Judgment :- This appeal arises out of an order passed by the learned Single Judge on 11-3-2005 in W.P. Nos. 32819 and 32820 of 2002 (in Management of M/s. Indian Aluminium Company Limited, Belgaum vs. S. Nagaiah 2005 AIR Kar. HCR 1150), dismissing the writ petitions filed by the petitioner/appellant. Factual background: 2. To appreciate the controversy raised in this appeal, few relevant facts may be noted: Appellant is a company engaged in manufacturing activities. Respondent was an employee of the appellant and at the relevant point of time, he was one of the Vice-Presidents of the Workers' Union. Charge-sheets dated 14-4-1980 and 29-4-1980 were issued to the respondent alleging acts of misconduct, to which, he submitted separate explanations, which were not accepted by the appellant and domestic enquiries were ordered, after holding of which, the Enquiry Officer submitted reports, holding the respondent guilty of certain charges. Thereafter, a show-cause notice dated 8-7-1980 was issued to the respondent, proposing the punishment of dismissal from service, to which, he submitted a reply dated 11-7-1980, whereupon, final order was passed by the disciplinary authority, imposing the punishment of dismissal from service, with effect from 15-7-1980. An industrial dispute pertaining to the justification or otherwise of the lock out declared by the appellant-management was pending at that point of time before the Industrial Tribunal (Tribunal' for short) in I.D. No. 8 of 1980 (renumbered as I.D. No. 17 of 1983) and hence the appellant filed an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act' for short) seeking express permission to dismiss the respondent from service, with effect from 15-7-1980. Said application was registered as Sl. Appl. No. 64/80 in the Tribunal and after its transfer to the Tribunal at Hubli, it was renumbered as Serial Application No. 26 of 1983. The Tribunal framed a preliminary issue regarding the validity of the domestic enquiry held by the appellant and passed an order on 30-6-1986, setting aside the domestic enquiry on two grounds: (1) The respondent had not been afforded a reasonable opportunity; and (2) The charge-sheets had not been issued by the Competent Authority. Management was however, permitted to justify the proposed action. Management filed W.P. No. 13956 of 1986 challenging the said order. Respondent also filed W.P. No. 17231 of 1986, insofar as the order related to the granting of permission to the management to lead fresh evidence. Management was however, permitted to justify the proposed action. Management filed W.P. No. 13956 of 1986 challenging the said order. Respondent also filed W.P. No. 17231 of 1986, insofar as the order related to the granting of permission to the management to lead fresh evidence. Writ petition filed by the respondent was rejected on 14-10-1986 (in (1996)69 FJR 369). Respondent filed W.A. No. 3322 of 1986. The Division Bench disposed of the matters, by a common order dated 10-7-1990 holding that, the charge-sheets have been issued by the Competent Authority, but, confirmed the order of the Tribunal setting aside the domestic enquiry (in S. Nagaiah vs. Management of Indian Aluminium Company Limited ILR.1990 Kar. 2744 (DB)). 2.1 Thereafter, appellant adduced common evidence in respect of both the charge-sheets, by examining 13 witnesses (A.Ws. 1 to 13) and produced the documents, which were marked as Exs. A. 1 to A. 79. The witnesses were cross-examined. Respondent got himself examined as a witness. The Tribunal after hearing arguments, allowed the applications by a common order dated 15-9-1997, granting permission to the appellant to dismiss the respondent from service with effect from 15-7-1980. 2.2 Subsequently, respondent raised an industrial dispute by filing a petition under Section 10(4-A) read with Section 2-A of the Act, challenging the order of dismissal dated 15-7-1980. Labour Court framed 4 issues and subsequently an additional issue. By consent of parties, the order passed in Serial Application No. 26 of 1983, dated 15-9-1997 was marked as Ex. M. 1. After hearing the arguments, the Tribunal passed an order dated 7-3-2002 (Annexure-F) answering the additional issue in the negative. 3. Being aggrieved, appellant filed the writ petition, to which, the respondent filed statement of objections. On consideration, learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition, mainly on the following findings: “(i) Proceedings under Section 33 would not operate as res judicata because the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 33 is very much limited, whereas, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 10 do not suffer any such inhibitions. (ii) After the requisite permission is granted to the employer under Section 33, that would not be the end of the matter. It merely removes ban and the permission so granted would not validate the order of dismissal. (ii) After the requisite permission is granted to the employer under Section 33, that would not be the end of the matter. It merely removes ban and the permission so granted would not validate the order of dismissal. (iii) The finding of misconduct recorded cannot be said to operate as res judicata in a subsequent proceedings because, that finding on the question of misconduct was only for the purpose of granting permission or not and it would be in the nature of prima facie finding only. (iv) The evidence adduced on the preliminary issue would be the same even in proceedings under Section 10(1)(c) or 33-A. When the validity of the domestic enquiry has to be gone into, even then, the