Judgment :- (1.) The petitioner was working as a contract labourer through a contractor in the Durgapur Steel Plant since the year 1978. In an accident in the plant he lost his left forearm which had to be amputated. In the year 1994 when the authorities of the plant were going to appoint some unskilled labourers, the petitioner applied for regularization absorption which was not responded to. The petitioner in the circumstances filed a writ petition seeking a mandamus which was disposed of by B. P. Banerjee, J. as His Lordship then was, by an order dated 26th September, 1994 by which the authorities were directed to dispose of the representation of the petitioner by a reasoned order. The Chief Personnel Manager of the Durgapur Steel Plant by his letter dated 12/13th January, 1995 rejected the prayer for absorption on the ground that the writ petitioner was medically unfit. The petitioner once again invoked writ jurisdiction of this Court. His writ petition was registered as C. O. No.17397 (W) of 1995. The petition was allowed by D.K. Basu, J. as His Lordship then was, by an order dated 30th June, 1997 by which the authorities were directed to absorb the writ petitioner. To be precise the operative portion of the judgment and order was as follows:-"In such view of the matter, I direct the respondent-company to absorb the petitioner at the earliest, preferably by 30th June, 1997, from three percent quota available for the disabled persons category. No disabled person shall be appointed from the quota of 3% reserved for handicapped persons until the petitioner is absorbed. Such exercise has to be completed by 30th June, 1997. For the purpose of appointment, the maximum age limit shall be relaxed and this preference shall not create any precedent." (2.) The Steel Authority preferred an appeal. From a supplementary affidavit affirmed on behalf of the Authorities it appears that on 13.11.97 a Division Bench presided over by S.B. Sinha and R. K. Mitra, JJ. as Their Lordships then were stayed the operation of the order dated 25th February, 1997. From a supplementary affidavit affirmed on behalf of the Authorities it appears that on 13.11.97 a Division Bench presided over by S.B. Sinha and R. K. Mitra, JJ. as Their Lordships then were stayed the operation of the order dated 25th February, 1997. The appeal was finally dismissed by a Division Bench presided over by A.K. Mathur, C.J. and Ranjan Kumar Mazumdar, J. as Their Lordships then were by a judgment and order dated 23rd June, 2000 on the basis of the following reasons:- "In fact, the petitioner had been in service for 18 years and there is a handicapped quota and it is not the case of the appellant that there is no vacancy against this quota, ft is of no significance that whether there is any clause for handicapped persons in the tripartite agreement or not. But there is three percent handicapped quota and against that this incumbent can be absorbed as he is old worker of this unit who has spent his whole life here. Therefore, in this background, we are of the opinion that the direction given by the learned Single Judge cannot be said to be wrong so as to warrant interference in this appeal. However, the respondents are directed to absorb the writ petitioner against handicapped quota within four weeks from the date of receipt of this order." (3.) The Steel Authority preferred a special leave petition challenging the order of the Division Bench which came up for hearing before the Supreme Court on 28th November, 2000 when Their Lordship passed the following order:- "On an undertaking being given by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the judgment will be implemented and the respondent will be asked to do a job which he can suitably do and further that the legal expenses of the respondent will be borne by the petitioner, we issue notice to show-cause returnable after four weeks." (4.) It is on the basis of this order of the Apex Court that a letter of appointment dated 31st January, 2001 was issued to the writ petitioner directing him to report for duty on 7th February, 2001. The writ petitioner duly joined service on the appointed day. The writ petitioner duly joined service on the appointed day. The special leave petition of the respondent authority came up for final hearing on 19th February, 2001 when the same was disposed of by the following order:- "Learned Senior Counsel points out that compliance of the Division Benchs judgment has been made and the respondent has joined duties on 7th February, 2001. The Special Leave Petition is disposed of accordingly." (5.) The contention of the writ petitioner is that he lost his forearm during his course of employment as a contract labourer in the Durgapur Steel Plant. His prayer for absorption made in the year 1994 was illegally turned down. As a handicapped person he was ultimately given appointment from out of the quota reserved for handicapped person. The authorities should have given the benefit of that quota in the year 1994 itself and by not having done so they failed and neglected to discharge their statutory obligation resulting in loss and damage to the writ petitioner. He therefore has prayed principally for the following, relief:-"A writ of and/or in the nature of Mandamus to issue commanding the respondent authorities concerned, each one of them, their men, agents and/or subordinate to forthwith grant all benefits including promotion and seniority to the petitioner at par with the other co-contractor labourers on and from the year of their joining, i.e. 1994 alongwith entire arrears without any delay whatsoever." (6.) Mr. Bhattacharyay, learned Advocate appearing for the Steel Authority advanced two-fold submissions relying on two separate judgments. The first contention was that an identical prayer in another writ petition was rejected by a learned Single Judge of this Court by a judgment and order dated 15th December, 2006. He relied on that unreported judgment in the case of Sri Subhas Chandra Sarkar and Ors. v. Steel Authority of India Limited and Ors., W. P. No.17901 (2) of 2005. (7.) His second submission was that in the case of the Direct Recruit Class -II Engineer Officers Association and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., reported in AIR 1990 SC 1607 the Apex Court held as follows:-"To sum up, we hold that: (a) Once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to rule, his seniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not according to the date of his confirmation. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., reported in AIR 1990 SC 1607 the Apex Court held as follows:-"To sum up, we hold that: (a) Once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to rule, his seniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not according to the date of his confirmation. The corollary of the above rule is that where the initial appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules and made as a stop-gap arrangement, the officiation in such post cannot be taken into account for considering the seniority." (8.) He contended that the claim of the writ petitioner is altogether bad considering the law laid down by the Supreme Court. (9.) It can at once be pointed out that the judgment of the Supreme Court relied upon by Mr. Bhattacharyay has no manner of application to the facts and circumstances of this case. In that case the dispute was with regard to seniority between the direct recruits and promo tees and therefore that judgment is distinguishable on facts. The unreported judgment relied upon by Mr. Bhattacharyay may partially be applicable to this case insofar as the claim of the writ petitioner for the benefits for the period prior to 30th June, 1997. The unreported judgment relied upon by Mr. Bhattacharyay does not even remotely apply to the claim of the writ petitioner for the benefits with effect from 30th June, 1997, by which date the Steel Authority was directed to absorb the writ petitioner by the order dated 25th February, 1997. Whereas the writ petitioner was actually absorbed with effect from 7th February, 2001 when he was allowed to join as noticed above. (10.) The question for determination is "whether the authorities can be directed to give benefits to the writ petitioner as far as money can do it for the period between 30th June, 1997 and 7th February, 2001?" (11.) To this question Mr. Bhattacharyay replied that the writ petitioner should file a civil suit. No such relief, according to him, can be granted in a writ petition. This submission, according to me, is unacceptable. The petitioner has admittedly been unjustly impoverished for the acts of the Court. It is well settled that Courts act should not prejudice anyone. Bhattacharyay replied that the writ petitioner should file a civil suit. No such relief, according to him, can be granted in a writ petition. This submission, according to me, is unacceptable. The petitioner has admittedly been unjustly impoverished for the acts of the Court. It is well settled that Courts act should not prejudice anyone. It is on the basis of the interim orders granted by the Court that the Steel Authority succeeded in inflicting the unjust impoverishment which has to be remedied ex debito justice. I am supported in my view by a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of South Eastern Coal Fields Limited v. State of M.P. and Ors., reported in 2003 (8) SCC 648 wherein Their Lordships expressed the following view:-"In our opinion, the principle of restitution takes care of this submission. The word restitution in its etymological sense means restoring to a party on the modification, variation or reversal of a decree or order, what has been lost to him in execution of decree or order of the Court or in direct consequence of a decree or order (See: Zafar khan v. Board of Revenue, U.P.). In law, the term restitution is used in three senses: (i) return or restoration of some specific thing to its rightful owner or status; (ii) compensation for benefits derived from a wrong done to another; and (iii) compensation or reparation for the loss caused to another. (See Blacks Law Dictionary, 7th Edition, p.1315). The Law of Contracts by John D. Calamari and Joseph M. Perillo has been quoted by Black to say that restitution is an ambiguous term, sometimes referring to the disgorging of something which has been taken and at times referring to compensation for injury done: "Often, the result under either meaning of the term would be the same.... Unjust impoverishment as well as unjust enrichment is a ground misrepresentation, the measure of recovery is not rigid but, as in other cases of restitution, such factors as relative fault, the agreed-upon risks, and the fairness of alternative risk allocations not agreed upon and not attributable to the fault of either party need to be weighed." The principle of restitution has been statutorily recognised in Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 144 C.P.C. speaks not only of a decree being varied reversed, set aside or modified but also includes an order on a par with a decree. The scope of the provision is wide enough so as to include therein almost all the kinds of variation, reversal, setting aside or modification of a decree or order. The interim order passed by the Court merges into a final decision. The validity of an interim order, passed in favour of a party, stands reversed in the event of a final decision going against the party successful at the interim stage. Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, the successful party at the end would be justified with all expediency in demanding compensation and being placed in the same situation in which it would have been if the interim order would not have been passed against it. The successful party can demand (a) the delivery of benefit earned by the opposite party under the interim order of the Court, or (b) to make restitution for what it has lost, and it is the duty of the Court to do so unless it feels that in the facts and on the circumstances of the case, the restitution far from meeting the ends of justice, would rather defeat the same. Undoing the effect of an interim order-by resorting to principles of restitution is an obligation of the party, who has gained by the interim order of the Court, so as to wipe out the effect of the interim order passed which, in view of the reasoning adopted by the Court at the stage of final decision, the Court earlier would not or ought not to have passed. There is nothing wrong in an effort being made to restore the parties to the same position in which they would have been if the interim order would not have existed. Section 144 C.P.C. is not the fountain source of restitution, it is rather a