Judgment : 1. 1. Petitioners, while working in the service of the second respondent, were placed under suspension on 13.2006. Show cause notices with memos of charges were issued to them on 7.2006. Being dissatisfied with their replies, an enquiry was ordered and enquiry officer appointed. 2. 2. The elected committees then in office was superseded on 11.2007. An administrator was put in charge. Later, administrative committee took charge on 8.2.2007. Disciplinary proceedings were dragged on. But the fact remains that neither the then elected committee nor the successor administrator or the administrative committee applied for prior approval of the Registrar in terms of Rule 198 (6) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969, hereinafter, the ‘Rules’ for short, to continue the petitioners under suspension for a period beyond six months. .3. Matters stood so for quite a long time and the managing committee now in office assumed charge on 30.1.2008. The sub committee constituted by the managing committee now in office proceeded further on the basis of the enquiry report and issued show cause notices to the petitioners on its basis. The petitioners replied. The sub committee decided to dismiss the petitioners from service. Exts.R2(a) and R2(b) would show that on 29.2008, the petitioners were dismissed from service retrospectively from 13.2006, the date on which they were placed under suspension. This writ petition was filed on 9.2008, i.e., before the issuance of the orders of dismissal.. 3. 4. In the writ petition, the petitioners seek a declaration that their continued suspension without prior sanction of the Registrar in terms of Rule 198(6) of the Rules is contrary to law and that on account of that illegality, they seek a further declaration that they are entitled to full wages and other perquisites attached to the posts that they would have respectively held during the period under which they were kept out of office. They also seek a direction to the statutory authorities to further proceed with certain matters in terms of Section 68 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969, hereinafter, the ‘Act’ for short, on the basis of the enquiry report stated to be available in terms of Section 65 of that Act. 4. 5. By the time the matter is taken up today for consideration, it is the admitted position that the employer society has, through its President, issued orders dismissing the petitioners from service. 4. 5. By the time the matter is taken up today for consideration, it is the admitted position that the employer society has, through its President, issued orders dismissing the petitioners from service. Those orders, Ext.R2(a) and R2(b), were issued on 29.2008, after the filing of this writ petition. The date of actual service of Exts.R2(a) and R2(b) on the petitioners is not a matter of record. Whatever that be, all that is needed to be noted at this point of time is that the dismissal orders were issued on 29.2008 and that the said action was after the institution of this writ petition. Also of relevance is the fact that those decisions, on their face, express that they would operate from 13.2006, the date on which the petitioners were placed under suspension. .6. Thefacts and sequence of events noticed above would show that the allegations against the petitioners were leveled while an elected committee was in office. Show cause notices were issued to the petitioners. They replied to it. Enquiry officer was appointed since the disciplinary authority was not satisfied with the explanations given by the petitioners. Obviously therefore, enquiry proceedings had commenced while the elected committee was in office. That committee was superseded on 11.2007. This means, from that date until 30.1.2008 the date on which the present committee assumed office following election, the administrator or the administrative committee, as the case may be, under the control and direction of the competent authority or Registrar, was duty bound to carry out the management of the society. Such management necessarily takes with it the power and duty to ensure that disciplinary proceedings are also pushed forward within the appropriate time schedule as expected by the statue. When an administrator or administrative committee is in office, it does not preclude those public authorities to act in terms of Rule 198(6) of the Rules, if the situation calls for such action. If a delinquent is required to be placed under suspension beyond a period of six months, it is the bounden duty of whoever is in power to ensure that proper sanction is obtained in terms of the law. The facts of the case would show that obedience to that rule had been obtained only in its callous breach. If a delinquent is required to be placed under suspension beyond a period of six months, it is the bounden duty of whoever is in power to ensure that proper sanction is obtained in terms of the law. The facts of the case would show that obedience to that rule had been obtained only in its callous breach. I say so because it was only after the present committee assumed office on 30.1.2008 that it requested the first respondent Registrar to extend the period of suspension and on 27.3.2008, the first respondent passed an order extending the period of suspension from 12.2006 to 33.2008. If this were the intention of the Rules, I am sure in my mind that Rule 198(6) would not have been in the statute book as it stands now. 5. 7. The fixation of the period of six months in Rule 198(6), as the period for which an employee could be kept under suspension at one time and the statutory direction that no suspension at one time and the statutory direction that no suspension could be continued beyond one year without appropriate approval of the Registrar are clearly indicative of the fact that the intention of the Rules governing the field is that the employer should not continue to maintain a person under suspension. In fact, that would be against the interest of the establishment. This can be fairly demonstrated from the fact that in terms of Rule 198(6), an employee placed under suspension would be entitled to subsistence allowance payable under the Kerala Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1972, hereinafter, the ‘Subsistence Allowance Act’ for short, and the case of employees not falling under that Act would be governed by laws applicable to State Government employees as prescribed under the Kerala Service Rules. Adverting to the provisions of the subsistence Allowance Act, it could be seen that if a person is placed under suspension and continued for more than one hundred and eighty days, the rate of subsistence allowance will be equal to the wages. Therefore, while a delinquent placed under suspension and facing disciplinary proceedings is not drawing wages, salary, other emoluments, perquisites etc., he would be entitled to draw subsistence allowance equivalent to wages and it makes no sense for any attempt to drag on the disciplinary proceedings. Therefore, while a delinquent placed under suspension and facing disciplinary proceedings is not drawing wages, salary, other emoluments, perquisites etc., he would be entitled to draw subsistence allowance equivalent to wages and it makes no sense for any attempt to drag on the disciplinary proceedings. In this