Labour Court under Section 33-A is expected to only record a prima facie finding whether the domestic enquiry conducted is fair and proper. If the Labour Court holds that the domestic enquiry is valid and proper then, it has to look into the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer to find out whether there is any perversity in the finding or is it a case of victimisation or unfair labour practice. (v) When an industrial dispute is raised thereafter under Section 10, contending that the domestic enquiry is invalid, the finding recorded by the Tribunal in a proceeding under Section 33, holding that the domestic enquiry is valid would not operate as res judicata, though the said finding is recorded after recording the evidence. The object being is to lift the ban contained in Section 33, in the event of the permission being granted, if that order were to be challenged by the workman before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, all that the High Court would say is, as the said finding is not final and binding and as the workman has remedy by way of raising a dispute under Section 10, a case for interference for such permission is not made out. (vi) The word "Adjudicate”" used in Sections 33-A and 10 is conspicuously missing in Section 33. Therefore, Tribunal in a proceeding under Section 33 do not adjudicate the dispute between the parties. (vi) The word "Adjudicate”" used in Sections 33-A and 10 is conspicuously missing in Section 33. Therefore, Tribunal in a proceeding under Section 33 do not adjudicate the dispute between the parties. (vii) When the Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute between the parties, the finding recorded on any point, even on merits, would not operate as res judicata in a proceeding under Section 10 or 33-A of the Act. (viii) In an adjudication under Section 33, though not the finding recorded operate as res judicata, the pleadings, the evidence and finding recorded in such proceeding may be looked into as a piece of evidence.” 4. We have heard Sri Pradeep S. Sawkar, learned Counsel for the appellant and Sri B.S. Umesh, learned Counsel for the respondent. Sri K. Kasturi, Sri M.C. Narasimhan and Sri P.S. Rajagopal, learned Senior Advocates, sought permission to intervene in the matter and made submissions: “(a) Firstly, learned Counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that, the orders passed by the learned Single Judge and the Tribunal, are clearly illegal for the failure of not considering the findings recorded in Ex. M. 1, wherein, the Tribunal, after detailed consideration and appreciation of both the oral and documentary evidence placed on record by both parties has held that, the management has proved the charges mentioned in Exs. A. 3 and A. 4. (b) Secondly, he contended that, the question for consideration before the learned Single Judge and the Tribunal was `whether the finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal on the issue regarding proof of charges/misconduct, in a proceeding under Section 33 of the Act, especially, when the domestic enquiry is set aside and the Tribunal records a finding on merits, would operate as res judicata in subsequent proceeding under Section 10, between the same parties in respect of the very same issue pertaining to proof of charge' and also the issue pertaining to proof of misconduct, having been finally decided between the parties in the order-Ex. M. 1, whether would operate as res judicata, consequently, only question that would be open for consideration was in respect of the second part of Section 11-A of the Act, relating to proportionality of punishment. He contended that, both the learned Single Judge and the Tribunal have misdirected themselves in passing the impugned orders. M. 1, whether would operate as res judicata, consequently, only question that would be open for consideration was in respect of the second part of Section 11-A of the Act, relating to proportionality of punishment. He contended that, both the learned Single Judge and the Tribunal have misdirected themselves in passing the impugned orders. He pointed out that, learned Single Judge having accepted the fact that the doctrine of res judicata applies to industrial cases, has misconstrued the provisions relating to its applicability by failing to decide the question as to whether an issue which has been decided earlier in a proceeding under Section 33 would operate as res judicata, mainly having regard to Explanation VIII to Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 ('Code' for short). (c) Thirdly, he contended that, the question as to, whether, the respondent was guilty of the charges levelled against him in the charge-sheets which were directly and substantially in issue in Serial Application No. 26 of 1983, wherein, the Tribunal recorded a finding on merits vide its order dated 15-9-1997, holding that, the charges having been established and the respondent was guilty of misconduct, based on which, permission was granted to the management to dismiss the respondent from service with effect from 15-7-1980, but, in the subsequent proceedings i.e., industrial dispute raised by the respondent, he not only questioned the proportionality of the punishment, but also the issue relating to the workman being guilty of charge of misconduct, which could not have been gone into, since, the very same issue has been finally decided on merit in Ex. M. 1 and consequently the doctrine of res judicata' is applicable. He contended that, the scope and power of the Labour Court/Tribunal, while acting under Sections 33 and 10 