JUDGMENT : H.K. Rathod, J. Heard learned AGP Mr. AL Sharma for appellant and learned Advocate Mr. KL Dave for respondents original claimants in this group of appeals. 2. By filing these appeals, appellant – State of Gujarat has challenged award made by Reference Court, Junagadh in Land Reference Case No. 954 of 1999 and other group matters by Exh. 132 dated 10.5.2006. At this stage, it is necessary to note that reference court has taken time of about fifteen years in deciding land reference cases. Reference Court, Junagadh has awarded additional amount of compensation in favour of claimants Rs.70.00 per square meter with other consequential benefits. Lands of original claimants situated in sim of village Keshod, Taluka and District Junagadh were acquired for public purpose. Notification under section 4 of Land Acquisition Act was published on 24.6.88. Notification under section 6 of said Act was published on 4.7.1989. After following due procedure, Special Land Acquisition Officer by his award dated 21.1.91, awarded compensation for acquired land @ Rs.175.00 to Rs.500.00 per Are for irrigated land and Rs.275.00 to Rs.350.00 per Are for non irrigated land as against claim of claimants. Therefore, being aggrieved by said award, original claimants preferred reference under section 18 of Act which was heard by reference court and reference court, vide his judgment and award dated 10.5.2006, awarded additional compensation @ Rs.70/- per square meter, excluding compensation already awarded by Special Land Acquisition Officer. Therefore, present appeals have been filed by appellant State before this court. 3. It is submitted by learned Asstt. GP Mr. AL Sharma before this Court that reference court has committed gross error in not considering question of limitation in filing of reference before reference court by claimants. He further submitted that under section 12(2), notice issued by appellant to claimant and from date of receiving such notice, within six weeks, reference is required to be made under section 18 of Act but reference was not made in time. He also raised contention before this court that it is not necessary that copy of award must have to be annexed to notice under section 12(2) of Act. He relied upon decision of Full Bench of this Court in case of Special Land Acquisition Officer, Himatnagar v. Nathaji Kachraji reported in 2002 (1) GLR pg. 462. He also raised contention before this court that it is not necessary that copy of award must have to be annexed to notice under section 12(2) of Act. He relied upon decision of Full Bench of this Court in case of Special Land Acquisition Officer, Himatnagar v. Nathaji Kachraji reported in 2002 (1) GLR pg. 462. He submitted that notice needs to contain only information regarding essential parts of award but it is not necessary that such notice should contain all details of award and copy of award is not required to be supplied along with such notice and, therefore, contrary decision of this Court has been overruled by Full Bench of this Court. He also submitted that the payment was made to claimants on 27.2.1991 and section 12(2) notice was dated 13.2.1991 and award was passed by Special Land Acquisition Officer on 21.1.1991 but reference was thereafter made on 26.8.1991 and, therefore, it was apparently clear from record that reference is time barred but that aspect has not been properly appreciated by reference court and, therefore, interference of this court is necessary. He further submitted that reference court has committed an error in not giving any reason how award passed by Land Acquisition Officer is not proper and how compensation awarded by Land Acquisition Officer is inadequate. He submitted that it is the burden upon claimant to show how compensation awarded by land acquisition officer is meager and inadequate. He further submitted that land acquisition officer has considered location of each piece of land, prevailing market rates, type of lands and other relevant factors, nature of land, area thereof, level and development of land and has considered sale instances of five years but that aspect has not been properly appreciated by reference court while granting additional compensation and, therefore, according to him, additional compensation awarded by reference court is contrary to law as well as evidence on record and, therefore, interference of this court is necessary. 4. Learned Advocate Mr. KL Dave appearing for respondents claimants has submitted that question of limitation has been properly examined by reference court while examining issue no. 3, 4, 5 and 6 at internal page 14, para 25 of award. 4. Learned Advocate Mr. KL Dave appearing for respondents claimants has submitted that question of limitation has been properly examined by reference court while examining issue no. 3, 4, 5 and 6 at internal page 14, para 25 of award. He submitted that mere contention was raised before reference court but in respect of such contention, no further details were given by State before reference court and, therefore, in absence of such details, reference court has rightly examined matter considering six months period from date of section 12(2) notice. He submitted that award was communicated to claimants on 5th June, 1991, 9th December, 1991 and 11th November, 1991 and thereafter, reference has been filed within the period of six months from date of communication and, therefore, reference court has properly examined matter and has not committed any error which would require interference of this Court. He further submitted that reference court has considered sale deed Exh. 128 which was of 1986 where amount of Rs.162.50 was considered to be sale price. Another document Exh. 129 was for the period prior to section 4 notification and sale deed was of the year 1988 where Rs.156.00 has been considered to be sale price. He submitted that reference court has relied upon sale deed Exh. 29 where vendy was examined at Exh. 43, in respect of adjoining land which was prior to three years of section 4 notification where sale deed was executed in the year 1985. So, in short, it is his submission that reference court has properly considered sale transactions produced by claimants and after considering Rs.156.00 as per Exh. 129, 50% has been deducted for development charges and thereafter, Rs.70.00 has been awarded being additional compensation and according to him, this being reasonable and just compensation awarded by reference court, matter does not call for any interference of this court and, therefore, there is no substance in this group of appeals and hence appeals are required to be dismissed with no order as to costs. 5. I have considered submissions made by both learned advocates. I have also perused impugned award made by reference court. 