statutory recognition of a pre-existing rule of justice, equity and fair play. That is why it is often held that even away from Section 144 the Court has inherent jurisdiction to order restitution so as to do complete justice between the parties. Section 144 C.P.C. is not the fountain source of restitution, it is rather a statutory recognition of a pre-existing rule of justice, equity and fair play. That is why it is often held that even away from Section 144 the Court has inherent jurisdiction to order restitution so as to do complete justice between the parties. In Jai Berham v. Kedar Nath Marwari Their Lordships of the Privy Council said: "It is the duty of the Court under Section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code to place the parties in the position which they would have occupied, but for such decree or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed. Nor indeed does this duty or jurisdiction arise merely under the said section. It is inherent in the general jurisdiction of the Court to act rightly and fairly according to the circumstances towards all parties involved." Cairns, L. C. said in Rodgerv. ComptoirD Escompte de Paris: (ER p. 125) "One of the first and highest duties of all Courts is to take care that the act of the Court does no injury to any of the suitors, and when the expression, the act of the Court is used, it does not mean merely the act of the primary Court, or of any intermediate Court of appeal, but the act of the Court as a whole, from die lowest Court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter up to the highest Court which finally disposes of the case." This is also on the principle that a wrong order should not be perpetuated by keeping it alive and respecting it (A. Arunagiri Nadar v. S.P Rathinasami). In the exercise of such inherent power the Courts have applied the principles of restitution to myriad situations not strictly falling within the terms of Section 144. That no one shall suffer by an act of the Court is not a rule confined to an erroneous act of the Court: the act of the Court embraces within its sweep all such acts as to which the Court may form an opinion in any legal proceedings that the Court would not have so acted had it been correctly apprised of the facts and the law. The factor attracting applicability of restitution is the act of the court being wrongful or a mistake or error commitied by the Court: the test is whether on account of an act of the party persuading the Court to pass an order held at the end as not sustainable, has resulted in one party gaining an advantage which it would not have otherwise earned, or the other party has suffered an impoverishment which it would not have suffered but for the order of the Court and the act of such party, The quantum of restitution, depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case, may take into consideration not only what the party excluded would have made but also what the party under obligation has or might reasonably have made. There is nothing wrong in the parties demanding being placed in the same position in which they would have been had the Court not intervened by its interim order when at the end of the proceedings the Court pronounces its judicial verdict which does not match with and countenance its own interim verdict. Whenever called upon to adjudicate, the Court would act in conjunction with what is real and substantial justice. The injury, if any, caused by the act of the Court shall be undone and the gain which the party would have earned unless it was interdicted by the order of the Court would be restored to or conferred on the party by suitably commanding the party liable to do so. Any opinion to the contrary would lead to unjust if not disastrous consequences. Litigation may turn into a fruitful industry. Though litigation is not gambling yet there is an element of chance in every litigation. Unscrupulous litigants may feel encouraged to approach the Courts, persuading the Court to pass interlocutory orders favourable to them by making out a prima facie case when the issues are yet to be heard and determined on merits and if the concept of restitution is excluded from application to interim orders, then the litigant would stand to gain by battle has been lost at the end. This cannot be countenanced. This cannot be countenanced. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the successful party finally held entitled to a relief assessable in terms of money at the end of the litigation, is entitled to be compensated by award of interest at a suitable reasonable rate for the period for which the interim order of the Court withholding the release of money had remained in operation. Once the doctrine of restitution is attracted, the interest is often a normal relief given in restitution. Such interest is not controlled by the provisions of the Interest Act of 1839 of 1978. " (12.) This judgment was subsequently followed in the case of Karnataka Rare Earth and Anr. v. Senior Geologist, Department of Mines and Geology and Anr., reported in 2004 (2) SCC 783 para 10. (13.) This petition is therefore disposed of by directing the respondent authority to pay all monetary benefits to the writ petitioner commencing from 30th June, 1997 up to 6th February, 2001 including the benefit of notional service for the aforesaid period in calculating the terminal benefits at the appropriate stage together with interest at the rate of 9% per annum. To make the things clearer the respondent authorities are directed to ensure that the petitioner is restored to the same position as tar as money can do it which he would have occupied if he were given appointment on 30th June, 1997 according to the order dated 25th February, 1997 passed in CO. No. 17397(W) of 1995. In doing so the authorities shall be entitled to deduct the amount if any which the writ petitioner may have earned during the aforesaid period as a contract labourer. The respondent authority shall also pay costs of this application assessed at 300 G.Ms. Urgent xerox certified copy of this judgment, be delivered to the learned Advocate for the parties, if applied for, upon compliance of all formalities. Lafer-Mr. Narayan Chandra Bhattacharyya, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondents, prayed for stay of operation of this order. His prayer is considered and rejected.