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Gujarat High Court · body

2009 DIGILAW 762 (GUJ)

PRAFULCHANDRA V PATEL v. STATE BANK OF INDIA

2009-12-18

JAYANT PATEL

body2009
JUDGMENT JAYANT PATEL, J. The learned Counsel appearing for both the sides are heard for final disposal. Hence, Rule. 2. The short facts of the case appear to be that the respondent Bank has filed O.A. No.156 of 2001 against the petitioners and respondents No.2 to 5 for recovery of the amount of Rs.37,29,68,080.84 with accrued interest and other consequential reliefs. It appears that in the said O.A., simultaneously an application was submitted for interim injunction by the Bank, who was plaintiff therein for the relief, inter alia, to restrain the defendants therein, including the petitioners herein, including the transfer of the property, the appointment of the commissioner and it was also prayed to restrain the respondent Nos.2 to 7, including the petitioners herein from leaving India without prior permission of the Hon'ble Tribunal and other consequential reliefs. 3. On 23.4.2001, the Tribunal granted interim injunction with respect to the mortgaged immovable properties and hypothecated assets, however, did not grant any ex parte interim injunction for restraining the defendants Nos.2 to 7 therein from leaving India, etc. The matter remained therein for about six years and more and on 6.8.2007. The Bank moved another application Ex.44 for the relief, inter alia, to restrain defendants No.2, 4 to 7 therein to surrender their passports and not to leave India, without prior permission of the Court. It appears that ultimately vide order dated 4.9.2009, the Tribunal below the said Application restrained defendants No.2 to 7 not to leave India without prior permission of the Tribunal. The Tribunal also granted prayer at Clause 'C' of the Application, restraining defendants No.2 to 7 from transferring or disposing or alienating or parting with, in any manner, their immovable properties, more particularly described in the schedule. It appears that the petitioners carried the matter in appeal being Misc. Appeal No.237 of 2009 and also applied for interim stay. However, D.R.A.T., in appeal, vide order dated 8.10.2009 observed that the appellants-defendants have not approached the Tribunal for seeking the permission to leave the country, and further observed that they may approach before the Tribunal justifying the travel abroad and seek permission accordingly and if they do not get permission, they may approach D.R.A.T., and the matter was stood over to 18.11.2009. It is under these circumstances, the present petition by the petitioners for challenging the legality and validity of the order passed by D.R.A.T., as well as the order passed by the D.R.T. It may be recorded that the learned Counsel for the petitioners declared that the petitioners are not objecting to the interim injunction granted by the Tribunal vide order dated 4.9.2009 and the challenge is limited to the order for restraining the petitioners from leaving India, without prior permission of the Tribunal. 4. Heard Mr. Vakil, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners and Mr. Parikh, learned Counsel for respondent Bank. 5. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that there is no power with the Tribunal to grant interim injunction, restricting the travel by the petitioners, whereas the learned Counsel for the respondent bank contended that there is power with the Tribunal to grant injunction and he also submitted that all types of injunctions can be granted, which are available for exercise of the power to the Civil Court as per C.P.C. Therefore, it was submitted that the order passed by the Tribunal for granting interim injunction, restraining concerned defendants therein, who are petitioners herein from leaving the country without prior permission is legal and valid. 6. Therefore, the only aspect which deserves to be considered is as to whether the DRT exercising the powers under the Recovery of the Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') has the power to grant injunction of such type and if yes, under what circumstances. 7. In order to examine the aforesaid aspects, reference to certain provisions of the Act read with the relevant Rules known as Debt Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993 may be relevant. Chapter III of the Act provides for the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal. Chapter IV provides for the procedure of the Tribunal and Section 19 thereof provides for various procedures, which includes the substantive exercise of power by the Tribunal by way of interim order or for the interregnum period, as the case may require. 8. Chapter III of the Act provides for the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal. Chapter IV provides for the procedure of the Tribunal and Section 19 thereof provides for various procedures, which includes the substantive exercise of power by the Tribunal by way of interim order or for the interregnum period, as the case may require. 