JUDGMENT : K.M. Thaker, J. Aggrieved by the action of the Special Land Acquisition Officer (hereinafter referred to as "LAO") of (i) disbursing, in favour of an alleged legatee Mr. Jayantibhai R.Patel compensation amount of about Rs.27.29 crores (about Rs.19.23 crores as ad hoc payment made even before the award and about Rs.8.06 crores paid after the award under section 11) out of total compensation of about Rs.33.33 crores determined by the LAO under section 11 on the basis of a disputed will allegedly signed by deceased Mr. Mahendrakumar P. Desai; and also (ii) upon being aggrieved by L.A.O's action of ignoring (a) the requests and demand by the deceased's heirs and legal representatives (L.R.s for short) for reference under section 30 read with section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), and (b) the fact that the so called MOU-settlement between the alleged legatee Mr. Jayantibhai R. Patel and some of the heirs is under challenge in a civil suit filed by some of the other heirs of the deceased Mr. Mahendrakumar P. Desai, the two petitions have been preferred alleging inter alia, that the alleged legatee staked his claim over the title and interest in the property in question almost six years after the date on which the will was allegedly executed. 1.1 In effect and substance the subject matter of the two petitions is (i) the dispute between the petitioners and respondent No. 4 Mr. Jayantibhai R. Patel (hereinafter referred to as "the alleged legatee or "the Respondent No.4" who is also joined in SCA No.2393/2009 as respondent No. 3) about the title to receive compensation in respect of parcels of huge land admeasuring about 53 Bighas and 18 vasas equivalent to about 1,22,718 sq. mtrs., popularly known as Police Pared Ground, Lal Baug, bearing Survey No. 371 and 372 situate in Vadodara City, and about (ii) the action of the respondent No. 2 LAO in paying the compensation in the ratio of 81.9% to the respondent No. 4. mtrs., popularly known as Police Pared Ground, Lal Baug, bearing Survey No. 371 and 372 situate in Vadodara City, and about (ii) the action of the respondent No. 2 LAO in paying the compensation in the ratio of 81.9% to the respondent No. 4. Since the respondents (except one respondent in SCA No.1592/09) are common in both petitions and also for the reason that the relevant facts involved in both matters are almost similar and also because one of the reliefs prayed for (i.e.to command the respondent No.2 LAO and Respondent No.1 state to reclaim and redeposit the disbursed compensation) is common in both petitions, the two petitions are decided by this common judgment. 1.2 The petitioners in Spl.C.A. No. 1592 of 2009 have, inter alia, prayed : "14(a) for a declaration that the action of the respondent no.2 in disbursing the amount of compensation to the respondent no.4 is mala fide, collusive, contrary to law and without jurisdiction and hence violative of Article 14, 19, 21 and 300A of the Constitution of India. (b) for declaration that the action of the respondent no.2 of not considering the objections of the petitioners submitted in response to notice u/s. 9 of the Act and their request for reference u/s. 30 of the Act being malafide, collusive and contrary to the known procedure of law. (c) for direction to take appropriate actions against the Land Acquisition Officer for his malafide acts and omissions and to recover from him personally the amount disbursed by him in favour of the respondent no.4 in violation of law. (c) for direction to take appropriate actions against the Land Acquisition Officer for his malafide acts and omissions and to recover from him personally the amount disbursed by him in favour of the respondent no.4 in violation of law. 1.3 Whereas the petitioners in Spl.C.A. No. 2923 of 2009 have prayed : "(a) for declaration that the action of the Special Land Acquisition Officer (Unit-1), Vadodara, the Respondent No. 2 herein, in making the Final Award dated 11.12.2008 under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and thereupon depositing the amount of compensation to the extent of 18.90% coming to the share of the petitioners and other heirs and legal representatives of the deceased Mahendrakumar Desai in the District Court, Vadodara, whereas disbursing the amount of compensation to the extent of balance 81.90% coming to the share o the respondent No. 3 herein, is unlawful, unjust, discriminatory, arbitrary and in patent violation of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and in violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioners under Article 14 and 31A of the Constitution of India. (b) for direction to the respondent No. 1-State and the respondent No. 2 LAO to bring back forthwith to the State Exchequers the amount of compensation released and disbursed in favour of the respondent No. 3 herein, pursuant to the Final Award dated 11.12.2008 approved by the respondent No. 1 and declared by the respondent No. 2 under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894." 2. The facts emerging from the record of this proceedings need to be considered little closely. The petitioners have asserted following facts: 2.1 The two petitioners in Spl.C.A. No.1592 of 2009 are heirs-grandsons of the deceased Mr. Mahendrakumar P. Desai. They are minors and have preferred petitions through their mothers. It is claimed that the ancestors of the petitioners were owners and occupiers of land admeasuring about 138 Bighas and 19 vasas out of which land ad-measuring about 85 Bighas and 1 vasas were acquired by the erstwhile state of Baroda in 1892 leaving balance of 53 about Bighas and 18 vasas which devolved upon the successors including the deceased Mr. Mahendrakumar P. Desai. Mahendrakumar P. Desai. It is further claimed that in September, 1960 one Jayantibhai Patel (the alleged legatee and respondent No. 4 in Spl.C.A. No.1592 of 2009 and No.3 in Spl.C.A. No.2923 of 2009) had applied for a portion of the aforesaid land on lease basis. It is also claimed that the deceased Mr. Mahendrakumar P. Desai subsequently learnt about such an application and therefore, in November, 1962 he filed objection before the Commissioner claiming ownership rights in respect of the said land. The objections were referred to the city survey office for inquiry and by report dated 19.2.1963 it was reported that the said land belonged to the Government. The said reports gave rise to dispute between the deceased Mahendrakumar P. Desai and Government which resulted in litigation, the details of which are stated in Spl.C.A. No. 2923 of 2009 as per which at one stage of the litigation the Collector, Vadodara while exercising Suo Motu Revisional Power, passed an order dated 9/16.9.1964 and quashed an earlier order dated 1.6.1964 by Assistant Collector, Vadodara and ordered fresh inquiry in the matter. After the remand, the Assistant Collector passed order dated 30.11.1966 holding that the land was of the ownership of the Government. Being aggrieved by the order deceased Mr. Mahendrakumar P.Desai preferred Appeal No.4 of 1967 before the Collector, Vadodara who by order dated 9.8.1968 dismissed the same. Upon being aggrieved by the said order of Collector the deceased Mahendrakumar P. Desai preferred Revision Application No.137 of 1968 before the Revenue Tribunal which, by order dated 11.7.69 set aside the orders and remanded the matter to the Assistant Collector, Vadodara for fresh inquiry. Once again by his order dated 7.4.1980 the Assistant Collector, Vadodara reiterated that the lands were of the Government's ownership. The said order was challenged in Appeal No. 151 of 1980 before the Revenue Tribunal which was returned on the ground of jurisdiction. Thus, deceased Mr. Mahendrakumar P.Desai preferred an Appeal No.15 of 1989 before the Collector, Vadodara who by his order dated 14.5.83 dismissed the appeal. After delay of seven years, the said order was challenged in Revision Application No. 39 of 1990 before the Revenue Tribunal which came to be allowed by judgment dated 29.11.1991 holding that the land in question admeasuring about 53 Bighas and 17 vasas was of the ownership of Mr. Mahendrakumar P.Desai. After delay of seven years, the said order was challenged in Revision Application No. 39 of 1990 before the Revenue Tribunal which came to be allowed by judgment dated 29.11.1991 holding that the land in question admeasuring about 53 Bighas and 17 vasas was of the ownership of Mr. Mahendrakumar P.Desai. The said order of the Tribunal was challenged by the Collector by way of petition being Spl.C.A. No. 6528 of 1992 before the High Court. While the said petition being Spl.C.A. No.6528 of 1992 was pending the respondent No.1 State filed Special Civil Suit No.776 of 1992 in the Civil Court, Vadodara challenging the legality of the above referred decision dated 29.11.1991 passed by the Revenue Tribunal in Revision Application No.36 of 1990 and prayed for declaration and injunction in respect of the lands in question admeasuring about 1,28,073 sq.mtrs. In view of the said suit, the Division Bench dismissed Spl.C.A. No.6528 of 1992. On the other hand, the Civil Court, Vadodara by judgment and decree dated 21.3.1994 dismissed the suit filed by respondent No.1-State. Upon being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 21.3.1994 respondent No.1-State preferred First Appeal No. 969 of 1994. The High Court, by judgment dated 7.5.2002 dismissed the First Appeal. It deserves to be mentioned that during the pendency of the First Appeal the respondent No.1-State had preferred Civil Applications No. 4849 of 2000, 964 of 2002 and 1150 of 2002 praying, inter alia, leave to produce additional evidence on the record of the First Appeal to show Government ownership of the land in question. The said Civil Applications were dismissed by the High Court by orders dated 22.6.2000 and 7.5.2002. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 7.5.2002 in First Appeal No. 969 of 1994 and also by the orders rejecting the Civil Applications, respondent No.1-State preferred appeal by Special Leave being Civil Appeal No. 7898 of 2002 and 7900 of 2002 before the Hon'ble Apex Court. The Hon'ble Apex Court, by judgment dated 10.4.2006, held that the respondent No.1-State is the owner of the land ad-measuring about 2 Bighas and 5 vasas. The dispute ultimately came to be decided by the judgment dated 10.4.2006 of the Hon'ble Apex Court accepting the claim of the State Government only in respect of about 2 Bighas & 5 Vasas of land, and confirming ownership of the deceased Mr. The dispute ultimately came to be decided by the judgment dated 10.4.2006 of the Hon'ble Apex Court accepting the claim of the State Government only in respect of about 2 Bighas & 5 Vasas of land, and confirming ownership of the deceased Mr. Mahendrakumar P. Desai over the said lands, except the land ad-measuring about 2 Bighas and 5 vasas from out of total area ad-measuring 53 Bighas and 73 vasas. Differently put, land ad-measuring about 51 Bighas and 12 vasas i.e. about 1,22,718 sq. mtrs. were held to be of the ownership of deceased Mr. Mahendrakumar P.Desai. It is also claimed that after the judgment dated 10.4.2006 by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the State had preferred review application before the Hon'ble Apex Court, which also came to be dismissed by order dated 11.7.2006. 2.2 At this stage it may be mentioned that while the aforesaid proceedings were pending/in progress the said Mr. Mahendrakumar P. Desai died in October 1995 leaving behind him several heirs and L.R.s as well as the aforesaid disputed property (hereinafter referred to as the lands in question). When said Mr. Mahendrakumar P.Desai expired on 31.10.1995 the dispute between the deceased Mr. Mahendrakumar Desai and the State Government was pending. So far as the private litigants are concerned there is no dispute about the fact that lands in question are ancestral and coparcenary property. 2.3 After lapse of about 6 years since the death of said Mr. Mahendrakumar P. Desai, and while the aforesaid proceedings were pending one Mr. Jayantibhai Ramdas Patel i.e. the respondent No. 4 (and respondent No. 3 in Spl. C.A. No. 2923 of 2009) came forward claiming that the deceased Mr. Mahendrakumar P. Desai had bequeathed the lands in question in his favour by virtue of a so-called will allegedly dated 22.8.1995 (i.e. six years before) purportedly signed by deceased Mr. Mahendrakumar P. Desai. 2.4 Though, testamentary succession was claimed by the alleged legatee (respondent No.4) on the basis of the will in his favour, such claim was made for the first time in 2001 i.e. six years after the date of the alleged will (the date being 22.8.1995) and death of Shri Mahendrakumar P. Desai (date of death being 31.10.1995).The alleged legatee Mr. 2.4 Though, testamentary succession was claimed by the alleged legatee (respondent No.4) on the basis of the will in his favour, such claim was made for the first time in 2001 i.e. six years after the date of the alleged will (the date being 22.8.1995) and death of Shri Mahendrakumar P. Desai (date of death being 31.10.1995).The alleged legatee Mr. Jayantibhai R. Patel claimed that he possessed the will and on that premise he applied, in or around September 2001, for probate of the will by filing Civil Misc. Application No. 224 of 2001 in the Civil Court at Vadodara. 2.5 It is claimed by the petitioners that in the aforesaid Civil Misc. Application No. 224 of 2001 seeking probate of the will, the alleged legatee Mr. Jayantibhai R.Patel had not joined any of the heirs/L.R.s of deceased Mr. Mahendrakumar P. Desai and even the so-called witnesses of the alleged will were not examined to prove the will, while seeking probate. 2.6 The Competent Court, within span of one month, granted probate of the will in favour of the alleged legatee Mr. Jayantibhai R.Patel. 2.7 After the probate was granted in October 2001, three heirs of deceased Mr. Mahendrakumar P. Desai (who are the petitioners in Spl. C.A. No. 2923 of 2009)viz. his widow and his two sons Ananat Desai and Rakesh Desai filed Probate (Revocation) Application No.23 of 2003 seeking revocation of probate. After considering the said revocation application No. 23 of 2003, the court revoked the probate by order dated 2.9.2004. 2.8 Since in the meanwhile, the name of the alleged legatee Mr. Jayantibhai R. Patel was entered into the City Survey Record on the basis of the Probate Certificate, the heirs of deceased Mr. Mahendrakumar P. Desai filed an appeal against the entry which is said to be pending. It is also claimed that the respondent No.4 Jayantibhai R.Patel had also filed a Special Civil Suit No.116 of 2007 (joining only 3 heirs as opponents) in the Civil Court at Vadodara praying, inter-alia, that he may be declared the sole and absolute owner of the lands in question. 2.9 Subsequently in October 2006 i.e. after almost two years since the order revoking the probate was passed, the alleged legatee Mr. 2.9 Subsequently in October 2006 i.e. after almost two years since the order revoking the probate was passed, the alleged legatee Mr. Jayantibhai R. Patel (respondent No.4) preferred an application being Review Application No. 169 of 2006 seeking review of the order dated 2.9.2004 revoking probate wherein he joined only three heirs (i.e. petitioners of Spl.C.A. No.2923 of 2009). 2.10 On the other hand after the judgment and order dated 10.4.2006 by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the State Government commenced proceedings for acquisition of the lands in question. The notification dated 25.01.2007 under Section 4 of the Act was issued and was followed by Section 6 declaration. It is claimed that during the hearing of objections the heirs of deceased Mr. Desai had raised serious objections against any disbursement in favour of the respondent No. 4 Mr. Jayantibhai R. Patel or any other persons. 2.11 It appears, from the record that around the time the section 4 and section 6 Notifications were issued, the alleged legatee Mr. Jayantibhai R.Patel (the respondent No.4) entered into alleged MOU on 9th April 2007 which, as claimed by the petitioners, was though apparently signed by 8 persons, actually one person had signed on behalf of 3 persons (as the power of attorney holder for said three persons) who are plaintiffs in Suit No.308 of 2008 for apportionment of compensation in ratio of 81.90% and 18.10% amongst them and on the same day i.e. on 9.4.2007 a compromise pursis was also filed in the earlier referred Suit No.116 of 2007 which was disposed of on the same day on the basis of the said compromise pursis. The earlier referred Review Application No. 169 of 2006 filed by the Respondent No.4 also came to be allowed by order dated 7.5.2007 on the basis of the said compromise pursis and order in Civil Suit No. 116 of 2007. 2.12 Then, in October 2008 a suit being Special Civil Suit No.516 of 2008 came to be filed by two grand sons (petitioners in Spl.C.A. No.1592 of 09) of deceased Mr. Mahendrakumar P. Desai challenging the capacity of the deceased Mr. Mahendrakumar P. Desai, to bequeath the ancestral property i.e. land in question by the alleged will. In the said Suit No.516 of 2008 all the heirs and the L.A.O. as well as the respondent No.4 Mr. Jayantibhai R.Patel are party defendants. Mahendrakumar P. Desai challenging the capacity of the deceased Mr. Mahendrakumar P. Desai, to bequeath the ancestral property i.e. land in question by the alleged will. In the said Suit No.516 of 2008 all the heirs and the L.A.O. as well as the respondent No.4 Mr. Jayantibhai R.Patel are party defendants. The L.A.O. is said to have filed reply on or around 12.11.2008. The petitioners have also stated that they had lodged objections against any disbursement in favour of respondent No. 4 and claimed right and interest in the land in question and also sought reference under Section 30 of the Act. It is claimed that such protests were lodged on 5.9.2008, 16.9.2008, 20.10.2008 and 21.10.2008. 2.13 During the pendency of Civil Suit NO. 516 of 2008 and after the above mentioned protests were lodged the respondent No. 2 L.A.O. passed award dated 11.12.2008 under Section 11 of the Act. By the said award dated 11.12.2008 the respondent No. 2 L.A.O. determined the total compensation payable in respect of the land in question to the tune of Rs. 33,33,15,552/- and since Rs. 23,48,82,252/- were already paid as ad hoc/advance payment, compensation of Rs. 9,84,33,300/- remained to be paid. It is claimed that the respondent No. 2 L.A.O. prepared the treasury bills on the same day and sent the same on the same day to facilitate the withdrawal of compensation amount and also obtained advance receipt from respondent No. 4. Mr. Jayantibhai R.Patel (the alleged legatee). 