Judgment Petitioner-Corporation of Chennai challenges the award of Principal Labour Court in I. D. No. 111 of 1999 dated 18. 2004 whereby the Labour Court ordered reinstatement of 1st respondent with backwages. 2. Brief facts which led to the filing of writ petition are as follows: (i) 1st respondent was appointed as permanent labour from 1. 1978 and he has worked as permanent labour till the date of compulsory retirement awarded to him on 4. 1998. (ii) It is alleged that while in service 1st respondent misbehaved with his colleagues and superiors in drunken condition while on duty for which he was also fined Rs. 40/- in Saidapet XI Court. 1st respondent was frequently absenting and was irregular in his duty and also misbehaved with his colleagues and superiors. As many as 15 charges were framed against the 1st respondent. 1st respondent was suspended and he refused to receive the suspension order on 6. 1996. (iii) One Raghava Rao, Executive Engineer was appointed as Enquiry Officer to conduct, enquiry against the 1st respondent. After affording sufficient opportunity to 1st respondent enquiry was conducted. It is alleged that inspite of opportunities 1st respondent refused to file written statement and proceed with the matter. In the enquiry, Enquiry Officer held that out of 15 charges, 12 charges were framed. Based on report of Enquiry Officer, second show cause notice was issued to 1st respondent on 19. 1997 and thereafter, final order of dismissal was passed on 2. 1998. 3. Challenging order of dismissal, 1st respondent-employee filed an appeal before the Appellate Committee. Appellate Authority sympathetically considered the 1st respon-dents plea and the order of dismissal has been changed to compulsory retirement. Being aggrieved by modification of punishment as compulsory retirement 1st respondent filed I.D.No.111 of 1999 before the Principal Labour Court, Chennai. Both parties adduced oral and documentary evidence. Labour Court held that the domestic enquiry was not in accordance with rules and principles of natural justice was not followed and by the impugned order, Labour Court awarded reinstatement with backwages. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner-Corporation submitted that proved charges are very serious in nature and without going into the gravity of charges, Labour Court grossly erred in ordering reinstatement with backwages. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner-Corporation submitted that proved charges are very serious in nature and without going into the gravity of charges, Labour Court grossly erred in ordering reinstatement with backwages. It was further submitted that proper opportunity was afforded to the 1st respondent and only 1st respondent failed to utilise the same and while so, Labour Court erred in saying that there was violation of principles of natural justice. 5. For quite sometime, Advocates were not attending Court. 1st respondent himself appeared in person and made his submissions and also submitted his written submissions. I have heard the counsel for 1st respondent. On behalf of 1st respondent it was submitted that Corporation passed order without giving opportunity and 1st respondent was not served with any orders or communications and he was not even furnished the Enquiry Officers report. 1st respondent further submitted that when principles of natural justice was not followed by petitioner-Corporation, Labour Court rightly held that he was unlawfully terminated and that 1st respondent is entitled to reinstatement with backwages. 6. Labour Court mainly ordered reinstatement on the ground that proper opportunity was not afforded to the 1st respondent. Labour Court has observed that Management witness has admitted that he was not aware of examination of the witnesses by the Enquiry Officer. Labour Court has observed that no records was produced showing that notification was sent to the 1st respondent regarding domestic enquiry and there is no evidence to show that 2nd show cause notice was issued to the 1st respondent. Drawing Courts attention to the observations of Labour Court, 1st respondent contended that there was no intimation about the domestic enquiry and therefore it cannot be assumed that 1st respondent was informed about the various dates of domestic enquiry. Main plea of 1st respondent is that principles of natural justice was not followed. 7. As pointed out earlier, as many as 15 charges were framed against 1st respondent. Charge memo dated 16. 1996 was issued to the 1st respondent on 16. 1996 to explain why penal action should not be taken against him. It is stated that in his explanation dated 111. 1997, the 1st respondent accepted the charges and pleaded for lesser punishment. The Labour Court did not appear to have kept in view the explanation dated 111. 1997. 1996 was issued to the 1st respondent on 16. 1996 to explain why penal action should not be taken against him. It is stated that in his explanation dated 111. 1997, the 1st respondent accepted the charges and pleaded for lesser punishment. The Labour Court did not appear to have kept in view the explanation dated 111. 1997. On behalf of petitioner-Corporation, it was submitted that inspite of several opportunities 1st respondent refused to furnish written statement for interrogation of witnesses. Enquiry was fixed on 112. 1996 and due to heavy rain it was postponed to 212. 1996. On 212. 1996, Enquiry Officer interrogated five witnesses in the presence of 1st respondent and 1st respondent also cross examined the witnesses. Thereafter 1st respondent refused to furnish written statement for interrogation of other witnesses. Evidently, that enquiry was conducted in the presence of 1st respondent. After examining the witnesses and upon consideration of explanation submitted by 1st respondent, Enquiry Officer held that out of 15 charges 12 charges were proved. For proved 12 charges, 1st respondent was removed from service. In the appeal preferred by the 1st respondent, the Appellate Authority revised the punishment of dismissal into compulsory retirement. 