 in the record of right. Mr. Vyas submitted that the learned Trial Judge has overlooked the fact that there cannot be a statement, more particularly, when the notice was not issued by the Talati before making Entry No.1380 in the record of right. The learned Trial Judge has not referred to the fact that the defendant No.1 Ukabhai Naranbhai has, in fact, filed a suit being Special Civil Suit No.265 of 2008 in the Court of learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, which has been transferred to the Court of the learned 2nd Additional Senior Civil Judge, Surat. The learned Trial Judge has also not appreciated that Ukabhai Naranbhai had also filed criminal complaint before the Commissioner of Police Surat. As far as Deed of Relinquishment dated 23.10.1990 is concerned, Mr. Vyas has submitted that the stamp papers are of 20.08.1990. No reference has been made in the Sale Deed executed in favour of the defendant No.4 - Bhikhubhai Ranchhodbhai Dabhi about the said Deed of relinquishment. The same does not have the signature of the Notary nor a stamp of .Notary on each page nor is there signature on each page by the executant, who is said to have executed the said document. The document produced by the defendant No.4 - Bhikhubhai Ranchhodbhai Dabhi in the present suit, however, bears stamp paper of the Notary on each page. 14. Mr.Vyas further submitted that it is a settled position of law that Deed of Relinquishment is compulsorily registered under Section 17 of the Registration Act. The learned Trial Judge at one stage refers to the said document as a Deed of Relinquishment. However, while dealing with the argument of the plaintiffs that it is required to be compulsorily registered, even though it was not the case of the defendants nor pleaded in the suit, the learned Trial Judge has held that it is a family arrangement and not required to be registered. 15. In support of the above submission, Mr.Vyas relied on the following judgments. (I) In Bankey Bihari V/s. Surya Narain @ Munnoo, 2004 (11) SCC 393 , it is held that the so-called family arrangement arrived at between the parties required registration and since the document was not registered, it was inadmissible in evidence. No reliance could be placed upon the so-called family arrangement arrived at between the parties. (ii) In Gohil Amarsing Govindbhai (Decd.) by L.Rs. No reliance could be placed upon the so-called family arrangement arrived at between the parties. (ii) In Gohil Amarsing Govindbhai (Decd.) by L.Rs. V/s. Shah Mansukhlal Chhaganlal (Decd.) by L.R., AIR 2003 GUJARAT 78, it is held that where the suit for possession of the suit house filed by the plaintiff was based only on terms of agreement to sale suit house and it was not pleaded even alternatively that plaintiff being owner of suit property was entitled for possession of suit property, such document could not be looked into as the suit filed by the plaintiff did not fall in any of the three exceptions carved out in Proviso to Section 49 and the document was also made compulsorily registrable by Gujarat Amendment Act and consequently the suit would fail. (iii) In Dina Ji and Others V/s. Daddi and others, AIR 1990 SC 1153 , the Apex Court held that Section 17 (1) (b) of the Registration Act clearly provides that such a document where any right in immovable property is ever assigned or extinguished will require registration. It would not be disputed that this part of the deed which refers to creation of an immediate right in the adopted son and the divesting of the right of the adoptive mother in the property will squarely fall within the ambit of Section 17 (1) (b) and, therefore, under Section 49 of the Registration Act, this could not be admitted since it is not a registered document. Therefore, the alienation of immovable property by the widow was not illegal. (iv) In State of Gujarat V/s. Narges K. Panthaky, 1996 (1) SCC 298 , the Apex Court held that since by the agreement, right, title and interest held by the owner was sought to be extinguished and conferred on respondent, it was a compulsorily registrable document under Section 17 of the Registration Act. In absence of registration, the owner had not been divested of the right, title and interest and continued to be the owner. The Court, therefore, directed the Ceiling Authority to compute the ceiling area accordingly. (v) In Sneh Gupta V/s. Devi Sarup and others, 2009 SCALE 765, the Apex Court held that title to a property must be determined in terms of the statutory provision. The Court, therefore, directed the Ceiling Authority to compute the ceiling area accordingly. (v) In Sneh Gupta V/s. Devi Sarup and others, 2009 SCALE 765, the Apex Court held that title to a property must be determined in terms of the statutory provision. If by reason of the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the appellant herein had derived title to the property along with her brothers and sisters, she cannot be deprived thereof by reason of an agreement entered into by and between the original plaintiff and the contesting defendants. If a party furthermore relinquishes his or her right in a property, the same must be done by registered instrument in terms of the provisions of the Indian Registration Act. 16. In view of the above position in law and of facts, it was contended that by no stretch of imagination, it could be said that the plaintiffs who had admittedly 2/3rd share in the property had lost their right and, therefore, the suit would not be maintainable. 17. So far as the consent document of 10.02.1992 by which it is said that Respondent No.1 has transferred his rights to Respondent No.2 is concerned, Mr. Vyas has invited the Court's attention to the following important circumstances which according to him have not been considered by the learned Trial Judge :- a. The stamp paper is of 01.07.1991. b. there is no reference about the same in the document of sale in favour of Respondent No.4. c. The date of 10.02.1992 is clearly an interpolation. d. The document is not Notarised. e. The document is not registered. f. The appellants came to know about the documents only when the suit is filed. 18. Mr. Vyas has further submitted that the agreement dated 19.04.2001 is also of doubtful nature in view of the fact that no reference of the said agreement has been made in the Sale Deed dated 05.08.2005. It does not seem to be duly notarized. It is not dated at the time of alleged notarization and it is unregistered. 