JUDGMENT J. Chelameswar, C.J. 1. Heard Mr. U. Bhuyan, learned Counsel for the applicant. 2. This application is filed praying that the delay of 290 days in filing an appeal under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, against the order dated August 31, 2007, passed in I.T.A. No. 44 (Gauhati)/2004 and in I.T.A. No. 51(Gauhati)/2004 for the assessment year 2000-01 be condoned. The application is filed by the Revenue invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 3. The respondent is served, represented by Dr. A.K. Saraf, learned senior counsel. 4. When the matter is taken up today Dr. A.K. Saraf, learned senior Counsel raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the present application. The learned Counsel argued that Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application to the appeals under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act. The power conferred upon the courts by virtue of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay, if any, in presenting either an appeal or an application is not available to this court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act. 5. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent is that the provisions of the Income Tax Act in so far as appeals and revisions under the Act are concerned, are a complete code in themselves prescribing various aspects of appeals and revisions such as the forum, the procedure and the limitation and it is not permissible in the background of such a situation to place reliance upon the provisions of the Limitation Act. 6. The learned Counsel for the respondent also placed reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India P. Ltd. [2009] 315 ITR 449 (SC) in support of his submission. Further, the learned Counsel brought to the notice of the court that the abovementioned decision of the Supreme Court was also followed in another order of the Supreme Court made in Civil Appeal No. 5389/07 Chaudharana Steels P. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise [2009] 238 ELT 705 (SC). 7. On the other hand, Mr. Further, the learned Counsel brought to the notice of the court that the abovementioned decision of the Supreme Court was also followed in another order of the Supreme Court made in Civil Appeal No. 5389/07 Chaudharana Steels P. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise [2009] 238 ELT 705 (SC). 7. On the other hand, Mr. U. Bhuyan, learned Counsel for the applicant/appellant argued, firstly, that the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India P. Ltd. [2009] 315 ITR 449 is distinguishable for the reason that the provisions of the Central Excise Act, which fell for the consideration of the Supreme Court in the said case, are not in pari materia with the provisions of the Income Tax Act dealing with the appeals to High Court and, secondly, that a Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court reported in CIT v. Velingkar Brothers [2007] 289 ITR 382 on a consideration of the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act came to the conclusion that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to the proceedings under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act. 8. To arrive at a conclusion on the above issue we are of the opinion that the ratio decidendi of the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India P. Ltd. [2009] 315 ITR 449 is required to be examined. The question which fell for the consideration of the Supreme Court in the abovementioned case was whether a reference application under Section 35H(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, as it existed on the date relevant to the appeal could be presented beyond the period of limitation prescribed under the abovementioned Section invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. One of the submissions before the Supreme Court was that in view of the language of Section 29 Sub-section (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, the exclusion of the applicability of the pro visions of the Limitation Act is permissible only in those cases where there is an express declaration in any special or local law to that effect. Since the Central Excise Act (no doubt a special enactment) does not contain any such express provision of exclusion of the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act ought not to be implied. The Supreme Court categorically rejected the said submission. Since the Central Excise Act (no doubt a special enactment) does not contain any such express provision of exclusion of the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act ought not to be implied. The Supreme Court categorically rejected the said submission. In the said judgment, it was held by the Supreme Court as follows (page 459): Though an argument was raised based on Section 29 of the Limitation Act, even assuming that Section 29(2) would be attracted, what we have to determine is whether the provisions of this Section are expressly excluded in the case of reference to the High Court. It was contended before us that the words 'expressly excluded' would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. In this regard, we have to see that the scheme of the special law here in this case is the Central Excise Act. The nature of the remedy provided therein is such that the Legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If, on an examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. 