2.14 On 30.12.2008 the respondent No.4 Mr. Jayantibhai R.Patel was paid Rs. 8,06,16,873/- (@ 81.9% being the share fixed by M.O.U.). The balance amount of compensation attributable towards 18.1% totalling to Rs. 1,78,16,427/- (out of total amount of Rs. 9,84,33,300/-) was initially deposited in the court but the respondent No.2 L.A.O. it is stated by the petitioners, subsequently reclaimed the deposited amount of Rs. 1,78,16,427/-. From the record and/or submissions by the parties it does not become clear whether the L.A.O. has withdrawn the aforesaid amount of Rs.1,78,16,427/- from the court (after having earlier deposited in the court) and what is the exact present status of said amount and whether the said amount has been paid to any of the heirs of the deceased Mr. Mahendrakumar P. Desai, or not. Mahendrakumar P. Desai, or not. 2.15 The petitioners (of Spl.C.A. No. 1592 of 2009) have also claimed that on 30.1.2009 they were informed that their request for reference under Section 30 cannot be entertained. The petitioners have, by an amendment, claimed that after the award dated 11.12.2008 and after the compensation was disbursed in aforesaid manner by the LAO the respondent No.4 Mr. Jayantibhai R. Patel has preferred reference under Section 18 of the Act for higher compensation and the petitioners apprehend that the LAO may even disburse higher compensation, they have amended the petition (Spl.C.A. No.1952 of 2009) so as to pray for relief against such disbursement. 2.16 So far as the Special Civil Application No.2923 of 2009 is concerned, the petitioners are (i) widow of deceased M.P. Desai, (ii) Mr. Anant M. Desai and (iii) Mr. Rakesh M. Desai (the two sons of deceased M.P. Desai). The said three petitioners have claimed that they addressed a letter dated 1.6.2007 to the L.A.O. asking for payment of compensation amount to them (the three petitioners of Spl.C.A. No.2923 of 2009) and the respondent No.4 Mr. Jayantibhai R. Patel in ratio of 18.10% and 81.90% respectively. It is also claimed that since they learnt that name of Mr. Jayantibhai R. Patel, the respondent No.4 was already mutated (in view of his application) as the sole and exclusive owner of the lands in question, they preferred C.T.S. Appeal which is stated to be pending. It has been also stated that a petition being Spl.C.A. No.20703 of 2007 praying for direction that the names of the petitioners therein should be incorporated in the draft award as the persons entitled to compensation, was filed and it was disposed of by order dated 27.8.2007 with direction to the L.A.O. to indicate in the award that the petitioners will be entitled to receive compensation at the rate of 18.10% out of total compensation. 2.17 It is also stated that two daughters and a son of deceased Shri Mahendrakumar P. Desai have filed a suit being Special Civil Suit no.308 of 2008 challenging the settlement(M.O.U.) claiming that the said settlement is null and void. The L.A.O. and respondent No.4 are party defendant in said Suit No.308 of 2008. 2.17 It is also stated that two daughters and a son of deceased Shri Mahendrakumar P. Desai have filed a suit being Special Civil Suit no.308 of 2008 challenging the settlement(M.O.U.) claiming that the said settlement is null and void. The L.A.O. and respondent No.4 are party defendant in said Suit No.308 of 2008. 2.18 The three petitioners in Spl.C.A. No.2923 of 2009 have asserted that on 28.7.2008 the sanction accorded to the draft award was subject to certain conditions including the condition that the compensation should be paid only after ascertaining the ownership of land and the procedure under sections 30 and 31 of the Act should be followed if any dispute was existing with regard to the title. It is also stated that vide the letter dated 10.12.2008 Mr. A.M. Desai has withdrawn the consent for apportionment of compensation in view of the challenge against the M.O.U. 2.19 At this stage, we may refer to a writ petition being Spl.C.A. No. 6686 of 2008 which came to be filed praying, inter alia, that the order dated 4.12.2007 may be set aside and to hear petitioners and their objections and for directions to the LAO and other respondents to deposit Rs.4,20,13,688/- paid to the heirs of deceased Mr. Mahendrakumar P. Desai and Rs.19,23,68,564/- paid to Mr. Jayantibhai R.Patel may be deposited and reference under Section 18 of the Act may be made for enhancement of the compensation. It is in this petition that the orders dated 8.5.2008, 2.2.2009, 15.5.2009 and 8.7.2009, of which reference has been made hereafter, came to be passed. 3. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to record a subsequent development i.e. subsequent to the submission of Spl.C.A. No.1592 of 2009 and 2923 of 2009. We have been informed, during the hearing, that in April-2009, another petition being Spl.C.A. No. 7242 of 2009 has been filed, wherein, the petitioners have claimed that according to the expert opinion the signature on the alleged will is not of the deceased Mr. Mahendrakumar P.Desai and the petitioners in the aforesaid petition have prayed that the orders dated 7.5.2007 and 28.5.2007, in Review Applications No. 169 of 2006 and 89 of 2007 respectively and the consent decree dated 9.4.2007 in Civil Suit No. 116 of 2007 may be declared void. Mahendrakumar P.Desai and the petitioners in the aforesaid petition have prayed that the orders dated 7.5.2007 and 28.5.2007, in Review Applications No. 169 of 2006 and 89 of 2007 respectively and the consent decree dated 9.4.2007 in Civil Suit No. 116 of 2007 may be declared void. It has also been submitted that by order dated 16.7.2009, the implementation of the aforesaid orders and decree has been stayed. 4. Mr. Asim Pandya learned Advocate has appeared for the petitioners in Spl.C.A. No.1592 of 2009 while Mr. D.C. Dave, learned Advocate has appeared for the three petitioners in Spl.C.A. No.2923 of 2009. Mr. Umesh Trivedi, learned Additional G.P. has appeared for the State of Gujarat and the LAO while Mrs. K.A. Mehta Learned Counsel has appeared with Mr. Dhaval Barot Learned Advocate for respondent No.4 (in Spl.C.A.No.1592 of 2009 and respondent No.3 in Spl.C.A. No.2923 of 2009). We have heard the learned Advocates for the respective parties. 5. Mr. Pandya for the petitioners in Spl.C.A. No.1592 of 2009 has submitted that the action of the L.A.O. in disbursing the compensation amount in favour of respondent No.4 and in not making reference under Section 30, though demanded, is contrary to the mandate of Sections 30 and 31 of the Act, and it ignores the pendency of the disputes and diverse litigation and is also contrary to the direction issued vide G.R. dated 4.12.2008. Mr. Mr. Pandya further submitted that the action of the L.A.O. is mala fide, collusive and violative of Articles 14, 19, 21 and 300-A of the Constitution of India, which is evident from the manner and method of disbursement of compensation in favour of respondent No. 4 and is also evident from the act of ignoring the mandate of Section 30 and 31 of the Act and keeping ready the treasury bills as well as advance-receipt on the same day on which the award is passed so as to facilitate quick and immediate withdrawal of compensation by respondent No.4 and is also evident from the fact that the intimation under Section 12(2) was given to respondent No.4 on 20.12.2008 whereas to the other interested persons the intimation was given on 22.1.2009 and the compensation was disbursed/paid to the respondent No. 4 on 30.12.2008, while the balance compensation was deposited in the name of Principal Senior Civil Judge in January-2009 without any intimation to the Court and by ignoring instruction of the respondent No.1 as well as the protest application and legal notices by the petitioners of Spl.C.A. No.1592 of 2009. Mr. Pandya also submitted that if there is dispute about the rights and interest in the lands and about entitlement for compensation, the LAO is obliged to refer dispute to the competent Court. Mr. Pandya submitted that the despite such position of law, the L.A.O. deliberately ignored the protest application and also ignored the demand for reference under Section 30 as well as G.R. dated 4.12.2008 and disbursed the compensation in favour of Mr. Patel. Mr. Pandya also asserted that action by L.A.O. is evidently mala fide since it has been executed despite knowledge about the disputes and litigation. Mr. Pandya submitted that in view of this Civil Suit No.156 of 2008 in which the L.A.O. as well as respondent No.4 are party defendant, the L.A.O. was also aware of the prayer in the said suit demanding refund of the ad hoc amount paid to said Mr. Patel before passing the award. Mr. Pandya also highlighted that some of the heirs were represented in the M.O.U. by the power of attorney and they themselves had not signed it in person and such heirs have thereafter prayed for declaration that the settlement was not binding to them. 5.1 Mrs. K.A. Mehta, learned Counsel with Mr. Patel before passing the award. Mr. Pandya also highlighted that some of the heirs were represented in the M.O.U. by the power of attorney and they themselves had not signed it in person and such heirs have thereafter prayed for declaration that the settlement was not binding to them. 5.1 Mrs. K.A. Mehta, learned Counsel with Mr. Barot, learned Advocate for respondent No.4 opposed the petition and raised objections about maintainability of the petition on the grounds, inter-alia, that a petition by a minor through mother is not maintainable and minor can come before the Court only through father. Ms. Mehta also submitted that in present case, the father of minor has entered into an M.O.U. with respondent No.4 and a consent decree in light of the M.O.U. has been passed and the L.A.O., therefore, disbursed the compensation in favour of the respondent No.4 hence there is no illegality or mala fides as alleged. Mrs. Mehta also submitted that minor's father, who have entered into the M.O.U., have not been joined as petitioners or respondents. Ms. Mehta relied on (1996) 8 SCC 54 and submitted that in case the minors are coparcener, only karta can represent the minor and a mother cannot represent as guardian for undivided share of minor in coparcener property and that Section 8 of the Minority Guardian Act does not apply in facts of the present case. She has placed reliance on 1961 GLR 108 and to support the contention that L.A.O. has to proceed on the basis of revenue entry, reliance is placed on 1973 G.L.R. 506. Ms. Mehta also submitted that since substantive civil suits being Suit No.308 of 2008 and 516 of 2008 are pending before the Civil Court, High Court should not exercise extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. In support of the submission that there was no illegality or malafides in L.A.O.'s action of disbursing compensation in favour of respondent No.4 Mrs. Mehta also submitted that there was no stay operating against L.A.O. restraining him from disbursing the compensation to Mr. Patel. 