JUDGMENT U.B. Saha, J. 1. By this writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner, a retired Divisional Manager, of Arunachal Pradesh Forest Corporation Ltd. (respondent No. 3), has prayed for quashing/setting aside the impugned order of penalty dated 16.10.2006 whereby and whereunder, the Board of respondent No. 3, decided to award punishment of forfeiture of 25 per cent of the amount of compensation due to be paid to the petitioner on account of serious violation of financial rules and procedures on his part, and also the decision of the Board appellate authority which was communicated to him vide letter dated 6.7.2009 (Annexure-11 to the writ petition) whereby and whereunder, the appellate authority maintained the order of the disciplinary authority and dismissed the appeal of the petitioner. 2. Heard Mr. S. Dutta alongwith Mr. S. Choudhury, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner. Also heard Ms. S. Sarkar, learned Government Advocate for respondent No. 1 and Mr. K. Jini, learned Counsel for respondent Nos. 2 to 8. 3. The case of the petitioner, in brief, is that while the petitioner was holding the charge of Divisional Manager, Miao Project Division at Miao, under the respondent No. 3 i.e. Arunachal Pradesh Forest Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as 'APFCL' in short) he received a show-cause notice dated 13.9.2000 by which the respondent authority asked him to show cause as to why a disciplinary proceeding should not be initiated against him for misconduct and also why an action should not be taken against him for recovery of the losses sustained by the APFCL due to his negligence. The said show-cause notice was replied by the petitioner denying the allegation made therein. Thereafter, the respondent No. 4, having not satisfied with the reply of the petitioner, framed 2 Nos. of charges against him vide Memo dated 15.10.2001 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition), which are quoted hereunder: Article-I.-That Shri T.K. Chakraborty, Divisional Manager, while functioning as Divisional Manager, Miao Project Division, Miao during the period from 5.6.1990 to 19.7.1996 failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and allowed M/s. Sree Narottam Udyog, Deomali to lift the timber for a total quantity of 2066.720 cu. mt. at the rate prevailing at the time of original allotment by violating the instruction of PCCF/Govt. of Arunachal Pradesh and in process APFCL/Govt. mt. at the rate prevailing at the time of original allotment by violating the instruction of PCCF/Govt. of Arunachal Pradesh and in process APFCL/Govt. exchequer has sustained loss to the tune of 46.52 lakhs and thus committed misconduct unbecoming of a govt. servant/corporation employee in contravention of Rule 3 of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964. Article-II-That Shri T.K. Chakraborty, Divisional Manager, while functioning in the aforesaid office during the aforesaid period failed to raise revised bill in respect of M/s. Sree Narottam Udyog, Deomali to the tune of Rs. 46.52 lakhs during April 96 . when the issue was pointed out by the A.G. Shillong during their inspection on the accounts of Divisional Manager, Miao Project Division and thus committed misconduct unbecoming of a Govt. servant/corporation employee in contravention to Rule 3 of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964. 4. Against the aforesaid charges, the petitioner made a reply on 9.11.2001 (Annexure-4 to the writ petition) wherein he denied all the allegations. Thereafter, the petitioner received another memo of charges vide Memorandum No. FC/CON/17/98/878-79 dated 30.7.2002 alleging two Nos. of charges against him, which are quoted as under: Article-I.-That Shri T.K. Chakraborty, Divisional Manager, while functioning as Divisional Manager, Miao Project Division, Miao during the period from 4.6.1990 to 19.7.1996 had violated the laid down-procedure of Govt. of Arunachal Pradesh/APFCL in raising the royalty bills against supplying a quota timber to the industries through self operating despite of clear cut instruction received from the higher authority and committed wilful insubordination or disobedience to the reasonable orders of his superiors and in the process violated Rule 3(i), (ii) and (iii) of CCS Conduct Rules, 1964. Article-II.-That during the period from 4.6.1990 to 19.7.1996, while functioning as Divisional Manager, Miao, the said Shri T.K. Chakraborty, Divisional Manager, failed to raise the bills being value of royalty, M. fee, R. fee etc. against the wood-based industries in respect of the passed logs amounting to Rs. 15,23,614/- as intimated by General Manager (T), APFCL, vide his No. FC/GMT/CON/DP/24-C027-28, dated 20.5.1999 and also failed to raise the interest bill which accumulated to Rs. 8,76,828/- as on 31.5.2001 as highlighted in the outstanding list submitted by the Divisional Manager, Miao Project Division vide No. MP/CORP/Acctt/35/2000/299, dated 16.6.2001 followed by report of the sub-committee constituted vide No. FC/CON/11/96/Pt. II/96/4284-96/4284-96, dated 14.2.2001, for the delayed payment of the value of timber so supplied to the wood-based industries. 