JUDGMENT Ranjan Gogoi, J. 1. The constitutional validity, of the provisions of "the Nagaland Retirement from Public Employment (Second Amendment) Act, 2009" ('the Second Amendment Act') has been questioned in the present writ application. By the aforesaid Second Amendment Act State Government employees who have completed 35 years of service have been made liable to retire with effect from 31.10.2009 from which date, the Act has been made operative. The consequential Notification dated 20.7.2009 issued pursuant to the Amendment Act has also been assailed in the writ petition. 2. The essential facts that will be required to be noticed may be set out herein below: The Nagaland (Retirement from Public Employment) Act, 1991 (Act 3 of 1991) was enacted to come into force w.e.f., 18.6.1991 by which the retirement age of the State Government employees was fixed at 57 years instead of the prevailing age of 58 years. Alternatively, employees who had completed 33 years of service were also made liable for retirement which retirement was to be effective from the afternoon of the last date of the month in which the employee attains the age of 57 years or completes 33 years of service, whichever is earlier. The provisions of the aforesaid Act contained in Section 3thereof were put to challenge before this Court in a proceeding registered and numbered as civil rule No. 364/92. A learned Single Judge of this Court, by the judgment and order dated 18.1.1993 upheld the provisions of the Act in so far as retirement at the age of 57 years is concerned. However, in, so far as the alternative provision for retirement is concerned, i.e., on completion of 33 years of service, the learned Single Judge found the same to be arbitrary and unreasonable as the said provision would entail Government servants retiring at the age of 51 or 52 years. Considering the said age of retirement to be unreasonably low the learned Single Judge interfered with the aforesaid alternative Rule of retirement holding the same to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It will be further required to be noticed that the learned Single Judge did not consider it appropriate to grant any consequential relief flowing from the determination made. It will be further required to be noticed that the learned Single Judge did not consider it appropriate to grant any consequential relief flowing from the determination made. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge in so far as retirement at the age of 57 years is concerned as well as refusal to grant consequential relief, the writ petitioners carried the matter further in appeal, i.e., writ appeal No. 37/93. A Division Bench of this Court by order dated 6.9.1995 upheld the order of the learned Single Judge with regard to the validity of the provisions of the Act of 1991 in so far as fixing the retirement age at 57 years is concerned. However, the Division Bench took the view that on the conclusion recorded by the learned Single Judge with regard to the validity of the alternative Rule of retirement, i.e., after completion of 33 years of service, consequential reliefs ought to have been granted. The Bench, therefore, directed grant of such consequential reliefs. 3. No appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge or that of the Division Bench granting consequential reliefs was preferred by the State. Thereafter, the Act of 1991 was amended by the Nagaland (Retirement from Public Employment) (Amendment) Act, 2007 with effect from 15.11.2007. By the aforesaid Amendment Act published on 15.4.2009, the age of retirement stipulated by Section (3) of the 1991 Act was enhanced from 57 to 60 years. Thereafter, the Retirement from Public Employment (Second Amendment) Act, 2009 was passed by the State Legislature by which Section 3(1) of the Principal Act amended by the. First Amendment Act of 2007 was further amended to provide that "a State Government employee shall hold office for a term of 35 years from the date of joining public employment or until he attains the age of 60 years, whichever is earlier". The Second Amendment Act, it may be noticed, was published in the Official Gazette on 13.8.2009. Pursuant to the enactment of the aforesaid Second Amendment Act, an Office Memorandum dated 20.7.2009 had been issued requiring submission of a list of employees who have completed 35 years of service on 30.9.2009 and a second list of employees as on 31.12.2009, respectively. By another Notification dated 7.8.2009, the provisions of the Second Amendment Act, 2009 have been made effective from 31.10.2009. By another Notification dated 7.8.2009, the provisions of the Second Amendment Act, 2009 have been made effective from 31.10.2009. Aggrieved, this writ petition has been filed seeking the reliefs earlier noticed. 4. We have heard Sri. P.K. Goswami, Learned Senior Counsel for the writ petitioners and Sri. K.N. Balagopal, learned Advocate General, Nagaland for the respondents. 