19. So far as the document of ratification dated 27.09.2007 is concerned, Mr. Vyas has submitted that the learned Trial Judge has taken into consideration these documents as if it has been executed by the Respondent No.1. It has not been noticed that the same is executed by Respondent No.2 ? 19. So far as the document of ratification dated 27.09.2007 is concerned, Mr. Vyas has submitted that the learned Trial Judge has taken into consideration these documents as if it has been executed by the Respondent No.1. It has not been noticed that the same is executed by Respondent No.2 ? Hasmukhbhai Ukabhai Patel showing himself as Power of Attorney of Ukabhai Naranbhai Patel. The learned Trial Judge has not considered the public notice of 23.09.2005 published by Respondent No.1 stating that he has not given any Power of Attorney. 20. So far as the document of 17.01.2008 by which the Respondent No.1 is said to have transferred the rights in favour of Respondent No.4 without payment of any consideration is concerned, Mr. Vyas has submitted that the following things have not been considered by the learned Trial Judge :- a. On 24.02.2005, the appellants had published a public notice in the daily newspaper that they have got undivided share in the disputed land and other lands. No objections have beenfiled by any person including Respondent No.1, Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.3 herein. On 23.09.2005, Respondent No.1 gave a public notice in newspaper stating that he has not given any Power of Attorney with respect to the disputed land. b. On 25.04.2005, Respondent Nos.2 and 3 had filed Regular Civil Suit No.179 of 2008 in the Court of learned 2nd Senior Civil Judge, Surat against Respondent No.1 and appellants, inter alia, contending that the deceased Naranbhai Patel before his death executed a Will on 28.12.1984 bequeathing the property to Respondent No.2 and that he is in possession of the property and that the Respondent No.1 and appellants are trying to disturb his possession and he had prayed for a permanent injunction. 21. Mr. Vyas has further submitted that a minute reading of the document of 05.08.2005 would show that the same is without consideration. For arriving at this conclusion, Mr. Vyas submitted that it is stated to have been executed by a person staying in Bhavnagar District. He has executed the Power of Attorney on 15.06.2006 in favour of Gordhanbhai Dahyabhai. No entry has been made by Respondent No.4 - Bhikhubhai Ranchhodbhai Dabhi before purchasing the property. The public notices are issued by Respondent No.4 on 02.10.2007 and 12.10.2007 regarding clearance of title though the Sale Deed was already executed on 05.08.2005. 22. He has executed the Power of Attorney on 15.06.2006 in favour of Gordhanbhai Dahyabhai. No entry has been made by Respondent No.4 - Bhikhubhai Ranchhodbhai Dabhi before purchasing the property. The public notices are issued by Respondent No.4 on 02.10.2007 and 12.10.2007 regarding clearance of title though the Sale Deed was already executed on 05.08.2005. 22. So far as balance of convenience is concerned, Mr. Vyas has submitted that the learned Trial Judge has made observations which are not borne out from the pleadings as well as from the record. He has invited the Court's attention to the following points which require consideration : a. “The plaintiffs have got 2/3rd share in the property. The said right still continues. b. That the possession was never with the Respondent No.4 who is staying in Bhavnagar District. c. Along with the suit, the appellants had made application Exh.6 for Panchnama of the suit property which was objected to by the Respondent No.4. He did not file written statement even to application Exh.5 which he did only after the direction given by this Court in AO filed by the said Respondent and direction given to dispose of application Exh.5. Inspite of the injunction having been given from 21.05.2008, the concerned Respondent continued the construction in defiance of the same because of which the application for breach of injunction under Order 39, Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure had to be filed. d. The learned Trial Judge has stated that the concerned Respondent has spent Crores of rupees in construction and may have sold the Flats. It is interesting to note that there is no pleading and / or material on record before the learned Trial Judge for the aforesaid findings. There is nothing on record to show that the learned Trial Judge come come to such findings on the basis of which he held that the balance of convenience is in favour of Respondent No.4 and dismissed the application. e. On behalf of Respondent No.4, what has been stated is that the construction made is worth Rs.12.34 Lacs, though the affidavit would show that there is no transfer whatsoever made with respect to the alleged construction. In support of this submission, Mr. Vyas relied on the decision of Apex Court in the case of Maharwal Khewaji Trust (Regd.) Faridkot Vs. In support of this submission, Mr. Vyas relied on the decision of Apex Court in the case of Maharwal Khewaji Trust (Regd.) Faridkot Vs. Baldev Dass, reported in AIR 205 SC 104 the Apex Court held that unless and until the case of irreparable loss or damage is made out by a party to the suit, the Court should not permit the nature of the property being changed which also includes alienation or transfer of the property which may lead to loss or damage being caused to the party who may ultimately succeed and may further lead to multiplicity of proceedings. 