of the Act has been dealt with by the Apex Court in several cases, wherein, it has been held that, the powers are identical, except for the additional power conferred in Section 11-A of the Act. (d) Lastly, he contended that, learned Single Judge and the Tribunal have misconstrued the ratio of law laid clown by the Apex Court on the scope of the order passed on an application filed under Section 33. (d) Lastly, he contended that, learned Single Judge and the Tribunal have misconstrued the ratio of law laid clown by the Apex Court on the scope of the order passed on an application filed under Section 33. It was contended that, the learned Single Judge has not kept in view the clear distinction, while examining the two situations namely, (1) The Tribunal passing the approval order on the basis of the record of domestic enquiry conducted by the management, wherein the enquiry is held to be valid; and (2) The converse situation - the disciplinary enquiry being held to be vitiated - set aside and an opportunity being provided to prove the charge/proposed action against the workman. Learned Counsel pointed out that, the instant case falls in the second category and in the instant case the management placed on record both oral and documentary evidence before the Tribunal, proved the charge and that the findings recorded in Ex. M. 1 are on merit, considering the said independent evidence and not a mere approval of the action of the management, based on disciplinary proceedings conducted earlier.” 4.1. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, referring to the record and the statement of objections filed to the writ petition, made submissions in support of the order passed by the Tribunal and as upheld by the learned Single Judge. He contended that, the liberty granted to the appellant by the Tribunal, being in a proceeding under S. 33 of the Act, wherein, only limited jurisdiction is exercised by the Tribunal, there being no adjudication on merits and the issue being not directly and substantially considered, the doctrine of res-judicata is not applicable and no ground is made out for interference. 4.2. It is to be noted that, Sri.K. Kasturi, learned Senior Counsel made submissions in support of the contentions canvassed by learned counsel for the appellant Sri.M.C. Narasimhan, learned Senior Counsel contended that, there is a vast difference in the exercise of jurisdiction by the Labour Court / Tribunal in proceedings under Ss. 10 and 33 which should be kept in view, in deciding matter. Learned counsel referred to the decisions on which reliance has been placed by learned Single Judge, to point out the distinction in exercise of jurisdiction by the court Labour Court/ Tribunal in proceedings under Ss.10 and 33 of the Act. 10 and 33 which should be kept in view, in deciding matter. Learned counsel referred to the decisions on which reliance has been placed by learned Single Judge, to point out the distinction in exercise of jurisdiction by the court Labour Court/ Tribunal in proceedings under Ss.10 and 33 of the Act. Sri.P.S. Rajagopal, learned advocate, made submissions in support of the findings recorded by the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge and stated that both on precedents and principle, the order passed by the learned Single Judge is a well considered one. 5. Having heard the learned counsel and after perusing the record, the question of law which arises for our consideration is:- “Whether, finding of the Labour Court / Industrial Tribunal, on the question of misconduct of the workman, rendered on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties, after the domestic enquiry is set aside in a proceeding under S.33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, would operate as res-judicata in subsequent proceedings under S. 10 of the Act, when the order of termination is challenged by the workman?” Findings: 6. It is to be noted that, the issues and additional issue, raised in the dispute by the Labour Court, for consideration were as follows: “(i) Whether the respondent management proves that the domestic enquiry held against the claimant is fair and proper? (ii) Whether the respondent management proves that for reasons stated in the written statement, the claimant is estopped from contending that the domestric enquiry held is not fair and proper? (iii) Whether the respondent management is justified in dismissing the claimant from the service, vide order dated 15.07.1980? (iv) Whether the claimant is entitled to any reliefs sought for?” Additional issue: (considered and decided) “Whether the finding given on misconduct/charges against Shri. S. Nagaiah in Serial Application No.26/1983 by the Industrial Tribunal, Hubli, operates as res judicta.” 7. At the outset it is significant to notice and state here itself that, the Tribunal by considering the scope of enquiry under S. 33(2) (b) of the Act, without even making any reference to the findings recorded in the order passed on 15.09.97 (Ex.M1), has answered the additional issue in the negative, which is apparently illegal. At the outset it is significant to notice and state here itself that, the Tribunal by considering the scope of enquiry under S. 33(2) (b) of the Act, without even making any reference to the findings recorded in the order passed on 15.09.97 (Ex.M1), has answered the additional issue in the negative, which is apparently illegal. 