5. At the outset Sri. Goswami has submitted that the implementation of the provisions of the Second Amendment Act will result in retirement of approximately 4000 employees of the State Government majority of whom are Grade-IV employees. It is submitted that most of the affected employees would be retiring at the age of 53/54 years. Referring to the earlier round of litigation Sri Goswami has submitted that the State not being aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 18.1.1993 passed by the learned Single Judge in the proceeding registered and numbered as C.R. No. 364/92, the conclusions recorded in the said order of the learned Single Judge have attained finality in law and the legal effect of the said judgment has been sought to be nullified by the provisions of the Second Amendment Act which is constitutionally impermissible. A judicial verdict cannot be overreached by a legislative act, as has been sought to be done and, therefore, according to Sri Goswami, there is lack of legislative competence in the State Legislature to enact the provisions of the Second Amendment Act. In this regard, Sri Goswami has drawn the specific attention of the court to the views recorded by the learned Single Judge in para 12 of the order dated 18.1.1993. Sri Goswami has contended that it is beyond the power of the Legislature to re-introduce a similar provision as sought to be done by the Second Amendment Act without curing the defects noticed by the learned Single Judge in C.R. No. 364/92 with regard to the earlier provisions of retirement on completion of 33 years of service. In this regard, reliance has been placed by Sri Goswami on a judgment of the Apex Court in Madan Mohan Pathak and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. (1978) 2 SCC 50 . 6. In this regard, reliance has been placed by Sri Goswami on a judgment of the Apex Court in Madan Mohan Pathak and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. (1978) 2 SCC 50 . 6. Continuing, Sri Goswami has argued that before embarking upon the legislative exercise impugned in the present writ petition the State of Nagaland had filed a review petition before this Court, i.e., review petition No. 10(K)/08 seeking recall of the order dated 18.1.1993 passed in C.R. No. 364/92 in so far as the findings of the court recorded in respect of the alternative Rule of retirement on completion of 33 years of service provided by the 1991 Act is concerned. Sri Goswami has pointed out that the said review Petition was filed on the strength of a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Yeshwant Singh Kothari v. State Bank of Indore and Ors. 1993 Supp (2) SCC 592. However, the review petition was withdrawn. Apart from the fact that the withdrawal of the review petition amounts to abandonment of the attempts of the State Government to come out of the purview of the order of the learned Single Judge dated 18.1.1993 passed in C.R. No. 364/92, according to Sri Goswami, the reliance place on the judgment of the Apex Court in Yeshwant Singh Kothari (supra) is wholly misplaced. According to Sri Goswami, the issue dealt with by the learned Single Judge in the order dated 18.1.1993 passed in C.R. No. 364/92 was not before the Apex Court in the case of Yeshwant Singh Kothari (supra). Hence, the ratio of the judgment in Yeshwant Singh Kothari (supra) will not apply. That apart, Sri Goswami has submitted that the judgment of the Apex Court in Yeshwant Singh Kothari (supra) was in the context of two retirement ages emanating from the retirement policy in force in the nationalized and subsidiary Banks respectively. The views of the Apex Court in the Yeshwant Singh Kothari (supra), therefore, has to be understood in the aforesaid limited context and cannot be made applicable to the retirement of civil servants. In this regard, it has also been pointed out that nowhere in the country there exists any similar provision with regard to retirement of Government servants on completion of specified years of service. In this regard, it has also been pointed out that nowhere in the country there exists any similar provision with regard to retirement of Government servants on completion of specified years of service. Sri Goswami has additionally argued that even assuming, though not admitting, that the decision in Yeshwant Singh Kothari (supra) can be made applicable to civil servants there would still be the need for a validating Act to validate the infirmities noticed by the learned Single Judge in the order dated 18.1.1993 passed in C.R. No. 364/92 with regard to the Rule of retirement on the basis of years of service rendered. The said findings contained in Para 12 have not been sought to be cured in the present case as no validating Act has been passed. 7. Lastly, Sri Goswami has submitted that assuming that the decision of the Apex Court in Yeshwant Singh Kothari (supra) can be understood to mean that retirement by adoption of the criteria of length of service is permissible in case of civil servants and no validating Act is required for enactment of the said Amendment Act, the provisions of the Second Amendment Act will still have to satisfy the requirement of Article 13(2) of the Constitution and conform to the provisions contained in Part-III of the Constitution. According to Sri Goswami, the application of the said Rule of retirement must give rise to acceptable results consistent with the provisions of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution. The Learned Counsel has argued that from the standpoint of the employees the operation of the rule of retirement on completion of 35 years of service has affected about 4000 employees who are facing retirement at a relatively young age of 53/54 years. Retirement at such a relatively young age negates the right