8. Sub-sections (12) to (18) of Section 19 of the Act read as under :- (12) The Tribunal may make an interim order (whether by way of injunction or stay or attachment) against the defendant to debar him from transferring, alienating or otherwise dealing with, or disposing of, any property and assets belonging to him without the prior permission of the Tribunal. (13)(A) Where, at any stage of the proceedings, the Tribunal is satisfied, by affidavit or otherwise, that the defendant, with intent to obstruct 18 or delay or frustrate the execution of any order for the recovery of debt that may be passed against him, -- (i) is about to dispose of the whole or any part of his property; or (ii) is about to remove the whole or any part of his property from the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; or (iii) is likely to cause any damage or mischief to the property or affect its value by misuse or creating third party interest, the Tribunal may direct the defendant, within a time to be fixed by it, either to furnish security, in such sum as may be specified in the order, to produce and place at the disposal of the Tribunal, when required, the said property or the value of the same, or such portion thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the certificate for the recovery of the debt, or to appear and show cause why he should not furnish security. (B) Where the defendant fails to show cause why he should not furnish security, or fails to furnish the security required, within the time fixed by the Tribunal, the Tribunal may order the attachment of the whole or such portion of the properties claimed by the applicant as the properties secured in his favour or otherwise owned by the defendant as appears sufficient to satisfy any certificate for the recovery of debt. 14. The applicant shall, unless the Tribunal otherwise directs, specify the property required to be attached and the estimated value thereof. 15. 14. The applicant shall, unless the Tribunal otherwise directs, specify the property required to be attached and the estimated value thereof. 15. The Tribunal may also in the order direct the conditional attachment of the whole or any portion of the property specified under subsection (14). 16. If an order of attachment is made without complying with the provisions of sub-section (13), such attachment shall be void. 17. In the case of disobedience of an order made by the Tribunal under subsections (12), (13) and (18) or breach of any of the terms on which the order was made, the Tribunal may order the properties of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached an may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding three months, unless in the meantime the Tribunal directs his release. 18. Where it appears to the Tribunal to be just and convenient, the Tribunal may, by order -- (a) appoint a receiver of any property, whether before or after grant of certificate for recovery of debt; (b) remove any person from the possession or custody of the property; (c) commit the same to he possession, custody or management of the receiver; (d) confer upon the receiver all such powers, as to bringing and defending suits in the courts or filing and defending application before the Tribunal and for the realization, management, protection, preservation and improvement of the property, the collection of the rents and profits thereof, the application and disposal of such rents and profits, and the execution of documents as the owner himself has, or such of those powers as the Tribunal thinks fit; and (e) appoint a Commissioner for preparation of an inventory of the properties of the defendant or for the sale thereof.” 9. The aforesaid shows that the Tribunal has the power to make an interim order, by way of injunction or stay or attachment against the defendants to debar them from transferring, alienating or otherwise dealing with or disposing of any properties or assets belonging to them without prior permission of the Tribunal and as per Sub-section (13), the Tribunal has also power to call upon the defendants to furnish security or to produce the properties or the value thereof, which may be sufficient to satisfy the certificate of the recovery of debts or to show cause as to why such security should not be ordered. The same is coupled with the circumstances that if there is failure to furnish security the Tribunal may order attachment of the whole or portion of the property claimed by the applicant. 10. Order of the Tribunal is fully made enforcible inasmuch as the person guilty of the disobedient or the breach would be liable to be detained in Civil prison or his property may be attached. 11. Section 22 of the Act provides for further procedural powers with the Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal. The same reads as under :- “22. Procedure and Powers of the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal :- (1) The Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and, subject to the other provisions of this Act and of any rules, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall have powers to regulate their own procedure including the places at which they shall have their sittings. (2) The Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall have, for the purposes of discharging their functions under this Act, the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely :-- (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents; (c) receiving evidence on affidavits; (d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or (e) reviewing its decisions; (f) dismissing an application for default or deciding it ex parte; (g) setting aside any order of dismissal of any application for default or any order passed by it ex parte; (h) any other matter which may be prescribed. (3) Any proceeding before the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228, and for the purposes of section 196, of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) and the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil court for all the purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).” 