6. Before dealing with the rival contentions it is necessary to take note of certain developments and orders, which have been passed from time to time in certain connected matters. Mehta also submitted that there was no stay operating against L.A.O. restraining him from disbursing the compensation to Mr. Patel. 6. Before dealing with the rival contentions it is necessary to take note of certain developments and orders, which have been passed from time to time in certain connected matters. Two petitions being Spl.C.A. Nos.8215 of 2008 and 1967 of 2009 were filed claiming that four daughters of deceased M.P. Desai had entered into agreement to sell dated 17.10.2000 with the petitioners by virtue of which the four daughters had agreed to sell their 50% share. While rejecting the Spl.C.A. No.1967 of 2009, the Division Bench in the order dated 30.3.2009 observed that :- "The petitioner herein is already party defendant in Special Civil Suit No.308 of 2008. Both Special Civil Suits No.308 of 2008 and 516 of 2008 were ordered to be heard within three months, as per the order dated 24th February, 2009 of this Court and, therefore, it is reasonable to proceed on the basis that the present petitioner was aware of the aforesaid order dated 24th February, 2009. The said order dated 24th February, 2009, however, was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge on 18th March, 2009. It would, therefore, appear that the present petitioner is interested in seeing that Special Civil Suit No.516 of 2008 (for the reliefs referred to in para 12 hereinabove) does not proceed further, otherwise if the suit is decreed Jayantibhai Ramdas Patel will have refund Rs.19.23 crores." 6.1. It is also necessary to refer to Spl.C.A. No.6686 of 2008. The said petition has been disposed off as per the order dated 02.02.2009, however the developments noted on the record of said petition and orders passed therein need to be taken into account. During the hearing of the said petition at one stage, a serious grievance was made against the action of the LAO in disbursing, at the time of award dated 11.12.2008, the compensation in favour of the alleged legatee, particularly on the ground that a statement by learned AGP was made to the effect that the L.A.O. will be conveyed to not to finalise the award under Section 11. In view of the said grievance, a detailed order dated 2.2.2009 was passed by the Division Bench wherein earlier order dated 8.5.2008 was reproduced. The relevant part of the said order reads thus :- "4. In view of the said grievance, a detailed order dated 2.2.2009 was passed by the Division Bench wherein earlier order dated 8.5.2008 was reproduced. The relevant part of the said order reads thus :- "4. The prayer made by him has not been opposed by Mr. M.B.Gandhi, Learned Advocate of the petitioners. However, he states that at the time of issuance of notice, Ms Mini Nair, Learned AGP, had stated that she will convey to the Land Acquisition Officer not to finalise the Award under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act. 5. In view of this, by consent, the matter is adjourned to 15.5.2008." 6.2 Subsequently by order dated 15.5.2009 it was directed that an inquiry into the matter as to how the award was declared and amounts were paid to respondent No.4, be entrusted to a Senior Officer of the State Government. In pursuance of the said order, a report dated 4.7.2009 came to be placed on record of the said petition. After perusal of the said report, Division Bench passed an order dated 8.7.2009 that:- "3....So at least two suits filed by some of the heirs of Mahendrakumar Desai were pending since 10.7.2008 and 15.10.2008 in which the Land Acquisition Officer as well as Jayantibhai Ramdas Patel were joined as the defendants along with other defendants and where the previous compromise was very much challenged. 4. It is, therefore, surprising as to how the Land Acquisition Officer Shri Baria himself did not deposit the amounts in the Court. Shri Baria did not even refer to pendency of and the dispute or the claims in those suits while answering question No.5 posed by the Collector. It also appears that the Collector who has submitted Annexure-III containing the list of cases relevant to the controversy at hand has also not referred to those two cases being Special Civil Suit Nos.308 and 516 of 2008 at item Nos.17 and 18 respectively of the said Annexure-III." In the said order dated 8.7.2009, the court also took note of the conclusions recorded by the officer in the said report, which read thus:- "However, during this inquiry there are two instances where I think he has made some lapses. The first is when the A.G.P. had instructed him not to declare the award and this thing has been brought to the notice of the Hon'ble High Court by the petitioners advocate, Shri Baria ought to have consulted the A.G.P. before declaring the award. Better still, he should have brought to the notice of the Hon'ble Court the facts and circumstances created by the instructions given by the Home Department necessitating an early declaration of the award. He could have easily sought necessary instructions from the Hon'ble High Court and avoided placing himself in this situation. The second lapse is that even though the award had to be declared, he did not choose the option of depositing the amount in the District Court. He deposited the amount payable to the heirs of Mahendrakumar Desai (18.90%) but he did not do the same in the case of the 81.90% payable to Jayantbhai Ramdas Patel. Though it is the discretion of the L.A.O. and if he is satisfied that there is not dispute regarding the apportionment of the compensation he can pay the amount, but in hindsight it is clear that he could have avoided this controversy by depositing the amount in the Civil Court." 7. It is pertinent that even before the said award was passed, the L.A.O. had, on 4/1/2008, disbursed ad hoc compensation to the tune of Rs.23,48,82,252/- out of which Rs.19,23,68,564/- are said to have been paid as ad hoc/advance to the alleged legatee Mr. Jayantibhai R.Patel (Respondent No.4) and Rs.4,25,13,688/- are said to have been paid, at that point of time, as ad hoc/advance to some of the heirs of deceased Mr. Mahendrakumar P.Desai and subsequently when the award was made further sum of Rs.8,06,16,873/- (i.e. Rs.4,96,87,623/- (actually paid) + Rs.3,09,29,250/- deducted towards I.T) also came to be paid to Respondent No.4 on 30.12.2008. 8. It is apposite to note some of the prominent facts:- (a) The lands in question are ancestral property and not self acquired property of the deceased Mr. Mahendrakumar P. Desai. (b) The minor grandsons (petitioners in Spl.C.A. No.1592 of 2009) have filed Civil Suit No.516 of 2008 challenging the will. They have also challenged the deceased Mr. Mahendra P. Desai's capacity to bequeath, by will, the ancestral land in which they have interest. (c) It was six years after the alleged execution of the will and death of the deceased Mr. They have also challenged the deceased Mr. Mahendra P. Desai's capacity to bequeath, by will, the ancestral land in which they have interest. (c) It was six years after the alleged execution of the will and death of the deceased Mr. M.P. Desai that the alleged legatee Mr. Jayantibhai R. Patel staked his claim over the right, title and interest in the property without explaining the delay of 6 years. (d) Even the so-called witnesses to the Will were not examined in support of the probate application No.224 of 2009 in which the court granted probate on 19.10.2001. (e) In said probate application, the legatee did not join the heirs/L.R.s of deceased Mr. Mahendra P. Desai. (f) Three heirs had filed probate revocation application disputing the will and seeking revocation of the will and by order dated 2.9.2004 the court had revoked the probate (however subsequently in view of MOU order dated 19.10.2001 was restored). (g) The alleged legatee Mr. Jayantibhai R. Patel and some of the heirs of deceased Mr. M.P. Desai entered into a M.O.U. and on that basis invited consent decree cancelling revocation. It is claimed that the order dated 19.10.2001 was then, restored. (h) It is also claimed by some heirs that the said M.O.U. was signed by the power of attorney holder of some of the heirs and not by all the heirs personally. (i) The 2 daughters and a son of deceased Mr. Mahendra P. Desai, who are alleged to be signatories to the M.O.U., have filed suit and challenged the M.O.U., and thereby the very base of the claim of the alleged legatee. (j) Some of the heirs of deceased Mr. M.P.Desai have claimed, by way of S.C.S.No. 308 of 2008, that the M.O.U. is null and void and was signed by power of attorney without their consent . (k) By letter dated 10.12.2008 a signatory to the M.O.U. withdrew the consent for apportionment of compensation between the petitioners and the alleged legatee. (l) Two other claims (one by Mr. M.J. Shah and D.J. Shah and second by C.J. Sheth) were also raised with regard to the lands in question. (m) Though the civil suits being S.C.S. No. 516 of 2008 (15-10-2008) and S.C.S. No.308 of 2008 (10-7-2008) and C.T.S. Appeal were pending, the L.A.O. disbursed huge compensation to the alleged legatee and some of the heirs. M.J. Shah and D.J. Shah and second by C.J. Sheth) were also raised with regard to the lands in question. (m) Though the civil suits being S.C.S. No. 516 of 2008 (15-10-2008) and S.C.S. No.308 of 2008 (10-7-2008) and C.T.S. Appeal were pending, the L.A.O. disbursed huge compensation to the alleged legatee and some of the heirs. The L.A.O. also disregarded the dispute as to the title to receive compensation and about the apportionment though the L.A.O. is party to both suits proceedings i.e. Suit No.516 of 2008 and 308 of 2008, and he is thus aware of the claims. (n) By order dated 28.7.2008 the State Government had expressly conveyed to LAO to take out proceedings under section 30 and 31 of the Act in case of dispute and also to take into account pending proceedings and also to ensure that compensation may not be paid to any unauthorized person. (o) by letter dated 10.12.2008 the petitioners of S.C.A.No.2923 of 2008 even demanded reference under section 30." 