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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2009 DIGILAW 751 (MP)

GURUJI SEVA NYAS v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

2009-06-30

VINEY MITTAL

body2009
Judgment ( 1. ) THE petitioner-Shri Guruji Seva Nyas (hereinafter referred as the petitioner-trust) is a public trust registered under the provisions of Madhya Pradesh Public Trust Act, 1951, and has approached this Court raising a challenge to the cancellation order dated December 12, 2008, passed by indore Development Authority (IDA), respondent No. 2, with regard to plots Nos. A and B, situated in Scheme No. 54, indore. The facts. ( 2. ) AN advertisement dated March 23, 2007 was issued by IDA, inviting tenders for allotment of two plots, being plot no. A, measuring 4110 square meters, and plot No. B, measuring 4376 square meters, both situated in Scheme no. 54, Indore, which had been floated by IDA. Only Public trusts, Societies, registered under the Societies Registration act, Registered Companies or Cooperative Societies, so registered in the State, were to be treated as eligible for allotment of the said plots. ( 3. ) THE petitioner-trust claims that on April 7, 2007, it submitted an application for allotment of both the plots. Along with the application, as required, Rs. 10,00,000/-each, i. e. a total of Rs. 20,00,000/-, was deposited by it as earnest money. The tenders were submitted by the petitioner-trust , submitting the tender price at the rate of Rs. 5200/- per square meter. The aforesaid tenders were opened by IDA on april 10, 2007. There were a total of ten tenders. Since the tender submitted by the petitioner-trust was found to be highest, the same was provisionally accepted by IDA, subject to an approval to be granted by the State Government. According to the petitioner-trust, even the aforesaid approval was granted by the State Government on April 12, 2007, as required under Rule 19 of Madhya Pradesh Nagar tatha Gram Nivesh (Vikasit Bhumion, Grihon, Bhawanon tatha Anya Sanrachnaon Ka Vyayan) Niyam, 1975. On the aforesaid approval granted by the State Government, a formal allotment letter was issued by IDA on April 12, 2007, itself, for allotment of both the plots to the petitioner-trust. For plot No. A, a premium of Rs. 2,13,72,000/- was fixed, whereas for plot No. B, the premium fixed was rs. 2,27,55,200/ -. ( 4. ) THE petitioner-trust has pleaded that as per the conditions of allotment, the amount which was required to be deposited by it, was actually so deposited and up-to august 2007. A total amount of Rs. 3,26,92,085/-was deposited. 2,13,72,000/- was fixed, whereas for plot No. B, the premium fixed was rs. 2,27,55,200/ -. ( 4. ) THE petitioner-trust has pleaded that as per the conditions of allotment, the amount which was required to be deposited by it, was actually so deposited and up-to august 2007. A total amount of Rs. 3,26,92,085/-was deposited. Since there was a default for some payment, even penal interest for the aforesaid defaulting period was deposited. Consequently, two allotment letters, Annexures p-10 and P-11, were issued with regard to the aforesaid two plots by IDA to the petitioner-trust on August 26, 2007. ( 5. ) IT appears that some complaint was made by one k. K. Mishra to the Lokayukt, State of Madhya Pradesh, whereby a grievance appears to have been made against the aforesaid allotment of the plots to the petitioner-trust by ida. On receipt of the aforesaid complaint, the Lokayukt appears to have sought some explanation/response from IDA in the matter. It also appears from the record (as per the stand taken by the Lokayukt in the reply filed on its behalf)that IDA had furnished some explanations on June 30, 2007, january 18, 2008, March 19, 2008, April 23, 2008 and May 7, 2008. As per the reply filed on behalf of the Lokayukt, it also appears that the relevant record of IDA was made available for examination by the Lokayukt. However, the petitioner-trust has specifically pleaded, and the said fact has not even been disputed by the respondents, including the Lokayukt, that at no stage, the petitioner-trust had ever been issued any show cause notice in the matter, nor any opportunity had ever been provided to it, to appear and explain the allotment in question. Ultimately, on May 7, 2008, a communication was issued by the Lokayukt to IDA, issuing directions, to cancel the allotment of both the plots. The aforesaid communication issued by Lokayukt to IDA is available on record as Annexure R-3/1 with the reply filed on behalf of the Lokayukt. ( 6. ) ON receipt of the aforesaid directions from the lokayukt, IDA issued an order dated July 14, 2008, whereby the allotment of the plots in question, in favour of the petitioner-trust, was ordered to be cancelled. A copy of the aforesaid cancellation order has been appended as Annexure p-14 with the petition. ( 6. ) ON receipt of the aforesaid directions from the lokayukt, IDA issued an order dated July 14, 2008, whereby the allotment of the plots in question, in favour of the petitioner-trust, was ordered to be cancelled. A copy of the aforesaid cancellation order has been appended as Annexure p-14 