5. I have considered submissions made by both learned advocates. I have also perused impugned award made by reference court. Looking to the back ground of reference applications made by claimants, in response to the proposal made by Executive Engineer, R&B Department, Junagadh vide his letter dated 29.7.87 to acquire lands of claimants situated in village Keshod, Taluka Keshod of District Junagadh for public purpose, Collector ordered to initiate further proceedings vide his order dated 7.8.87 and therefore, proceedings had started and in reference to such proceedings, section 4 notification was published on 14.7.88 and thereafter, section 6 notification was published in Government Gazette on 17.8.89 and thereafter, after following procedure, land acquisition officer passed award as aforesaid against which reference were made by claimants under section 18 of Land Acquisition Act. Demand was made by claimants that they are entitled for Rs.200.00 per square meter. Award was passed by land acquisition officer on 21.1.1991. Section 12(2) notice under Land Acquisition Act was served to claimants on 27.2.1991. Reference Court has considered claim of each claimant while giving details of land in question and area of land acquired by State Authority. Before reference court, objections were filed by appellant at Exh. 11. It was contended by appellant before reference court that whatever amount determined has been determined being market price of land by land acquisition officer after considering sale transactions, area of land in question and crops and construction made upon land and also keeping in mind, potentiality of land in question and, therefore, no additional amount of compensation is required to be granted. Issues were framed by reference court at Exh. 21. Question of limitation has been framed by issue no. 3 which has been decided by reference court after considering pleadings between parties. Reference court considered award passed by land acquisition officer on 21.1.1991 and then, considering section 18(2) of Act, considered that reference has been made by claimants within six months from date of knowledge of award. At this stage, learned AGP Mr. Sharma raised contention before this court that moment notice under section 12(2) is served to claimant and payment is made, then, period of six weeks would apply and not six months as per section 18(2) of Land Acquisition Act. Relevant section 18 sub section (2) of Land Acquisition Act is quoted as under: "18. At this stage, learned AGP Mr. Sharma raised contention before this court that moment notice under section 12(2) is served to claimant and payment is made, then, period of six weeks would apply and not six months as per section 18(2) of Land Acquisition Act. Relevant section 18 sub section (2) of Land Acquisition Act is quoted as under: "18. (2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken; Provided that every such application shall be made,- (a) if the person making it was present or represented before Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award; (b) in other cases within six weeks of the receipt of notice from the Collector under section 12, sub section (2) or within six months from the date of Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire." 6. Thus, as per proviso to section 18 (2), such application shall be made if the person making it was present or represented before Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award and in other cases within six weeks of the receipt of notice from the Collector under section 12, sub section (2) or within six months from the date of Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire. 7. In view of aforesaid provisions, question required to be considered by this Court is whether any evidence is led by appellant before reference court to prove two facts. One is that section 12(2) notice indicating gist of award and whether it has been communicated to claimants by appellants in notice under section 12(2) of Act or not. As per full bench decision of this Court as referred to above, section 12(2)notice must contain information regarding essential parts of award. Scheme of Act suggests that Collector shall give notice of award to persons interested who are not present when award is pronounced. Meaning thereby, notice under section 12(2) of Act is required to be served by appellant to claimants. Naturally, at the time when award was declared by land acquisition officer, claimants had not remained present or award was not declared in their presence, this situation would require issuance of notice under section 12(2) of Act. Meaning thereby, notice under section 12(2) of Act is required to be served by appellant to claimants. Naturally, at the time when award was declared by land acquisition officer, claimants had not remained present or award was not declared in their presence, this situation would require issuance of notice under section 12(2) of Act. Second question to be considered is whether contents of such notice were giving information to claimants regarding essential parts of award or not. For that, there is no evidence whatsoever on record produced by appellant before reference court. Before reference court, it has not been proved by appellant by producing necessary evidence that notice given under section 12(2) was giving information regarding essential parts of award. Notice under section 12(2) is required to be given giving information regarding essential parts of award, otherwise, such notice is not proper as per statutory provisions contained in section 12(2) of Act. Issuance of such notice under section 12(2) of Act is having purpose, because at the time when award was declared, claimants were not remained present or award was not declared in presence of claimants, such situation is making it necessary to give notice under section 12(2) of Act giving information regarding essential parts of award. If it has not been proved by State by leading proper evidence that such notice under section 12(2) was served giving information regarding essential parts of award, it would bring the matter within the purview of proviso (b) to section 18(2) of Act. If it has not been proved that notice under section 12(2) is containing relevant portion of award, then, such notice cannot be considered to be information given to claimant by collector in respect of pronouncement of award in their favour. From perusal of impugned award, it appears to this court that mere contention was raised by appellant before reference court in respect of this question and then, no further detail has been placed on record highlighting that all such essential details were given in 12(2) notice and, therefore, considering this factual data, according to my opinion, reference court has rightly examined question of limitation while keeping in mind statutory purpose of issuing notice under section 12(2) and looking to date of filing of reference, after having knowledge of award on 5th June, 1991, 9th December, 1991 and 11th November, 1991, reference court has rightly decided issue of limitation. It is more so when appellant has not been able to produce necessary evidence before reference court in that regard. Except raising of contention about limitation, no further details were placed on record or high lighted or brought to notice of reference court by appellants and therefore, in light of what is stated above, reference court has rightly decided issue of limitation and, therefore, contentions raised by learned AGP Mr. A.L. Sharma in that regard cannot be accepted and same are therefore rejected. 