8,76,828/- as on 31.5.2001 as highlighted in the outstanding list submitted by the Divisional Manager, Miao Project Division vide No. MP/CORP/Acctt/35/2000/299, dated 16.6.2001 followed by report of the sub-committee constituted vide No. FC/CON/11/96/Pt. II/96/4284-96/4284-96, dated 14.2.2001, for the delayed payment of the value of timber so supplied to the wood-based industries. The said Shri T.K. Chakraborty Divisional Manager also failed to realise the extension amounting to Rs. 4,99,813/- from the quota holding industries against supply of timber made to them and in the process violated Rule 3(i), (ii) of CCS/Conduct Rules, 1964. 5. Thereafter, the Managing Director of respondent No. 3, again proposed to hold an inquiry against the petitioner under Rule 14 of the CCS (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, and the petitioner was directed to submit written statement in his defence within 10 days. On receipt of the memo of charges as stated supra, the petitioner replied vide representation dated 30.10.2002 denying the charges levelled against him and furnished the factual position with all details. On the same date, the petitioner by another letter apprised respondent No. 4 regarding illegality and infirmity of the alleged charges and requested him to drop the charges. No response was received from the respondent authority for about 2 years and the petitioner was under the belief that the proceedings might have been dropped. But surprisingly on 1.6.2005, the petitioner received two inquiry reports at a time, one of dated 1.6.2005 and another one, undated (Annexure-7 and 8 to the writ petition). The aforesaid inquiry reports were placed before the Board of Directors of respondent No. 3 by the respondent No. 4 and the Board in the 129th meeting held on 15.9.2006 perused the said reports and decided to award punishment to the petitioner by imposing forfeiture of 25 per cent of the amount of compensation payable to him on account of serious violation of financial discipline and procedures on his part and directed the Management to take appropriate action (Annexure-9 to the writ petition). Acting on the decision of the Board of Directors (respondent No. 5), respondent No. 4 issued the impugned memorandum dated 16.1.2006 conveying the above decision of the Board to the petitioner and directed the petitioner for preferring an appeal within 2 (two) months from the date of receipt of the aforesaid order of punishment. Acting on the decision of the Board of Directors (respondent No. 5), respondent No. 4 issued the impugned memorandum dated 16.1.2006 conveying the above decision of the Board to the petitioner and directed the petitioner for preferring an appeal within 2 (two) months from the date of receipt of the aforesaid order of punishment. It is also contended that since the petitioner has already retired from service, the forfeiture of 25 per cent of the amount of compensation payable to him has been made from his retirement benefits. Being aggrieved by the order of penalty passed by the Board of Directors, as a disciplinary authority, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the appellate authority but the said appeal was also taken-up by the same authority of Board of Directors and the appeal was rejected. The same has been communicated to the petitioner by respondent No. 4 vide letter dated 6th/9th of July, 2007. The relevant portion of the letter is reproduced hereunder: ...After examination of the case, the Board decided to agree with its earlier decision taken in 129th Board Meeting, awarding punishment of forfeiting of 25% of the amount of CRS compensation due to be paid to Shri T.K. Chakraborty, Ex-DM, on account of serious violation of financial discipline and procedures on his part. 6. Hence, being aggrieved by the aforesaid decision of the respondent-Board, the petitioner preferred the instant writ petition. 