Judgment : DEBASISH KAR GUPTA, J. (1.) This appeal is filed assailing the judgment dated January 30, 2009, delivered in writ application bearing W.P. No. 20913(W) of 2007. By the impugned judgment the above writ was dismissed. (2.) The facts of the case in brief, as revealed from the writ application, were as follows: Pursuant to an advertisement dated June 15, 1991, published in leading newspapers the applicant submitted his application dated July 5, 1991, for the post of Associate Professor of Organon of Medicine and Philosophy, Chronic Diseases and Psychology in National Institute of Homoeopathy. One of the eligibility criteria for applying in respect of the above post was seven years teaching experience out of which at least four years of teaching experience in the concerned filed as Assistant Professor/Lecturer in recognised Homoeopathy College. In support of teaching experience, the appellant submitted one certificate issued by Bengal Homoeopathic Medical College and Hospital for working as a Lecturer in Organon Medicine, Repertory and Practices since September 26, 1984. The appellant also disclosed in his above application his teaching experience in National Institute of Homoeopathy, Calcutta as a Guest Lecturer in Repertory/Organon of Medicine of Physiology from February 25, 1991. The appellant was appointed in the post of Associate Professor, Organon of Medicine by a letter of appointment dated July 14, 1994. The above appointment was subject to a condition, amongst others, that if any declaration given or information furnished by him was proved to be false or if he was found to had wilfully suppressed any material information, he would be liable to removal from service and such other action as Government may deem necessary. (3.) On July 11, 1994, a criminal proceeding under section 154 Cr. PC was initiated against the appellant by the Central Bureau of Investigation in the Court of Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Barackpore, on the ground of submitting false and fabricated certificate in support of his teaching experience for the purpose of getting appointment in the post of Associate Professor under the respondent No. 1. However, the Central Bureau of Investigation submitted final report under section 173 Cr. PC in the proceeding on December 14, 1996. However, the Central Bureau of Investigation submitted final report under section 173 Cr. PC in the proceeding on December 14, 1996. (4.) A chargesheet was issued on April 22, 2003 against the appellant by the respondent No. 3, in his capacity as the President of the Governing Body of the respondent No. 1, containing the charge of furnishing false and fabricated teaching experience certificate to meet the eligibility criteria for appointment in the above post. (5.) The appellant challenged the legality of the above charge-sheet by filing an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India bearing W.P. No. 9150(W) of 2003 which was allowed on October 15, 2004 and the charge-sheet under reference was quashed. (6.) The respondent No.1 preferred an appeal bearing MAT No. 938 of 2005 against the above judgment and the same was allowed on May 16, 2006 quashing and setting aside the judgment dated October 15, 2004 delivered in W.P. No.9150(W) of 2003. (7.) Thereafter, a departmental enquiry was conducted against the appellant in connection with the charge-sheet under reference by appointing one Shri Inder Singh, Retired Deputy Secretary (CDI), CVC as enquiry officer. A copy of report of the above enquiry dated January 24, 2007, was served upon the appellant. The appellant submitted his representation dated February 17, 2007 to the above enquiry report. Then a notice dated March 20, 2007 was served upon the appellant to show cause as to why a penalty of removal from service should not be imposed upon the appellant. The appellant submitted his reply dated April 4, 2007, to the above show cause notice. By an order dated August 22, 2007, passed by the respondent No.2, the appellant was removed from the service of the respondent No.1. (8.) The subject-matter of challenge in the writ application which gives rise to this appeal was the above article of charges, the order of appointment of enquiry officer, the enquiry report under reference, the show cause notice dated March 20, 2007 and the order of punishment under reference. (8.) The subject-matter of challenge in the writ application which gives rise to this appeal was the above article of charges, the order of appointment of enquiry officer, the enquiry report under reference, the show cause notice dated March 20, 2007 and the order of punishment under reference. (9.) It is submitted on behalf of the appellant that the enquiry officer conducted the departmental enquiry travelling beyond the articles of charges which contained allegation of submitting false and fake certificate of teaching experience of the appellant issued by the Bengal Homoeopathy Medical College and Hospital, Calcutta for working as a Lecturer in Organon of Medicine Repartory and Practices since September 26, 1984. Drawing the attention of this Court towards the evidence adduced by the erstwhile Administrator of Calcutta Homoeopathy Medical College and Hospital