9. We may first take up the objections raised by Mrs. K.A. Mehta, Learned Counsel for respondent no.4 Mrs. Mehta submitted that since the civil proceedings are pending, this Court should not exercise extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. Ordinarily, High Court would not entertain a petition under Article 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution when suit proceedings are pending. Mr. Pandya submitted that the relief prayed for in the suit and the relief prayed for in present petition is different and therefore, there would be no bar to entertain the petition and that the objection against the petition on this ground is not justified. He also submitted that what is substantially challenged here is the act of respondent No.2 L.A.O. of disbursing the compensation in favour of respondent No.4 which is wholly without jurisdiction, ex-facie contrary to law and specific instructions of the State Government and hence, a petition under Article 226 is the only proper and efficacious remedy. He also submitted that what is substantially challenged here is the act of respondent No.2 L.A.O. of disbursing the compensation in favour of respondent No.4 which is wholly without jurisdiction, ex-facie contrary to law and specific instructions of the State Government and hence, a petition under Article 226 is the only proper and efficacious remedy. While we find some substance in this submission, we are, more than for the said reason, inclined to entertain the petition for the reason that the L.A.O. is said to have disbursed the compensation even after the statement made to this Court that L.A.O. would be instructed to not to finalise the award under Section 11 of the Act and yet not only the award came to be passed but the compensation also came to be paid with rare quickness and urgency though the L.A.O., according to petitioners' undisputed submission was, as a party opponent to suit No.308 of 2008 and Suit No.516 of 2008, aware about the dispute and the claim. Thus, we do not accept this objection. 9.1 It is also contended on behalf of the alleged legatee Mr. Jayantibhai R. Patel that in the case where minors are coparcener's only Karta can represent the minors and for undivided share of minor, mother cannot represent as guardian and that the petition by minor through mother is not maintainable. In this regard, it is necessary to note that in present petitions the dispute is regarding L.A.O's action of disbursing compensation awarded under the Act and of denying reference under section 30 of the Act it is claimed that the disbursed compensation should be redeposited during the pendency of minor's suit challenging will and appropriate orders for reference under section 30 of the Act should be made. 9.1 (a) It is apposite, in this context, to take into account the provision under section 3(g) which prescribes who shall be the deemed persons "entitled to act". The sub-clause (ii) of the proviso of said Section 3(g) of the Act provides that in every case, the person interested may appear through a next friend and as per sub Clause (iii) of the proviso the provisions of Order XXXII of the Civil Procedure Code are mutatis mutandis applicable in case of persons appearing by a next friend or by a guardian. Rule 1 of Order XXXII inter alia provides that suit by a minor shall be instituted in his name by a "next friend of the minor". Rule 4 of Order XXXII merely provides that any person who is major and of sound mind (provided he does not have interest adverse to the minor's interest) can act as next friend. There is no other restriction in respect of minor's suit by a next friend. Consequently, from conjoint reading of Section 3(b) & (g) and the two sub-clauses of the proviso of said section of the Act and Order XXXII and Rules 1 and 4 it emerges that the guardians of minor are persons "entitled to act" and it is legally permissible to a minor to appear through next friend, who can be any person who is major and of sound mind and does not have interest adverse to the minor's interest. Thus, it can not be said that in all cases a minor's suit through mother would be barred. 9.1(b) Now, what also becomes relevant in present case is the factual background, particularly the assertion of the minor grandsons that other coparcener's have acted against the interests of minors. As mentioned hereinabove earlier the relief prayed for in the petition is for protecting the interests of minors. A mother being guardian of minor can, in view of the earlier mentioned provisions can be the next friend of minor in proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, by and in the name of minor i.e. a minor can take out and maintain an action, under Land Acquisition Act, through mother. 9.1 (c) The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that if the father is indifferent to the matters of minor or if there is father's absence from the care of minor's property or person, father can be considered "absent" and mother being natural guardian can act on behalf of minor and father cannot be ascribed to have preferential right over mother. Hence,in the facts and circumstances and for the purpose such as in present case, an action under Land Acquisition Act by minor through mother as next friend would be maintainable. At this stage, reference deserves to be made also to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Githa Hariharan (Ms)& Another v. Reserve Bank of India & Another reported in (1999)2 SCC 228 wherein it has been held : "10. At this stage, reference deserves to be made also to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Githa Hariharan (Ms)& Another v. Reserve Bank of India & Another reported in (1999)2 SCC 228 wherein it has been held : "10. We are of the view that Section 6(a)(Supra) is capable of such construction as would retain it within the constitutional limits. The word "after" need not necessarily mean "after the lifetime". In the context in which it appears in Section 6(a) (Supra), it means "in the absence of", the word "absence" therein referring to the father's absence from the care of the minor's property or person for any reason whatever. If the father is wholly indifferent to the matters of the minor even if he is living with the mother or if by virtue of mutual understanding between the father and the mother, the latter is put exclusively in charge of the minor, or if the father is physically unable to take care of the minor either because of his staying away from the place where the mother and the minor are living or because of his physical or mental incapacity, in all such like situations, the father can be considered to be absent and the mother being a recognised natural guardian, can act validly on behalf of the minor as the guardian. Such an interpretation will be natural outcome of a harmonious construction of Section 4 and Section 6 of the HMG Act, without causing any violence to the language of Section 6(a)(Supra). 45. Be it noted further that gender equality is one of the basic principles of our Constitution and in the event the word "after" is to be read to mean a disqualification of a mother to act as a guardian during the lifetime of the father, the same would definitely run counter to the basic requirement of the constitutional mandate and would lead to a differentiation between male and female. Normal rules of interpretation shall have to bow down to the requirement of the constitution since the constitution is supreme and the statute shall have to be in accordance therewith and not dehors the same. Normal rules of interpretation shall have to bow down to the requirement of the constitution since the constitution is supreme and the statute shall have to be in accordance therewith and not dehors the same. The father by reason of a dominant personality cannot be ascribed to have preferential right over the mother in the matter of guardianship since both fall within the same category and in that view of the matter, the word "after" shall have to be interpreted in terms of the constitutional safeguard and guarantee so as to give a proper and effective meaning to the words used. 46. In our opinion, the word "after" shall have to be given a meaning which would subserve the need of the situation, viz. The welfare of the minor and having due regard to the factum that law courts endeavour to retain the legislation rather than declare it to be void, we do feel it expedient to record that the word "after" does not necessarily mean after the death of the father, on the contrary, it depicts an intent so as to ascribe the meaning thereto as "in absence of"- be it temporary or otherwise or total apathy of the father towards the child or even inability of the father by reason of ailment or otherwise and it is only in the event of such a meaning being ascribed to the word "after" as used in in Section 6 then and in that event, the same would be in accordance with the intent of the legislation viz. The welfare of the child." (emphasis supplied) 9.1(d) A reference, in this regard may also be made to the judgment in case of Geetanjali Mishra and others v. Gangadhar Upadhyay and others reported in AIR 1997 Orissa 88 where the plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 were minors and plaintiff No.1 was their mother and the issue about the maintainability of the suit on behalf of the said minors through plaintiff No.1 as the next friend was raised. 