7. Although, the petitioner has challenged the order of disciplinary authority as well as appellate authority on various grounds inter alia (i) biasness of the disciplinary authority as well as appellate authority, (ii) non-examination of the listed witnesses, (iii) non-providing of relevant documents to the petitioner, (iv) non-examination of documents in terms of relevant rules, (v) non-supply of inquiry reports before imposition of penalty, and (vi) not providing any reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to submit representation against the inquiry report which is highly arbitrary and prejudiced to the petitioner. However, Mr. However, Mr. Dutta, learned Counsel for the petitioner, virtually pressed the following grounds : (i) biasness of the disciplinary and appellate authority, (ii) non-examination of the listed witnesses by the I.O. at the disciplinary proceeding to sustain the charges brought against the petitioner, (iii) not providing an opportunity to participate in the disciplinary proceeding to the petitioner, and (iv) penalty imposed by the respondents are contrary to the provisions of service Rules framed by the respondents as well as under CCS (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. The learned Counsel for the petitioner also contends that from the inquiry report, no reasonable person can come to a conclusion that out of 2 (two) charges, neither has been proved. He further contends that the entire disciplinary proceeding is vitiated for the reason that the disciplinary authority acted as appellate authority which is not permissible under the law and also hit by doctrine of bias. In respect of his aforesaid contention, he relied a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Cantonment Executive Officer and Anr. v. Vijay D. Wani and Ors. reported in (2008) 12 SCC 230 . 8. He also contends that the appellate authority also did not follow the provisions of Rule 15(j) of APFCL Service Rules, wherein the provisions of an appeal is available and what should be the method for consideration of an appeal, has been prescribed and due to non-consideration of the appeal, as per Rules, the present writ petitioner is prejudiced. In support of his contentions, he relied a decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Uttaranchal and Ors. v. Kharak Singh reported in (2008) 8 SCC 236 wherein the Apex Court noted that, ...20. A reading of the enquiry report also shows that the respondent herein was not furnished with the required documents. The Department's witnesses were not examined in his presence. Though the respondent who was the writ petitioner specifically stated so in the affidavit before the High Court in the writ proceedings, those averments were specifically controverted in the reply-affidavit filed by the Department. Mere denial for the sake of denial is not an answer to the specific allegations made in the affidavit. Though the respondent who was the writ petitioner specifically stated so in the affidavit before the High Court in the writ proceedings, those averments were specifically controverted in the reply-affidavit filed by the Department. Mere denial for the sake of denial is not an answer to the specific allegations made in the affidavit. Likewise, there is no evidence to show that after submission of the report by the enquiry officer to the disciplinary authority, the respondent herein was furnished with the copy of the said report along with all the relied upon documents. When all these infirmities were specifically pleaded and brought to the notice of the appellate authority {i.e. Forest Conservator), he rejected the same but has not pointed out the relevant materials from the records of the enquiry officer and disciplinary authority to support his decision. Hence, the appellate authority has also committed an error in dismissing the appeal of the respondent. 9. The learned Counsel further contends that charges were framed for the alleged misconduct after a long delay of 8 years for which the instant petitioner is prejudiced. In support of his contentions, he relied a decision of the Apex Court in the case of M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India and Ors. reported in (2006) 5 SCC 88 particularly he referred to para 19 and 20 of the judgment. 10. While resisting the contentions of Mr. Dutta, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. K. Jini, learned Counsel appearing for respondent Corporation (respondent No. 2) and other official respondents, would contend that the petitioner was given ample opportunity by the authority concerned to disprove the charges levelled against him. He also contended that it would be evident from the inquiry report (Annexure-7) to the writ petition) that the then General Manager (T), Mr. M.L. Deori, IFS, who was the immediate boss of the petitioner has cancelled his letter dated 23.10.2000 addressed to the Managing Director, APFCL, subsequently was considered by the inquiry authority and also one Sri S.K. Chatterjee, Asstt. has been examined, who confirms issue of 2 (two) letters on the same date i.e. on 9.9.1994 on the same subject out of which one letter is cancelled and the office copy is there in the file which was also perused by the inquiry officer. has been examined, who confirms issue of 2 (two) letters on the same date i.e. on 9.9.1994 on the same subject out of which one letter is cancelled and the office copy is there in the file which was also perused by the inquiry officer. The learned Counsel also contended that the Writ Court cannot re-assess the evidence recorded by the inquiry officer based on which the disciplinary authority imposed the punishment as an appellate authority. The learned Counsel also contended that respondent No. 4, Managing Director, acted as the disciplinary authority and the respondent No. 5, Board of Directors, acted as an appellate authority and therefore, there was no procedural discrepancy. 