JUDGMENT Honble Prakash Krishna, J.—The present writ petition arises out of the proceedings initiated against the petitioners under the provisions of Indian Stamp Act. The sole point for consideration is whether the instrument in question which is a lease deed is chargeable to stamp duty under Article 35 (v) or under Article 35 (vi) of Schedule 1-B of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 as amended in the State of U.P. by U.P. Act No. 9 of 2001 w.e.f. 25-4-2001. The petitioner is a society registered under the provisions of Societies Registration Act. The aims and objects of the society is to render effective services to the poor and down trodden class residing in village, in almost every field. The petitioner No. 2 claims himself as President of the society and the petitioner Nos. 3 and 4, according to their own showing, have nothing to do with the society. Mahant Subhash Chandra claiming himself chela Bajrangdas Siwaith/Manager of Sri Ram Janki Mandir situate in village Kataibna Tehsil Aurai District Sant Ravidas Nagar executed a lease deed dated 29-11-2005 in favour of the petitioners for a period of 30 years for doing plantation and gardening etc. and a sum of Rs. 12,000/- per year is payable as premium subject to increase of rent at the rate of 10% after every 10 years. The lease deed is for a period of 30 years and it also contains a clause for its cancellation and execution of de novo lease deed. Gata Nos. 96/2, 97, 172/8, 220/5, 172/2, 172/3, 172/12, 172/7, 220/4 and 221, total 10 plots, are subject-matter of the lease. The stamp duty was paid in terms of Section 2 (16) of the Indian Stamp Act as per Article 35 (a) (v) of Schedule 1-B. Notice under Section 33/47-A (as amended in the State of U.P.) was issued by the stamp department on the allegations that the said lease deed being in violation of Sections 156 and 157 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, the stamp duty is payable on the market value of the property as the said lease is void under Section 164 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act and the transferee would become bhumidhar with non-transferable right under Section 164 of the said Act. The contention of the petitioners, that the provisions of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act to determine the duty on the instrument in question i.e. lease deed cannot be invoked, has not been found favour by either of the two authorities below. The Assistant Inspector General (Registration) by his order dated 29­12-2006 found that the document in question is deficient by Rs. 5,90,286 towards the stamp duty and Rs. 4,200/- towards registration fee and a sum of Rs. 10,000/- has been levied as penalty. The said order has been confirmed in stamp appeal No. 140 of 2006-07 by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, vide order dated 23-5-2007 and the review application to review the said order has been dismissed by the order dated 4-2-2008. By means of the present petition, the petitioners have sought for quashing of all the aforesaid three orders. 2. When the petition came up for consideration before this Court, the following order was passed on 18-4-2008 : “Prima facie the document of lease treated to be conveyance for the purposes of stamp duty appears to be of doubtful. The lessor (a religious institution) does not appear to have taken permission of the District Judge for lease of 30 years. The second party has not been properly described. The status of petitioner Nos. 3 and 4 in the sale deed is not clearly given. The clause 12 (for renewal) is absolutely vague. Sri B.K. Srivastava submits that the document is in respect of the barren land and is lease, and that Section 164 of the UPZA & LR Act is not attracted. He further submits that the Assistant Inspector General (Registration) has not been conferred powers as Asstt. Commissioner (Stamps). The appellate authority has found that document violates Sections 156 and 157 and that under Section 165 if it is for more than 12-1/2 acres the consequence of void transfer by bhumidhar will follow, which are given out in Section 167. Shri B.K. Srivastava prays for and is granted a weeks adjournment to make further submissions. Put up/list on 24th April, 2008.” 3. Sri B.K. Srivastava, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in support of the present writ petition raised the following two points : (1) The Assistant Inspector General (Registration) has not been conferred power as Assistant Commissioner (Stamp). Put up/list on 24th April, 2008.” 3. Sri B.K. Srivastava, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in support of the present writ petition raised the following two points : (1) The Assistant Inspector General (Registration) has not been conferred power as Assistant Commissioner (Stamp). There being no such notification or delegation, the order passed by the said authority is void and illegal. (2) The provisions of alleged statute cannot be taken into consideration while determining the applicability of a particular Article for the purposes of payment of stamp duty. In other words, the provisions of U.P.Z.A.& L.R. Act were invoked by the authorities below to hold that the instrument in question is chargeable under Article 35(vi) of Schedule 1-B of the Act. 4. The learned Standing Counsel, on the other hand, supports the impugned orders and submits that there has been a notification conferring power and Assistant Commissioner (Stamp) also holds the designation of Assistant Inspector General (Registration). 5. Considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. Taking the questions in seriatim, it may be noted that ‘Collector’ has been defined by Section 2(9) of the Act which includes besides other things a Deputy Commissioner and any officer whom the State Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, appoint in this behalf. A notification has been issued in the official Gazette by invoking said power, conferring power of Collector on the Assistant Commissioner (Stamp) also. When these things were pointed out, the argument was thereafter given up and was not pursued. Apart from the above, no such plea was raised before either of the two authorities below. Even otherwise also, the order of the Assistant Inspector General (Registration) having been merged in the order of Chief Controlling Revenue Authority in appeal, the defect of jurisdiction, if any, stands cured. 7. The next submission is more vital. A copy of the lease deed has been annexed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition. A plain reading of the said document would show that Shebait of the temple let out the said property on an yearly rent of Rs. 12,000/- with a view to augment the income of the temple. A sum of Rs. A copy of the lease deed has been annexed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition. A plain reading of the said document would show that Shebait of the temple let out the said property on an yearly rent of Rs. 12,000/- with a view to augment the income of the temple. A sum of Rs. 50,000/- has been paid by the lessee to the lessor as a security money which would form part of rent and the said money shall be spent on the maintenance of the temple property and to meet the litigation expenses. In case of default in payment of rent, the amount of arrears of rent will be adjusted from the said security amount. Clause 4 of the lease deed provides periodical enhancement of rent by 10% after every 10 years. It has been further provided that the said lease is for a period of 30 years and will commence from 29-11-2005, the date on which it was registered. Clause 12 of the said lease provides that the parties to the agreement may mutually agree to cancel the said lease prior to the expiry of the period and a fresh lease deed may be registered, subject to fresh conditions. 8. The authorities below proceeded to hold that the document is insufficiently stamped on the ground that such a lease of agricultural land is not permissible under the provisions of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. If a lease deed is executed in violation of the provisions of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, the lessor will become bhumidhar with non transferable right if the total area of land held by him together with land held by his family including the land let out to him does not exceed 12-1/2 acres and where the total area exceeds 12-1/2 acres the provisions of Sections 154 and 163 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act will apply. Section 154 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act provides that no bhumidhar shall have the right to transfer by sale or gift any land other than tea gardens to any person where the transferee shall, as a result of such sale or gift, become entitled to land which together with land if any, held by his family will, in the aggregate, exceed 12.50 acres in Uttar Pradesh. It has been found that in the present case the lessor has executed the lease deed in violation of the provisions of Section 156 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, the consequence as provided under Sections 156 and 157 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act will ensue. It has been found that the said lease deed in view of the various provisions of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, already referred to above, will amount to a sale deed and, therefore, the stamp duty shall be payable on the market value of the subject matter of the instrument, as applicable to a deed of conveyance. 9. Challenging the aforesaid orders, the learned Senior Counsel submits that the provisions of U.P.Z.A.& L.R. Act cannot be taken into consideration while deciding a dispute under the Stamp Act. Reliance has been placed on a Special Bench decision of this Court in Banney Khan v. Chief Inspector of Stamp, U.P., AIR 1976 All 476. In this case the question was with regard to the applicability of the correct Article in respect of toll auction. The case of the auction purchaser was that such a transaction does not amount to lease as defined under Transfer of Property Act while on the other hand, the case of the stamp department was that it amounts a ‘lease’ as defined under Section 2(16) of the Indian Stamp Act and the duty was chargeable under Article 35(b) of Schedule 1-B of U.P. Stamp (Amendment) Act, 1962. The Court posed the question whether the document is a lease deed falling under Section 2(16) of the Indian Stamp Act or is a licence and also a bond under Section 2(5) of the Stamp Act and is chargeable with duty as a bond under Article 15 Schedule 1-B of the Act. In the above context, the following observations, which were relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel here, were made : “....Therefore, the Stamp Act also being an Act to consolidate and amend is exhaustive and indicates that all the former Acts on the subject of stamps have been collected and the law embodied therein altered and for determining the nature of a document, the provisions of this Act alone will be taken into consideration.” 10. Ultimately, it was held that in view of definition of ‘lease’ given in Section 2(16)(C) of the Stamp Act duty is chargeable under Article 35(b) of Schedule I-B of the Stamp Act, as amended in U.P. 11. It is an acknowledged legal position that there are two guiding principles for applicability of the Stamp Act in respect of a particular document. They are : (1) The Court is not bound by the apparent tenor of an instrument, it shall decide according to the real nature or substance of the document; and (2) The duty is on the instrument and not on the transaction. 