12. The aforesaid shows that the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal for discharging their functions under the Act will have the same power as vested to the Civil Court while trying the suit, but in respect of the matters specified in Clause 'A' to 'H'. Further, Rule 18 of the aforesaid Rules, which may also be relevant and the same reads as under:- “18. Orders and directions in certain cases.-The Tribunal may make such orders to give such directions as may be necessary or expedient to give effect to its orders or to prevent abuse of its process or to secure the ends of justice.” 13. Therefore, Rule 18 does provide for the enabling power with the Tribunal to issue the directions, as may be necessary or expedient to give effect to its order or to prevent abuse of its process or to secure the ends of justice. 14. Therefore, Rule 18 does provide for the enabling power with the Tribunal to issue the directions, as may be necessary or expedient to give effect to its order or to prevent abuse of its process or to secure the ends of justice. 14. On conjoint reading of the powers of the Tribunal, it appears that the powers of the Tribunal are expressly provided under Sub-section (12) onwards of Section 19 of the Act and all such powers pertain to the property disposal or alienation or attachment of the property of the defendants and it also provides for documents; prohibiting the defendants from disposal of whole or all or any part of their property or to restrain the defendants to remove all or whole or any part of the property from the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal or to restrain the defendants to cause any damage or mischief to such properties or to restrain the misuse of the properties or the creation of third party interest. All the aforesaid go to show that such powers are essentially to have the command and control over all the properties of the defendants against whom the suits are filed and such powers further extend to the order against third party, in case if the properties of the defendants are in possession of third party like a garnishee order. The purpose behind vesting of such power with the Tribunal is to ensure that in the event the final order is passed in the proceedings before the Tribunal holding the defendants liable to pay the amount, such can be realized from all the properties of the defendants, whether in possession of the defendants or in possession of the third party, and it is not intended to control the physical movement of the defendants beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. It is only if the Tribunal, for the valid reasons, prima facie, finds that the presence of the defendants, if not secured, would result into an obstruction for the execution of the decree/certificate against the properties of the defendants or the Tribunal, for the valid reasons, prima facie, finds that allowing the defendants to go beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is to result into mischief or damage to the property or the defendants are to create any obstruction in execution of the decree/certificate, which may be issued by the Tribunal, etc., are the circumstances, in which the Tribunal may exercise the power for grant of injunction. But be it noted that it is the command and control of the properties of the defendants by the Tribunal pending the petition matters and the relevant consideration while exercising the power of injunction and not to control and command the person or the physical body of the person by putting him in confinement resulting to create no physical movement beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Tribunal or beyond the limits of the country. It also deserves to be recorded that in order to have the command and control over the properties of the defendants the powers are extended to the properties in possession of third party upon satisfactory evidence produced before the Tribunal. Therefore, if the essential purpose is to control and command the properties of the defendants, the Tribunal can appoint the receiver for taking possession of the properties from the defendants if their possession, it can also, in a given case, authorize the receiver to take possession of the properties belonging to the defendants if it is satisfactorily shown to the Tribunal that the properties belong to the defendants, but are in possession of the third party. It can injunct such third party for such properties of the defendants. 