7.1 The learned Single Judge also while dismissing the writ petitions, has not noticed the said error committed by the Tribunal and has also not taken into consideration the findings recorded by the Tribunal in its order dated 15.09.97 (Ex.M1). Learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition, by referring to the precedents and on general propositions, without actually findings out, whether, while passing the order at Ex.M1, any adjudication has taken place and if so, nature of finding recorded and whether, the finding recorded therein is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. 8. It is significant to notice that, the learned Single Judge has held that, the principles of res judicata as contained in S.11 of Code is not exhaustive and the doctrine of res judicata has been extended to the adjudication proceedings other than suits and therefore, the principles of res-judicata are applicable to industrial adjudications as well. 9. Before proceeding further, at the risk of repetition, it is relevant to notice, the material aspects of the order Ex.M1. Serial Application No. 26/83 was filed in the Tribunal by the management under S. 33(1) of the Act, stating that, the opposite party / respondent Sri. S. Nagaiah was chargesheeted on 11.04.80 and 29.04.80, domestic enquires were conducted according to the accepted norms and principles of natural justice and the enquiry officers found him quality on certain counts which constituted major misconducts under the Company’s Certified Standing Orders (‘Standing Orders’, for short) and for each of the said major misconducts, the punishment provided under the Standing Orders, is dismissal. Since the misconducts on the delinquent workman were of grave nature, he deserves punishment of dismissal and hence, express permission was sought to take the proposed action i.e, to punish the employee by way of dismissal from service of the Company. The said application was contested by the opposite party / respondent, by filling statement of objections, denying the material statements made in the application, raising objection to its maintainability and also contending the same to be devoid of merit. The said application was contested by the opposite party / respondent, by filling statement of objections, denying the material statements made in the application, raising objection to its maintainability and also contending the same to be devoid of merit. It was also contended that, the enquiries conducted were in violation of principles of natural justice and the Standing Orders; that the findings in the reports are perverse, baseless and based on no legal evidence; that the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate and it smacks of victimisation and the dismissal order passed is clearly unjustified and dismissal of the application was sought. Based on the pleadings of the parties, the Tribunal raised the points and evidence was led by both sides. By an order dated 30.06.86, it was held that the domestic enquiry held against the employee is not fair and proper and the case was posted for evidence on merit. As already noticed, the said order was challenged by both parties in this Court, wherein, the order / judgment as aforenoticed, were passed. It is thereafter, the parties have led evidence both oral and documentary, on merits of the misconduct alleged. The Tribunal taking into consideration the evidence and the contentions of the parties, at para 24 of its order, raised the point for consideration as follows:- Taking into consideration the principles laid down in these decisions, we shall see how far the Management has made out the case for dismissal. The evidence of AWs 1 to 13 and Ex.A1 to A79 Was assessed with reference to the contentions and the law and it was held that the charges leveled against the opponent S. Nagaiah in Exs. A3 and A4 are proved. It was further held that there is no reason made out to interfere with the decision of the management for dismissal from service. It could be seen that, there is a detailed consideration of the oral and documentary evidence by the Tribunal and the aforesaid findings have been recorded. 10. It is now trite that, wherever, the disciplinary enquiry held by management is found to be defective and is set aside by the Labour Court / Tribunal, it is open to the management to lead evidence on the merit of alleged misconduct before the Labour Court / Tribunal, which has the jurisdiction to decide the issue on merit. 10. It is now trite that, wherever, the disciplinary enquiry held by management is found to be defective and is set aside by the Labour Court / Tribunal, it is open to the management to lead evidence on the merit of alleged misconduct before the Labour Court / Tribunal, which has the jurisdiction to decide the issue on merit. 10.1 In the case of Workmen of Motipur Sugar Factory (Private), Ltd. Vs. Motipur Sugar Factory (Private), Ltd. reported in 1965 (ii) LLJ 162, the facts were that, 119 workmen of Motipur Sugar Factory (Private), Ltd. Who were employed as cane carrier mazdoors and seasonal workmen, were discharged from 18.12.60. The same was followed by a general strike by the Union which continued up to 22.12.60, when, as a result of an agreement, it was decided that the case of discharged workmen and the question of wages of the strike period be referred to adjudication. On the application by both sides to the Government on 21.12.60, the Government made a reference of the two questions to the Tribunal on 25.01.61. The first questions referred was, whether, the discharge of workmen mentioned in the appendix was justified? If not, whether they should be reinstated and / or they are entitled to any relief thereof? The management did not hold any enquiry as required by Standing Orders before dispensing