2 and 3 were minors and plaintiff No.1 was their mother and the issue about the maintainability of the suit on behalf of the said minors through plaintiff No.1 as the next friend was raised. The High Court has observed that :- "I am of the view that when the minor's interest was affected, it could not have been justified on the part of the mother guardian to wait and see if the father guardian (defendant No.7) was ever prepared to take up the cause of the minors whose interest in the property had been affected by the sale by defendant No.7. The reasoning given by the lower court that there was no material to hold that the father guardian refused to take up the cause of minors can not be accepted as the reasoning acceptable to an ordinary prudent man. Therefore I set aside the findings and hold that plaintiff No.1 is competent to maintain the suit on behalf of plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3." 9.1(e) In light of the above mentioned provisions and in view of the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Githa Hariharan (Supra) and by the High Court in the case of Gitanjali Mishra (Supra), we are not inclined to accept the objection on behalf of the alleged legatee Mr. Jayantibhai R. Patel against the petition by minor through mother. 9.2 So as to support her submission that the deceased Mr. Mahendrakumar P. Desai had executed a will in favour of respondent no.4, Mr. Jayantibhai R. Patel and there is no illegality in said action and the heirs and legal representatives of deceased Mr. M.P.Desai are bound by the act of the deceased, Mrs. Mehta relied on In Re Krishnakant Maganbhai [1961 (2) GLR 108] wherein this court has observed that:- "............The entire scheme of the Act which I have analyzed in the preceding paragraph shows that the concept of a guardian in respect of the undivided interest of a minor in joint family property is excluded from the scope and purview of the Act and the Act does not contemplate and deal with any guardians in respect of the undivided interest of a minor in joint family property. Since Section 8 deals with the powers and restrictions on powers of natural guardians in respect of the minors property other than undivided interest in joint family property the words the minors estate and the immovable property of the minor must be construed so as to mean minors estate or immovable property other than his undivided interest in joint family property..........". On this issue, it should be recalled that the minor grandsons of the deceased Mr. Mahendrakumar P. Desai have challenged his legal competence and authority to make the will and bequeath the ancestral property. Further, the 2 daughters and 1 son of the deceased Mr. Mahendrakumar P. Desai have challenged the Will (its genuineness).Besides this, even the so-called MOU and its legality are under challenge before the Civil Court. Thus, the very basis on which the disbursement in favour of the alleged legatee Mr. Jayantibhai R. Patel has been made is under challenge. Likewise the issues whether the so-called M.O.U. was result of fraud and without consent of some of the alleged signatories and/or whether the orders dated 9.4.2007 and 7.5.2007 in Review Application No.116 of 2007 are legal or not, are the issues yet to be decided by the Civil Court. The said issues are at large and open before the competent Civil Court. Under the circumstances, it is premature to contend that there is no illegality in the action of making the will and allegedly bequeathing the ancestral property in favour of respondent no.4 by purported will and/or to decide as to whether the said action is legal or not and whether it is binding to the heirs or not? The said issues can be and are required to be decided by the competent Civil Court after receiving proper and sufficient evidence of the plaintiffs and opponents and need not be preempted in these proceedings. We are not inclined to observe, and will not be justified in observing, anything in this regard at this stage. What is relevant is that the said aspects, or the aspects relating to the rights in the property and/or the legality of Will/M.O.U. etc., could not have been gone into and examined by L.A.O. at this stage when the minor grandsons have disputed the will and the deceased's legal authority to bequeath the property are under challenge. What is relevant is that the said aspects, or the aspects relating to the rights in the property and/or the legality of Will/M.O.U. etc., could not have been gone into and examined by L.A.O. at this stage when the minor grandsons have disputed the will and the deceased's legal authority to bequeath the property are under challenge. Suffice it to say that, pending the said disputes, L.A.O. ought not have so hastily proceeded on the basis of M.O.U. We are not inclined to reject the petition at this stage on such ground. 9.3 So far as the contention that the father of the minors have already entered into so-called M.O.U. with Mr. Jayantibhai R. Patel respondent no.4 and on that basis a consent decree has already been passed is concerned it deserves to be recalled that the said M.O.U. itself is under substantial challenge on diverse grounds. Hence, this contention, at this stage, is without merits and can not be accepted and the petition, on this ground, can not be rejected at this stage. Even more, relevant and important fact, in this context, is that the widow of deceased Mr. Mahendra P. Desai and two sons (Mr. A.M. Desai and Mr. R.M. Desai) have filed Spl.C.A. No. 7242 of 2009 in which this Court has by order dated 16.07.2009 granted ad interim relief in terms of para 20(C) of the said petition which include the prayer that present respondent no.4 Mr. Jayantibhai R. Patel (who is respondent no.1 in said Spl.C.A. No. 7242 of 2009) should deposit the compensation amount paid to him, in the registry of the Court. Thus, the said contention on behalf of respondent no.4 has, in view of said proceedings and the order dated 16.07.2009 lost significance at this stage. It is stated that the said order dated 16.07.2009 is in operation. On behalf of the petitioners it has been submitted, with reference to the order dated 27.8.2007 in Spl.C.A. No.20703 of 2007, that order dated 27.08.2007 was passed in different set of facts and at that time the court did not adjudicate any issues including the dispute about the will or the M.O.U. and that the minors grandsons were not made party opponent in the said petition and therefore, it cannot bind the minors grandsons. 9.4 The contention on behalf of the alleged legatee that since no stay was operating against the L.A.O. there is nothing wrong in his action of disbursing compensation is, in our view, not only wholly misconceived but is bagging the issue. It is surprising that even on behalf of the L.A.O. also the same explanation has been advanced to defend the action of disbursing the compensation in favour of the alleged legatee and some of the heirs. In the facts of the case discussed earlier, it is too bold for the respondent no.4 to advance such a defence in as much as the L.A.O., in the facts of the case, was statutorily obliged to deposit the amount in the Court. It only reflects and magnifies his conduct. 9.5 As regards the submission raised in light of the judgment in the case of Madhukantaben wd/o Maganlal Dwarkadas Shah v. State of Gujarat & Anr. reported in 1973 GLR 506 , holding that the L.A.O. can proceed on the basis of revenue entries, it deserves to be noted that in the facts of this case, the said judgment is not applicable, more particularly, since, on one hand CTS appeals challenging the entry are pending while on the other hand the very basis on which the entry in the revenue record was mutated is also under substantial challenge in the suit proceedings in which the L.A.O. himself is party opponent and thus, aware about the dispute. Under the circumstances, merely because entry in revenue record was made, the L.A.O. could not have disbursed the compensation, ignoring the statutory obligation under Sections 31 & 30. Further the said observation was made in altogether different legal and factual context and not while testing an action taken by ignoring the mandate of a statue. 