of livelihood of the concerned incumbents guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. Such a retirement age has also to be construed to be artificially or unreasonably low age keeping in mind the parallel enhancement of the retirement age to 60 years by the first amendment to the 1991 Act. Relying on the observations of the Apex Court in para 7 of the judgment in K. Nagaraj and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. Relying on the observations of the Apex Court in para 7 of the judgment in K. Nagaraj and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. (1985) 1 SCC 523 , Sri Goswami has submitted that retirement at a low age would indicate a palpable fallacy in the retirement policy, in which event, though the court itself will not fix a retirement age, the matter will be required to be sent for re-determination by the State Legislature. Sri Goswami has also pointed out by reference to the enclosures submitted along with the counter affidavit of the respondents that the implementation of the retirement policy introduced by the Second Amendment Act, i.e., on completion of 35 years of service will bring in utter chaos in the administration and certain departments would be denuded of the service of experienced hands as indicated in the Office Memorandum dated 20.7.2009. The provisions of the Second Amendment Act, therefore, according to Sri Goswami, are not rational and in public interest. 8. Specifically, Sri Goswami has relied on a decision of the Apex Court in General Manager, Southern Railway and Anr. v. Rangachari AIR 1962 SC 36 (paras 15 and 16) to contend that equality of opportunity in "matters relating to employment" guaranteed by Article 16(1)prohibits the State from prescribing different ages of superannuation for same or similar posts as has been done by the Second Amendment Act. Sri Goswami has relied on the observation of the Apex Court in the case of Moti Ram Deka and Ors. v. General Manager, North East Frontier Railway and Ors. AIR 1964 SC 600 (para 29) to the effect that a Government servant has a right to continue until he reaches the age of superannuation or he is compulsorily retired in accordance with the Rules in force. Another decision of the Apex Court in the case of Dr. R.N. Rajanna v. State of Karnataka and Anr. (2004) 1 SCC 249 has been placed before the court to contend that the Apex Court has laid down the law that retirement on superannuation relates to discharge from a post on attaining the age fixed for retirement which must be uniform for all or particular class or category of service holders. R.N. Rajanna v. State of Karnataka and Anr. (2004) 1 SCC 249 has been placed before the court to contend that the Apex Court has laid down the law that retirement on superannuation relates to discharge from a post on attaining the age fixed for retirement which must be uniform for all or particular class or category of service holders. According to Sri Goswami, by virtue of the Second Amendment Act, State Government employees are sought to be treated differently by application of two rules of retirement, i.e., retirement on attaining a particular age and, alternatively, on completion of the specified years of service. Additionally, according to Sri Goswami, application of the rule of retirement by reference to years of completed service has the effect of giving rise to consequences which are, on the face of it, arbitrary and unreasonable, i.e., retirement at a low age. 9. The arguments advanced by Sri Goswami have been sought to be countered by Sri K.N. Balagopal, the learned Advocate General of the State who at the outset has mentioned certain peculiar features of the State of Nagaland which, according to the learned Advocate General, satisfactorily explain the reasons as to why the provision for retirement of Government servants after completion of a specified number of years of service had to be introduced. The learned Advocate General has contended that industrially and economically Nagaland is at a disadvantageous position and apart from employment under the State other avenues of employment is strictly limited. There are a large number of educated unemployed youths in Nagaland who are anxiously waiting for their employment under the State. With the raising of the retirement age from 57 to 60 years, it became necessary for the State to ensure and provide reasonable avenues of employment to a large body of educated youth. The State Legislature, therefore, had to balance conflicting interests, i.e., of those people waiting for employment and those already in employment. Such delicate and fine balancing of the competing interests of different groups has resulted in evolution of or an addition to the retirement policy of the State which found manifestation in the Second Amendment Act which provides for retirement on completion of 35 years of service. Such delicate and fine balancing of the competing interests of different groups has resulted in evolution of or an addition to the retirement policy of the State which found manifestation in the Second Amendment Act which provides for retirement on completion of 35 years of service. The learned Advocate General has urged that in taking the final decision in the matter all the requirements stipulated by the Apex Court in K. Nagaraj (supra) have been scrupulously followed. Only those who had joined service between the age of 18 and 24 years, the number of whom is not very sizeable compared to the total employee strength of over 80,000, have been affected by the provisions of the second amendment. In this regard, Sri Balagopal, learned Advocate General has pointed out that the provisions of the Second Amendment Act will not effect all those who have joined service on attaining the age of 25 as all such employees, in any event, will complete 35 years of service on reaching the age of 60. It is only about 4,000 employees who had joined before reaching the age of 25 who will be affected. According to the learned Advocate General, the policy decision to effect retirement on completion of 35 years of service has been dictated by larger public interest. 