Judgment Rakesh Kumar Jain, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the order dated 06.8.2009, passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rewari, whereby an application filed for setting aside/recalling the order dated 30.8.2007, has been dismissed. 2. In brief, the facts of the case are that the appellant filed a petition before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rewari, for compensation in respect of the injuries suffered by him in a vehicular accident. The said claim petition was dismissed in default vide order dated 30.8.2007, which reads as under :- "Several calls given but none has turned up on behalf of petitioner. Statement of Shri Sanjeev Yadav, Advocate, has been recorded. He has no instruction to plead the case. Hence the petition is hereby dismissed in default. File be consigned to the record room after due compliance" 3. Instead of filing an application for recalling the said order,the appellant filed another petition on27.10.2007 in which notice was issued. When the respondent put in appearance, he brought to the notice of the Court the order dated 30.8.2007, as a result of which, second petition for claiming compensation was got dismissed as withdrawn by the appellant on 3.5.2008. Thereafter, an application dated 17.9.2008 had been filed on 18.9.2008 for recalling the order dated 30.8.2007, which has been dismissed by the Tribunal vide the impugned order dated 06.8.2009 observing thus :- "From appraisal of record in light of aforesaid rival contentions, it is amply clear that on 30.8.2007, Shri Sanjeev Yadav,Advocate, for the petitioner stated that the petitioner had taken the brief and he had no instruction to plead his case. So, same day, the claim petition was dismissed in default. The second claim petition of the petitioner was dismissed as withdrawn on 3.5.2008. The present application dated 17.9.2008 had been filed on 18.9.2008. As per provisions of Article 122 of the Limitation Act, 1963 , period of limitation for restoration of application dismissed for default is 30 days from the date of dismissal. Ratio of judgment in Khazisra v. Jagdishs Case (supra) is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case". Aggrieved against the aforesaid order, the appellant has argued that there is no limitation for filing a petition for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act and secondly, the procedure are summary in nature to which provisions of limitatiion Act are not strictly applicable.
Aggrieved against the aforesaid order, the appellant has argued that there is no limitation for filing a petition for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act and secondly, the procedure are summary in nature to which provisions of limitatiion Act are not strictly applicable. He has also argued that the appellant has suffered as many as six injuries in the accident and he should not be allowed to suffer due to lapse on the part of his counsel. 4 On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the application for recalling of the order was beyond limitation because as per Artice 122 of the Limitation Act,1963, (for short,the Act), limitation is 30 days from the date when the order is passed, which shall be counted from 30.8.2007. It is further submitted that the appellant has deliberately tried to mislead the Court by filing another application for compensation instead of filing an application for recalling the order dated 30.8.2007, therefore, it lacks bonafide. He has relied upon a judgment of this Court in Khazisra v. Jdgdish, 2000 (3) R.C.R. (Civil) 214, to contend that the application filed for recalling is not maintainable being barred by limitation. 5. I have heard learned counsel for both the parties and have perused the record with their assistance. 6. The facts of this case are not in dispute. The conduct of the appellant is such which disentitles him any relief from this Court as he tried to overreach the Court below by filing another application for compensation (even without disclosing the order dated 30.8.2007) despite the fact that earlier application for compensation was dismissed. Moreover, he had not filed any application for condonation of delay as second application had been filed after expiry of 30 days from the date of order dated 30.8.2007. In my view, the decision taken by the learned Tribunal vide the impugned order is well in accordance with law which does not call for any interference by this Court. Hence, the present appeal is dismissed.