with the service of the workmen concerned and therefore, when the matter went up before the Tribunal, the question that was tried, was, whether, there was go-slow between 27.11.1960. and 15.12.1960. The management led evidence to show that there was in fact, go-slow by the workmen concerned during the period. The workmen / Union led evidence. The Tribunal considered the question on the basis of relevant statistics supplied by both parties and after considering the evidence, it came to the conclusion that there was go-slow during the period. Consequently, it held that the discharge of workmen was fully justified. It therefore, answered the first question referred to it in favour of the management. Therefore, the workmen approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court wherein the aforesaid question referred to the Tribunal was pressed for consideration inter alia contending that, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to go into the merits of the questions relating to go-slow. It therefore, answered the first question referred to it in favour of the management. Therefore, the workmen approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court wherein the aforesaid question referred to the Tribunal was pressed for consideration inter alia contending that, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to go into the merits of the questions relating to go-slow. The question formulated for consideration by the Hon’ble Supreme Court was that: “Whether it was open to the Tribunal when there was no enquiry whatsoever by the respondent to hold an enquiry itself into the question of go-slow?” Considering the facts and record of the case, it was held as follows: “It is now well-settled by a number of decisions of this Court that where an employer has failed to make an enquiry before dismissing or discharging a workman, it is open to him to justify the action before the Tribunal by leading all relevant evidence before it. In such a case the employer would not have the benefit which he had in cases where domestic enquiries have been held. The entire matter would be open before the Tribunal which will have jurisdiction not only to go into the limited questions open to a Tribunal where domestic enquiry has been properly held (See Indian Iron and Steel Company V. their workmen (1958-I L.L.J. 260)) but also to satisfy itself on the facts adduced before it by the employer whether the dismissal or discharge was justified.” It was further held as follows: “If it is held that in cases where the employer dismisses his employee without holding an enquiry, the dismissal must be set aside by the industrial Tribunal only on that ground, it would inevitably mean that the employer will immediately proceed to hold the enquiry and pass an order dismissing the employee once again. In that case, another industrial dispute would arise and the employer would be entitled to rely upon the enquiry which he had held in the meantime. This course would mean delay and on the second occasion it will entitle the employer to claim the benefit of the domestic enquiry. On the other hand, if in such cases the employer is given an opportunity to justify the impugned dismissal on the merit, the employee has the advantage of having the merits of his case being considered by the Tribunal for itself and that clearly would be to the benefit of the employee. On the other hand, if in such cases the employer is given an opportunity to justify the impugned dismissal on the merit, the employee has the advantage of having the merits of his case being considered by the Tribunal for itself and that clearly would be to the benefit of the employee. That is why this Court has consistently held that if the domestic enquiry is irregular, invalid or improper, the Tribunal may give an opportunity to the employer to prove his case and in doing so, the Tribunal tries the merits itself. This view is consistent with the approach which industrial adjudication generally adopts with a view to do justice between the parties without relying too much on technical considerations and with the object of avoiding delay in the disposal of industrial disputes. Therefore, we are satisfied that no distinction can be made between cases where the enquiry has in fact been held. We must therefore reject the contention that as there was no enquiry in this case it was not open to the respondent to justify the discharge before the Tribunal.” (emphasis supplied by us) 10.2 In the case of M/s. Bharat Iron Works Vs. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel and others reported in AIR 1976 SC 98 , it has been held as follows: “When an application under S. 33 whether for approval or for permission is made to a Tribunal it has initially a limited jurisdiction only to see whether a prime facie case is made out in respect of the misconduct changed. This is, however, the position only when the domestic enquiry proceeding the order of dismissal is free from any defect, that is to say, free from the vice of violation of the principles of natural justice. If on the other hand, there is violation of natural justice, the Tribunal will then give opportunity to the employer to produce evidence, if any, and also to the workman to rebut it if he so chooses. In the latter event the Tribunal will be entitled to alive at its own conclusion on merits on the evidence produced before it with regard to the proof of the misconduct charged, and the Tribunal then, will not be confined merely to consider whether a prima facie case is established against the employee. In the latter event the Tribunal