10. The learned Advocate General has also argued that in Yeshwant Singh Kothari (supra), the Apex Court has clearly held that prescription of two rules of retirement, one by reference to age and the other by reference to years of completed service is permissible and that prescription of a length of 30 years of service for retirement is not unreasonable. There is no reason, according to the learned Advocate General, why the ratio of the aforesaid decision cannot extend to the civil servants under the State. If that be so, according to the learned Advocate General, the decision of the learned Single Judge dated 18.1.1993 passed in C.R. No. 364/92 can be legitimately understood to be per incuriam, as the judgment of the Apex Court in Yeshwant Singh Kothari (supra) was delivered earlier, i.e., on 14.1.1993. If that be so, according to the learned Advocate General, the decision of the learned Single Judge dated 18.1.1993 passed in C.R. No. 364/92 can be legitimately understood to be per incuriam, as the judgment of the Apex Court in Yeshwant Singh Kothari (supra) was delivered earlier, i.e., on 14.1.1993. The actions of the State in not immediately embarking upon a policy consistent with the judgment of the Apex Court in Yeshwant Singh Kothari (supra), according to the learned Advocate General, is again dictated by State policy and does not tantamount to the acceptance of the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 18.1.1993. Once the necessary situation had been occasioned it was open to the State Government to fine-tune its policy in the light of the permissible parameters of law laid down by the Apex Court in Yeshwant Singh Kothari (supra), as has been done by the Second Amendment Act. 11. Sri Balagopal has elaborately contended that in the above facts no question of violation of the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 can legitimately arise. In so far as the right to livelihood of the employees due to retire is concerned, according to the learned Advocate General, on the ratio of the law laid down in K. Nagaraj (supra), no employee has the right to continue for ever and such right only extends to the date on which he is due to retire by application of the correct principles for determination of the time/stage for retirement. It is also contended by the learned Advocate General that the consequences pointed out by the Learned Counsel for the petitioners following the withdrawal of the review petition filed by the State are not legally warranted, inasmuch as, in the review petition filed the State had mistakenly prayed for liberty to enact on appropriate law in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in Yeshwant Singh Kothari (supra). As the State Legislature is the supreme authority for framing of laws within its allotted sphere, according to the learned Advocate General, so long the law enacted is within its competence, the State Legislature is free to act according to its wisdom. As the State Legislature is the supreme authority for framing of laws within its allotted sphere, according to the learned Advocate General, so long the law enacted is within its competence, the State Legislature is free to act according to its wisdom. The legal competence and authority for framing of the provisions of the Second Amendment Act, according to the learned Advocate General, reasonably flows from the decision of the Apex Court in Yeshwant Singh Kothari (supra) and the judgment of the learned Single Judge rendered earlier could not have come in the way of the legislative exercise. 12. In so far as retirement at what has been contended to be at a low age is concerned, according to the learned Advocate General, the observations in para 7 of the K. Nagaraja's case (supra) was rendered in a situation where the Apex Court was considering the issue of lowering of the retirement age from 58 to 55. In the subsequent decision in Yeshwant Singh Kothari (supra), the Apex Court while approving the view taken in K. Nagaraj (supra) regarding lowering of retirement age, additionally held that retirement on the basis of completed years of service, so long as the number of years of service prescribed is mot unreasonable, does not offend Articles 14 of 16 of the Constitution. According to the learned Advocate General, in K. Nagaraj (supra) on which reliance has been placed by the Learned Counsel for the petitioners, the Apex Court had no occasion to deal with the issue of retirement on completion of a fixed tenure of service. In this regard, Sri Balagopal has further argued that in the present case, the average age of retirement on the basis of 35 years of completed service would be around 55 years, though in some cases people may retire on completion on 53/54 years of service. Relying on a decision of the Apex Court in Dilip Kumar Garg and Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. (2009) 4 SCC 753 , the learned Advocate General has drawn the attention of the court to the note of caution expressed by the Apex Court in para 15 of the judgment to the effect that "Article 14 should not be stretched too for, otherwise it will make functioning of the administration impossible". 