12. To answer as to under what Article the instrument falls, the first thing to be looked into is the document itself in order to determine the character thereof. Applying the above principle of law, in my considered view, for the purposes of determining the stamp duty, the document should be taken into account and not the transaction. If the said principle is applied on the facts of the present case, on a plain reading of the instrument, evidently it is nothing but a lease deed. It has not been found by any of the authorities below that from the tenor of the document it is other than a lease deed. What would be the effect of a particular statute on such instrument is another question which does not fall within the purview of the Stamp Act. 13. Stamp Act, as pointed out above by Special Bench decision in the case of Banney Khan (supra) is exhaustive on the subject relating to chargeability of stamp duty. The word ‘lease’ for the purposes of the Stamp Act would mean ‘lease’ as defined under the Stamp Act. The lease as understood in any other Act is completely out of context for the purposes of controversy involved under the Stamp Act. 14. It is equally well settled that Stamp Act is a taxing statute. It must be construed strictly, and if two meanings me equally possible, the meaning in favour of the subject must be given effect to. (See Board of Revenue v. Rai Saheb Sidhnath, AIR 1965 SC 1092 ). 15. The stamp duty payable upon an instrument must be determined by referring to the terms of the document and the Court is not entitled to take into consideration evidence de-hors the instrument itself. (See Board of Revenue v. Rai Saheb Sidhnath, AIR 1965 SC 1092 ). 15. The stamp duty payable upon an instrument must be determined by referring to the terms of the document and the Court is not entitled to take into consideration evidence de-hors the instrument itself. In determining whether a document is sufficiently stamped with reference to its admissibility in evidence the document itself must be looked at as it stands without having recourse to collateral circumstances to be proved by extraneous evidence. 16. The word ‘instrument’ has been defined under Section 2(14) of the Act which includes every document by which any right or liability is, or purports to be, created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded. 17. In Bal Krishna v. Board of Revenue, AIR 1970 MP 74 , it has been held that the following principles govern the application of Stamp Act to the instrument : “(i) The first rule is that duty is payable on the instrument and not on the transaction. (ii) The second rule is that the Court is not (sic.) by the apparent tenor of the instrument, it is the real nature of the transaction which will determine the stamp duty. (iii) The third rule is that the Court must look at the document itself as it stands and it is not permissible to show, by evidence, any collateral circumstances. (iv) The fourth rule is that in determining the stamp duty, the substance of the transaction as disclosed by the whole of the instrument has to be looked to, and not merely the operative parts of the instrument. (v) The fifth rule is that stamp duty is payable on an instrument according to its tenor and it does not matter that it cannot be given effect to for some independent cause. (vi) The sixth rule is that there can be no objection to a device effectuating a transaction in a manner that lower rate of duty is attracted. The goodness or badness of a vendors title in no way affects the question of stamp duty. The instrument has to be stamped according to its true intent and meaning of the transaction which it represents.” 18. Keeping in mind the above proposition of law, I find sufficient force in the argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the instrument in question is a ‘lease deed’ for agricultural land. The instrument has to be stamped according to its true intent and meaning of the transaction which it represents.” 18. Keeping in mind the above proposition of law, I find sufficient force in the argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the instrument in question is a ‘lease deed’ for agricultural land. The fact that the said lease has been executed in violation of the provisions of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act will not affect the relevant Article relating to the lease for the purposes of determining the stamp duty. The said lease may be void or invalid under the provisions of U.P.Z.A.& L.R. Act or under any other Act, but so far as the Stamp Act is concerned, the instrument shall be chargeable as a ‘lease deed’. 19. In interpreting a taxing statute, it has been said time and again, that equity has no role to play. Equitable considerations are entirely out of place. Nor can taxing statutes be interpreted on any presumptions or assumptions. The Court must look squarely at the words of the statute and interpret them. It must interpret a taxing statute in the light of what is clearly expressed; it cannot imply anything which is not expressed; it cannot import provisions in the statutes so as to supply any assumed deficiency. (See Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Modi Sugar Mills Ltd., AIR 1961 SC 1047 ). 20. In view of the above discussions, the impugned orders cannot be sustained. It is held that the instrument in question was duly stamped and demand of additional stamp duty, levy of penalty and additional registration fee are, therefore, unjustified and are hereby quashed. 21. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. All the three impugned orders, referred to above, are hereby quashed. Any amount already deposited in pursuance of the impugned orders shall be refunded to the petitioners within a period of one month from the date of production of certified copy of this order. In case of default, the respondents shall be liable to pay interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of deposit to the date of actual refund. 22. No order as costs. ———