8. By reading of Enquiry Officers report and record, it is seen that inspite of notice being served upon the 1st respondent, 1st respondent has delayed filing of written statement for interrogation of witnesses. Inspite of several opportunities, it is alleged that 1st respondent has failed to utilise the same. If at all Labour Court was of the view that opportunity was not afforded to 1st respondent, Labour Court ought to have remitted back the matter to the Disciplinary Authority for holding a fresh enquiry. Labour Court erred in setting aside the order of Appellate Authority and ordered reinstatement with backwages. 9. It is settled law principles of natural justice is audi alteram Partem ("Hear the other side"). But it is equally well settled that the concept `natural justice is, not a fixed one. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules and they cannot be imprisoned within the strait-jacket of a rigid formula. Violation of principles of natural justice does not by itself make punishment non-est. The delinquent has to prove prejudice caused thereby. 10. In Haryana Financial Corpn v. Kailash Chandra Ahuja, (2008) AIR SCW 6055, the Honble Supreme Court has held as under: "29. Violation of principles of natural justice does not by itself make punishment non-est. The delinquent has to prove prejudice caused thereby. 10. In Haryana Financial Corpn v. Kailash Chandra Ahuja, (2008) AIR SCW 6055, the Honble Supreme Court has held as under: "29. In the leading case of A.K. Kripak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150 : (1969) 2 SCC 262 , HEGDE, J stated; "What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a Court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the Court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case." 30. Again in R.S. Dass v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 593 : (1986) Supp SCC 617, this Court said; "It is well established that rules of natural justice are not rigid rules; they are flexible and their application depends upon the setting and the background of statutory provision, nature of the right which may be affected and he consequences which may entail, its application depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case." 31. At the same time, however, effect of violation of rule of audi alteram partem has to be considered. Even if hearing is not afforded to the person who is sought to be affected or penalized, can it not be argued that "notice would have served no purpose" or "hearing could not have made difference" or "the person could not have offered any defence whatsoever." 11. 1st respondent having preferred appeal and Appellate Authority having modified the punishment as compulsory retirement, cannot complain prejudice being caused to him. 12. Indisputably, the Labour Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 11-A of the I.D. Act was entitled to consider as to whether the punishment awarded is wholly disproportionate to the delinquent employee or not but it is well known that the discretion vested in it must be exercised in a judicious manner. 12. Indisputably, the Labour Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 11-A of the I.D. Act was entitled to consider as to whether the punishment awarded is wholly disproportionate to the delinquent employee or not but it is well known that the discretion vested in it must be exercised in a judicious manner. The Labour Court ordinarily should not interfere with the discretion exercised by the employer unless the same is found to be inconsistent with the provisions of a statute or otherwise perverse or unjust. It may be true that in terms of the Model Standing Order framed under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, ordinarily fine for wrongful absence was to be imposed but in this regard the number of occasions on which the workman had remained on unauthorised absence was also required to be taken into consideration. In this case, apart from remaining unauthorisedly absent without leave, the 1st respondent had been charged with indiscipline at the workplace. 1st respondent not only was found guilty of remaining unauthorisedly absent, but also guilty of misbehaviour with his superiors. In my considered view, Labour Court ought not to substitute its own view merely because two views are possible on the basis of evidence and record. 13. In Usha Breco Mazdoor Sangh v. Management of Usha Breco Limited (2008) 5 SCC 554 it is held that: "39 The decision of the Labour Court should not be based on mere hypothesis. It cannot overturn a decision of the management on ipse dixit. Its jurisdiction under Section 11-A of the Act although is a wide one, must be judiciously exercised. Judicial discretion, it is trite, cannot be exercised either whimsically or capriciously. It may scrutinise and analyse the evidence but what is important is how it does so." 14. In Tula Engg. and Locomotive Co. Ltd v. N.K. Singh, (2006) 12 SCC 554 , whether the question was as to whether on the basis of a relief granted to one of the workman a direction for reinstatement with half of the backwages could be issued. In the fact of the said case, it was held: “… 10. We find that the Labour Court has found the inquiry to be fair and proper. The conduct highlighted by the Management and established in inquiry was certainly of a very grave nature. In the fact of the said case, it was held: “… 10. We find that the Labour Court has found the inquiry to be fair and proper. The conduct highlighted by the Management and established in inquiry was certainly of a very grave nature. The Labour Court and the High Court have not found that misconduct was of any minor nature. On the contrary, the finding on facts that the acts complained of were established has not been disturbed. That being so, the leniency shown by the Labour Court is clearly unwarranted and would in fact encourage indiscipline. Without indicating any reason as to why it was felt that the punishment was disproportionate, the Labour Court should not have passed the order in the manner done. The case of R.P. Singh was not on a similar footing. He was one of the persons instigating whereas the respondent was the person who committed the acts. Therefore, the orders of the Labour Court as affirmed by the High Court cannot be sustained and are set aside. The order of dismissal from service in the disciplinary proceedings stand restored." 