will be entitled to alive at its own conclusion on merits on the evidence produced before it with regard to the proof of the misconduct charged, and the Tribunal then, will not be confined merely to consider whether a prima facie case is established against the employee. In other words, in such an event, the employer’s findings in the domestic enquiry will lapse and these will be substituted by the independent conclusions of the Tribunal on merits.” (emphasis supplied by us) 10.3 After noticing the said decisions, learned Single Judge has held that, in order to appreciate the contentions raised before him, the law of precedents has to be borne in mind and by doing so, it was held that, the question of misconduct was not actually decided. The finding of the learned Single Judge is erroneous in view of the findings of the Tribunal in Ex.M1, to the effect that, the charges levelled in the chargesheets – Exs.A3 and A4 issued to the workman have been proved and consequently, management has made out the case for dismissal. Doctrine of res-judicata: 11. The doctrine of res-judicata is a wholesome one, which is applicable not only to matters covered by the Code of Civil Procedure i.e., suits, but to all litigations including industrial cases. Learned Single Judge has in fact, recorded a finding that, the principles of res-judicata are applicable to industrial cases. Having held so, learned Single Judge has erred in not noticing the explanation VIII to S.11 of Code, to find out, whether, an issue which has been decided earlier in a proceeding under S.33 of the Act, would operate as res-judicata, having regard to the said provision, which reads as follows:- “Explanation VIII – An issue heard and finally decided by a court of limited jurisdiction, competent to decide such issue, shall operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit, notwithstanding that such court of limited jurisdiction was not competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised.” 11.1 The scope of the said provision has been stated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sulochana Amma Vs. Narayanan Nair, reported in AIR 1994 SC 152 , as follows:- “5. Narayanan Nair, reported in AIR 1994 SC 152 , as follows:- “5. ……..No, doubt main body of S.11 was not amended, yet the expression “the Court of limited jurisdiction” in Explanation VIII is wide enough to include a Court whose jurisdiction is subject to pecuniary limitation and other cognate expressions analogous thereto. Therefore, S. 11 is to be read in combination and harmony with Explanation VIII. The result that would flow is that an order or an issue which had arisen directly and substantially between the parties or their privies and decided finally by a competent Court or Tribunal, though of limited or special jurisdiction, which includes pecuniary jurisdiction will operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit or proceedings, notwithstanding the fact that such Court of limited or special jurisdiction was not a competent Court to try the subsequent suit. The issue must directly and substantially arise in a later suit between the same parties or their privies. This question is no longer res integra.” (emphasis supplied by us) 11.2 In the case of Church of South India Trust Association Vs. Telugu Church Council, reported in (1996) 2 SCC 520 , it has been held as follows: “35. Explanation VIII thus removes the limitations that were placed on the principle of res judicata as applicable in India by the Privy Council in Misir Raghobardial v. Rajah Shec Baksh Singh ((1881-82) 9 IA 197 : ILR 9 Cal 439). It would be rather incongruous to read a limitation in the applicability of the said principle by construing the competence of the court to mean that the court which has decided the earlier suit must have the territorial jurisdiction to try the subsequent suit. Such a construction would be running against the trend in the development of law in this filed. We are, therefore, of the opinion that S. 11 of the present Code (excluding Explanation VIII) envisages that the judgment in a former suit would operate as a res judicata if the court which decided the said suit was competent to try the same by virtue of its pecuniary jurisdiction and the subject-matter to try the subsequent suit and that it is not necessary that the said court should have had territorial jurisdiction to decide the subsequent suit. On that view of the matter, it must be held that the judgment of the madras High Court in OSA No. 20 of 1976 dated 2-9-1976 arising out of second suit (OS No. 107 of 1971) operates as res judicata inasmuch as Madras High Court had pecuniary jurisdiction as well as jurisdiction over the subject-matter to try the subsequent suit and it cannot be held that the said judgment does not operate as res judicata for the reason that the Madras High Court does not have territorial jurisdiction to try the subsequent suit relating to properties in Andhra Pradesh.” 