8. Aforesaid aspect of limitation was considered by this court Raja Khima v. State of Gujarat, in First Appeal No. 2601 of 2009 to 2636 of 2006 decided on 14.7.2009 where same contention was raised and after considering said contention, this court observed as under in para 10 : "10. I have considered submissions made by all learned advocates appearing on behalf of respective parties. The issues have been framed by Reference Court vide Exh. 8, where, Issue No. 4(A) is a preliminary issue framed by Reference Court on basis of pleadings as to whether claimant's petition is barred by law of limitation along with other issues ? According to Reference Court, issue of limitation is required to be decided first before determining other issues in contravention. The Reference Court has considered Section 18 and Section 12(2) of LA Act. The LAO concerned has made award on 31st July 1984 and reference was filed on 21st December 1987. The Reference Court has relied upon one Ganesh Chaku resident of Khoravadha village has applied for certified copy of award on 17th November 1984 and he get it same on 15th December 1984. Thereafter, recently, he came to know the facts of award. It is also admitted position on record that respondent has not produced any notice of award under Section 12(2) of Act, therefore, no notice was received by appellant, but, as per statement made by claimant in reference case. That Ganesh Chaku has obtained certified copy of award on 15th December 1984. It transpires from judgment produced by claimant Exh. 22 when Ganesh Chaku was a claimant in LRC No. 73/85 which has been decided by District Court, Jamnagar on 30th March 1987. At this stage, it is necessary to note that Ganesh Chaku is one of claimant in LRC No. 73/85 is not included in group of these appeals or reference. It transpires from judgment produced by claimant Exh. 22 when Ganesh Chaku was a claimant in LRC No. 73/85 which has been decided by District Court, Jamnagar on 30th March 1987. At this stage, it is necessary to note that Ganesh Chaku is one of claimant in LRC No. 73/85 is not included in group of these appeals or reference. Shri Ganesh Chaku is having separate reference of LRC No. 73/85 which has been decided on 30th March 1987. Shri Ganesh Chaku wants benefit of award passed by LAO in respect of present appellant, therefore, he obtained copy of award, but, that fact was not known to any of appellant. Shri Ganesh Chaku was not examined before Reference Court. On behalf of appellant, one Shri N.L. Rathod vide Exh. 17 was examined to prove facts that Section 12(2) notice was served to claimant, for that, no materials was produced on record by respondent and there was no evidence on record produced by appellant that at the time of passing award by Collector, these appellants were remained present or their representatives were also remained present. Therefore, in absence of that document, Reference Court has committed gross error in relying upon merely certified copy of award Exh. 22 produced by appellant. Shri Ganesh Chaku is not a claimant in this group of appeals, but, he is having separate reference. Therefore, relying upon Exh. 22 considered date of knowledge of claimant 15th December 1984 and on that basis, Reference Court has come to conclusion that reference is barred by limitation. The Reference Court has also committed an error that reference which has been filed by appellant is prepared in cyclostyle manner in year of 1985, but, it has been filed in year of 1987 which suggests that appellant must have knowledge of award in year of 1985. But, for that, except presumption, there was no specific evidence produced by respondent before Reference court and claimant Shri Laxman Rna Exh. 14 was examined and no question was asked in cross-examination. The claimants have not accepted amount of compensation when Mamlatdar came for disbursing amount of compensation and raised objection that compensation is less and inadequate. Therefore, appellants have filed written objections when amount of compensation is to be disbursed by Mamlatdar to claimant. 14 was examined and no question was asked in cross-examination. The claimants have not accepted amount of compensation when Mamlatdar came for disbursing amount of compensation and raised objection that compensation is less and inadequate. Therefore, appellants have filed written objections when amount of compensation is to be disbursed by Mamlatdar to claimant. Therefore, Reference Court has come to conclusion that a moment claimant must have to make inquiry in respect of award or to apply for certified copy of award when amount of compensation is disbursed by Mamlatdar, on that occasion, claimant should raise objection. The amount of compensation received by appellant after filing reference petition with protest, but, claimants have not produced written objection raised before Mamlatdar, therefore, Reference Court has come to conclusion that no such objection was raised by appellant. The Reference Court has not believed evidence of claimant Exh. 14 and cross-examination of it that reference is made after receiving information by appellant in respect of other award passed by Collector for similarly situated claimant, therefore, prior to that, appellants have no knowledge of award declared by Collector. The appellants having knowledge after receiving information in respect of award passed by Collector in favour of similarly situated claimant and thereafter, reference has been filed by appellant. So, reference was filed within six months from date of knowledge and accordingly, evidence of claimant has not been properly appreciated by Reference Court and there was no evidence of Ganesh Chaku was held before Reference Court and Reference Court has merely presumed fact that because of Ganesh Chaku obtained certified copy of award received on 15th December 1984, therefore, from that date onwards, appellants were having knowledge of award, but, not filed reference within a period of six months. Before Reference Court, respondent has led oral evidence of Shri N.L. Rathod, Exh. 17 who has not rebutted evidence of claimant appellant. The Reference Court has only considered pleadings of parties and then presumed certain things against appellants. For that, there was no evidence on record before Reference Court. Section 12(2) notice was not received by appellant and no such record was produced by respondent before Reference Court. The date of knowledge not proved by respondents by leading proper evidence. So, reference can not be considered as barred by limitation. For that, there was no evidence on record before Reference Court. Section 12(2) notice was not received by appellant and no such record was produced by respondent before Reference Court. The date of knowledge not proved by respondents by leading proper evidence. So, reference can not be considered as barred by limitation. The appellant has made very clear case