9.6 So far as the submission based on the judgment in the case of Shri Narayan Bal in (1996) 8 SCC Page 54 is concerned, it needs to be mentioned that the facts of present case are different from the facts involved in the cited case and the issue on hand at present is also different. Whether the action of the deceased was just and legally competent or not? Whether the action of the deceased was just and legally competent or not? is a matter still at large before the Civil Court and the limited issue in present proceeding is whether the L.A.O. could have disbursed the compensation ignoring the provisions under Section 31 of the Act when the said issues were pending for determination by court. Further, in this context reference may also be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Apoorva Shantilal Shah v. Commissioner of Income Tax ( AIR 1983 SC 409 ). Though the issue in the said case also can not be said to be directly relevant in present case, the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court explain the legal position. The Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that :- "…… in appropriate cases even during the minority, the minor sons through a proper guardian may impeach the validity of the partition brought about by the father either in entirety of the joint family properties or only in respect of part thereof, if the partition had been effected by the father to the detriment of the minor sons and to the prejudice of their interests…" 10. We may now consider whether the prayer claiming that the compensation may be deposited with the court and a reference under section 30 may be made, is justified and can it be granted in view of the facts of the case. In our view, the answer lies in the peculiar set of facts of the case and in the provisions under section 30 and 31 of the Act . 10.1 The petitioners in both petitions have approached this court with grievance against the actions of LAO, viz. the action of disbursing compensation in favour of the alleged legatee and some of the heirs and also against the rejection of their request for reference under Section 30 of the Act. 10.2 The facts stated in the petitions are eloquent to proclaim that there have been disputes between the parties about apportionment and about title to receive compensation and such disputes still subsist between the heirs/L.R.s inter-se and also between the heirs/L.R.s and the respondent No.4. 10.3 Now we may take a closer look at Sections 31 and 30 of the Act. 10.3 Now we may take a closer look at Sections 31 and 30 of the Act. According to the provisions under Section 31 of the Act, the Collector has to tender the compensation to the persons interested and has to make the payment unless prevented by any of the contingencies mentioned in sub Section (2) of Section 31. 10.4(a) It cannot be disputed that the petitioners are "person interested" as contemplated under section 3(b) of the Act which defines the said term as: "Section 3(b) :- the expression "person interested" includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under this Act, and a person shall be deemed to be interested in land if he is interested in an easement affecting the land". 10.4 (b) The contingencies mentioned in the said Sub Section (in view of which he may not pay/offer compensation) include any dispute as to the title to receive compensation or a dispute about apportionment. 10.4 (c) In view of the provision under Section 31 of the Act, if there is any dispute to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment of it, the Collector shall deposit the amount of compensation in the court to which reference under Section 18 of the Act would be submitted. It is also clear that the scope and meaning of the phrase 'contingencies' and/or the phrase 'if there is any dispute' are not restricted to mean that the dispute should be such which arises after the award is made, but it would cover even the dispute which existed and/or had arisen during the proceedings for making the award. 10.4 (d) Thus, it follows that if the persons interested in and entitled for compensation do not consent to receive compensation or if there is any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or if there is any dispute about the apportionment (i.e. if any of the contingencies contemplated under sub section (2) of Section 31 exist or emerges) then it is necessary that the collector (i)deposits the amount in the court; and (ii) in the event the dispute is related to apportionment or if the dispute is about the persons to whom it is payable, refers the dispute for decision to the court. 10.5 As noted earlier the facts of the case narrated in some details, demonstrate that there were disputes between the heirs/L.R.s inter-se and also L.R.s and respondent No.4 Mr. Jayantibhai R.Patel. Therefore it appears from the facts stated in the petition (some of which are recapitulated in Para 8) coupled with the statutory provisions of the Act that the compensation should have been deposited in the court. In light of the facts of present case the L.A.O./Collector was under mandatory duty, in view of the provision contained under Section 30 and 31 of the Act, to deposit the compensation and to make reference as demanded by the petitioners, however the L.A.O. instead of depositing the compensation with the court, disbursed the compensation. There seems to be no justification or material available on record which can satisfactorily justify or explaining, in face of the provisions under section 30 and 31 of the Act coupled with the facts of the case, the L.A.O's action of disbursing (and also the urgency in disbursing) the huge compensation before determination of disputes. 10.6 Thus from the foregoing discussion, to us it appears that the L.A.O. paid the compensation awarded under the Act ignoring the mandate of the Act and the recipients, at this stage of proceedings and dispute, wrongly received it. The question which now remains is whether the recipients of the compensation should refund/should be directed to refund the compensation received by them. 10.7 In this regard, we may, at this stage, refer to the 3rd proviso of Section 31 which provides that : "Nothing contained in the provision shall affect the liability of any person, who receive the compensation, wholly or in part, awarded under the Act, to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled" 10.8 In the present case the minor grandsons have challenged the legality and veracity of alleged will and some of heirs/L.R.s have challenged the legality and veracity of the M.O.U. and the dispute about the title to receive compensation and the issue about apportionment-disbursement is yet to be decided. The issue viz. who are the persons lawfully entitled to receive the compensation awarded under the Act, will be decided/settled after the decision of the court. The issue viz. who are the persons lawfully entitled to receive the compensation awarded under the Act, will be decided/settled after the decision of the court. Since the suit challenging the will and the M.O.U. are pending we do not make any observation on the merits of the allegations or defence and we have refrained from entering into the issues and disputes and their merits or demerits and we have restricted ourselves only to the extent of taking note of the facts that the dispute as contemplated under Sections 30 and 31 of the Act existed. In such facts and circumstances, when at this stage (i.e. during the pendency of the dispute and suits/C.T.S. appeal) the compensation has been paid before determination of (i) the title to receive compensation and (ii) the dispute about the legality of the will and (iii) about the M.O.U. and when the provisions under Section 31 read with Section 30 of the Act impose an obligation on the L.A.O./Collector to deposit the amount in the court if dispute about the title to receive compensation and/or about the apportionment exist, it emerges that, the amounts have been, wrongly received by the payee and, in our view, the payee should, in light of 3rd proviso of Section 31 pay the compensation to the person lawfully entitled to and until the decision by the court is rendered such amount should be, in the fitness of things and interest of justice returned and should be deposited with the court. 10.9 This is also necessary and in the interest of minors and their estate as well as in the interest of daughters who have been obliged to file S.C.S. No. 308 of 2008. This position equally applies to those heirs also who have received/have been paid some part of the compensation. Hence, the compensation amount should be, at this stage, deposited in the court. 10.10 In this regard, we may also refer to the judgment by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Shayam Rao v. Land Acquisition Officer (Spl.)-cum-Dy. Collector Singoor Project (AIR 1991 Andra Pradesh 219) wherein the High Court has observed in para 13, 17 and 18 as follows : "13. 10.10 In this regard, we may also refer to the judgment by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Shayam Rao v. Land Acquisition Officer (Spl.)