with the petition. Even the aforesaid cancellation order was passed by IDA without ever issuing any show cause notice to the petitioner-trust, and without ever affording it an opportunity to explain the matter. ( 7. ) IN these circumstances the petitioner-trust approached this Court through a writ petition, being WP no. 4306 of 2008, raising a challenge to the aforesaid cancellation order. Since it was found by this Court that IDA had ordered the cancellation of the plots, in complete violation of the principles of natural justice, therefore, this court, without going any further into the controversy, through an order dated July 16, 2008, quashed the cancellation order dated July 14, 2008. However, a liberty was granted to IDA to initiate fresh proceedings, against the petitioner-trust, if so desired, by issuing a show cause notice, at the first instance, and thereafter on consideration of the reply of the petitioner-trust, by passing a fresh order. A copy of the order dated July 16, 2008 passed by this Court in WP no. 4306 of 2008 has been appended as Annexure P-15 with the petition. ( 8. ) IN terms of the liberty granted to IDA, and keeping in view the directions issued by the Lokayukt, a show cause notice dated August 18, 2008, Annexure P-16, was issued by ida to the petitioner-trust, proposing the cancellation of the plots in question. A detailed reply was filed by the petitioner-trust on September 17, 2008 (Annexure P-19 ). However, although the petitioner-trust appears to have raised many pleas in the detailed reply to the proposed action of cancellation, but without consideration of the said pleas raised by it, IDA has passed a fresh order on December 12, 2008, whereby the allotment of the plots in question has been ordered to be cancelled. A copy of the aforesaid cancellation order has been appended as Annexure P-20 with the petition, and is a subject matter of challenge before this court. ( 9. ) THE petitioner-trust has challenged the aforesaid action taken by IDA by raising various pleas. A copy of the aforesaid cancellation order has been appended as Annexure P-20 with the petition, and is a subject matter of challenge before this court. ( 9. ) THE petitioner-trust has challenged the aforesaid action taken by IDA by raising various pleas. It has been maintained that although IDA was required to pass a fresh order, after issuance of a show cause notice for cancellation, only after taking into consideration the reply filed by the petitioner-trust, but the impugned order Annexure P-20 reveals that various pleas raised by the petitioner-trust, have not at all been adverted to. It has been maintained that as a matter of fact, a perusal of the cancellation order shows that the same has been passed, merely on the basis of the directions issued by the Lokayukt, by observing that the decision taken by the Lokayukt is to be treated as binding on ida. It has also been maintained by the petitioner-trust that due procedure had been followed by IDA, in allotting the plots in question, and even when the tenders submitted by the petitioner-trust were found to be highest, and before the allotment of the plots even the requisite sanction of the State government under the Rules had also been obtained. Thus, the petitioner-trust has pleaded that there was no justification for IDA to have ordered the cancellation of the plots. ( 10. ) IT has also been maintained by the petitioner-trust that since the cancellation order recites to have been passed on the directions issued by the Lokayukt, but the petitioner-trust had never been issued any notice of any such proceedings/investigation taken out by the Lokayukt, nor at any stage had ever received notice from the Lokayukt in the matter. It has also been pleaded by the petitioner-trust that the Lokayukt was having no authority or jurisdiction for ordering cancellation of the allotment of the plots. According to the petitioner-trust, since it had deposited a huge amount after acceptance of its tenders, being highest, IDA was even estopped from cancelling the same. ( 11. ) THE claim made by the petitioner-trust has been contested by respondents No. 2 and 3. Two separate replies have been filed. In the reply filed on behalf of IDA, the facts, as pleaded by the petitioner-trust, have not been disputed. ( 11. ) THE claim made by the petitioner-trust has been contested by respondents No. 2 and 3. Two separate replies have been filed. In the reply filed on behalf of IDA, the facts, as pleaded by the petitioner-trust, have not been disputed. As a matter of fact, it has been conceded that the tenders submitted by the petitioner-trust, for both the plots at the rate of 5200 per square meter, were the highest and therefore, a resolution was passed by IDA to accept the same, and the requisite approval of the State Government was sought under rules 19/20 of the Rules, which was also granted by the State Government. However, the only defence offered by IDA is that having received the directions from the Lokayukt, IDA was duty bound in law to carry out the said directions, being binding upon it, and therefore, the cancellation order with regard to the plots in question had been passed. In the