15. In normal circumstances, when a suit is for recovery of the amount, it is a matter of civil liability and after the decree or the certificate, if the person concerned is not having any property from where the money can be recovered, he cannot be put into civil prison by controlling his physical movement just for the pleasure of the judgement creditor. It is only in case where, though judgement debtor is having property and is not allowing the execution of the decree/certificate against such properties or is creating any obstruction therein, the powers may be exercised by the Court or the Tribunal which has passed the decree/certificate but the money is not to be realized from the physical body of the defendants by execution of the decree/certificate. The issuance of the process for securing the presence by the Court or the Tribunal in civil proceedings are different than that of the Court or the Tribunal in criminal proceedings. In criminal proceedings, the ultimate outcome, may be for conviction with or without fine and upon failure to pay fine, it may result into further more conviction or imprisonment. Therefore, in such criminal proceedings when a trial takes place, it may result into effecting or controlling the physical movement of the accused concerned. Such will not be the case in the civil proceedings for recovery of the amount or money suits. It may be that in the civil suits for enforcement of the contract or injunctions against the defendants personally at the ultimate outcome of the suit the presence of the defendants may be required like decree for specific performance of contract, decree for restitution of conjugal rights, decree for specific performance of contract of personal in nature, etc., but in such circumstances also after the decree either the consequence may arise for further civil liability or otherwise, if the decree or the certificate is not executed the executing Court may appoint the receiver for enforcement of such contract, but in none of such cases, as an outcome of the decree/certificate in civil proceedings, the physical movement of the defendants is controlled or confined. It is only during the course of the trial if there is defiance to the injunction by the defendants or the order of the Court or the Tribunal is not respected or abide by any defendants, the Court may ensure the compliance thereof by the means provided under the law, if required, by applying force and such powers may extend to punish such defendants by putting him into the civil prison or otherwise and if a case is made out, such defendants may also be punished as per law. All the aforesaid in civil proceedings are not for ventilation of the rights of the plaintiffs, who have to recover the money, but are for maintaining the enforcement of the orders of the Court in the process of trial of the suit or to uphold the authority, dignity of the power of the Court or the Tribunal. Such in no case can be equated with the rights of the plaintiff to recover the amount may be in capacity as the mortgagee of the property of the defendants or otherwise. 16. The attempt was made by the learned Counsel for respondent Bank to contend that the Tribunal enjoys all powers of the Civil Court under Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as “CPC” for short) in the matter of grant of injunction and for preservation of properties of the defendants. It was submitted that Order 38 Rule 1 provides for enabling power with the Court to issue a warrant of arrest against the defendants and consequently the power to issue injunction restraining the defendants from leaving the country or the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. Therefore, the Tribunal enjoys such power as that of the Civil Court under CPC. It was submitted that under these circumstances the order passed by the Tribunal could not be said as unwarranted or without authority. 17. The contention that the Tribunal enjoys all powers of the Civil Court or of the Court under CPC cannot be accepted in toto as sought to be canvassed. Firstly the Tribunal cannot be said to have all trapping of the Court, nor the Tribunal can be said as a Court even if all the provisions of RDB Act are considered. At this stage, it would be profitable to advert the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Nahar Industrial Enterprises Limited V. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, reported in (2009) 8 SCC, 646, and more particularly the observations made at paragraphs 89, 91, and 92, which reads as under:- 89. The Tribunal could have been treated to be a civil court provided it could pass a decree and it had all the attributes of a civil court including undertaking of a full-fledged trial in terms of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and/or the Evidence Act. The Tribunal could have been treated to be a civil court provided it could pass a decree and it had all the attributes of a civil court including undertaking of a full-fledged trial in terms of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and/or the Evidence Act. It is now trite law that jurisdiction of a court must be determined having regard to the purpose and object of the Act. If the Parliament, keeping in view the purpose and object thereof thought it fit to create separate tribunal so as to enable the banks and the financial institutions to recover the debts expeditiously wherefor the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure as also the Evidence Act need not necessarily be resorted to, in our opinion, by taking recourse to the doctrine of purposive construction, another jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon it so as to enable this Court to transfer the case from the civil court to a tribunal. 90. xxx xxx xxx 91. Would the tribunal answer the description of the civil court must be considered having regard to the provisions of the Act constituting civil court as also the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure? 92. We have held that the Tribunals are neither civil courts nor courts subordinate to the High Court. The High Court ordinarily can be approached in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 or its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercises such jurisdiction not only over the courts but also over the Tribunals. Appellate tribunals have been constituted for determining the appeals from judgments and orders of the Tribunal. Thereafter, the Apex Court has concluded at paragraphs 96, 97 and 98 with different facets and has recorded the final hearing as under :- “The Tribunal, therefore, would not be a Civil Court.” 