23. Based on the above submission and considering the legal position in light of the facts found on record, Mr.Vyas submitted that the learned Trial Judge has committed grave error in law and on facts in rejecting the appellants' application, Ex.5 for interim injunction and hence impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside. 24. Mr. S. B. Vakil, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for Respondent No.1 has more or less adopted the arguments and submissions made by Mr.Vyas and supported the case of appellants. He has further submitted that the entire defence of respondent No.4 is based on fabricated documents. In the sale deed dated 5.8.2005, there is no reference of the alleged will. The said will is alleged to have been executed by late Shri Naranbhai in favour of the respondent No.2. He has further submitted that for the purpose of defeating the rights of the daughters forged documents were created by the respondent No.4 in collusion with respondent Nos.2 and 3. He has further submitted that release deed dated 23.10.1990 is also a got up document. Even otherwise it is an unregistered document and hence the same cannot be considered as an admissible evidence. He has further submitted that if there is a Will in favour of the respondent No.2 there is no question of there being release deed. He has, therefore, submitted that the injunction granted by the trial Court on the basis of such false documents requires to be vacated. Mr.Vakil further submitted that certain documents are produced for the first time before this Court. They are either not produced before the Trial Court or they are not admitted/exhibited. This is not permissible in view of the decision of Apex Court in Sathi Vijay Kumar Vs. Mr.Vakil further submitted that certain documents are produced for the first time before this Court. They are either not produced before the Trial Court or they are not admitted/exhibited. This is not permissible in view of the decision of Apex Court in Sathi Vijay Kumar Vs. Tota Singh And Others, reported in (2006) 12 SCC 353, the Apex Court dealing with the practice and procedure with reference to record of Court held that the documents produced before the appellate Court which did not form part of the original record should not straightway be produced before the appellate Court. In the case before the Hon'ble Supreme Court certain documents were placed on record by respondent alongwith the affidavit-in-rejoinder. When the Apex Court called for the original record, those documents could not be found there. It is, therefore, held that the appellants should have made application before the appellate Court praying for production of those documents so that the Court could pass appropriate orders thereon. The documents produced before the appellate Court did not form part of the original record. It is nothing but an abuse of process of the Court and also in violative of the provisions contained in Rule-27 and 28 of the Order-41 of Civil Procedure Code. 25. Mr.S. H. Sanjanwala, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent No.4 ON THE OTHER HAND has submitted that the Special Civil Suit No.181 of 2008 filed by the appellants before the Civil Court is yet another attempt to reopen the matter which has already become final since years and the appellants have now been put up by the respondent No.1 and other family members, despite the fact everything is over and rights have been decided. He has further submitted that the respondent No.4 is a bonafide purchaser for value and he has spent Rs.12,40,000/- for the purchase of the suit land and has made construction worth Rs.12,34,000/- ( the correct figure is Rs.12,00,34,000/- as per Respondent No.4). He has made construction on the suit land to the knowledge of the appellants as well as respondent No.1, who is residing just opposite the land on which the construction is put up and it is within their knowledge that the construction was being put up after getting plans sanctioned from the relevant authorities. At no point of time any objection was raised either by the appellants or by the respondent No.1. At no point of time any objection was raised either by the appellants or by the respondent No.1. On the contrary, the appellants as well as the respondent No.1 by their conduct, were well within the knowledge of all the developments and have acquiesced in the same. The appellants are, therefore, equitably estopped from filing such a suit worthless praying for interim relief. In support of this submission Mr.Sanjanwala relied on the decision of Apex Court in Mandali Ranganna and others Vs. T. Rama Chandra and others, 2008 (8) SCALE 277 and in Kishorsinh Ratansinh Jadega Vs. Maruti Corporation & Ors., 2009 (5) SCALE 229. 26. Mr.Sanjanwala further submitted that in the impugned order the learned trial Judge has arrived at the following findings of fact :- (i) That the plaintiffs have voluntarily relinquished their right by executing documents and by their conduct. He submitted that if Release-deed is in the nature of family arrangement, it does not require registration. It is not open for the appellants to challenge it on the ground that it has not been registered. In support of this submission he relied on the following decisions :- (a) In (Lala) Kanhai Lal V/s. (Lala) Brij Lal and others, AIR 1918 Privy Council 70, it is held that K was a party to the compromise. He was one of those whose claims to the family property, or to shares in it, induced G against her own interests and those of her daughter, and greatly to her own detriment to alter her position by agreeing to the compromise and under that compromise, K obtained a substantial benefit which he had all along enjoyed and he was, therefore, bound by it and cannot claim as a reversioner. (b) In Smt. P. N. Wankudre V/s. C.C. Wankudre and others, AIR 2002 BOMBAY 129, informal family arrangement was arrived at whereby various members of family were put in possession and enjoyment of different property. All members of family were signatories to the said arrangement. Partition so arrived at was acted upon by parties and also derived benefits there from. No objection raised in it for number of years. Inspite of such circumstances, even assuming that documents were required to be registered, conduct of members would operate as an estoppel preventing them from resiling from said arrangements. Partition so arrived at was acted upon by parties and also derived benefits there from. No objection raised in it for number of years. Inspite of such circumstances, even assuming that documents were required to be registered, conduct of members would operate as an estoppel preventing them from resiling from said arrangements. One member cannot seek injunction or restrained order in respect of property partitioned and mutated in favour of another member. (c) In Kale and others V/s. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, 1976 (3) SCC 119 , it is held that by virtue of a family settlement or arrangement members of a family descending from a common ancestor or a near relation seek to sink their differences and disputes settled and resolved their conflicting claims or disputed titles once for all in order to buy peace of mind and bring about complete harmony and goodwill in the family. Family arrangements are covered by a special equity peculiar to themselves and will be enforced if honestly made. Although they have not been meant as a compromise, but have proceeded from an error of all parties originating in mistake or ignorance of fact as to what their rights actually are, or of the points on which their rights actually depend. The object of arrangement is to protect the family from long drawn litigation or perpetual strifes which mar the unity and solidarity of the family and create hatred and bad blood between the various members of the family. It promotes social justice through wider distribution of wealth. Family therefore has to be construed widely. It is not confined only to people having legal title to the property. (c) In Ranganayakamma & Anr. Vs. K.S.Prakash (D) by L.Rs. & Ors., 2008 AIR SCW 6476 the Apex Court held that, family settlement is necessary for achieving peace and harmony for family. Partition by metes and bound is not always possible and hence preservation of family property can form ground or consideration for foregoing substantial part of its share by a party to make settlement binding on it. It is not permissible for the Court to reopen a compromise decree passed on the basis of settlement except when fraud on party or Court is pleaded and established. The Court cannot go into the question as to whether contents of settlement are correct or not or as to whether properties were joint or self-acquired. It is not permissible for the Court to reopen a compromise decree passed on the basis of settlement except when fraud on party or Court is pleaded and established. The Court cannot go into the question as to whether contents of settlement are correct or not or as to whether properties were joint or self-acquired. The Court further held that the document relating to release of shares by sisters in favour of their brothers is not per se void for want of consideration. Renunciation may be for consideration or may not be for consideration. Release by an heir other than coparcener does not need any consideration Release is valid without consideration. Love and affection is also a consideration within meaning of Sections 122, 123 of Transfer of Property Act. .(ii) That they have not challenged the document dated 23.12.1990 for 18 years. Even if the Suit filed by the appellants is treated as filed within limitation they are not entitled to any interim relief. In support of this submission, he relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Veetrag Holding Company Limited V/s. Gujarat State Textile Corporation Limited, 37 (3) GLR 536, wherein this Court has held that in as much as this Contract was terminated on 6.12.1993, it was expected of the appellant to move for specific performance at the earliest, if they were serious about the same. The appellant certainly cannot be non-suited on the ground of limitation in as much as their suit is within time. However, when it comes to grant of equitable relief, when the suit is filed after such a lapse of time, it cannot be said that the remedy of interim injunction was the necessary remedy and there was no other remedy available to the party concerned in this behalf. (iii) That the Will is not under challenge in the present suit. The respondent No.4 is bonafide purchaser and he has spent huge amount by putting up the construction and he has also sold flats constructed on the said land and the third party rights have already been created and the majority of the construction work is already over as per the sanctioned plan and the photographs are also produced to show the construction. Therefore, irreparable loss will be caused to the present respondent No.4 if the injunction is granted. Therefore, irreparable loss will be caused to the present respondent No.4 if the injunction is granted. (iv) That third party rights are already created and innocent people will suffer if the interim relief is granted. (v) That the plaintiffs have filed suit to squeeze more money from respondent No.4. There is no reason to disbelieve the above finding of facts which requires any interference by this Court. 26. Mr.Sanjanwala further submitted that the three ingredients which are required to be considered by the trial Court, are properly considered by the trial Court, namely, that the plaintiffs have no prima facie case, balance of convenience is in favour of the contesting respondent and that the irreparable loss will be caused to them if the injunction is granted. There is no balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiffs, who have slept over the rights for 18 years. Since these are clear findings arrived at by the trial Court, Mr.Sanjanwala submitted that this Court should not interfere with the impugned order passed below Ex.5. He has further submitted that granting of interim relief regarding stay of the operation of the impugned order will amount to allowing the appeal and as per settled law the Court should not grant interim relief as prayed for. 27. Mr.Sanjanwala further submitted that the Special Civil Suit No.181 of 2008 is filed by the appellants only with a view to extract more money from the respondent No.4. The appellants have not stated the correct facts even in the notice of motion filed before the trial Court and the trial Court has observed that many important facts have been suppressed. The said facts are also suppressed in the present Appeal From Order and the Civil Application, inspite of the fact that in the earlier Appeal From Order No.206 of 2008 filed by the respondent No.4, correct facts were stated and all the documents were produced. Even thereafter, while filing the present Appeal From Order and the Civil Application the appellants have suppressed those facts from this Court and hence this Appeal as well as Civil Application suffer from suppretio vary and suggestio falsy and since the appellants have not come with clean hands before this Court they are not entitled to claim any equitable interim relief. 28. 