separate reply filed on behalf of Lokayukt, respondent No. 3, it has been maintained that a complaint was received by the Lokayukt from one K. K. Mishra, in which it was alleged that officers of IDA had abused their official position, and had illegally allotted two plots to the petitioner-trust, in violation of the terms and conditions of the tender, and contrary to the government circulars and guidelines, causing a huge loss to the State Exchequer. According to the said reply, the aforesaid complaint was duly enquired into by seeking an explanation from IDA, and by perusing its record, and as per the advise rendered by the legal Advisor of the Lokayukt, it was found that the petitioner-trust was not eligible for allotment of two plots. Consequently, the Lokayukt had passed an order on May 5, 2008, thereby making a recommendation to the Principal secretary, Housing and Environment Department of the state Government, and also to IDA, for cancellation of two plots, allotted to the petitioner-trust. ( 12. Consequently, the Lokayukt had passed an order on May 5, 2008, thereby making a recommendation to the Principal secretary, Housing and Environment Department of the state Government, and also to IDA, for cancellation of two plots, allotted to the petitioner-trust. ( 12. ) IT would be relevant to notice, at this stage only, that although a specific plea has been raised by the petitioner-trust that all proceedings on the aforesaid complaint of K. K. Mishra were conducted in the office of the lokayukt, behind the back of the petitioner-trust, and without ever issuing any show cause notice to it, the said fact has not at all been denied in the reply filed on behalf of respondent No. 3. However, it has been maintained that "an enquiry had been conducted according to prescribed procedure, after giving due notice to the petitioner and also opportunity of personal hearing (copy of the notice and reply sent by them, Annexure-P/1, copy of the note-sheets dated 22. 2. 2008, 19. 3. 2008, 27. 3. 2008 and 23. 4. 2008 Annexure-P/2), as per para 2. 1 of the reply of respondent No. 3". However, a perusal of the aforesaid notice in the reply depicts that the said show cause notice had merely been issued by the office of the Lokayukt to the Chairman of IDA, and the reply had also been submitted only by the Chairman of IDA. There is absolutely no material on record, nor has even been pleaded in the reply of respondent No. 3, that any show cause notice had ever been issued to the petitioner-trust, requiring it to explain the matter. ( 13. ) I have heard Shri A. K. Sethi, learned senior counsel for the petitioner-trust, Shri Vivek Patwa, learned Deputy government counsel for respondent No. 1-State, Shri Z. A. Khan, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent no. 2-IDA and Shri Manoj Dwivedi, learned counsel for respondent No. 3-Lokayukt, and with their assistance, have also gone through the record of the case. ( 14. ) ALL the learned counsel for the parties, during the course of arguments, have reiterated the pleas raised by the parties in their respective pleadings. ( 15. 2-IDA and Shri Manoj Dwivedi, learned counsel for respondent No. 3-Lokayukt, and with their assistance, have also gone through the record of the case. ( 14. ) ALL the learned counsel for the parties, during the course of arguments, have reiterated the pleas raised by the parties in their respective pleadings. ( 15. ) SHRI A. K. Sethi, learned senior counsel for the petitioner-trust, has referred to various provisions of madhya Pradesh Lokayukt and Up-Lokayukt Act, 1981, (hereinafter called as the Act), and maintained that firstly, since the complaint in question appears to have been made by the complainant K. K. Mishra, alleging wrong/illegal allotment of the plots to the petitioner-trust, therefore, no investigation/enquiry, could be held in the matter by the lokayukt behind the back of the petitioner-trust, and without issuing a show cause notice to the petitioner-trust, seeking its explanation, and without associating it in the matter. On that basis, it has been maintained that the mandatory procedure had not been followed by the Lokayukt, as laid under the Act, and in any case, the procedure adopted by the lokayukt was in complete violation of the principles of natural justice. ( 16. ) SHRI Sethi has further argued that under the provisions of the Act, the Lokayukt has been empowered to hold an enquiry, and on being satisfied that the allegation in the compliant is established, may submit a report in writing, to communicate his findings and recommendation, along with the relevant documents etc. , to the Competent authority. Shri Sethi maintains that as per Section 12 of the act, the report submitted by the Lokayukt is in the nature of a recommendation, and therefore, the Competent Authority is required to independently examine the report and the material submitted before it, and take appropriate action thereupon. Thus, according to Shri Sethi, the communication dated May 7, 2008, Annexure R-3/1, issued by the Lokayukt to IDA, being in the nature of directions to IDA to cancel the allotment of the plots to the petitioner-trust, such directions were not