before the enquiry officer, it is submitted that the genuineness of that certificate as also the correctness of the period of experience were proved before the enquiry officer. It is further submitted that the depositions of the erstwhile Director-in-Charge of respondent No.1, who happened to be a member of the selection committee for selecting the appellant, were in favour of the appellant. According to the appellant the copy of the minutes of meeting of 15th Governing Body meeting held on September 16, 1993 were not supplied to him by the enquiry officer and in that meeting the selection of the appellant was approved. In spite of a prayer made before the enquiry officer, one Shri P. K. Sen, who had been a member of the selection committee under reference, was not produced before enquiry officer. So, according to the appellant, the findings of the enquiry officer were based on no evidence. (10.) It is submitted on behalf of the appellant that according to the certificate of experience the period of teaching experience was less than 7 years. It was disclosed in the short affidavit affirmed on behalf of the respondents in connection with the writ petition bearing W.P. No.7668 of 2002(in re. Ashok Kumar Das vs. Union of India and Ors.) before the High Court of Delhi and New Delhi (at page 203 of this paper book) that the appellant was given relaxation with regard to his teaching experience by the selection committee admitting that he was academically brilliant. Ashok Kumar Das vs. Union of India and Ors.) before the High Court of Delhi and New Delhi (at page 203 of this paper book) that the appellant was given relaxation with regard to his teaching experience by the selection committee admitting that he was academically brilliant. (11.) With regard to the second show-cause notice, it is submitted that the same was issued by the respondent No.2 for showing cause in respect of the proposed penalty. According to the appellant the opportunity of submitting the representation with regard to the finding of guilt was not given to him before imposing the punishment of removal from service. Further, the arguable points raised by the appellant in his reply to the above show cause notice regarding the non-supply of relevant document, nonproduction of vital witness were not considered by the respondent No.2 before imposing punishment upon the appellant. As a result, according to the appellant, the rules of natural justice were violated. (12.) It is submitted on behalf of the appellant that he was a Grade A-I officer under the respondent No. 1. The Governing Body was the disciplinary authority to impose major punishment upon him. But in the instant case the respondent No. 2, being the President of the respondent No.1 initiated the disciplinary proceeding and imposed punishment upon the appellant invoking his emergency power under Rule 10.7 of the National Institute of Homoeopathy Rules and Regulations (hereinafter referred to as the said Rules and Regulation). But such action could be taken in emergency and it should be ratified by the Governing Body of the respondent No. 1. According to the appellant, no material was produced in course of hearing of the writ application showing compliance of the provisions of Rule 10.7 of the said Rules and Regulations. Therefore, the action of the respondent No. 2 in imposing punishment is not sustainable in the eye of law. (13.) Relying upon the decisions of H. Harnam Singh vs. State (Delhi Admn.), reported in AIR 1976 SC 2140 ; Union of India vs. Prakash Kumar Tandon, reported in 2009(2) SCC 541 , it is submitted on behalf of the appellant that the enquiry report under reference cannot be sustained in law due to non-production of relevant documents and non-production vital witness in the enquiry proceeding. Reliance is placed upon the decisions of Narinder Mohan Arya vs. United India Insurance Co. Reliance is placed upon the decisions of Narinder Mohan Arya vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., reported in 2006 (4) SCC 713 and M. V. Bijlani vs. Union of India and Ors., reported in 2006(5) SCC 88 , to submit that the enquiry officer travelled beyond the charges levelled against the appellant violating concept of fair play. Relying upon the decisions of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Ors. vs. B. Karunakar and Ors., reported in 1993(4) SCC 727 and Baban Singh vs. Union of India and Ors., reported in 1993(2) CLT 128, it is submitted on behalf of the appellants that the second show cause notice dated March 20, 2007 was not issued to give him an opportunity to submit representation in connection with the finding of guilt. So the same is liable to be set aside. The decision of Junas Kerketta vs. Union of India and Ors., reported in 2008(4) SLR 573, was produced before us to submit that the disciplinary authority did not spend a single word with regard to the points urged by the appellant in his reply to the second show-cause notice. So, the same is liable to be set aside. Relying upon the decisions of Sachi Nath Ghosh and Ors. vs. West Bengal Board of Secondary Education and Ors., reported in 1976(2) CLJ 289 and Nagaraj Shivarao Karjagi vs. Syndicate Bank, reported in 1991(3) SCC 219 , it is submitted