28. Mr.Sanjanwala further submitted that the appellants have already released their interest in the property long back by giving statements under their own signature and they have no right in the property in question. As far back as on 21.12.1990, both the appellants have given their statements before the Talati-cum-Mantri, Althan in which they have clearly admitted that they have executed the document dated 23.10.1990 and released their right and that aspect has not been mentioned in the injunction application. Regular panchnama alongwith pedigree was also drawn in presence of the witnesses in which this was clearly mentioned. The respondent No.4 has got sale deed registered and executed in his favour on 5.8.2005 from the original Respondent Nos.2 and 3. The respondent No.1 has now colluded with the appellants to get the suit filed by sisters to extract more money after having executed a registered ratification document dated 17.1.2008. The appellants have also executed document dated 23.10.1990 releasing their right in the property. They have filed an affidavit dated 18.1.2008 which is notarized before the public notary in which they have approved all the transactions entered into by their brother Shri Ukabhai Naranbhai Patel the Respondent No.1 including withdrawal of Suit No.179 of 2007. He has, therefore, submitted that after backing out from these documents, false and frivolous suit was filed and exparte ad-interim order was obtained which was vacated after by-parte hearing. 29. Mr.Sanjanwala further submitted that the appellants have filed the suit and the injunction application with malafide intention and it is nothing but an abuse of process of the Court especially when they have no semblance of right in the suit property. The respondent No.4 has purchased the suit property on 5.8.2005 whereas the suit is filed almost after three years. The respondent No.4 has put up construction after purchase of the property in question by registered sale deed. Though it was not signed by the Respondent No.1, the said action was subsequently ratified by him by ratification document dated 20.9.2007 which is also registered one. 31. Mr. Sanjanwala has further submitted that the findings arrived by the Trial Court are based on sound reasoning and also after proper consideration of facts and appreciation of evidence. Though it was not signed by the Respondent No.1, the said action was subsequently ratified by him by ratification document dated 20.9.2007 which is also registered one. 31. Mr. Sanjanwala has further submitted that the findings arrived by the Trial Court are based on sound reasoning and also after proper consideration of facts and appreciation of evidence. The Trial Court has recorded that the plaintiffs have filed the suit after 18 years after releasing their right and, therefore, the suit is suffered from the defect of delay and latches. The Trial Court has further recorded that the plaintiffs have suppressed important facts regarding releasing their right as per the document dated 23.10.1990, giving statement before Talati on 21.12.1990. The Talati having made the Panch Kayas, entry made in the record of rights bearing Entry No.1380 and they have suppressed the important aspects from the Court. That the document of release is a family arrangement and is not required to be registered and that can be taken in evidence. The Trial Court has relied on the judgment of this Court reported in 1993 (1) GCD 350 . The Trial Court has further recorded that it is proved prima facie that the plaintiffs have released their rights voluntarily in the properties of deceased Naranbhai Kalabhai and it is not even prima facie established that the Release Deed dated 23.10.1990 is not executed and that the plaintiffs have not challenged the said documents for 18 years till the suit is filed. That the advocate was instructed by the son of plaintiff No.2 i.e. Harishbhai. That Ukabhai has ratified the document on 17.01.2008 and admitted that he does not challenge the document executed in favour of defendant No.4 by defendant Nos.2 & 3. That the plaintiffs have released their right in 1990 in favour of the defendant No.1 and from that date, they have no right, title or interest in the property in question. That suit No.179/2007 is withdrawn in which plaintiffs of the present suit were parties, namely, defendants No. 2 and 3 and they did not file any written statement claiming their right. On the contrary, their advocate under instruction had written no objection as per written statement filed by advocate defendants No.5. The Trial Court has rightly discussed the requirement of granting injunction, namely, prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss. On the contrary, their advocate under instruction had written no objection as per written statement filed by advocate defendants No.5. The Trial Court has rightly discussed the requirement of granting injunction, namely, prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss. The Trial Court has further recorded that the plaintiffs have filed the present suit to squeeze money after the defendant No.4 has spent crores of rupees and put up the construction and they have waited till the nature of the land is changed. He has, therefore, submitted that the learned Trial Judge has rightly refused injunction and the same order is required to be confirmed. 32. Mr. A. J. Patel, and Mr.Kamal Trivedi, learned advocates appearing with Ms.Brahmbhatt for the respondent Nos.2 and 3 have supported the case of Respondent No.4 and submitted that the appellants, to succeed in an Appeal or even in the suit have to lead evidence in their favour. They should not rely on the weaknesses of the otherside. He has further submitted that the release deed dated 23.10.1990 was not challenged by the appellants. The respondent No.1 after pocketing the money from the respondent No.4 instigated his sisters to file the suit against the respondent No.4. He has, therefore, submitted that no indulgence should be shown by the Court in the order passed by the trial Court. 33. Having heard the learned counsels appearing for the contesting parties and having gone through the impugned order and judgment passed by the learned trial Judge below an application Ex.5 in Special Civil Suit No.181 of 2008 as well as the documents produced before this Court and having considered the rival submissions of the parties in light of the facts emerged on record as well as decided case law on the subject covering the field of interim relief, the Court at the first sight finds the case of the appellants being legal heirs of late Shri Naranbhai, on sound footing, however, on detailed analysis of the documents produced before the Court and considering the challenge made by the appellants at the belated stage, the Court is rather reluctant to interfere in the order and judgment passed by the learned trial Judge. The Court, however, takes care of the interest of the appellants by putting the respondent No.4 on certain terms. 