11.3 In the case of Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh Vs. State of Gujarat reported in AIR 1965 SC 1153 , the contention considered was, whether S. 11 CPC is exhaustive with respect to the application of principles of res-judicata in a suit and whether in a subsequent suit, general principles of res-judicata can bar the consideration of matter directly in issue and identical with those which had been in earlier and after full contest, decided on merits by a competent Court in any other proceedings including proceedings of a writ petition. The Constitution Bench has, held as follows:- “60. As a result of the above discussion, we are of opinion that the provisions of S.11, C.P.C., are not exhaustive with respect to an earlier decision operating as res judicata between the same parties on the same matter in controversy in a subsequent regular suit and that on the general principle of res judicata, any previous decision on a matter in controversy, decided after full contest or after affording fair opportunity to the parties to prove their case by a Court competent to decide it, will operate as res-judicata in a subsequent regular suit. It is not necessary that the Court deciding the matter formerly be competent to decide the subsequent suit or that the former proceeding and the subsequent suit have the same subject-matter. The nature of the former proceeding is immaterial. It is not necessary that the Court deciding the matter formerly be competent to decide the subsequent suit or that the former proceeding and the subsequent suit have the same subject-matter. The nature of the former proceeding is immaterial. (emphasis supplied by us) 11.4 It is well settled that, S.11 of the Code is not exhaustive of the general doctrine of res-judicata, though the rule of res-judicata contained in S.11 of the Code has some technical aspects, the general doctrine is founded on considerations of high public to achieve two objects namely, (i) that there must be a finality to litigation and (ii) that individuals should not be harassed twice over with the same kind of litigation. In this connection, it would be relevant to notice the decision in the case of Daryao & Others Vs. State of U.P. reported in AIR 1961 SC 1457 , wherein, it has been held as follows:- “Now, the rule of res-judicata as enacted in S.11 of the Code of Civil Procedure has no doubt some technical aspects, for instance, the rule of constructive res-judicata may be said to be technical; but, the basis on which the said rule rests is founded on considerations of public policy. It is in the interest of public at large that a finality should attach to the binding decisions pronounced by Courts of competent jurisdiction and it is also in the public interest that individuals should not be vexed twice over with the same kind of litigation.” 11.5 In the case of Satyadhyan Ghosal and Others Vs. SMT. Deorajin Debi and another reported in AIR 1960 SC 941 , it has been held as follows: “7. The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving a finality to judicial decisions. What it says is that once a res is judicata, it shall not be adjudged again. Primarily it applies as between past litigation and future litigation. When a matter – whether on a question of fact or a question of law – has been decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no appeal was taken to a higher court or because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party will be allowed in a future suit or proceeding between the same parties to canvass the matter again. This principle of res judicata is embodied in relation to suits in S.11 of the code of Civil Procedure; but even where S.11 does not apply, the principles of res judicata has been applied by courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation. The result of this is that the original court as well as any higher court must in any future litigation proceed on the basis that the previous decision was correct. 8. The principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a court, whether the trial court or a higher court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings. Does this however mean that because at an earlier stage of the litigation a court has decided an inter-locutory matter in one way and no appeal has been taken therefrom or no appeal did lie, a higher court cannot at a later stage of the same litigation consider the matter again?” (emphasis supplied by us) Thus it was held that the principle of res-judicata applies also between two stages in the same litigation to the extent that whether the Trial Court or higher Court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way, will not allow the parties to agitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings. 12. Form the record it could be seen that the question as to whether the respondent was guilty of the charges levelled against him in the charge-sheets dated 14.04.80 and 29.04.80, was directly and substantially considered by the Industrial Tribunal in Serial Application No. 26/1983 and the Tribunal has recorded a finding on merit after assessment of the evidence placed on its record by both parties (It having earlier set aside the domestic enquiry held by the management and opportunity having been given to both the parties to lead evidence), it has been held that the charges have been established and the respondent – workman was guilty of misconduct. The matter decided, was not incidental or collateral, whereas, the parties having adduced evidence in support of their respective cases with regard to the allegations of misconduct levelled in the charge-sheets at Exs.A3 and A4, the matter has been decided on merit by the Tribunal, which has been conferred with the jurisdiction. The Industrial Tribunal has held in Ex.M1 that, the charges leveled against respondent / opponent – S. Nagaiah in the charge-sheet at Ex.A4, are proved. The finding recorded in Ex.M1 is not an incidental finding but a substantial finding to the effect that, the management has made out the case for dismissal of the respondent / workman. The said order having not been questioned by the respondent, has attained finality and cannot be treated as incidental. The observation made by