18. It is by now well settled that CPC is not only a law providing for the procedures of the Civil Court, but it is also providing for substantive powers with the Civil Court. The provisions of Order 38 Rule 1 of CPC are required to be considered in light of substantive powers vested to Civil Courts by virtue of Section 94 of CPC. There are no such substantive powers vested by the Act with Tribunal like Section 94 of CPC. The provisions of Order 38 Rule 1 of CPC are required to be considered in light of substantive powers vested to Civil Courts by virtue of Section 94 of CPC. There are no such substantive powers vested by the Act with Tribunal like Section 94 of CPC. It is true that Rule 18 provides for enabling powers with the Tribunal to give effect to its orders or to prevent abuse of its process or to secure the ends of justice, but such powers are not conferred by the provisions of RDB Act like Section 94 of CPC read with Order 38 Rule 1 of CPC. Further, such powers under Rule 18, even if considered as to secure ends of justice, they are to be exercised for the purpose of grant of injunction and prohibitory order by the Tribunal as an incidental power to the substantive power so vested under Sections 19 and 22 of the Act. All powers under Section 19 and 22 of the Act, as observed earlier, relates to the command and control over the properties of the defendants, may be in possession of the defendants or in possession of third party belonging to the defendants, but such powers are not for controlling or commanding the physical movement of the defendants, unless the Tribunal finds that the defendants are creating obstruction to the Tribunal or its officers to have the command or control over the properties of the defendants, may be in possession of the defendants or may be in possession of the third party. It is by now well settled that the residuary power can neither be exercised against the express provisions of the statute, nor can be exercised beyond the specified power provided by he statute. Therefore, power under Rule 18 can be read only as an incidental power to the substantive power under Sections 19 and 22 of the Act of the Tribunal and not for absolutely controlling the physical movement of any of the defendants. Under these circumstances, the contention raised on behalf of the respondent Bank cannot be countenanced. 19. Therefore, power under Rule 18 can be read only as an incidental power to the substantive power under Sections 19 and 22 of the Act of the Tribunal and not for absolutely controlling the physical movement of any of the defendants. Under these circumstances, the contention raised on behalf of the respondent Bank cannot be countenanced. 19. The learned Counsel for the petitioner did rely upon the decision of Delhi High Court in C.M. (M) No.505/1999 and C.M. No.2538/1999 in the case of A.S. Mittal v. P.O., Debt Recovery Tribunal & Ors dated 21.11.2003 holding that the Tribunal had no authority to either impound the passport of the petitioner or to put restrictions on the travel of the defendant. He also relied upon another decision of the Division Bench of Delhi High Court in the case of Sanjeev R. Apte v. I.F.C.I. Limited and Ors in Writ Petition No.9576 of 2007 decided on 21.5.2009, reported at (2009)3 PLR, 44, wherein the Division Bench, based on the earlier view of the Hon’ble Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi, in the case of A.S. Mittal (supra), has observed that the Tribunal has no such powers to grant injunction to impose restriction on travelling and passport of the defendant. In both the decisions, there is no elaborate discussion on the scope and ambit of the power of the Tribunal under Section 19 read with Section 22 read with Rule 18 read with powers of grant of injunction by the Civil Court in Civil Proceedings or by Criminal Court in Criminal Proceedings. Further in view of the reasons recorded herein, it appears to the Court that the powers under Rule 18 can be exercised as an incidental power to the substantive power under Section 19 read with Section 22 of the Act to have the command and control over the properties of the defendants may be in possession of the defendants or in possession of third party. If such a course is obstructed by the defendants, the Tribunal may exercise the power to control physical movement of the defendants but not for controlling the physical movement of the defendants in absolute, either by granting injunction or by directing the use of the passport or deposit of the passport or otherwise. 20. If such a course is obstructed by the defendants, the Tribunal may exercise the power to control physical movement of the defendants but not for controlling the physical movement of the defendants in absolute, either by granting injunction or by directing the use of the passport or deposit of the passport or otherwise. 20. So far as the command and control over the passport is concerned, it is by now well settled that the passport even if to be impounded, it has to be under the Passport Act and the Court, trying criminal case cannot so order for impounding of the passport directly. The reference may be made to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Suresh Nanda v. C.B.I., reported in AIR 2008 SC, 414. 