34. The Court, however, takes care of the interest of the appellants by putting the respondent No.4 on certain terms. 34. The appellants are the original plaintiffs and are legal heirs of late Shri Naranbhai who died on 1.9.1987 leaving behind him the appellants and the respondent No.1. The appellants would have been entitled to claim two third share in the suit land, but for the document executed by them way back in 1990. The appellants have executed the Release Deed on 23.10.1990. There is no dispute about the fact that they have signed this Release Deed. Subsequent to this, the statements were recorded by Talati-cum-Mantri of Village, Althan on 21.12.1990. A panchnama was drawn on the same day and Entry No.1380 was recorded in the records of right on 23.12.1990. These documents have remained unchallenged till the Special Civil Suit No.181 of 2008 was filed by the appellants in 2008. Of course, the appellants have challenged the Entry No.1380 in R.T.S.Appeal No.94 of 2007 which came to be dismissed on 31.12.2008. For the purpose of prima facie satisfaction of the Court, these documents are good enough to arrive at the conclusion as to whether the appellants are entitled to any interim relief. The genuineness of the documents and that too when the question is raised after more than 18 years, can be gone into at the time of trial. It would not, however, be just and proper for the learned Judge to ignore these documents and grant the interim relief in favour of the appellants. The nature of the Release Deed and whether it requires registration or not can also be gone into at the time of trial. It is settled position in law that if a particular document is executed by way of family arrangement, it does not require any registration. A contention is raised before the Court that the Release Deed is nothing but a part of family arrangement and hence it does not require any registration. Even if it is assumed that the Release Deed is required to be executed, the conduct of the appellants would operate as an estoppel preventing them from resiling from the said relinquishment of their share in the suit property. 35. Even if it is assumed that the Release Deed is required to be executed, the conduct of the appellants would operate as an estoppel preventing them from resiling from the said relinquishment of their share in the suit property. 35. The respondent No.1 - brother of the appellants and one of the legal heirs of late Shri Naranbhai has supported the case of the appellants in the present proceedings, despite the fact that a family arrangement was made way back on 10.2.1992 under which the respondent No.1 gave the suit land to the respondent Nos.2 and 3 who are his son and daughter-in-law respectively. Not only this, on 19.4.2001 an agreement was executed by the respondent No.1 releasing his share in the suit land in favour of the respondent No.2. A question may arise as to why another agreement dated 19.4.2001 is required to be executed especially when on 10.2.1992, by way of family arrangement, the respondent No.1 has already released his share in the suit land in favour of the respondent Nos.2 and 3. This question can also be gone into at the time of trial and simply because there are two documents pertaining to the same issue the release of interest of the respondent No.1 in favour of respondent Nos.2 and/or 3 cannot be doubted or disputed, at least for the purpose of considering the question of interim relief. 36. The respondent Nos.2 and 3 have filed Regular Civil Suit No.179 of 2007 against the appellants as well as respondent No.1 on the basis of a Will dated 28.12.1984 executed by late Shri Naranbhai bequeathing the suit land in favour of the respondent No.2. It is true that the will is not under challenge in the present proceedings nor the respondent Nos.2 and 3 have claimed their right and sold the suit land to the respondent No.4 on the basis of the said Will. The said suit was subsequently withdrawn on the basis of further written statement filed by the respondent No.1 on 17.1.2008 and affidavit filed by the appellants on 18.1.2008. In the said written statement the respondent No.1 has accepted the claim of the respondent No.2 and the appellants have also endorsed the view of the respondent No.1 in their affidavit filed on 18.1.2008. In the said written statement the respondent No.1 has accepted the claim of the respondent No.2 and the appellants have also endorsed the view of the respondent No.1 in their affidavit filed on 18.1.2008. Despite these documents forming part of Court records, the appellants have filed Special Civil Suit No.181 of 2008 and the respondent No.1 has supported the appellants in the said suit. This shows the conduct of the appellants as well as the respondent No.1. Nobody would prevent them from contending that the said documents were not genuine or they were fabricated. However, the Court has to prima faice weigh those documents for the purpose of granting interim relief. If the conduct of the appellants as well as respondent No.1 is not free from doubt, the Court would not grant any interim relief in their favour. The most shocking part is that the appellants have not disclosed nor even made reference to some of documents referred to above in their plaint of the suit. This prima facie shows that the appellants have not come before the Court with clean hands. The Apex Court in the case of Gujarat Bottling Company Ltd., reported in AIR 1995 SC weekly 3521 has held that, under Order-39 of the Code of Civil Procedure, jurisdiction of the Court to interfere with an order of interlocutory or temporary injunction is purely equitable and, therefore, the Court, on being approached, will, apart from every consideration, also look to the conduct of the party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court, and may refuse to interfere unless his conduct was free from blame. Since the relief is wholly equitable in nature, a party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court has to show that he himself was not responsible for bringing about the state of things complained of and that he was not unfair or inequitable in his dealings with the parties against whom he was seeking relief. If this parameters laid down by the Apex Court are kept in mind, it is difficult to accept that the conduct of the appellants and the respondent No.1 is free from any blame. If it is so, the Court may not like to interfere in the order passed by the trial Court. 