before Reference Court that a moment, appellants were having information of award passed by Collector in favour of similarly situated claimants, then, immediately, reference was filed under Section 18 on 21st December 1987 after passing nine months from judgment passed in cognate matters of Ganesh Chaku who have benefited in terms of money. The presumption of Reference Court is that claimants have received compensation under protest, but, manner in which, claimant has deposed that he has received amount of compensation after filing of these reference cases, meaning thereby, he has knowledge about order passed by Special Land Acquisition Officer prior to filing of these reference petitions, but, nowhere he has stated date of knowledge and date of which, he had applied for copy of award and obtained same. This observation made by Reference Court on Page 39 is contrary to evidence of claimant led before Reference Court as referred in Para 24 of award. The said presumption is having no legal base, because, merely, claimant has deposed that he has received amount of compensation after filing these reference cases, that does not mean that prior to receiving amount of compensation, claimants must have knowledge or having information of award. The appellant was not having any information or knowledge about award passed by Sp.LAO prior to filing these reference cases. Therefore, Reference Court has committed gross error in dismissing reference only on ground of limitation when Section 12(2) notice was not received by claimant being an admitted position between parties. The written arguments Exh. 19 is not properly appreciated by Reference Court and also not appreciated decision relied upon by appellant. The Reference Court has only relied upon date of award 15th December 1984 and petition filed on 21st December 1987 and Ganesh Chaku obtained certified copy on 15th December 1984, but, there was no iota of evidence on record that claimants were aware about or having knowledge of award on 15th December 1984 or thereafter. The Reference Court has only relied upon date of award 15th December 1984 and petition filed on 21st December 1987 and Ganesh Chaku obtained certified copy on 15th December 1984, but, there was no iota of evidence on record that claimants were aware about or having knowledge of award on 15th December 1984 or thereafter. So, fact of knowledge of appellant is not proved by respondents when respondent is raising contention before Reference Court that reference is time barred. So, a party who raised contention must have to prove by proper evidence before Reference Court, but, knowledge of appellant not proved by leading evidence by respondent before Reference Court and no documents were also produced on record to prove contentions raised by respondent before Reference Court. Therefore, there was no positive evidence produced by respondents before Reference Court that claimants having knowledge of award with a particular date and reference was filed after a period of six months. The respondent has also not produced any evidence in respect of fact that when LAO has passed an award whether claimants were remained present or not and Section 12(2) notices were served to claimants or not. In absence of this evidence, Reference Court has committed an error in presuming certain things against appellant without having cogent evidence on record." 9. Relevant decisions have also been considered by this court in para 13 to 17, 19 and 20, as under: "13. The said view has been taken by Calcutta High Court in case of Nirmala Bala Sen v. Jatindra Nath Sen reported in AIR 1977 Calcutta 205. The relevant discussion is made in Para 4 which is quoted as under: "4. The petitioner states that she did not receive any notice under Section 12(2) though it appears, it was served on her son. It will be seen under sub-section (20 of Section 45 that it is always desirable whenever practicable that the service of the notice shall be made on the person named therein. Sub-section (3) provides that if such person cannot be found service may be made on any adult member residing with him. This provision, it appears to us, does not imply that in the even of a casual absence of the person interest, the notice is to be served on any other adult member of the family. Sub-section (3) provides that if such person cannot be found service may be made on any adult member residing with him. This provision, it appears to us, does not imply that in the even of a casual absence of the person interest, the notice is to be served on any other adult member of the family. The use of the word 'cannot' in subsection (3) is of significance and it amounts in our opinion to habitual absence of the person interest at the recorded address and not to a casual absence of such person. In the facts and circumstances of the case it would appear that the notice was served on the very first attempt on the son of the petitioner and this service cannot be considered to be a proper service of the notice under Section 12(2) of the Act in the context of the discussion indicated above. We accordingly hold that in this circumstances, the question of limitation of the application under Section 18 does not arise and accordingly, the Additional Land Acquisition Officer committed error in exercise of jurisdiction in holding that the application for reference was time barred. We therefore set aside the impugned order and hold that the application under Section 18 was not time barred. We further direct that this application will not be entertained and considered in accordance with law. It however appears that the application under Section 18 suffers from lack of material particulars. The petitioner will furnish the number of items in the award in respect of which reference is sought to be made together with the names of the persons concerned against whom the relief is claimed. Such supplementary statement will be filed by the petitioner within a month from the date of arrival of the records at the office of the L.A. Collector and in default, the application as originally filed will be dealt with and disposed of by the authority concerned in accordance with law." 14. The Division Bench of this Court has also taken said view in case of Rajat Hirabhai Motibhai v. Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition & Rehabilitation, Panam Project, Godhra reported in AIR 1985 Gujarat 170. The relevant observations are made in Para 3 and 4 which are quoted as under : "3. The Division Bench of this Court has also taken said view in case of Rajat Hirabhai Motibhai v. Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition & Rehabilitation, Panam Project, Godhra reported in AIR 1985 Gujarat 170. The relevant observations are made in Para 3 and 4 which are quoted as under : "3. The question, therefore, is whether under Section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, there is an obligation upon the Collector merely to intimate about the passing of the award or he is obliged to convey the matters contained in the award by serving either a copy of the award or the essential part of it. In State of Punjab v. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum, AIR 1963 SC 1604 , the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the purpose of the notice under Section 12(2) in the context of a plea as to whether mere knowledge of the passing of the award would be sufficient as a starting point reckoned for the purpose of filing a reference application. It is in dealing with this that the Supreme Court observed : "Now, knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. These contents may be known either actually or constructively. If the award is communicated to a party under Section 12(2) of the Act, the party must be obviously fixed with knowledge of the contents of the award whether he reads it or not. Similarly when a party is present in Court either personally or through his representative when the award is made by the Collector, it must be presumed that he knows the contents of the award. Having regard to the scheme of the Act we think that knowledge of the award must mean knowledge of the essential contents of the award." This Court has expressed the same view referring to the above said decision in Rasulkhanji v. H.P. Rathod, (1975) 16 Guj LR 911. In this view, it is clear that there is an obligation on the part of the Collector not merely to intimate about the passing of the award but he has to communicate the essential contents of the award, if not a copy of the award. That has not been fulfilled in this case and we direct that this shall be done within a month. 4. That has not been fulfilled in this case and we direct that this shall be done within a month. 4. In view of what we have said about the obligation of the Collector, it follows that the time for reckoning the period for filing a reference application will commence with the service of the copy of the award and if such an application is made within time thereafter, it shall be disposed of in accordance with law." 15. The same view has been also taken by Division Bench of this Court in case of Gopalbhai Becharbhai v. State of Gujarat and another reported in AIR 1989 Gujarat 56. The relevant Para 2 is quoted as under : "2. This Special Civil Application is filed for quashing and setting aside the order at Annexure-'C' to the Special Civil Application and also to direct the respondent No. 2 in this petition to make a reference to the District Court as prayed for by the petitioner, by issuing a suitable writ, direction or order. This matter pertains to the land acquisition effected by respondent No. 2. In this matter the award was passed as early as 26-6-1981. Notice under Section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 18-9-1981. The petitioner actually received copy of the Award on 30-5- 1985. Immediately thereafter, the petitioner filed an application before the 2nd respondent, requesting him to refer the matter under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act to the District Court. This application was filed on 30-7-1985. The 2nd respondent rejected this application as time barred. While rejecting the application, the 2nd respondent has taken into consideration the date of the award, which is 26-6-1981 and the notice, which is dated 18-9-1981 and came to the conclusion that there is an inordinate delay in making the application. No doubt, the application has to be made within 6 weeks, as per the provisions of the Act. In the decision in the case of Rajat Hirabhai Motibhai v. Deputy Collector. Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation, Panam Project, Godhra, reported in ( AIR 1985 Guj 170 ), a Bench of our High Court has clearly held that the notice in law is deemed to have been served only when the copy of the contents of the Award is served on the party concerned. In this case, copy of the Award was served only on 30-5-1985. In this case, copy of the Award was served only on 30-5-1985. Hence, according to this judgment, limitation starts only from 30-5- 1985. No doubt, there is two weeks' delay in filing the application by the petitioner for the purpose of directing the 2nd respondent to refer the matter under Section 18 to the District Court. In the decision in the case of Mohan Vasta v. State of Gujarat, reported in ( AIR 1985 Guj 115 ) it has been clearly held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable for an application for reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. In view of this specific observation made by the Bench of our High Court in the above said decision, there cannot be any difficulty for respondent No. 2 to condone the delay and refer the matter to the District Court under Section of the Act, in as much as there is only two weeks' delay in this case. We have examined ourselves the reasons for such delay in preferring the application under Section 18. If only the 2nd respondent had understood the prevailing position of the law as to when exactly the limitation starts running against such a party, he would have definitely condoned the delay of two weeks, which has occurred in this case. We find that the petitioner is a poor agriculturist and has rushed up to the 2nd respondent for filing necessary application, even though there is a delay of two weeks in doing so. The reasons given by the petitioner in his application filed before the 2nd respondent, in our view, sufficiently explains the delay of two weeks, that has occurred in this case. We are satisfied that there is sufficient explanation for such a delay of two weeks by the petitioner herein and as such, following the decision referred to above, we direct the 2nd respondent to refer the matter to the District Court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, within six weeks from this date. Rule is made absolute with the above said observations. There will be no order as to costs." 16. The Andhra Pradesh High Court has also taken same view in case of Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition (S.S.P.), Kurnool v. C. Sai Reddy reported in AIR 1984 Andhra Pradesh 24. Rule is made absolute with the above said observations. There will be no order as to costs." 