11. Before dealing with the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, it would be proper for this Court to consider the provisions for appeal as enumerated in the APFCL Service Rules, wherein it is prescribed how to consider an appeal against the order of the disciplinary authority. For ready reference, the relevant portion is quoted hereunder: Arunachal Pradesh Forest Corporation Ltd., Service Rule Section 15-Appeal (a) Right of appeal.... (j) Consideration of appeals-If cases of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 14, the appellate authority shall consider (i) Whether the procedure prescribed in these rules has been compiled with and if not, whether such non-compliance has resulted in the failure of justice. (ii) Whether the findings are justified (iii) Whether the penalty imposed is excessive, adequate or inadequate and pass order: (a) setting aside, reducing, confirming or enhancing the penalty; (b) remitting the case to the authority which imposed the penalty, or to any other authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case provided that an order enhancing the punishment may be passed only after giving adequate opportunity to the employee of making representations. 12. It would also be proper to reproduce paragraphs 19 and 20 of M.V. Bijlani, (supra) as relied upon by Mr. Dutta, learned Counsel for the petitioner. Accordingly, paragraph 19 and 20 are reproduced herein, as under: 19. It is really a matter of great surprise that a disciplinary proceeding was initiated five years after the appellant handed over charge. At that time he was admittedly not having possession of any documents. The enquiry officer furthermore took a period of seven years to complete the enquiry. Accordingly, paragraph 19 and 20 are reproduced herein, as under: 19. It is really a matter of great surprise that a disciplinary proceeding was initiated five years after the appellant handed over charge. At that time he was admittedly not having possession of any documents. The enquiry officer furthermore took a period of seven years to complete the enquiry. The appellate authority also took seven years in disposing of the appeal. Even then, the Appellate Authority did not go into the question of as to whether the procedures laid down for holding the disciplinary proceedings had been followed or not. He did not go in to the contentions of the appellant herein minutely. The memo of appeal filed by the appellant was very elaborate. He raised a number of contentions therein. The enquiry officer was charged with bias. He was also charged with unfair conduct. He was said to have committed a large number of irregularities in the departmental proceeding. The memo of appeal of the appellant was in about 65 typed pages. It was subdivided into five parts. He made all endeavours to deal with each and every finding of the enquiry officer and dealt with almost all the documents relied upon by the department. He also dealt with the deposition of the witnesses examined on behalf of the parties. 20. The enquiry officer proceeded as if in the departmental proceedings the appellant was charged with misappropriation of property. The witnesses not only spoke of theft of copper wire, but also stated about the existence of muster roll diaries. According to one Daya Shankar, the work shown in the diaries was correct. According to him, apart from erection of 300 lb iron wire in Section Geedam-Bijapur, 150 lb was erected in the entire section. He stated that broken pieces of wire found were sent to Jagdalpur through SIT diary. According to him, the work of erecting copper wire started from 5.11.1969 and continued up to March 1970. One Shri K.C. Sariya who was the successor of the appellant stated about the maintenance of the muster rolls and ACE-8 Register. According to him, stores pertaining to estimate were accounted for and ACE-8 sheets were in the estimate file. One Shri K.D. Shrivastava had stated that there was report of copper wire theft by one Shri Kashiram. 13. One Shri K.C. Sariya who was the successor of the appellant stated about the maintenance of the muster rolls and ACE-8 Register. According to him, stores pertaining to estimate were accounted for and ACE-8 sheets were in the estimate file. One Shri K.D. Shrivastava had stated that there was report of copper wire theft by one Shri Kashiram. 