envisaged under the provisions of the Act, and was in fact without jurisdiction. ( 17. Thus, according to Shri Sethi, the communication dated May 7, 2008, Annexure R-3/1, issued by the Lokayukt to IDA, being in the nature of directions to IDA to cancel the allotment of the plots to the petitioner-trust, such directions were not envisaged under the provisions of the Act, and was in fact without jurisdiction. ( 17. ) ADDITIONALLY, learned senior counsel for the petitioner-trust has argued that even after having received the report of the Lokayukt, IDA was duty bound in law to independently examine the issue, consider the report and examine the material, and after taking into consideration the reply filed by the petitioner-trust, an order was required to be passed, de-hors the recommendation made by the lokayukt, whereas the cancellation order Annexure P-20, has merely been passed treating the directions of the lokayukt as binding. ( 18. ) ON the other hand, Shri Z. A. Khan, learned senior counsel for respondent No. 2, has defended the cancellation order, Annexure P-20, by maintaining that once, the directions had been issued by the Lokayukt, then it was not desirable that a Development Authority, such as IDA, should sit in judgment over the directions issued by such a high authority, as the Lokayukt, and therefore, the directions issued by the Lokayukt were infact treated as binding by ida. ( 19. ) HOWEVER, Shri Manoj Dwivedi, learned counsel appearing for the Lokayukt, respondent No. 3, has defended the directions Annexure R-3/1, dated May 7, 2008, issued by the Lokayukt to IDA, with regard to the cancellation of both the plots. Shri Dwivedi has maintained that an enquiry had been conducted by the Lokayukt, in which, a show cause notice was issued to IDA, and an explanation was sought in the matter from it, with regard to the allotment of said plots to the petitioner-trust. Thereafter a reply was filed by IDA, and even the relevant documents were produced. According to the learned counsel, once the Lokayukt was satisfied on perusal of the record, then the entire procedure should be taken to have been followed, and therefore, the directions, which had been issued by the Lokayukt to IDA, were to be carried out by IDA. Thus Shri Dwivedi maintains that the allotment of plots had rightly been cancelled by IDA. ( 20. ) I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions raised by learned counsel for the parties. Thus Shri Dwivedi maintains that the allotment of plots had rightly been cancelled by IDA. ( 20. ) I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions raised by learned counsel for the parties. I have also perused the various provisions of the Act, and gone through the relevant law on the point. ( 21. ) AT the outset, it would be pertinent to extract certain relevant provisions of the Act, as under. "10. Procedure in respect of enquiry :- The lokayukt or Up-Lokayukt shall, in each case before it decide the procedure to be followed for making the enquiry and in so doing ensure that the principles of natural justice are satisfied. 11. Applicability of Evidence Act and Code of criminal Procedure :- (1) The general principles of powers conferred by Evidence Act, 1872, (No. 1 of 1872), and criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (No. 2 of 1974)shall as nearly as may apply to the procedure of enquiry before Lokayukt or Up-Lokayukt in the matter of- (a) Summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and his examination on oath. (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents and proof thereof. (c) receiving evidence on affidavits: (d) requisitioning any public record or copy thereof from any court or office : (e) issuing commission for examination of witness of documents, and such other matters as may be prescribed : provided that no proceeding before the lokayukt or Up-Lokayukt shall be invalidated only on account of want of formal proof if the principles of natural justice are satisfied. Provided further that where it is necessary to summon any Government servant in his official capacity, his statement on affidavit shall be deemed to be sufficient as evidence. (2) Any proceeding before the Lokayukt or Up-Lokayukt shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Section 193 and Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (No. 45 of 1860 ). (3) The Lokayukt or the Up-Lokayukt shall be deemed to be court within the meaning of contempt of Court Act, 1971 (No. LXX of 1971 ). 12. Report of Lokayukt and Up-Lokayukt :- (1) If, after enquiry into the allegations, the lokayukt or an Up-Lokayukt is satisfied that such allegation is established, he shall, by report in writing, communicate his findings and recommendation along with the relevant document, materials and other evidence to the competent authority. 