the learned Single Judge that such order if questioned, writ petition will not be entertained, is too a general expression. The findings recorded on merit in each case may have its own effect and requires to be examined with reference to the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The effect of the finding may vary from case to case, like the instant case. In Ex.M1, there is a categorical finding on the substantive issue of misconduct leveled against the respondent and such a finding cannot be ignored nor can be tried between the same parties and in the subsequently instituted proceedings, wherein the same matter is again put in issue. It is erroneous on the part of learned Single Judge to have held that the order at Ex.M1 and the proceedings which led to the passing of it, can be looked into as a piece of evidence. The point having been decided on merit with reference to the evidence placed on record by the parties, pursuant to the liberty, granted by the Tribunal, i.e., after setting aside domestic enquiry conducted by the management, and such finding on merit of the misconduct having been allowed to attain finality, the general doctrine of res judicata is attracted, as otherwise, if tried may again may lead to inconsistent orders on the same point. 13. 13. Learned Single Judge has erred in not noticing the legal effect of the finding recorded in an application filed under S.33, more particularly when the disciplinary enquiry is set aside, as has been categorically declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, that, the parties are at liberty to lead evidence and the Labourt Court / Tribunal, has to decide the matter on merits. A finding on merits in respect of the acts of misconduct alleged against the respondent, has been recorded in Ex.M1 and to that extent, the issue would operate as res-judicata. 14. In view of explanation VIII to S.11 of the Code and taking into consideration, the ratio of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the decisions referred to supra, the finding of the learned Single Judge that the proceedings under S.33 would not operate as res-judicata because, the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under S. 33 is very much limited, whereas, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under S.10 do not suffer from any such inhibitions, is erroneous and hence is unsustainable. 15. No doubt, in Atherton West & Co, Vs. S.M. Mazdoor Union ( AIR 1953 SC 241 ); Automobile Products of India Ltd. Vs. Rukmaji Bala ( AIR 1955 SC 258 ); L.D. Sugar Mills Vs. Pt. Ram Sarup ( AIR 1957 SC 82 ); G. Mckenzie & Co. Vs. ITS Worksmen ( AIR 1959 SC 389 ); Bharat Electronics Limited Vs. Labour Court and another (1996 (5) KLJ 94), it has been held that, distinction between prima facie jurisdiction under S.33 and the full-fledged adjudication on a reference under S.10, should be kept in view. However, considering the law laid down by the Apex Court in the decision of Motipur Sugar Factory (Private), Ltd. (supra) which is by a Larger Bench and the decisions noticed supra interpreting the provisions contained in S.11 of Code, it has to be held that principles of res-judicata do apply, when before the Tribunal, the issue with regard to the misconduct is raised and finding recorded based on independent evidence of the parties, even in a proceeding under S.33 of the Act. A perusal of the order at Ex.M1 which has come into existence after due opportunity to the parties in proceedings under S.33, whereby, the Tribunal has accorded the permission / approval to the action of dismissal of the workman, based on the consideration of Independent evidence on its record, the principles of res-judicata is attracted, as otherwise, there would be duplicacy of proceedings, which situation should be avoided in the interest of the workman as well as the employer and in furtherance of the aims and object with which the Act was brought into force to foster industrial peace. Consequently, the findings recorded and the decisions of the learned Single Judge impugned herein are liable to be interfered with. In view of the finding in Ex.M1 and the doctrine of res-judicata being attracted, the appellant is entitled to the relief. For the foregoing discussion, we pass the following: ORDER (i) Writ appeal is allowed and the order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. Nos. 32819 and 32820 of 2002 dated 11.03.05, dismissing the writ petitions, it hereby set aside. (ii) Order passed in KID No.50/1997 dated 07.03.2002(Annexure-F) by the Addl. Labour Court, Hubli, is hereby quashed and consequently, the writ petition shall stand allowed. It is made clear that, despite the quashing of the order dated 07.03.2002 (Annexure-F), dispute No. KID No.50/1997 pending on the file of the Addl. Labour Court, Hubll, shall be liable to be adjudicated on all other grounds. It is open to both the parties to lead evidence in support of their respective pleas other than the proof of charge of misconduct, held as established in the order dated 15.07.97(Ex-M1). (iii) The Additional Labour Court, Hubll, is hereby directed to dispose of the dispute in KID No. 50/97, before 30.06.2009. Both the parties shall render co-operation for disposal of the dispute, within the stipulated period. In order to facilitate the early hearing and disposal of the dispute, both the parties are directed to appear before the Addl. Labour Court at Hubli, on 09.02.2009 either in person or through their respective advocates and receive further orders. (iv) In the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their respective costs.