16. The Andhra Pradesh High Court has also taken same view in case of Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition (S.S.P.), Kurnool v. C. Sai Reddy reported in AIR 1984 Andhra Pradesh 24. Para 3 to 5 and 7 are relevant, therefore, the same are quoted as under : "3. The right to seek a reference is provided under Section 18 (2) of the Act. If a person is not present when the award was made, as per the amendment made in the year 1959 under Act 20 of 1959, the person must seek a reference within two months from the date of service of notice from the Collector under Section 12 (2). With respect to the compensation determined as payable to the persons interested, the persons who have put in a claim, have been given a right to seek a reference. In other words, the persons whose property is being compulsorily acquired for a public purpose, is entitled to seek a reference within the period stipulated under the Act which period would begin to run from "the notice of the award to such of the persons interested as are not present," It is, therefore, necessary to determine what the notice under Section 12 (2) of the Act should contain. When Section 12 (2) requires the Collector to give a notice of his award, it must necessarily mean, in our view, the award itself. Mere intimation that in respect of certain lands, certain amount is payable to a certain person, does not constitute a notice of the award. The award contemplated by Section 11 of the Act must be with reference to the date of the notification. It must contain the claim made by the claimant. If there is a dispute as to the measurement of the land acquired, there should be determination of the extent and if there is a dispute as to the amount of compensation payable for such land, it should be determined having regard to the factors mentioned in Sections 23 and 24 of the Act. If, in a particular case, the land has been taken possession of invoking the emergency provisions, the claimant would be entitled not merely to the value of the land as such but also interest from the date of taking possession. If, in a particular case, the land has been taken possession of invoking the emergency provisions, the claimant would be entitled not merely to the value of the land as such but also interest from the date of taking possession. If there is a dispute as to the person or persons entitled to receive compensation, the Land Acquisition Officer is required to determine the person or persons entitled to receive compensation and if there are more than one person he has to apportion the compensation among the persons who, according to him, are entitled to receive compensation. It is left to the discretion of the Collector under Section 29 to apportion the amount among several claimants or refer the dispute as to apportionment to the Court under Section 30. Nonetheless, these are the several matters which have to be recorded in the award and under Section 12 (2) of the Act, the Collector is required to give notice of such award. A mere statement as is referred to above on which the signatures of some of the claimants have been obtained, in our opinion, does not constitute notice of the award made by the Collector, nor does it fulfil the requirements of Section 12 (2) of the Act. 4. The learned Government Pleader Mr. Innayya Reddy, however, contended that the expression "notice of his award" envisaged by Section 12 (2) does not mean that the award itself should be served on the claimants. According to him, it is enough if the extent of the land acquired, the total amount of compensation determined as payable to the claimants, the name of the claimant entitled to receive the same are furnished and that would constitute sufficient notice of the award and fulfil the requirement of Section 12 (2). If within two months of receipt of such a notice an application is not made, then under the proviso (b) of Section 18 (2) the claimant would be dis entitled to seek a reference under the Act. We are unable to agree with this contention. In order that a person may be entitled to seek a reference, he must know on what grounds his claim for a higher amount of compensation has been rejected. He must also know whether the Collector has determined the compensation with reference to the date of the notification. We are unable to agree with this contention. In order that a person may be entitled to seek a reference, he must know on what grounds his claim for a higher amount of compensation has been rejected. He must also know whether the Collector has determined the compensation with reference to the date of the notification. If there is a dispute as to the apportionment, on what grounds his claim has been rejected or accepted only in part, as the case may be, should be made known to the claimant. Without knowing the basis on which a lesser amount is awarded, he would not be in a position to seek a reference. The law would not except the claimant to seek a reference in every case irrespective of whether the amount awarded is reasonable or not. The legislature in incorporating sub-section (2) of Section 12 could not have intended only the sub-stance of the award to be intimated to the claimants. In our view the expression "notice of the award" occurring in sub-section (2) of Section 12 clearly postulates that the award as such should have been communicated to the claimants. 5. The Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Qaisar Jehan Begum, AIR 1953 SC 1604, dealing with proviso (b) to sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Act which lays down inter alia that reference may be sought "within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award" which words are deleted by Act 22 of 1959 in the application of the Land Acquisition Act to the State of Andhra Pradesh observed that any period of limitation should commence from the date of the knowledge of the award. As to what constitutes "knowledge" the Supreme Court held thus (at p. 1607): "It seems clear to us that the ratio of the decision in Harish Chandra's case ( AIR 1961 SC 1500 ) is that the party affected by the award must know it, actually or constructively, and the period of six months will run from the date of that knowledge. Now, knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. These contents may be known either actually or constructively. Now, knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. These contents may be known either actually or constructively. If the award is communicated to a party under Section 12 (2) of the Act, the party must be obviously fixed with knowledge of the contents of the award whether he reads it or not. xx xx xx xx Having regard to the scheme of the Act we think that knowledge of the award must mean knowledge of the essential contents of the award." "On the facts of that case the Court held that merely because the claimant had filed a petition on a particular date, though it was with reference to the land acquired and the compensation paid, he could not be attributed knowledge of the award. If knowledge of the award means knowledge of the essential particulars, the present notice under Section 12 (2) does not even refer to the essential particulars, nor does it make a mention of the claim made by the writ petitioners. It does not refer to the date of taking possession nor the amount awarded towards the value of the land, or structures and the interest if any paid. It does not state what the decision of the Land Acquisition Officer was with reference to the rival claims, if any, made. In those circumstances, it cannot be said that the claimants were given notice of the award. 7. Since the notice under Section 12 (2) itself has not been issued as contemplated by the Act and the statement prepared in respect of the lands acquired referred to above, in our view, (does not?) constitute "notice of the award", the writ petitioners are not precluded from seeking a reference under Section 18 (2) beyond the period of two months from the date of the award." 