13. (2009) 4 SCC 753 , the learned Advocate General has drawn the attention of the court to the note of caution expressed by the Apex Court in para 15 of the judgment to the effect that "Article 14 should not be stretched too for, otherwise it will make functioning of the administration impossible". 13. The arguments advanced on behalf of the rival parties having been elaborately noticed, the court must now proceed to examine the same. In the order dated 18.1.1993 passed in C.R. No. 364/92, undoubtedly, the learned Single Judge of this Court had held the provisions of the 1991 Act prescribing retirement on completion of 33 years of service as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The aforesaid view of the learned Single Judge was primarily based on the observations of the Apex Court contained in para 7 of the judgment in K. Nagaraj (supra) that though fixation of retirement age engrafts a policy decision which may not be open for scrutiny by the court, prescription of a low age of retirement may indicate an inherent fallacy in the policy which may require reconsideration either at the hands of the executive or the Legislature. As much argument has been advanced on the basis of the aforesaid findings of the learned Single Judge contained in para 12 of the judgment, it may be appropriate to set out hereinbelow para 12 of the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 18.1.1993: 12. In K. Nagaraj v. State of A.P. AIR 1985 SC 551 , the Supreme Court has, at para 7, observed that the proposition that there ought to be an age of retirement in public service is widely accepted as reasonable and rational; that fixing of age of retirement is common feature of all the public services; and that public interest demands that there should be an age of retirement from service. The observation of the Supreme Court indicates prima facie that consideration for retirement of a civil servant from service is to be made on the basis of age. Further, if every civil servant is to retire on completion of 33 years' service before his attainment of the age of 57, the age of retirement in some cases would be at an unreasonably low level. Further, if every civil servant is to retire on completion of 33 years' service before his attainment of the age of 57, the age of retirement in some cases would be at an unreasonably low level. For example, a person who enters into service at the age of 18 or 19 is to retire on his attaining age of 51 or 52. In such a case, the age of retirement would be at a low level in comparison with the age fixed at 50 and 57 for voluntary retirement and superannuation respectively. The Supreme Court in Nagaraj (supra) has also observed that if the age of retirement is unreasonable at a low level, it would be arbitrary or irrational, and that "the point of peak level of efficiency is bound to differ from individual to individual but the age of retirement cannot obviously differ from individual to individual for that reason". Considering the above observations of the Supreme Court, if a civil servant is retired after attaining the age of superannuation only, there shall be no difference of opinion, and the retirement at the age of 51 or 52, as stated above, would be at an unreasonably low level and, therefore, it would be arbitrary or irrational. 14. By the impugned Second Amendment Act, in addition to retirement at the age of 60 years, a provision has been introduced for retirement on completion of 35 years of service, which ever date is to occur earlier. The first question that confronts the court is whether introduction of the aforesaid provision in the Act of 1991 by the second amendment amounts to re-introduction of a provision which has been earlier nullified by the court without curing the defects pointed out by the court in para 12 of the judgment extracted above. 15. There can be no manner of doubt and on the authority of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Madan Mohan Pathak (supra) that so long the judgment of the learned Single Judge stands, it cannot be disregarded or ignored. 15. There can be no manner of doubt and on the authority of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Madan Mohan Pathak (supra) that so long the judgment of the learned Single Judge stands, it cannot be disregarded or ignored. The above will require the court to determine the true proposition and the correct ratio of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Yeshwant Singh Kothari (supra) in order to come to the conclusion as to whether the order of the learned Single Judge in C.R. No. 364/92 still holds the field so as to debar the Legislature from enacting the provisions of the Second Amendment Act or whether the effect of the decision of the learned Single Judge stands whittled away by the decision of the Apex Court in Yeshwant Singh Kothari (supra). 