9. In our considered view, even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court to examine whether and to what extent, the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. In other words, the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, is to be judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act but by the provisions of the Central Excise Act relating to filing of reference applications to the High Court. The scheme of the Central Excise Act, 1944, supports the conclusion that the time-limit prescribed under Section 35H(1) to make a reference to the High Court is absolute and unextendable by the court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The scheme of the Central Excise Act, 1944, supports the conclusion that the time-limit prescribed under Section 35H(1) to make a reference to the High Court is absolute and unextendable by the court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is well-settled law that it is the duty of the court to respect the legislative intent and by giving a liberal interpretation, limitation cannot be extended by invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the Act." In substance the exclusion of the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, does not solely depend on the existence of an express provision to that effect in any special or local enactment but such express exclusion is only one of the contingencies in which the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act is activated but there can also be other contingencies where it is possible and the courts are required to reach a conclusion that the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act is excluded, such as, when the scheme of the special or local enactment is such that it constitutes a complete code, regarding the forum, procedure and period of limitation, etc., in filing any appeal or initiating any legal proceeding, by necessary implication the exclusion of the Limitation Act is required to be inferred. 10. We are, therefore, required to examine the scheme of the Income Tax Act with reference to the provisions of the appeals and revisions under the Act with specific reference to the appeal to the High Court under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act. 11. Section 246A of the Income Tax Act specifies the orders which are appealable before the Commissioner (Appeals). The Section contains a long list of orders which are appealable, the details of which may not be necessary for us for the present purpose. Section 249 deals with the form of the appeal and the period of limitation for the appeal contemplated under Section 246A. The relevant provisions in the context are Sub-section (2) and Sub-section (3) of Section 249. Section 249 deals with the form of the appeal and the period of limitation for the appeal contemplated under Section 246A. The relevant provisions in the context are Sub-section (2) and Sub-section (3) of Section 249. While Sub-section (2) stipulated that an appeal is required to be filed within 30 days from the relevant date specified thereunder Sub-section (3) authorises the Commissioner (Appeals) to admit an appeal after the expiry of the period of limitation if the Commissioner is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within the prescribed period of 30 days. 12. Similarly, Section 253 of the Income Tax Act provides for appeals to an Appellate Tribunal, constituted under Section 252 of the Act, against the various orders enumerated in Section 253. Once again Sub-sections (3) and (5) of Section 253 are relevant in the context. While Sub-section (3) stipulates a period of limitation of 60 days reckoned from the date of the communication of the order sought to be appealed against Sub-section (5) enables the Appellate Tribunal in its discretion to admit an appeal presented after the expiry of the period of limitation in those cases where the Tribunal is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for the appellant for not presenting the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation. 13. Coming to the appeals to High Court, Section 260A of the Income Tax Act provides for appeals to the High Court from various orders enumerated therein. Section 260A Sub-section (2)(a) requires such appeals to be filed within 120 days from the date on which the order appealed against is received by the party proposing to prefer the appeal. No provision similar to the provision enabling both the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal to admit appeals presented beyond the period of limitation if they are satisfied that there was sufficient cause on the part of the appellant for not preferring the appeal within the period of limitation prescribed under the Act is framed in the context of appeals to the High Court under Section 260A. 14. Such conspicuous absence of a provision enabling the High Court to admit appeals presented beyond the stipulated period of limitation, in our view, is capable of leading to only one inference that the Legislature clearly intended not to permit the reception of appeals by the High Court beyond the period of limitation prescribed under the Act. 14. Such conspicuous absence of a provision enabling the High Court to admit appeals presented beyond the stipulated period of limitation, in our view, is capable of leading to only one inference that the Legislature clearly intended not to permit the reception of appeals by the High Court beyond the period of limitation prescribed under the Act. While the Legislature clearly provided with a discretion in favour of the other appellate fora created under the Act to receive appeals presented beyond the period or limitation prescribed in the context of the appeals to such fora Parliament was silent about such a discretion when it came to the appeals to the High Court. We are of the opinion that such a silence is not an accident or a mistake but by a deliberate choice and design. The scheme of the Income Tax Act in so far as it pertains to the appeals to various fora discussed above leads us to the inference that Parliament did not intend to vest any discretion on the High Court to admit appeal presented beyond the period of limitation specified under the Act under Section 260A Sub-section (2)(a), i.e., 120 days. 15. However, Mr. U. Bhuyan, learned Counsel for the applicant, submitted that the language of Sub-section (7) of Section 260A obligates this court to admit in appropriate cases appeals presented beyond the period of limitation, specified under the Act. Sub-section (7) of Section 260A reads as follows: (7) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), relating to appeals to the High Court shall, as far as may be, apply in the case of appeals under this section. 