that the disciplinary authority cannot act at the direction of a third party. (14.) It is submitted on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2, 3, 7 and 8 that the subject-matter of challenge in this first writ application bearing W.P. No.9150(W) of 2003 was the legality of the charge-sheet under reference. After disposal of the appeal bearing MAT No. 938 of 2005, arising out of the judgment of the above writ application, there is no scope of examining the validity of that charge-sheet. (15.) Articles of charges contained an allegation of furnishing false and fabricated teaching experience certificate. It was detected on perusal of the certificate issued in favour of the appellant by the University of Calcutta for obtaining Bachelor Degree in Homoeopathy Medicine and Surgery. The appellant appeared in the examination in June 1984 for obtaining the above degree. (15.) Articles of charges contained an allegation of furnishing false and fabricated teaching experience certificate. It was detected on perusal of the certificate issued in favour of the appellant by the University of Calcutta for obtaining Bachelor Degree in Homoeopathy Medicine and Surgery. The appellant appeared in the examination in June 1984 for obtaining the above degree. On the face of the certificate issued by the Council of Homoeopathy Medicine, West Bengal it was apparent that the appellant got registration on December 7, 1985. Therefore, according to the learned Senior Counsel, the letter of appointment dated September 26, 1984 issued by the Bengal Medical College and Hospital appointing the appellant as a Lecturer had been issued before the appellant became registered doctor. Further, the appellant was appointed in the above institution as Honorary Guest Lecturer subject to approval of the Governing Body and with effect from the date of joining. Such assignment was not a whole time job. But the appellant, in his application dated July 5, 1991 (Column VII) disclosed his engagement in the Bengal Homoeopathy Medical College and Hospital as permanent full time Lecturer in a proposed scale of Rs. 375-650. After detecting the above irregularities, charges of furnishing false and fabricated teaching experience certificate were brought against the appellant. The enquiry officer restricted the enquiry proceeding within the scope and ambit of the above charges. It is submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that in course of enquiry it was proved that the appellant obtained the above certificate from the Bengal Homoeopathy Medical College and Hospital. But fulfillment of the eligibility criteria for appointment in the post under reference was not proved. (16.) With regard to the question of relaxation of the period of teaching experience, it is submitted that admittedly relaxation was given to the appellant on the basis of his disclosure of teaching experience in Column No. VII of his application dated July 5, 1991 which was just short of a few months to meet the eligibility criteria of seven years. It was not permissible to assume that relaxation was given for a period more than what was claimed according to the declaration made in the application. It was not permissible to assume that relaxation was given for a period more than what was claimed according to the declaration made in the application. (17.) It is further submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that once the claim of relaxation of teaching experience as discussed hereinabove was proved before the enquiry officer on the basis of material on record, the allegation of violating rules of natural justice for non-production of the records of 15th meeting of the Governing Body could not be sustained in law. (18.) Regarding summoning erstwhile Director-in-Charge of the respondent institution and a member of the selection committee as a witness in the enquiry proceeding, it is submitted that the appellant did not avail of such opportunity. (19.) It is further submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that the enquiry report was served upon the appellant in accordance with the provisions of proviso to Rule 19 (iii) of the CCS (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules (hereinafter referred to as the said rules). The appellant submitted his reply thereto. Therefore, the second show-cause notice was served upon the appellant disclosing the proposed punishment. Therefore, the settled principles of law with regard to the rules of natural justice were not violated. (20.) It is also submitted that the power of respondent No.2 to impose the punishment was under challenge as pleaded in the writ application. To meet such challenge, the provision of Rule 10.7 of the said rules was relied upon. That was recorded by the learned Single Judge in his judgment. Once, the emergency power had been invoked in accordance with the provisions of law, it was not open for the learned Single Judge to proceed further in course of judicial review. (21.) Relying upon the decision of B. C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India, reported in 1995 (6) SCC 749 , it is submitted on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2,3,7 and 8 that the scope of judicial review