16. In Yeshwant Singh Kothari (supra), the employees of the erstwhile Bank of Indore were entitled to remain in service until completion of 58 years of age. The Bank of Indore Ltd. was taken over under the State Bank of India (Subsidiary Banks) Act, 1959, renamed as the State Bank of Indore and became a subsidiary bank of the State Bank of India. Under Section 11(1) of the State Bank of India (Subsidiary Banks) Act, 1959, an existing employee was to "hold office or service by the same tenure at the same remuneration and upon the same terms and conditions...he would have held...if the Bank had not been taken over". The aforesaid protection was to continue "unless and until his employment...is terminated or until his remuneration or other terms and conditions of service are revised or altered by the corresponding new bank under, or in pursuance of any law, or in accordance with any provision which, for the time being governs his service." 17. Under the State Bank of Indore (Officers) Service Regulations, 1979, particularly. Regulation 19(1) framed under Section 63(1) of the Act of 1959, an officer was to retire on attaining the age of 58 years or upon completion of 30 years of service which ever occurs first. The validity of the provisions contained in regulation 19(1) of the 1979 Regulations was the issue before the Apex Court. 18. Regulation 19(1) framed under Section 63(1) of the Act of 1959, an officer was to retire on attaining the age of 58 years or upon completion of 30 years of service which ever occurs first. The validity of the provisions contained in regulation 19(1) of the 1979 Regulations was the issue before the Apex Court. 18. While considering the question whether the alternative rule of retirement violated Article 14 of the Constitution, the Apex Court took the view prescribing the age of retirement at 58 years and, at the same time, "permitting retirement on the completion of 30 years of service, whichever occurs earlier, is in keeping with the policy of reckoning a stated number of years of office attaining the crest, where after inevitably is the descent, justifying retirement. In this context 30 years' period of active service is not a small period for gainful employment, or an arbitrary exercise to withhold the right to hold an office beyond thirty years, having not attained 58 years of age." 19. In para 12 of the aforesaid judgment, the Apex Court considered one of its earlier decision in B.S. Yadav v. Chief Manager, Central Bank of India (1987)3 SCC 120 , to the effect that prescribing 60 and 58 years as the age of retirement for employees who were already in the Bank prior to nationalization and those who had joined after nationalization is consistent with Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution. On the strength of the judgment of the Apex Court in B.S. Yadav (supra), an argument was advanced to the effect that the retirement age at 58 being a consistent policy for public employment, curtailment of the same by prescription of 30 years of service would be violative of the equality clause enshrined by the Constitution. The Apex Court negatived the aforesaid argument by understanding the history behind nationalization of the Banks which justified placing of the nationalized banks and the subsidiary banks on two different planks. 20. The ratio of the decision in Yeshwant Singh Kothari (supra) is contained in para 11 of the judgment. Retirement on attaining a particular age or alternatively on completion of a specified number of years of service, so long the number of years prescribed is not unreasonably small, can form a legally valid basis for framing of a retirement policy. 20. The ratio of the decision in Yeshwant Singh Kothari (supra) is contained in para 11 of the judgment. Retirement on attaining a particular age or alternatively on completion of a specified number of years of service, so long the number of years prescribed is not unreasonably small, can form a legally valid basis for framing of a retirement policy. This, to cur mind, is the true ratio of the judgment in Yeshwant Singh Kothari (supra). The discussions in para 12 of the judgment, particularly, those pertaining to uniform retirement age of 58 was in the context of the facts of the case before the Supreme Court and the view taken with regard to the difference between a nationalized bank and a subsidiary bank has to be confined to the facts of the particular case. If we are correct in identifying the true ratio of the judgment in Yeshwant Singh Kothari (supra), we do not see any reason why the same cannot be per se made applicable to the employees under the State, if the State so decides. In this connection, we must also keep in mind that the observations of the Apex Court in para 7 of the judgment in Nagaraj (supra) with regard to the low age of retirement was rendered in a situation where the Apex Court was considering the question of reduction of the retirement age from 58 to 55. In Nagaraj (supra), the Apex Court had no occasion to deal with the alternative rule of retirement, namely,, upon completion of a specified number of years of service. In fact, we may very well take the view that what has been introduced by the second amendment by prescription of the alternative Rule of retirement is not a age of retirement but retirement on completion of 35 years of service which is an entirely independent yardstick. Retirement of an individual at the age of 53/54 years by adoption of the said yardstick is a consequence not of attaining a particular age but of completing the prescribed period of service. 