16. According to the learned Counsel for the applicant, since Parliament stipulated that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, relating to appeals to the High Court, apply to the appeals under the Income Tax Act. The provisions under the Civil Procedure Code which deal with the appeals to the High Court are Section 96 and Section 100 read with Orders 41 and 42. The learned Counsel placed reliance on rule 3A of Order 41 of the Civil Procedure Code which, according to the learned Counsel, authorises the High Court receiving appeals to condone the delay, if any, in presenting the appeal. 17. The learned Counsel placed reliance on rule 3A of Order 41 of the Civil Procedure Code which, according to the learned Counsel, authorises the High Court receiving appeals to condone the delay, if any, in presenting the appeal. 17. Appeals to the High Court under the Civil Procedure Code could be filed under the provisions of Sections 96 and 100. While Section 96 deals with the appeals from original decrees Section 100deals with the appeals from the appellate decrees, Orders 41 and 42 deal with the form and other procedural aspects of the abovementioned appeals. Rule 3A of Order 41, relied upon by the learned Counsel for the applicant, reads as follows: 3A. Application for condonation of delay. - (1) When an appeal is presented after the expiry of the period of limitation specified therefore, it shall be accompanied by an application supported by affidavit setting forth the facts on which the appellant relies to satisfy the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period. (2) If the court sees no reason to reject the application without the issue of a notice to the respondent, notice thereof shall be issued to the respondent and the matter shall be finally decided by the court before it proceeds to deal with the appeal under rule 11 or rule 13, as the case may be. (3) Where an application has been made under Sub-rule (1), the court shall not make an order for the stay of execution of the decree against which the appeal is proposed to be filed so long as the court does not after hearing under rule 11, decide to hear the appeal. 18. On a plain reading of the said rule it is obvious that the rule does not provide for any legal authority to condone the delay in preferring the appeal but prescribes the procedure where an appeal is presented beyond the period of limitation. The underlying presumption under rule 3A is that the High Court entertaining the appeal under Section 100 or 96 or other court entertaining appeals under Section 96 has the requisite legal authority of condoning the delay in presenting the appeal, a presumption based on the express language of Section 5 read with Part II of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act. Therefore, the submission of the learned Counsel for the applicant that Sub-section (7) of Section 260A of the Income Tax Act read with rule 3A, Order 41 of the Civil Procedure Code authorises this court to condone the delay in presentation of an appeal under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act in an appropriate case, cannot be accepted. 19. The learned Counsel for the applicant, however, placed strong reliance upon a Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court reported in CIT v. Velingkar Brothers [2007] 289 ITR 382. No doubt, the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court was of the opinion that the High Court is entitled to condone the delay in presentation of appeal under Section 260A by resorting to the power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act but the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India P. Ltd. [2009] 315 ITR 449 is later than the decision of the Bombay High Court and the provision and scheme of the Central Excise Act are substantially similar to the relevant provision of the Income Tax Act. On the other hand, a later Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in a judgment dated July 8, 2009, in Income Tax Appeal (L) No. 3592/08 CIT v. Grasim Industries Limited [2009] 319 ITR 154 had an occasion to consider both the abovementioned two decisions of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court as well as the Supreme Court in the context of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act and came to the conclusion that the High Court cannot resort to Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in admitting an appeal delayedly presented under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act. 20. Another Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in a case reported in CIT v. Mohd. Farooq [2009] 317 ITR 305 also opined that Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application to the appeals under the Income Tax Act under Section 260A of the Act. It may be mentioned here that the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court also examined by the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court and the decision of the Supreme Court, referred to earlier. 21. It may be mentioned here that the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court also examined by the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court and the decision of the Supreme Court, referred to earlier. 21. For the above reasons, we are unable to accept the submission made by the applicant herein. Therefore, the preliminary objection raised by the respondent is accepted. The application is dismissed as not maintainable. Consequently, the appeal stands rejected.