12. Report of Lokayukt and Up-Lokayukt :- (1) If, after enquiry into the allegations, the lokayukt or an Up-Lokayukt is satisfied that such allegation is established, he shall, by report in writing, communicate his findings and recommendation along with the relevant document, materials and other evidence to the competent authority. (2) The competent authority shall examine the report forwarded to it under sub-section (3) and intimate, within three months of the date of receipt of the report, the Lokayukt or, as the case may be, the Up-Lokayukt, the action taken or proposed to be taken on the basis of the report. (3) If the Lokayukt or Up-Lokayukt is satisfied with the action taken or proposed to be taken on his recommendations, he shall close the case under information to the complainant, the public servant and the competent authority concerned. In any other case, if he considers that the case so deserves, he may make a special report upon the case to the governor and also inform the complainant concerned. (4) The Lokayukt and the Up-Lokayukt shall present annually a consolidated report on the performance of their functions under this Act, to the governor. (5) If in any special report under sub-section (3) or the annual report under sub-section (4) any adverse comment is made against any public servant, such report shall also contain the substance of the defence adduced by such public servant and the comment made thereon by or on behalf of the State government or department concerned of the State government or the public authority concerned, as the case may be. (6) On receipt of a special report under sub-section (3), or the annual report under sub-section (4), the governor shall cause a copy there of together with an explanatory memorandum to be laid before the state Legislative Assembly. (7) Subject to the provisions of Section 10, the lokauyukt may at his discretion make available from time to time, the substance of cases closed or otherwise disposed of by him or by an Up-Lokayukt, which may appear to him to be of general public, academic or professional interest, in such manner and to such persons as he may deem appropriate. (Emphasis Supplied) A bare perusal of the language employed in Section 10 of the Act clearly depicts that as and when, a complaint is received by the Lokayukt, it is entitled, in each case, to decide the procedure to be followed, for making the enquiry into such complaint, but while evolving the said procedure, it has to be ensured that the principles of natural justice are satisfied. In the present case, when some complaint made by the complainant K. K. Mishra had been received in the office of the Lokayukt, then at the time when an enquiry/investigation was being made in the said complaint, since the allegations in the said complaints were primarily with regard to the alleged wrong allotment of the plots in question to the petitioner-trust, therefore, it was obviously a mandatory requirement, as per Section 10 of the Act, to have issued a show cause notice to the petitioner-trust also, and associate it with any investigation/enquiry, which was proposed by the Lokayukt. However, in the present case, the aforesaid investigation/enquiry had been conducted only by issuing a show cause notice to the Chairman of IDA, and after taking an explanation from IDA, and merely on perusal of some record of IDA. Thus, the entire aforesaid exercise appears to have been done behind the back of the petitioner-trust, and without adhering to the principles of natural justice. On this ground alone, it is apparent that the directions contained in the communication dated May 7, 2008, Annexure R-3/1 issued by the Lokayukt to IDA, are in complete violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 10 of the Act and as such are liable to be set aside. ( 22. ) A reference to the provision of Section 11 of the Act further supports the inference that although the provisions of Evidence Act and Code of Criminal Procedure have been made applicable for the enquiry proceedings/investigation before the Lokayukt, still even though a formal proof as per the said provisions may not be really required, still adherence of the principles of natural justice is required. This brings me to the next issue canvassed, as to whether the report of the Lokayukt under Section 12 of the act, is to be treated as an order/direction, capable of execution/enforcement, or is to be treated as a recommendation to the State Government/competent authority, to take appropriate action in the matter, on the basis of the said report. ( 23. ) A bare perusal of the language employed in Section 12 (1) of the Act clearly depicts that if, after enquiry into the allegations of complaint, the Lokayukt is satisfied that such allegation is established, he shall, by report in writing, communicate his findings and recommendation, along with the relevant documents, materials and other evidence to the competent Authority. Under sub-section 12 (2), on receipt of the said report, the Competent Authority, is required to examine the report, and under sub-section (3) intimate within three months of the receipt of the report, the action taken or proposed to be taken on the basis of the report. ( 24. ) THE Supreme Court of India, while examining the powers of Human Rights Commission, constituted under the provisions of Protection of Human Right Act, 1993, in the case of N. C. Dhoundial Vs. Union of India and others 2004 (2) SCC 579 , held as follows. "14. We cannot endorse the view of the commission. The Commission