15. On behalf of the 1st respondent it was contended that 1st respondent was not supplied with the copy of enquiry report and non supply of enquiry report resulted in violation of principles of natural justice. In Union of India and Others v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, AIR 1991 SC 471 : (1991) 1 SCC 588 , the Honble Supreme Court has held that after the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, second opportunity contemplated by Article 311(2) of the Constitution had been abolished, but principles of natural justice and fair play required supply of adverse material to the delinquent who was likely to be affected by such material. Non-supply of report of Inquiry Officer to the delinquent would constitute infringement of doctrine of natural justice. 16. In Managing Director, Electronic Corporation of India v. B. Karunakar (1992) 1 SCC 709 a three Judge Bench of Supreme Court was called upon to consider the effect of non-supply of Inquiry Officers report to the delinquent. So far as the supply of report of the Enquiry Officer is concerned, it was held by the Constitution Bench that the delinquent employee had a right to receive the Enquiry Officers report and a denial thereof would constitute breach of natural justice. 17. So far as the supply of report of the Enquiry Officer is concerned, it was held by the Constitution Bench that the delinquent employee had a right to receive the Enquiry Officers report and a denial thereof would constitute breach of natural justice. 17. The Court then considered the effect of non-supply of Enquiry Officers report on the delinquent. Holding that it was incumbent on the delinquent employee to show prejudice and that non-supply of report of the Enquiry Officer to the delinquent employee would not by itself make the order of punishment null and void or non-est, the Supreme Court held as under: "Hence, in all cases where the Enquiry Officers report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court/Tribunal and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The Courts should avoid resorting to short cuts. Since it is the Courts/Tribunal which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. 18. From the ratio laid down in B. Karunakar (supra) case, it is clear that the doctrine of natural justice requires supply of copy of the Enquiry Officers report to the delinquent if such Enquiry Officer is other than the Disciplinary Authority. It is also clear that nonsupply of report of Enquiry Officer is in the breach of natural justice. 18. From the ratio laid down in B. Karunakar (supra) case, it is clear that the doctrine of natural justice requires supply of copy of the Enquiry Officers report to the delinquent if such Enquiry Officer is other than the Disciplinary Authority. It is also clear that nonsupply of report of Enquiry Officer is in the breach of natural justice. But, it is equally clear that failure to supply a report of Enquiry Officer to the delinquent employee would not ipso facto result in proceedings being declared null and void and order of punishment non-est and ineffective. It is for the delinquent employee to plead and prove that non-supply of such report had caused prejudice and resulted in miscarriage of justice. 19. In the instant case, 1st respondent has neither pleaded nor shown as to how prejudice has been caused to him by non-supply of Enquiry Officers report. It is not in dispute that 1st respondent has preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority and the Appellate Authority has modified the punishment of dismissal from service as that of compulsory retirement. While so, it is not open to the 1st respondent to contend that non-supply of Enquiry Officers report has caused serious prejudice. 20. Proved charges are grave in nature and having regard to gravity of charges, the Disciplinary Authority imposed punishment of dismissal from service which was modified by the Appellate Authority as compulsory retirement. Without going into the gravity of charges, pointing out some minor irregularities in conducting enquiry, Labour Court erred in interfering with the discretion exercised by the Authorities. Labour Court failed to consider that finding of Enquiry Officer is based on evidence supported by the documents. Having regard to gravity of charges, it cannot be said that punishment of compulsory retirement is shockingly disproportionate warranting interference. Labour Court grossly erred in ordering reinstatement with backwages. 21. Applying the principles of "No work No pay", 1st respondent is not entitled for any backwages. 1st respondent has filed W.P.M.P. No. 35399 of 2005 and this Court, by order dated 22. 2006, ordered payment of Section 17-B of the I.D. Act. Cheque No.184977 was issued for a sum of Rs. 2,56,185/-towards the arrears (on 19. 2006). It is stated that from October 2006 to February 2009 each and every month amount of Rs. 1st respondent has filed W.P.M.P. No. 35399 of 2005 and this Court, by order dated 22. 2006, ordered payment of Section 17-B of the I.D. Act. Cheque No.184977 was issued for a sum of Rs. 2,56,185/-towards the arrears (on 19. 2006). It is stated that from October 2006 to February 2009 each and every month amount of Rs. 2,539/- has been paid to the 1st respondent towards the payment under Section 17-B of the I.D. Act. The entire amount paid to the 1st respondent under Section 17-B is to be deducted from the pension amount payable to the 1st respondent. 22. In the result, award of the Labour Court in I.D.No. 111 of 1999 dated 18. 2004 is set aside and this writ petition is allowed. The order of Appellate Authority imposing punishment of compulsory retirement upon the 1st respondent is restored. The arrears amount paid to the 1st respondent under Section 17-B of the I.D. Act is ordered to be adjusted from the retiral benefits pension amount payable to the 1st respondent. All the retiral benefits payable to the 1st respondent shall be paid (after adjustment) within a period of eight weeks. Prior to the order of compulsory retirement if any arrears of salary is due, the same shall be paid to the 1st respondent within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The petitioner Corporation shall process the pension papers within twelve weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.