-cum-Dy. Collector Singoor Project (AIR 1991 Andra Pradesh 219) wherein the High Court has observed in para 13, 17 and 18 as follows : "13. As pointed out above, one of the contingencies referred to in Section 31(2) can be said to have occurred 'if there be any dispute as to title to receive the compensation or as to apportionment of it, such dispute arising in the course of the award inquiry itself. The words 'there be any dispute', in our view, do not mean that there must have arisen a fresh dispute after the passing of the award by the Collector. The contingency refers to the dispute which has already arisen in the award, inquiry and in such a case, the Collector is statutorily 'prevented' from making any payment as per the award and he is bound to wait and see till the expiry of the period of limitation under Section 18(2), whether any of the parties to the award is not satisfied with the title to the compensation or its apportionment as decided by him........ 17. .......If the contingencies referred to Section 31(2) occur, he has a mandatory duty to make a reference and also to deposit the disputed compensation in the civil Court after waiting till the expiry of the period of limitation mentioned in Section 18(2) and in case a reference is sought for. The legislative intendment is that the Court and not the Collector is to be the final arbiter of the question of title in the reference under Section 18, so far as the parties to the award are concerned. The scheme of the Act is therefore that the disputed amount must be deposited in the reference Court so that the Court could invest the same under Section 32 and then distribute the same to the parties as per its judgment, (subject of course to the other provisions of C.P.C.). The Collector cannot send an incomplete reference to the Court without sending the disputed amount to Court along with the reference. The Court therefore has the incidental power to direct the Collector to deposit the money before it so that the reference could be made complete. The Collector cannot send an incomplete reference to the Court without sending the disputed amount to Court along with the reference. The Court therefore has the incidental power to direct the Collector to deposit the money before it so that the reference could be made complete. We are therefore of the view that the power to issue directions to the Collector is clearly incidental to the provisions of the main part of Section 31(2). (emphasis supplied) 18. .......Every Civil Court has inherent powers to pass interlocutory orders so that its final orders can achieve the real purposes for which they are intended, and here, the purposes of adjudication of rights and immediate distribution. Therefore the powers to direct deposit by the Collector pending the reference are incidental and inherent in the Court. 11. The said proviso obliges the person who has received the compensation to pay the same to that person who, in law is entitled for the compensation which means that the person who has received the compensation is required/obliged to return the amount to the person lawfully entitled to receive it, and it further means that the person who is required to return the amount to another person would be, according to the proviso, a person not entitled for the compensation until the disputes are decided. This further translates into the position that payment made to such person (i.e the one not entitled for) would be "payment wrongly made". Differently put the said proviso confers a right in favour of the person who is lawfully entitled to receive the compensation and/or to claim the recovery of compensation amount from the State and/or from the person who received compensation i.e. who was wrongly paid at some earlier stage. The said proviso also enjoins the duty on the L.A.O./Collector to ensure that the compensation amount is paid to the person lawfully entitled to receive the compensation, even if, the compensation was earlier paid to any other person i.e. to a person "not lawfully entitled to the compensation". In the event the L.A.O./fails on this counts as a corollary the court is, when the action comes before it, required to mend the situation. Thus, the alleged legatee Mr. In the event the L.A.O./fails on this counts as a corollary the court is, when the action comes before it, required to mend the situation. Thus, the alleged legatee Mr. Jayantibhai R. Patel and the heirs who have been paid/have received the compensation, before the dispute about the title to receive the compensation and apportionment is determined and settled, should, at this stage return the amount received by them. So as to ensure that the compensation may be paid to the person lawfully entitled to receive the same, it is necessary and in the interest of justice that the compensation paid to the alleged legatee Mr. Jayantibhai R. Patel and some of the heirs is brought back from the recipients. 12. The most disturbing aspect of the whole matter is the manner in which and the rare quickness with which the compensation has been paid despite the disputes about title to receive compensation and apportionment. The petitioners have submitted that the L.A.O. made the payment by ignoring the disputes and also ignoring the relevant aspects (mentioned in Para 8 above) including the objections by the petitioners. It has been also submitted that there was no justification in disbursing the huge amount as ad hoc/advance compensation leaving behind comparatively minuscule portion. 12.1 Mr. Trivedi for Respondent No.2 L.A.O. tried to explain the conduct of the L.A.O. in disbursing compensation, by holding the straw of the communication dated 4.12.2008 wherein it is stated that if the amount sanctioned for the award is not utilised within two months, it would lapse, We fail to understand as to how the said instruction or remark justifies the manner in which the compensation has been disbursed. The rare quickness with which and the manner in which such a huge amount of compensation under the award has been disbursed-paid to the alleged legatee and only some of the heirs is not relatable to and cannot be wished away by clinging to the said instruction inasmuch as the said instruction/remark did not, by any standard, necessitate immediate payment to the alleged legatee and only some of the heirs. Even if, the said instruction had to be followed, the L.A.O. could have very well, rather should have in the facts of the case, deposited the compensation in the court instead of immediately making payment to the alleged legatee Mr. Jayantibhai R. Patel and some of the heirs. Even if, the said instruction had to be followed, the L.A.O. could have very well, rather should have in the facts of the case, deposited the compensation in the court instead of immediately making payment to the alleged legatee Mr. Jayantibhai R. Patel and some of the heirs. Further, even in the said letter dated 4.12.2008, it was expressly stated that it should be ensured that payment may not be made to any unauthorized person. The said explanation or defence is not, particularly in light of the facts of present case discussed above, worthy to accept. While advancing such explanation or defence the statutory obligation to deposit the amount with the court, is overlooked. 13. In light of the above discussion, we are of the view that the recipients of the disbursed compensation i.e. the alleged legatee Mr. Jayaantibhai R.Patel and the heirs who have been paid the compensation amount determined under the award under Section 11 of the Act should return-refund the compensation received by them. In the facts of the case and as a result of the foregoing discussion we are of the considered opinion that not only the alleged legatee Mr. Jayantibhai R.Patel (respondent No.4 in Spl.C.A. No.1592 of 2009 and respondent No.3 in Spl.C.A. No.2923 of 2009) but also the three heirs who also have been paid a part of the compensation should return the amount so that after the decision of the court the compensation can be paid to the persons lawfully entitled thereto. We are, therefore, also of the view that necessary and appropriate directions to the said effect deserve to be made, to achieve the ends of justice. 14. As an upshot of the aforesaid discussion, in our opinion, the following directions will meet with the requirements and also fulfil the ends of justice. It is, therefore, directed that :- (a) the Respondent Mr. Jayantibhai R.Patel (i.e. the alleged legatee who is respondent No.4 in Spl.C.A No.1592 of 2009 and Respondent No.3 in Spl.C.A No. 2293 of 2009) shall return-repay, to the respondent No.2 L.A.O./Respondent No. 1 State Government, within eight weeks from today, the compensation amount of Rs.27,29,85,437/- and any other and further amounts that he might have been paid by/he might have received from the said respondents No. 2 & No. 1 and the heirs of deceased Mr. Mahendrakumar P Desai who have been paid/have received payment of compensation to the tune of Rs. 4,25,13,688/- shall also return-repay to the Respondent No.2. L.A.O./Respondent No. 1 State Government, within eight weeks from today, the said amount of Rs.4,25,13,688/- and shall also return-repay any other/further amounts that they might have received from the said respondents No.2 and No.1 . (b) it is open to the respondent No.1 State and the L.A.O. to take steps to reclaim and recover the disbursed compensation from the alleged legatee Mr. Jayantibhai R. Patel and the heirs/L.R.s of deceased Mr. Mahendrakumar P. Desai i.e. the persons in whose favour the compensation has been disbursed–paid. (c) the respondent No.2 L.A.O. and respondent No.1 State shall deposit the compensation amount determined under the award in the court competent to receive and try the reference under the Act, within nine weeks from today. (d) after such deposit the court shall invest the amount in F.D. (cumulative interest) with a nationalised Bank, in the name of Nazir of the court and shall continue to reinvest the amount till the final decision in the suit proceedings of Special Civil Suit No.308 of 2008 and Special Civil Suit No.516 of 2008 pending in Civil Court at Vadodara and also till the decision in the reference. (e) the L.A.O./Collector shall make reference under section 3 within 15 days from the date of receipt of this judgment and order. (f) the court shall try to complete the pending proceedings of the 2 suits (Special Civil Suit No.308 of 2008 and Special Civil Suit No. 516 of 2008) within 6 months. In the result Spl.C.A. No.1592 of 2009 and Spl.C.A. No.2923 of 2009 are disposed off in terms of the aforesaid observation and directions. Rules is made absolute to the said extent. In the facts of the case there shall be no order as to costs. At this stage, learned advocate for respondent No.4 prays for stay of operation of this judgment to have further recourse in accordance with law. Since we have already granted eight weeks time to deposit the amount, the request is rejected. Orders accordingly.