is restricted to see that the finding of the disciplinary authority is based on some evidences. (21.) Relying upon the decision of B. C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India, reported in 1995 (6) SCC 749 , it is submitted on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2,3,7 and 8 that the scope of judicial review is restricted to see that the finding of the disciplinary authority is based on some evidences. Relying upon the decisions of Government of India vs. George Philip, reported in 2006(13) CCI; Apparel Export Promotion vs. A. K. Chopra, reported in 1999(1) SCC 759 and State of Madras vs. G. Sundaram, reported in AIR 1965 SC 1103 , it is submitted that any evidence in support of conclusion of the disciplinary authority amounts to substantial compliance of the principles of natural justice in a disciplinary proceeding and inadequacy of such evidence cannot be canvassed in a writ application. Reliance is placed on the decision of State of Orissa vs. Murlidhar Jena, reported in AIR 1963 SC 404 and State of T. N. vs. S. Subramaniam, reported in 1996 (7) SCC 509 , to submit that technical rules of evidence are not applicable in a case of disciplinary proceeding, nor re- appreciation of such evidence is permissible in course of judicial review. Relying upon the decisions of Jammu and Kashmir Public Service Commission, vs. Farhat Rasol and Ors., reported in 1995 Supp(4) SCC 621; Secretary, A.P. Swrei Society vs. J. Prathap, reported in 2002(1) SCC 430; Vice-Chairman, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan vs. Girdharilal Yadav, reported in 2004(6) SCC 325 and Addl. General Manager, Human Resources, Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. vs. Suresh Remkrishna Burde, reported in 2007(5) SCC 336 , it is submitted that the material date of obtaining qualification is the date of submitted application otherwise the disclosure of qualification in the application is fraud. Reliance is placed on the decision of State of Meghalaya vs. Mecken Sing N. Marak, reported in 2008(7) SCC 580 , to submit that misconduct of a charged employee, who holds the position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, has to be dealt with iron hands. With reference to the decision of M. Mazharuddin Ali vs. Govt. of A.P., reported in 2000(10) SCC 383 , it is submitted that in absence of any specific order of relaxation of teaching experience, it is not permissible to assume that relaxation is given for a period more than what is claimed. With reference to the decision of M. Mazharuddin Ali vs. Govt. of A.P., reported in 2000(10) SCC 383 , it is submitted that in absence of any specific order of relaxation of teaching experience, it is not permissible to assume that relaxation is given for a period more than what is claimed. Relying upon the decisions of State of Assam vs. Bimal Kumar Pandit, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1612 ; Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel, reported in 1985(3) SCC 398 ; Sardar Kaur Singh vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1960 SC 493 and Rajesh Kumar vs. Dy. CIT, reported in 2007(2) SCC 181 , it is submitted that the scope of judicial review in connection with a 2nd show-cause notice issued in connection with a disciplinary proceeding is to see that the authority applies his mind to the reply of the delinquent employee and there is no scope of an opportunity of hearing. The Court is to examine whether the delinquent employee is prejudiced due to noncompliance of any formality. Referring to the decision of Ram Kumar vs. State of Hariyana, reported in 1987(Supp) SCC 582, it is submitted that where the disciplinary authority agrees with the finding of the enquiry officer, no reason is required to be assigned to pass an order in a disciplinary proceeding. The decision of T. Cajee vs. Jormanik Siem, reported in AIR 1961 SC 276 , is referred to and it is submitted that the emergency power of the respondent No.2 is based on Rule 10.7 of the said rules. There is no scope to challenge the same in a writ proceeding. (22.) The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 and 4 adopted the submission made on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2, 3, 7 and 8. It is also submitted that one of the conditions of service of the appellant was that the consequence of furnishing false information in the application was removal from service. (23.) Reliance is placed by the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 and 4 adopted the submission made on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2, 3, 7 and 8. It is also submitted that one of the conditions of service of the appellant was that the consequence of furnishing false information in the application was removal from service. (23.) Reliance is placed by the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 and 4 on the decision of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. vs. Ashok Kumar Arora, reported in 1997(3) SCC 72 ; R. S. Saini vs. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1999 SC 3579 ; High Court of Judicature of Bombay vs. Uday Singh, reported in 1997(5) SCC 129 ; Sher Bahadur vs. Union of India and Ors.. reported in 2002(7) SCC 142 ; Bank of India and Anr. vs. Avinash D. Mandivikar and Ors., reported in 2005 AIR SCW 4477; R. Vishwanath Pillai vs. State of West Kerala and Ors., reported in 2004(2) SCC 105 ; State of A.P. and Anr. vs. T. Surya Chandra Rao., reported in 2005(6) SCC 149 ; Ram Chandra Singh vs. Sabitri Devi and Ors., reported in 2003(8) SCC 319 ; A. P. Public Service Commission vs. Koneti Venkateswarulu and Ors., reported in 2005 AIR SCW 5175; Bank of India vs. T. Jogram, reported in 2007(7) SCC 236 ; Nagendra Chandra vs. State of Jharkhand, reported in 2008(1) SCC 798 ; Bar Council of India vs. High Court of Kerala, reported in 2004(6) SCC 311 ; Ashok Kumar Sarkar vs. Union of India, reported in 2007(4) SCC 54 and Vice-Chairman, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan vs. Giridharilal Yadav, reported in 2004(6) SCC 325, in support of the submissions. (24.) Having heard the learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties as also after considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we find at the very out set that on a previous occasion the charge-sheet under reference was set aside by the judgment dated October 15, 2004 delivered in W.P. No. 9150(W) of 2003, But that judgment was set aside by the Appeal Court in an appeal bearing MAT No. 938 of 2005, Therefore, there is no scope to examine the legality or validity of the charge-sheet. (25.) Regarding the allegation of overstepping of the enquiry officer with regard to the charges levelled against the appellant, we find that the charges were of submitting false and fabricated certificate of teaching experience. (25.) Regarding the allegation of overstepping of the enquiry officer with regard to the charges levelled against the appellant, we find that the charges were of submitting false and fabricated certificate of teaching experience. In our considered view it was well within the power of the enquiry officer to enquire into the genuineness of the teaching experience of the appellant on the basis of the above charges. So we do not want to interfere with the decision of the learned Single Judge in this regard. (26.) Regarding the propriety of the decision making process of enquiry proceeding under reference in arriving at a conclusion, we find that it was not in dispute that in the application dated July 5, 1991 (Column No.7 at page 119 of this paper book), the appellant was attached to Bengal Homoeopathy Medical College and Hospital as a full time Lecturer, Organon of Medicine Reparatory Practices with effect from September 26, 1984 till the date of submitting that application at a proposed scale of pay of Rs.375-650. A letter of appointment dated September 26, 1984 (at page 82 of this paper book) was annexed to his above application in support of the above declaration. According to the letter of appointment the appellant was engaged as honorary Lecturer in that institution subject to the approval of the Governing Body for one year with effect from the date of his joining. That apart, it is evident from his own declaration in his application dated July 5, 1991 (at page 118 of this paper book) that he was a student of M.Sc. (Life Science) during the period 1985-86 at Agartala. We, therefore, do not find any infirmity in the decision making process of the enquiry officer that the appellant submitted false and fabricated document with regard to his teaching experience as required for participating in the selection process of appointment to the post of Associate Professor in Professor of Organon of Medicine and Philosophy Chronic Deceases and Psychology in National Institute of Homoeopathy. (27.) Filing of final report before the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Barrackpore in connection with the criminal proceeding as referred to herein above had no any bearing in the disciplinary proceeding under reference. Because sufficient evidences could not be collected during course of investigation for submitting charge-sheet. (27.) Filing of final report before the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Barrackpore in connection with the criminal proceeding as referred to herein above had no any bearing in the disciplinary proceeding under reference. Because sufficient evidences could not be collected during course of investigation for submitting charge-sheet. (28.) Regarding non-production of the copy of minutes of 15th meeting of the Governing Body of the respondent institution, it was an admitted position that in the affidavit affirmed on behalf of the respondent Nos.1, 2, 3 and 5 in connection with the writ petition, bearing W.P. No.9150(W) of 2003 (at page 203 of this paper book) that the selection committee gave the appellant relaxation regarding his teaching experience on the basis of the declaration furnished by him. Admittedly, the period of his experience on the basis of such information was for a few months. Therefore, there was no scope to presume that the respondent authorities gave relaxation to the appellant beyond such period. (29.) Regarding inaction on the part of the enquiry officer to take steps for producing one Shri P. K. Sen, a member of the selection committee, we find substance in the submissions made on behalf of the respondent