which is a "unique expert body" is, no doubt, entrusted with a very important function of protecting human rights, but, it is needless to point out that the Commission has no unlimited jurisdiction nor does it exercise plenary powers in derogation of the statutory limitations. The commission, which is the creature of statute, is bound by its provisions. Its duties and functions are defined and circumscribed by the Act. Of course, as any other statutory functionary, it undoubtedly has incidental or ancillary power to effectively exercise its jurisdiction in respect of the powers confided to it but the commission should necessarily act within the parameters prescribed by the Act creating it and the confines of jurisdiction vested in it by the Act. The commission is one of the fora which can redress the grievances arising out of violations of human rights. Even if it is not in a position to take up the enquiry and to afford redressal on account of certain statutory fetters or handicaps, the aggrieved persons are not without other remedies. The commission is one of the fora which can redress the grievances arising out of violations of human rights. Even if it is not in a position to take up the enquiry and to afford redressal on account of certain statutory fetters or handicaps, the aggrieved persons are not without other remedies. The assumption underlying the observation in the concluding passage extracted above proceeds on an incorrect premise that the person wronged by violation of human rights would be left without remedy if the Commission does not take the matter". ( 25. ) A Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court again dealing with the powers of State Human Rights commission under the provisions of said 1993 Act, in the case of Jai Singh Vs. Punjab State Human Rights cwp 20075 of 2003 decided on commission and another april 2, 2005, held as follows. "it may also be relevant to notice that the Commission is a creature of a Statute i. e. Protection of Human right Act, 1993. It, therefore, cannot obviously clothe itself with such powers which have not been conferred upon it by the aforesaid Statute. Apparently powers of judicial review have not been conferred upon the commission. Powers of holding parallel proceedings, where the matter is already pending before a competent court (civil or criminal), have also not been envisaged by the Act. Under the provisions of the Act, the Commission has been merely constituted with a function to make recommendations to the appropriate government, when any violation of human rights by a public servant, is brought to its notice, after due investigation of the matter. As the language of section 18 itself suggests that the Commission has only power to make recommendations to the concerned government or authority, for initiation of proceedings, or for initiation of such action as may be deemed fit. The word "recommendation" necessarily means "to suggest". "such a suggestion cannot be treated to be a decision capable of execution or enforcement. " ( 26. ) AGAIN, another Division Bench of Punjab and haryana High Court in a later case, being, Jatt Ram Vs. Punjab State Human Rights Commission and another, CWP 18237 of 2003 decided on May 18, 2005, approved the view in Jai Singhs case (supra), by making the following observations. " ( 26. ) AGAIN, another Division Bench of Punjab and haryana High Court in a later case, being, Jatt Ram Vs. Punjab State Human Rights Commission and another, CWP 18237 of 2003 decided on May 18, 2005, approved the view in Jai Singhs case (supra), by making the following observations. "thus the view taken by us with regard to meaning of the word "recommendations" in Jai Singhs case (supra) stands fully fortified. We reiterate that the word "recommendation" used in Section 18 of the Act necessarily means "to suggest". Such a suggestion cannot be treated to be a decision capable of execution or enforcement. " To find out the true import of the word "recommend", it would be relevant to refer to Websters encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English language (New Revised Edition) as follows. "recommend" means 1. to present as worthy of confidence, acceptance use etc; commend; mention favourably; to recommend an applicant for a job to recommend a book 2. to represent or urged as advisable or expedient; to recommend caution. 3. to advise as an alternative; suggest ( a choice, course of action etc.) as appropriate, beneficial, or the like; He recommended the blue plate special. The doctor recommended special exercises for her. 4. to make desirable or attractive; a plan that has very little to recommend it. "recommendation" has been described to mean an act of recommending. 2. a letter or the like recommending a person or thing, 3. representation in favour of a person or thing. 