context, learned counsel for the second respondent is right in pointing out that the prescription as to payment of subsistence allowance equivalent to wages is itself a detriment on the management to continue to place an employee under suspension beyond the statutory periods. This essentially is also the reason why the placing of a person under continued suspension beyond a particular period could be done only with the sanction of the statutory authorities and such sanction is prescribed by law to be prior sanction. The insistence of prior sanction vis-à-vis ex post facto sanction is a matter, which may arise for consideration in different situations and from different angles. It would depend upon determining the question as to whether the person who ought to have sought the sanction does or does not have a right to such sanction. It would also be relevant to consider whether the person who was to seek sanction could or could not have sought prior sanction. These two elements go into the process of deciding that a particular provision for seeking sanction could be exercised even ex post facto. .8. In certain situations, the availability of the competent authority to give sanction at a required point of time may also be a relevant factor. But lack of vigilance is never. Assume if I were to deal with a rule which governs the prior sanction in relation to something which may have to be done on emergent basis, for example, like a government employee being taken out of State for some medical attention. There appears to be such a rule governing the Kerala State Government Service, prescribing that such a government employee can avail reimbursement only if he is taken out of the limits of the State of Kerala with prior sanction of the competent authority. But in an emergent situation, if that patient had to be moved out of the State without awaiting for prior sanction, it may be a case where a rule prescribing prior sanction may be read as one providing for ex post facto sanction. But in an emergent situation, if that patient had to be moved out of the State without awaiting for prior sanction, it may be a case where a rule prescribing prior sanction may be read as one providing for ex post facto sanction. This could be exercised having regard to the exigencies of situation. 6. 9. If the inaction on the part of the managerial repositories, including the administrative committee and elected committee of a co-operative society, is to be read as a ground for claiming ex post facto sanction instead of prior sanction, that will be engineering a manner in which Rule 198(6) could be read down and thereby conform on the repository with unbridled power; totally unguided that yardsticks of time or space can aid any repository to make any order as he so wish, at any point of time. In the case in hand, the question as to what would have been the stage at which the enquiry had reached when a request is made for enlargement of the period of suspension ought to have been appropriately and timely placed before the competent authority seeking appropriate sanction to continue the person under suspension. I say this in this context, because, in so far as the petitioners are concerned, they had to face two elected committees, including the one now in office and the administrator or administrative committee, after they were placed under suspension. If any of those authorities which represent the management had acted well in time, either the enquiry proceedings would have ended earlier or action would have followed only in a controlled manner. 7. 10. The net result of the sequence of events is essentially that by the operation of Rule 198(6) of the Rules read with the provisions of the Subsistence Allowance Act, the petitioners became entitled to be paid subsistence allowance equivalent to wages after the lapse of 180 days of placing them under suspension. It is a matter of heart burn, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the second respondent, that the employer who has ultimately found, rightly or wrongly, that the employees deserve the punishment of dismissal, that too, on grounds of financial mismanagement had also to pay subsistence allowance to those employees at rates equivalent to wages. It is a matter of heart burn, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the second respondent, that the employer who has ultimately found, rightly or wrongly, that the employees deserve the punishment of dismissal, that too, on grounds of financial mismanagement had also to pay subsistence allowance to those employees at rates equivalent to wages. But the fact remains that this entitlement for subsistence allowance is not to be reckoned as payment of salary or emoluments, but is a package for sustenance framed and formulated within the framework of the socialist goals in the Constitution. Obviously therefore, any payment made towards subsistence allowance can only be set off against any payments that the employer may have to make to the employees, if it does not sustain its decision against the employees, it appropriately challenged. Equally, it is well settled that any claim of the employer cannot also be set off against the subsistence allowance. .11. In the aforesaid situation, while refusing a declaration that the petitioners are entitled to full wages or other perquisites, I am clear in my mind that the first respondent had acted in excess of jurisdiction in granting extension to place the petitioners under suspension. But that situation need not necessarily lead to a declaration that the suspension is invalid. This is because, with the passage of time, the clock cannot be put back and ends of justice does not require such an order being made. However, the petitioners are essentially entitled to the smaller relief, which is meager when compared to what they have claimed in the writ petition. They are entitled to subsistence allowance in terms of Rule 198(6). This has to be, at any rate, subject to any decision that the competent authority may take, if the disciplinary proceedings are challenged before the appropriate authority. 8. 12. Hence, this writ petition is ordered directing that subsistence allowance due to the petitioners in accordance with Rule 198 (6) of the Act or Section 3 of the Subsistence Allowance Act, as the case may be, from the date of their placement under suspension, shall be released to them, after giving due credit to all amounts already released. Let this be done within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. 9. 13. Let this be done within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. 9. 13. Before parting, it also needs to be stated that certain arguments were addressed before me regarding the legality of Exts.R2(a) and R2(b) in so far as those orders of dismissal have been issued as if they operate from the date of suspension. The question whether an order of dismissal could be made with effect from a retrospective date or whether it would operate only from the date of service of the order of dismissal on the delinquent are matters fairly settled by the decisions of the Apex Court and of this Court. That issue is not being examined in this case having regard to the fact that the disciplinary proceedings and the resultant decision could be subjected to arbitration under Section 69 of the Act.