17. In 2005, the Apex Court has also taken the same view in case of Parsottambhai Maganbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat and another reported in AIR 2005 Supreme Court 3464. The relevant Para 7 is quoted as under : "7. In 2005, the Apex Court has also taken the same view in case of Parsottambhai Maganbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat and another reported in AIR 2005 Supreme Court 3464. The relevant Para 7 is quoted as under : "7. This Court, therefore, held that the limitation under the latter part of section 18(2)(b) of the Act has to be computed having regard to the date on which the claimants got knowledge of the declaration of the award either actual or constructive. This principle, however, will apply only to cases where the applicant was not present or represented when the award was made, or where no notice under Section 12(2) was served upon him. It will also apply to a case where the date for the pronouncement of the award is communicated to the parties and it is accordingly pronounced on the date previously announced by the Court, even if, the parties are not actually present on the date of its pronouncement. Coming to the facts of the instant case the High Court has not rejected the plea of the appellants that they came to know of the award only when compensation was being paid to them in July, 1988. They had therefore filed the application under Section 18 of the Act on September 22, 1988 well within the period of limitation. The Reference Court recorded a finding in favour of the appellants but the High Court has reversed that finding without applying the principle laid down in Raja Harish Chandra (supra). Moreover, we find from the grounds of appeal filed before the High Court that the assertion of the claimants that they came to know of the declaration of the award only when compensation was being paid to them in July, 1988, has not even been challenged." 19. The Reference Court has merely relied upon simply knowledge which was also presumed without any legal base, but, knowledge of award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relates to essential contents of award. These contents may be known either actually or constructively. If award is communicated to a party under Section 12(2) of the Act, a party must be obviously fixed with its knowledge of contents of award whether he reads it or not. The knowledge must relates to essential contents of award. These contents may be known either actually or constructively. If award is communicated to a party under Section 12(2) of the Act, a party must be obviously fixed with its knowledge of contents of award whether he reads it or not. Having regard to scheme of Act, knowledge of award must mean knowledge of essential contents of the award. 20. The aforesaid view has been taken by Apex Court in case of State of Punjab v. Qaisar Jehan Begum reported in AIR 1963 SC 1604 . Therefore, period of limitation should commence from date of knowledge of award and knowledge has been interpreted by Apex Court in aforesaid decision at Page 1607. In facts of this case, undisputedly, Section 12(2) notice was not received by claimants and it is not a case of respondents that such notice was served/communicated to appellants. No records were produced by respondents to prove the facts that Section 12(2) notice was communicated to appellants and contents of award were communicated to appellants. So, mere knowledge which presumed by Reference Court is an erroneous finding without any proof thereof produced by respondents. Therefore, in view of aforesaid decision, Issue No. 4A which is decided by Reference Court is an erroneous decision in absence of relevant evidence and Reference Court has committed gross error in coming to conclusion that reference is barred by limitation." 10. In view of above observations made by this court after considering various decisions on the subject, according to my opinion, contention of limitation raised by appellant before this court cannot be accepted as no evidence is led by appellant before reference court for proving facts that notice under section 12(2) of Land Acquisition Act contained details of award or not. Therefore, reference made by claimants within six months from date of knowledge cannot be considered to be barred by limitation and that has been rightly decided by reference court. Reference Court has considered evidence of witness Damabhai Nathubhai. He is applicant in Land Reference Case No. 956 of 1999. His lands were acquired for public purpose of widening Junagadh Veraval Road as per State level Highway. Amount of compensation were accepted by claimants with objection. Reference Court has considered evidence of witness Damabhai Nathubhai. He is applicant in Land Reference Case No. 956 of 1999. His lands were acquired for public purpose of widening Junagadh Veraval Road as per State level Highway. Amount of compensation were accepted by claimants with objection. Lands of each claimants are situated adjoining each other and it is at the distance of only one k.m. From Keshod Nagarpalika and is adjoining to limits of Nagarpalika which is a non agricultural land. Earlier, said road was State level Highway and now, it has been made the National Highway wherein lands approaching the road from Jetpur to Veraval are being used for residential and industrial purposes as deposed by him. It was deposed by him that Keshod is having city area. There is main head quarter of business of 70 to 80 villages in it and is also having availability of air services. On that basis, sale deed produced by claimants before reference court has been considered. When land forming part and parcel of survey no. 82/2 was sold, at that time, land was sold at the rate of Rs.220.00 per square meter on 12.1.1985, as per registered sale deed no. 1337 which land was sold by Dinsukh Ravji Vanparia to Savji Govind. Reference court considered that the prices of lands are increasing day by day and another sale deed Exh. 29 dated 12.12.85 has also been considered by reference court wherein Dinsukhlal Ravjibhai Vanparia sold land to Savji Govind in consideration of Rs.19580.00, plot No. 9 ad measuring 370 square meter. Reference court also considered sale instances produced by claimants at Exh. 29 where vendy of sale deed has been examined at Exh. 43 and on that basis, reference court has determined market price of land in question. Here, it is necessary to note that before reference court, on behalf of present appellant, witness Lalabhai Kuberbhai Kharadi filed affidavit in the form of evidence at Exh. 79. At the time of said evidence, he was performing duties in office of Deputy Mamlatdar, Special Land Acquisition Officer, Junagadh. As per his say, award was passed on 21.1.1991. Considering sale transactions of surrounding lands, amount of compensation as per market price prevailing at the relevant time was determined. 