21. There is yet another aspect of the matter which must not escape our attention. The judgment in Yeshwant Singh Kothari (supra) was delivered on 14.1.1993 whereas the order of the learned Single Judge in C.R. No. 364/92 is dated 18.1.1993. 21. There is yet another aspect of the matter which must not escape our attention. The judgment in Yeshwant Singh Kothari (supra) was delivered on 14.1.1993 whereas the order of the learned Single Judge in C.R. No. 364/92 is dated 18.1.1993. If the true ratio of the judgment in Yeshwant Singh Kothari (supra) is what has been indicated by us above, the subsequent judgment of the learned Single Judge had been rendered per incuriam and, therefore, the enactment of the Second Amendment Act prescribing retirement on completion of 35 years of service does not lack legislative competence. For the same reason, there would be no necessity of any validation Act curing the defects recorded in para 12 of the order of the learned Single Judge passed in C.R. No. 364/92 prior to enactment of the Second Amendment Act. The argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners that the Second Amendment Act infringes Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution by prescribing a low retirement age has already been dealt with in the discussions that have preceded. We have also held that prescription of length of service of 35 years cannot be said to be unreasonably short or small to bring about a situation of arbitrariness or unreasonableness, as has been contended on behalf of the petitioners. We have also held that retirement at the age of 53/54 years on completion of 35 years of service is a consequential effect of completion the prescribed period of service. It will now be necessary for us to consider whether introduction of the rule of retirement on completion of 35 years of service has the effect of causing any discrimination amongst similarly situated employees of the State Government. 22. Article 14 prohibits hostile discrimination amongst the members of the same class. Equals cannot be treated unequally and, conversely, unequals cannot be treated equally. The rule of retirement on completion of 35 years of service has relevance to employees who have joined service at an age below 25 years and the prescription with regard to retirement at the age of 60 years is in respect of the persons joining service at the age of 25 and thereafter. The rule of retirement on completion of 35 years of service has relevance to employees who have joined service at an age below 25 years and the prescription with regard to retirement at the age of 60 years is in respect of the persons joining service at the age of 25 and thereafter. The above two categories of employees, though performing similar duties and may be identically placed otherwise, can still be reasonably understood to form two different classes to whom application of two rules of retirement will not violate Article 14. The doctrine of equality enshrined by Article 14 of the Constitution is not necessary to be nor it is capable of being applied with mathematical exactitude and some amount of advantage or dis-advantage to persons who may seemingly appear to be equally placed can occur in a given situation. In the present case, persons joining Government service after 25 years of age, say at 30 or 35 years, though may retire at 60, will have a lesser period of service than the persons who may retire at an earlier age by virtue of the rule of retirement on completion of 35 years of service. Each and every instance of such advantage and corresponding dis-advantage will not attract Article 14. In fact, uniformity to the extent possible, thereby, enhancing the concept of equality has been sought to be brought in by the Second Amendment Act by prescribing retirement on completion of 35 years of service. 23. The judgments of vintage placed before the court, i.e., Rangachari (supra) and Moti Ram Deka (supra) have been repeatedly acknowledged to have laid the foundation of the present horizons of Articles 14 and 16. But we fail to see how the propositions laid down either in Rangachari (supra) or Moti Ram Deka (supra) can have any real application to the present case. That apart, the materials placed before the court along with the counter affidavit of the respondent State indicates that the policy decision with regard to retirement on completion of 35 years of service brought about by the Second Amendment Act was preceded by an elaborate and in depth study of the possible consequences of introduction of the said policy and the same is the result of conscious attempt to balance different shades of opinion and interests. 24. 24. For all the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any invalidity or infirmity in the enactment of the Nagaland Retirement from Public Employment (Amendment) Act, 2009 or the consequential actions taken pursuant thereto. 25. We, therefore, decline to interfere and are of the view that this writ petition deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, we dismiss the same. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Petition dismissed