that the appellant was always at liberty to produce him as a witness before the enquiry officer. Since the appellant did not make any attempt, we do not find any procedural impropriety in conducting the enquiry proceeding. (30.) As discussed hereinabove, the enquiry officer arrived at his conclusion on the basis of some evidences. So, we do not find any substance in the submissions made on behalf of the appellant that the findings of the enquiry officer was based on no evidence. In this regard the principles of law as decided in the matter of G. Sundaram (surpa) are quoted below: "9. It is therefore clear that the High Court was not competent to consider the question whether the evidence before the Tribunal and the Government was insufficient or unreliable to establish the charge against the respondent. It could have considered only the fact whether there was any evidence at all which, if believed by the Tribunal, would establish the charge against the respondent. Adequacy of that evidence to sustain the charge is not a question before the High Court when exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It could have considered only the fact whether there was any evidence at all which, if believed by the Tribunal, would establish the charge against the respondent. Adequacy of that evidence to sustain the charge is not a question before the High Court when exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. This view was reiterated in Union of India vs. H. C. Goel." (Emphasis supplied) (31.) With regard to the second show-cause notice, we find that admittedly a copy of the enquiry report under reference was served upon the appellant before issuing the second show-cause notice. Therefore, there was compliance of the provisions of first proviso to clause(iii) of Rule 19 of the CCS (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. Needless to point out that the above rules were applicable in conducting the disciplinary proceeding under reference. (32.) Therefore, neither there was any procedural impropriety nor the appellant was prejudiced. In this regard the proposition of law as settled in the matter of Rajesh Kumar and Ors. (supra) are quoted below: "23. We, however, need not dilate on the said question being not very necessary for the purpose of this case. But it is beyond any cavil that ordinarily unless excluded by operation of a statute, the superior Courts while exercising power of judicial review shall proceed on the basis that assignment of reasons is imperative in character. When an authority/, be it administrative or quasi judicial adjudicates on a dispute and if its order is appealable or subject to judicial review, it would be necessary to spell out the reasons therefore. While applying the principles of natural justice. however, the Court must also bear in mind the theory of useless formality and the prejudice doctrine." (Emphasis supplied) (33.) Regarding the allegation of non-application of mind by the disciplinary authority on the arguable points raised by the appellant in his representation, it is the settled principles of law that reasons need not be given in the event the punishing of authority agrees with the findings of the enquiry officer and accepts, the reasons given by him. It is not necessary for the punishing authorities to give the same reasons in support of the findings. In this regard the relevant portions of the decision of Ram Kumar(supra) are quoted below: "8. It is not necessary for the punishing authorities to give the same reasons in support of the findings. In this regard the relevant portions of the decision of Ram Kumar(supra) are quoted below: "8. In view of the contents of the impugned order, it is difficult to say that the punishing authority had not applied his mind to the case before terminating the services of the appellant. The punishing authority has placed reliance upon the report of the enquiry officer which means that he has not only agreed with the findings of the enquiry Officer, but also has accepted the reasons given by him for the findings. In our opinion, when the punishing authority agrees, with the findings of the enquiry officer and accepts the reasons given by him in support of such findings, it is not necessary for the punishing authority to again discuss evidence and come to the same findings as that of the enquiry officer and give the same reasons for the findings. We are unable to accept the contention made on behalf of the appellant that the impugned order of termination is vitiated as it is a non-speaking order and does not contain any reason. When by the impugned order the punishing authority has accepted the findings of the enquiry officer and the reasons given by him, the question of non-compliance with the principles of natural justice does not arise. It is also incorrect to say that the impugned order is not a speaking order. (Emphasis supplied) (34.) It was pleaded in the writ application that the imposition of penalty of removal from service was without jurisdiction since it was issued under the direction of the respondent No.2. We find that the learned Single Judge, after taking into consideration the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, held that