37. There is one more reason which prevent the Court from interfering with the order passed by the trial Court. If it is so, the Court may not like to interfere in the order passed by the trial Court. 37. There is one more reason which prevent the Court from interfering with the order passed by the trial Court. The appellants have released their interest in the suit land on 23.10.1990 and after recording their statement and drawing panchnama by Talati-cum-Mantri on 21.12.1990, an Entry No.1380 was recorded in records of right. The respondent No.1 has also released his interest in the suit land on 10.2.1992 or even on 19.4.2001 and, thereafter, registered Sale Deed was executed by respondent Nos.2 and 3 in favour of the respondent No.4 for consideration of Rs.12,34,200/-on 5.8.2005. The respondent No.4, thereafter, developed the said land, got the plan sanctioned and started construction. The suit was filed by the appellants in 2008. The suit, therefore, suffers by delay and latches. Even if it is considered to be the suit filed within the period of limitation, while considering the question of grating interim relief, the aspect of delay and latches cannot be lost sight of. In the case of Veetrag Holding Company Limited Vs. Gujarat State textile Corporation Ltd. (Supra) this Court has made this distinction and while refusing to grant the interim relief the Court has observed that when the suit is filed after such a lapse of time, it cannot be said that the remedy of interim injunction was necessary remedy and there was no other remedy available to the party concerned in this behalf. In the case of Mandali Ranganna and others Vs. T. Rama Chandra and others, the Apex Court held that while considering the application for grant of injunction, the Court will not only take into consideration the basic elements in relation thereto, viz. existence of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury. It must also take into consideration the conduct of the parties. The grant of injunction is an equitable relief. A person, who had kept quite for a long time and allowed another to deal with the properties exclusively, ordinarily would not be entitled to an order of injunction. The Court will not interfere only because the property is a very valuable one. The Apex Court was not, however, oblivious of the fact that grant or refusal of injunction has serious consequences depending upon the nature thereof. The Court will not interfere only because the property is a very valuable one. The Apex Court was not, however, oblivious of the fact that grant or refusal of injunction has serious consequences depending upon the nature thereof. When the substantial amount has been spent towards development and construction, it would not be proper to stop further construction. Interest of justice would be served if while allowing the respondent No.4 to carry out construction of the building, the same is made subject to the ultimate decision of the suit and the respondent No.4 may be directed to furnish sufficient security before the trial Court. 38. The Apex Court has also reiterated its view taken in Mandali Ranganna and others (Supra). In the case of Kishor R. Jadeja Vs. Maruti Corporation and others (Supra) wherein it is held that if the owners of the property remain restrained from developing the same, it is they, who will suffer severe prejudice, as they will be deprived of the benefit of the user of their land during the said period. The balance of convenience and inconvenience is against the grant of such injunction. The success of the suit for specific performance depends to a large extent on tenuous proof of genuineness of the agreement sought to be enforced after 19 years, despite the findings of the trial Court that the suit was not barred by limitation. The Court further observed that the question of conduct of the respondent also becomes relevant, inasmuch as, having slept over its right for more than 19 years, it will be inequitable on its prayer to restrain the owners of the property from dealing with the same, having particular regard to the fact that a large portion of the land have been conveyed to as many as 280 purchasers, who are in the process of erecting construction thereupon. In the present case, the situation is more or less similar. The suit is filed and right of ownership is sought to be claimed and established after more than 18 years. The suit land is already developed and construction is started. Substantial amount has been spent by the respondent No.4. In the present case, the situation is more or less similar. The suit is filed and right of ownership is sought to be claimed and established after more than 18 years. The suit land is already developed and construction is started. Substantial amount has been spent by the respondent No.4. The grant of injunction restraining the respondent No.4 from carrying out further construction would adversely affect his interest and hence grant of injunction even in the form of status-quo order would not help any one, except to bring pressure on respondent No.4 to settle the whole issue on appellants' terms. The Court may not and should not be a party to such unethical practice. 39. In light of the view taken by this Court in this matter, the other issues raised by the parties and/or arguments canvassed are of not much relevance. They may be gone into by the trial Court when the actual trial commences. Even the authorities cited by the counsels in support of their contentions are not of much assistance looking to the peculiar facts of the present case. The Court, therefore, does not see any justification to interfere in the order passed by the Trial Court except to put the respondent No.4 on certain terms and the order of Trial Court is confirmed subject to the following conditions :- (i) Since the suit land is sold at Rs.12,34,200/-and the appellants had got two third share in the said suit land they would naturally get two third share if they succeed in the suit. The value of two third share would come to approximately Rs.8,24,000/-. Over and above this, the respondent No.4 may also be directed to deposit a very substantial amount towards security, which in the opinion of the Court, a sum of Rs.25 lacs would be just and proper. Accordingly, the respondent No.4 is hereby directed to deposit a sum of Rs.33,24,000/-with the trial Court. On deposit of this