4. anything that serves to a recommend a person or thing or induce acceptance or favour. Similarly in Corpus Juris Secundum, the word "recommend" and "recommendation" have been ascribed the following meaning: "recommend", to advise or counsel, to counsel as to a course of action, to commend, to commend to the favourable, notice of another, to bestow commendation on, to praise as desirable advantageous, trustworthy, or advisable, to put in a favourable light before any one, to speak in behalf of, to present as ones advice or choice or as having ones approval, to commit to, to commit to anothers care, confidence, or acceptance, with favouring representations, to consign, to give in charge, to offer with favourable representations. Ordinarily it involves the idea that another has the final decision although it is sometimes used in an a imperative sense. Ordinarily it involves the idea that another has the final decision although it is sometimes used in an a imperative sense. "recommend" has been held synonymous with, or equivalent to, "desire". "recommendation": The act of one person in giving to another a favourable account of the character, responsibility, or skill of a third, the act of recommending or commending a person or thing to notice, use, confidence, or civility of another, favourable representation, mere suggestion as to the desirability of a certain course of action to be pursued, that which procures a favourable reception. The word is also defined as meaning a note commending a person to favour. "recommendation": has been held equivalent to, or synonymous with, "certificate" and "reference", and has been compared with, or distinguished form, "decision" and "instruction" in Chambers 21st Century Dictionary (Revised Edition)also, Recommend has been described to mean to suggest as being suitable to be accepted, chosen etc; to commend". ( 27. ) THEREFORE, in my considered view, the language of section 12 of the Act has necessarily to be interpreted, keeping in view the aforesaid meaning and interpretation. ( 28. ) WHILE dealing with the provisions of M. P. Anusuchit jati Ayog Adhiniyam, 1995, and interpreting the powers and functions of M. P. State Scheduled Caste Commission, a division Bench of this Court in the case of S. K. Verma Vs. State of M. P. and others, 2009 (1) MPLJ 632 has held that the Commission is only an advisory body and has not been constituted to act as a superior body, or an adjudicating authority, having judicial or quasi-judicial powers, to sit over and above all departments of the State Government. The orders passed by the Commission cannot be enforced by it, nor directions can be issued calling for a compliance report. The law laid down in S. K. Vermas case (supra) is also relevant, and is attracted to the controversy in the present case, as well. ( 29. ) ALTHOUGH the communication, Annexure R-3/1 dated may 7, 2008, issued by the Lokayukt to IDA, indicates that directions had been issued for cancellation of the plots to the petitioner-trust, and IDA has treated the said directions as binding upon it, whether or not the aforesaid directions were automatically binding upon IDA or not is a matter of divergence between the learned counsel for the parties. Whereas the learned senior counsel for the petitioner-trust maintains that such directions were not binding, and even on receipt of the said report from the Lokayukt, IDA was required in law to have examined the matter independently; the learned counsel for the respondents have maintained that the Lokayukt, being such a high Authority and creation of a statute, the report given by the said Authority obviously, is to be treated as binding upon IDA. However, since I find that even the mandatory procedure had not been followed by the Lokayukt, while issuing the aforesaid directions annexure R-3/1, dated May 7, 2008, in as much as, the petitioner-trust had not at all been heard in the matter, as was required under Section 10 of the Act, therefore, it would be appropriate not to express any opinion on the said controversy, since the matter on the complaint filed by K. K. Mishra, requires to be examined afresh by the Lokayukt, by associating all concerned. However, as noticed earlier, as is even the agreed position between the parties, that the order of cancellation dated December 12, 2008, Annexure P-20, has been passed by IDA, merely on the basis of the report dated May 7, 2008, Annexure R-3/1, therefore, if the complaint of K. K. Mishra is now to be examined afresh by the Lokayukt, then obviously, the cancellation order annexure P-20 is liable to be quashed, at this stage. ( 30. ) CONSEQUENTLY, in view of the aforesaid discussion, the communication/report dated May 7, 2008, Annexure r-3/1, forwarded by the Lokayukt to the State Government, as well as Indore Development Authority, is hereby quashed, being in violation of the principles of natural justice, and being in contravention of the provisions of Section 10 of the 29 act. The Lokayukt is requested to look into the complaint made by K. K. Mishra, once again, if so desired, after holding an appropriate enquiry into the matter, and after affording an opportunity to all the affected parties i. e. the complainant, petitioner-trust, as well as Indore development Authority. If after such enquiry/investigation, it is desired to submit a report, as per Section 12 (1) of the Act, then further action, in accordance with law, shall obviously be taken. As a result thereof, the order dated December 12, 2008, Annexure P-20 passed by IDA is also quashed.