Rule 10.7 of the said rules and regulations authorised the respondent No.2 the exercise any or all powers of the Governing Body, In this regard we find that it is the settled principles of law is this, once the authority exercises emergency power in accordance with law, it is not for the Court to go into the question whether there is emergency or not with respect to expected matters and for such circumstances the action taken by the authority cannot be challenged on the ground that it is beyond its power. In this regard the relevant portions of the decision of T. Cajee (supra) are quoted below: "12. The next question that arises is whether the Executive Committee could take the action which it did in this case. Ordinarily, the appointment being made by the District Council, the removal could only be by it. The contention on behalf of the respondent is that even if the District Council had the power to remove in accordance with the terms and conditions of the respondents appointment that power could only be exercised by the District Council and not by the Executive Committee. In this connection Rules 28, 29 and 30 of the Assam Autonomous Districts (Constitution of District Councils) Rules, 1951, are relevant. Rule 28 vests the executive functions of the District Council in the Executive Committee, Rule 29(1) give power to the Executive Committee to dispose of all matters falling within its purview subject to certain exceptions mentioned in Rule 29 (2). One of these exceptions is with respect to all important appointments. Assuming that the office of siem is an importance appointment, the Executive Committee could not normally deal with it in view of the exceptions in Rule 29(2). But Rule 30(a) lays down that where immediate action in respect of any of the excepted matters is necessary, the Executive Committee of a District Council other than that of the Mikhir Hills or the North Cachar Hills, may take such action thereon as the emergency appears to it to require; but every such case shall have to be laid before the District Council at its next session. The order of July 7, 1959, shows that the Executive Committee took action udder Rule 30(a) as it considered the matter to be one of emergency. It is not for the Courts to go into the question whether there was emergency or not with respect to excepted matters and in the circumstances the action taken by the Executive Committee cannot be challenged on the ground that it is beyond its power." (Emphasis supplied) (35.) We find that the matters of H. Harnam Singh (supra) and Rakish Kumar Tandon (supra) were decided on the basis of the facts the circumstances involved in those cases. But in the instant case we find that due to non-production of the documents or due to non-production of the witness the enquiry proceeding was not vitiated. But in the instant case we find that due to non-production of the documents or due to non-production of the witness the enquiry proceeding was not vitiated. Therefore, the ratio of the above decisions does not help the appellant in any way. Regarding the decision Narinder Mohan Arya (supra) and M. V. Bijlani (supra), we find that on the basis of the facts and circumstances involved therein, it was decided that the enquiry officer travelled beyond the charges levelled against the delinquent employee. But taking into consideration the facts the circumstances of the case we have arrived at a conclusion that there was not procedural impropriety. Therefore, the above decisions are not applicable in the instant case. Regarding the settled principles of law as decided in the matter of Managing Director, ECIL, (supra) and Baban Singh (supra), we find that there was sufficient compliance of the principles of natural justice by giving an opportunity to the petitioner to submit his representation to the enquiry report before issuing second show-cause notice disclosing proposed punishment therein. Therefore, the above decision do not help the case of the appellant in any way. The decision of Junas Kerketta (supra) has no manner of application in the instant case because in that case the enquiry officer found the delinquent employee partially guilty in respect of the charges. But punishment of removal from service was imposed upon the delinquent employee. But we have decided that issue on the basis of the settled principles of law as decided in the matter of Ram Kumar (supra) after due consideration of the facts and circumstances of the instant case. We do not find that the decision of Sachi Nath Ghosh (supra) and Nagaraj Shivarao Karjigi (supra), are applicable in the instant case because the respondent No.2 passed the order of punishment in exercise of his emergency power as disciplinary authority as provided in the Rule 10.7 of the said rules and regulations and such order was not passed at the direction of a third period. (36.) In view of the above we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment. Accordingly, the appeal stands dismissed. (37.) There will be, however, no order as to costs. (38.) Urgent xerox certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties, as expeditiously as possible, upon compliance with the necessary formalities in this regard. Appeal dismissed.