21. In view of the aforesaid observations, following conclusions deserve to be recorded :- (a) The Tribunal has no power to control the physical movement of the defendants in absolute, merely because suit for recovery or the proceedings for recovery of the amount is filed, may be in capacity as the mortgagee by the plaintiff. (b) The Tribunal under RDB Act has power to command and control the properties of the defendants, may be in its possession or in possession of third party, and the powers are to be used for grant of injunction for such purpose. It is only when the Tribunal satisfactorily finds that the defendant is obstructing to the Tribunal or its officers to have command and control over the properties of the defendant may by in possession of the defendant or may be in possession of third party, the powers may be exercised by the Tribunal to control and restrict physical movement of the defendant, but not otherwise. (c) The Tribunal has no power in absolute to prohibit the physical movement of the defendants beyond its territorial jurisdiction or to prohibit the defendants from leaving the country. (d) The Tribunal has no power to direct impounding of the passport. 22. (c) The Tribunal has no power in absolute to prohibit the physical movement of the defendants beyond its territorial jurisdiction or to prohibit the defendants from leaving the country. (d) The Tribunal has no power to direct impounding of the passport. 22. If the impugned order is examined in light of the observations, discussions and conclusions, there is absolutely no satisfaction recorded by the Tribunal, even at the prima facie stage, that any obstruction is being created by the defendants in allowing the Tribunal or its officers to have control or command over the properties of the defendant, may be in possession of the defendants or in possession of third party. The only reason recorded by the Tribunal for grant of injunction restraining the defendants from leaving India without prior permission of the Tribunal reads as under:- “Undisputedly, the debt due of crores of rupees is yet to be recovered. The Applicant Bank is not having the secured assets except that of the land worth around Rs.3 crores. Therefore, instead of going into the technicalities and latches on the part of the Applicant Bank, it is necessary to serve the ends of justice. The matter has reached to its fag end. It is not in dispute that the pleading part is complete. The matter was fixed for Final Hearing also in the year 2007. Under such circumstances, the attachment and the sale of the property for which the Applicant Bank has prayed may not be considered. However, the following reliefs may be granted which will not cause much hardship to the Defendants. Defendants in their reply have undertaken not to sell their personal properties.” 23. The aforesaid can hardly be said as a valid ground for controlling the physical movement of the defendants. Unfortunately DRAT, below the stay application in the appeal, has not stayed the order of the Tribunal after examining the prima facie legality and validity of the order of the Tribunal, but has observed that as the defendants have not approached before the Tribunal seeking permission to leave the country, they may approach the Tribunal justifying the travel abroad and seek permission accordingly and if the permission is not granted, the defendants may approach DRAT. The net effect of the order of DRAT below stay application in appeal is that the order passed by the Tribunal controlling the physical movement of the defendants is allowed to operate, which also cannot be countenanced, more particularly when the effect of the order of the Tribunal is to result into controlling the physical movement of the defendants without there being any case made out to the effect that the defendants or any of the defendants are creating or have created any obstruction to the Tribunal or its officers to have the command and/or the control over all or any of the properties of the defendants. Therefore, it can be said that the DRAT has also committed error apparent on the face of record. It further appears that if the interference is not made by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in such a situation, it may result into allowing apparent illegal and unwarranted order to operate and would also create irreversible situation to the defendants-petitioners, which cannot be compensated in terms of money, if the mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution of India is kept in mind of each citizen. 24. In view of the aforesaid, the impugned order passed by the Tribunal dated 29.10.2009 so far as it relates to restraining defendants No.2 to 7 from leaving India without prior permission of the Tribunal cannot be sustained. Hence, the impugned order of the Tribunal to that extent shall remain stayed and suspended, until final disposal of the Misc. Appeal No.237 of 2009 pending before DRAT. 25. It is observed that as the contentions were raised by the learned counsel appearing for respective parties, observations are made by this court, however, all rights and contentions of the parties, as may be available before the appropriate forum, shall remain open. 26. The petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent. Rule made absolute accordingly. No order as to costs. (SBS) Petition partly allowed.