79. At the time of said evidence, he was performing duties in office of Deputy Mamlatdar, Special Land Acquisition Officer, Junagadh. As per his say, award was passed on 21.1.1991. Considering sale transactions of surrounding lands, amount of compensation as per market price prevailing at the relevant time was determined. Looking to his cross examination as considered by reference court as per para 30 of impugned award, said witness for appellant is not having knowledge whether award has been made in presence of claimants or in absence of claimants. He was not having knowledge that information/details of Award communicated to claimant or not. He is not having any other information except information as per record. At the time of award, in respect of market price, except five years 'Panchsali Patrak', no other evidence has been examined. It was admitted by him that the road in question is passing from middle of Keshod. When lands were acquired, there was Nagarpalika in Keshod or not is not known to him, however, subsequently, it was said by him that it was Nagarpalika at that time. He has also no knowledge whether section 12(2) notice indicating essential parts of award or information to that effect was communicated to claimants or not. Therefore, it has not been proved by appellant before reference court that section 12(2) containing details of award or not. Therefore, reference court has, after considering certain decisions cited from both sides and evidence on record, reference court has observed that land acquisition officer has determined price of Rs.175 to Rs.500 per Are as well as Rs.275 to Rs.350 per Are and has accordingly made payment of price whereas claimants are assessing Rs.200.00 per square meter and have made demand accordingly. Then, considering objections filed by opponents and evidence produced as well as evidence on record, reference court observed that opponent has determined price after taking into consideration position of land on site and sale transactions of last five years, cultivation, construction etc., but in respect of such sale transactions, parties to such sale transactions were not examined by appellant before reference court and, therefore, truthfulness of such sale transactions relied upon by appellant for determining market price of acquired land cannot be proved and on that basis, reference court held that since appellant has not produced evidence which can be compared for determining market price and, therefore, amount of compensation determined by land acquisition officer is inadequate. Considering Exh. 128 and 129, two documents in respect of 200 square meter land, Rs.162.50 ps. Per square meter and Rs.156.50 ps. Per square meter as per Exh. 129. Reference court also considered evidence of witness Gangdas Ladhabhai at Exh. 67 that the land situated near to his land was sold at the rate of Rs.3,20,000.00 per Vigha and, therefore, he can fetch price of Rs.400.00 per square meter in respect of his land and at the time of acquisition, price of land was running at Rs.200.00 per square meter and there was no any evidence to contrary produced and proved by appellant before reference court. On that basis, reference court held that it cannot be held that the land in question is not having any utility for any purpose. Therefore, considering such evidence on record as discussed by reference court, reference court came to conclusion that claimants are entitled to Rs.162.50 ps. On that basis, reference court held that it cannot be held that the land in question is not having any utility for any purpose. Therefore, considering such evidence on record as discussed by reference court, reference court came to conclusion that claimants are entitled to Rs.162.50 ps. Being market price and deducting development charges being more than half, fixed Rs.70.00 as additional amount of compensation per square meter and reference court has considered potentiality, utility and fertility of land in question after considering evidence on record produced by claimant and fixed price at Rs.140.00 per square meter and deducting 50 per cent towards development charges, awarded additional amount of compensation of Rs.70.00 per square meter to claimants and considering observations made by reference court as discussed above, according to my opinion, reference court has rightly examined matter based on evidence produced by claimants and evidence of witness Shri Kharadi examined on behalf of appellant who was having no personal knowledge of facts except record and he was not sure whether section 12(2) notice was containing essential part of award passed by land acquisition officer or not and, therefore, according to my opinion, reference court has rightly examined matter and no error has been committed by reference court which would require interference of this court. Parties to sale transactions which were referred to and relied upon by land acquisition officer for determining market price of acquired land were not examined by appellant before reference court. Sale deeds which are considered for determination of market price of land in question were nearby date of section 4 notification and prior to award passed by Land Acquisition officer and, therefore, considering all such evidence as appreciated by reference court, it cannot be said that the award of additional compensation of Rs.70.00 made by reference court is unreasonable, erroneous and/or on higher side. Therefore, contentions raised by learned AGP Mr. Sharma cannot be accepted and, therefore, contentions raised by learned AGP Mr. Sharma are rejected. Award made by reference court is quite just, reasonable and proper and same is not unreasonable and/or on higher side and, therefore, there is no substance in first appeals filed by appellants and same are, therefore, dismissed. R&P, if any, lying in registry of this court, be sent to reference court concerned immediately. Decree be drawn accordingly. 11. Learned Advocate Mr. R&P, if any, lying in registry of this court, be sent to reference court concerned immediately. Decree be drawn accordingly. 11. Learned Advocate Mr. K.L. Dave for respondents claimants submitted that acquisition is of year 1991. More than 25 years have passed and award passed by reference court on 10.5.2006. More than three years have passed thereafter and yet compensation awarded by reference court has so far not been deposited by appellants before reference court and, therefore, appellant State Authority may now be directed to deposit amount of compensation with all consequential benefits as awarded by reference court. 12. Considering submissions made by both learned advocates and looking to facts of this case, it is directed to appellant to deposit amounts as awarded by reference court with statutory/consequential benefits, before reference Court within two months from date of receipt of copy of this order. Amount, if any, deposited by appellant in registry of this court in these appeals be transmitted to claims tribunal immediately, if it has not been transmitted so far. After realising said amounts from appellant, it is directed to reference court, Junagadh to pay entire amount to each respondent claimant as per award made by reference court by way of an account payee cheque drawn in name of each respondent claimant after proper verification without any further delay. Order accordingly.