amount, the order of status-quo passed by this Court stands vacated. It is also made clear that entitlement of this amount either by the appellants or the Respondent No.4's right to get back their amount depends on the final outcome of the Suit. On deposit of this amount, the order of status-quo passed by this Court stands vacated. It is also made clear that entitlement of this amount either by the appellants or the Respondent No.4's right to get back their amount depends on the final outcome of the Suit. (ii) Since the stay granted by this Court in the form of status-quo order is now ordered to be vacated, the respondent No.4 on deposit of the above amount is permitted to carry out construction and to deal with the suit property in a manner he likes, however, it is subject to the final outcome of the suit and the respondent No.4 or anybody on his behalf shall not claim any equity. (iii) Any observation made and/or finding recorded by the trial Court in the impugned order or by this Court in this order is of prima facie nature and the trial Court shall decide the suit on the basis of evidence available on record and without being influenced by these interim orders. (iv) On request made by the parties, the trial Court should expedite the hearing of the suit and shall decide and dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible. 39. Subject to the above this Appeal From Order is disposed off and order of status-quo passed by this Court earlier stands vacated subject to above conditions. 40. So far as Civil Application no.8962 of 2009 is concerned, the same is filed by the appellants under Order-39 Rule-2(A) of the Civil Procedure Code for committing breach of the status-quo order passed by this Court, by the respondent No.4. Mr.Vyas has submitted that instead of there being order of injunction passed by this Court specifically directing maintenance of status-quo for the suit property, in defiance of the said injunction order the respondent No.4 through his representative and agent have started construction activities on the suit property. He has further submitted that under the instructions of his client the photographs of the on going constructions were taken which would normally show that the construction has started on the suit property. This act of respondent No.4 is in furtherance of the continuous malicious conduct not only of creation of forgery and fabricated documents but also of playing fraud with the Court including that of willfully disobeying the order of the Court. This act of respondent No.4 is in furtherance of the continuous malicious conduct not only of creation of forgery and fabricated documents but also of playing fraud with the Court including that of willfully disobeying the order of the Court. Mr.Vyas further submitted that there had been fraudulent document and dubious transactions which have been created by the respondent No.4 with respondent Nos.2 and 3 which has clearly been exposed by the appellants. He has, therefore, submitted that the act of deliberately disobeying the order is nothing but an attempt to overreach the order of this Court. The act of the respondent is contemptuous for which appropriate proceedings are required to be initiated against the respondent. He has, therefore, submitted that the prayers made in the Civil Application deserve to be granted. 41. Mr.Sanjanwala, on the other hand, has objected to the said Civil Application and contended that no breach is committed by the respondent No.4. The construction started by the respondent No.4 was during the period when the Apex Court has permitted the respondent No.4 to carry out and complete the construction. He has, therefore, submitted that the application deserves to be rejected. 42. On careful consideration of the submissions made by the learned counsels appearing for the parties, the Court is of the view that the present Civil Application is filed by the appellants on 15.6.2009. The Apex Court while issuing notice in SLP (Civil) NO.12120 of 2009 on 25.5.2009 permitted the respondent No.4 to complete the construction of the building at his own risk and cost. The said interim order was modified by the Court on 6.8.2009 and directed the parties to maintain status-quo as on that day i.e. 6.8.2009. The SLP was thereafter disposed of on 17.8.2009. This fact clearly reveals that when the appellants have filed Civil Application before this Court i.e. on 15.6.2009 there was no order of status-quo and the respondent No.4 was permitted to carry out the construction. The whole foundation of preferring the Civil Application is therefore unsustainable. The respondent No.4 has carried out the construction till 6.8.2009. There is nothing on record to indicate that after 6.8.2009 the respondent No.4 has carried out any further construction. In this view of the matter, there is no substance in this Civil Application. The whole foundation of preferring the Civil Application is therefore unsustainable. The respondent No.4 has carried out the construction till 6.8.2009. There is nothing on record to indicate that after 6.8.2009 the respondent No.4 has carried out any further construction. In this view of the matter, there is no substance in this Civil Application. Even otherwise, the order of status-quo is now vacated and the respondent No.4 is permitted to carry out the construction and to deal with the property in the manner he likes, on disposal of the Appeal From Order and hence there is no substance in this application and it is accordingly rejected. 43. Since the Appeal From Order is disposed of, Civil Application No.9802 of 2008 initially filed by the appellants for stay and Civil Application No.13051 of 2008 filed by the respondent No.4 for vacation of the interim order no longer survive and hence both these Civil Applications are disposed off. 44. In the result, Appeal From Order as well as all the three Civil Applications are accordingly disposed off. On pronouncement of the judgment Mr. D.D.Vyas, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants request to continue the order of the status-quo granted by this Court for a period of eight weeks so as to enable the appellants to approach the Apex Court. Mr.S.H.Snajanwala, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent No.4 has, however, objected to this request. Since the Court has considered all the aspects and also put the respondent No.4 to certain terms, the request for extension of status quo is rejected.