13. It is to be further noted here that as asked by this Court, Mr. K. Jini, learned Counsel for the respondent Corporation, placed 2 (two) files relating to the disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner being File No. FC/CON/17/98(a) and File No. FC/CON/17/98(B). However, none of the files contained any order of the inquiry officer. In one of the aforementioned files, only the extract of the minutes of 129th meeting of the Board of Directors, held on 15.9.2006, is available, which are as follows: EXTRACT OF ITEM No. 13 OF THE MINUTES OF 129TH MEETING OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ARUNA-CHAL PRADESH FOREST CORPORATION LIMITED HELD ON 15TH SEPTEMBER, 2006 IS REPRODUCED BELOW: ITEM No. 13: POSITION OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS INITIATED/CONTEMPLATED AGAINST CORPORATION EMPLOYEES. The Board perused the two inquiry reports in respect of Shri T.K. Chakraborty, former D. visional Manager. The Board decided to award punishment of forfeiture of 25% of the amount of compensation due to be paid to Shri T.K. Chakraborty on account of serious violation of financial discipline and procedures on his part. Appropriate action may be taken by the management in this regard. 14. On going through the aforesaid files, the Court has no hesitation to form an opinion that the submissions of Mr. Dutta, learned Counsel for the petitioner, inter alia that no listed witnesses were examined by the inquiry officer has some force. There is no doubt that the High Court should not act as an appellate authority and adjudicate the case on merit in a disciplinary proceeding. But, surely the Court can correct the errors of law leading to various injustices or violation of principles of natural justice, to a charged officer, what according to this Court, has happened here. It is also the admitted position that the disciplinary authority has acted as an appellate authority which is well evident from the minutes of the 129th Board Meeting of the respondent No. 1 as stated supra and also from paragraph-17 of the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent Nos. It is also the admitted position that the disciplinary authority has acted as an appellate authority which is well evident from the minutes of the 129th Board Meeting of the respondent No. 1 as stated supra and also from paragraph-17 of the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent Nos. 2 to 8 which are as follows: ...Since, in terms of chapter-IV ( Section 2 serial-15) of APFCL service Rules both the disciplinary authority and appellate authority in the instant case in the disciplinary proceeding are the Board of Directors, the management of APFCL, on receipt of inquiry report from the I.O. had placed the same (inquiry report) to the Board. The Board after detailed deliberation decided to forfeit the 25% out of compulsory retirement compensation which stands at Rs. 1.72,169/- of the petitioner for extending undue financial benefits to the tune of Rs. 46.52 lakhs by way of supply of timber to the M/s. Sree Narottam Udyog, Deomali and also on account of serious violation of financial discipline and procedures on his part during his tenure as Divisional Manager, Miao project Division. The Board of Directors being the disciplinary authority however allowed the petitioner two months time to make his submission if any in this regard if he wishes to do in writing. Accordingly the petitioner made in his appeal which was subsequently placed before the appellate authority i.e. again to the BOD in its 131st, the Board after examination of the case decided to agree its earlier decision taken in 129th meeting awarding punishment of forfeiting of 25% of the amount of compulsory retirement due to be paid to Mr. T.K.C., the petitioner, ex-DM on account of serious violation of financial discipline and procedures on his part. 15. In view of the above decision of the Apex Court in the case of Cantonment Executive Officer and Anr. v. Vijay D. Wani and Ors. reported in (2008) 12 SCC 230 it can be easily said that the action of the respondent Board of Directors is apparently biased as the respondent No. 5 Board of Directors acted both as a disciplinary authority and appellate authority and as the Board took the decision as a disciplinary authority, they would always try to maintain their earlier order as they would be interested for the punishment of the accused officer, the petitioner herein, on the basis of their report. Therefore, apprehension in the mind of the petitioner was not unreal, rather very much real and substantial one in view of the Apex Court decision, as stated, supra. It is also settled by this time that due to the procedural defects if a charged employee is prejudiced, in any way, the Court should not close its eyes and deny him/her justice. More so, when it appears from the record that even the petitioner was not provided any opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses on the basis of whose so-called statements, charges were framed against the petitioner/charged officer. By this time, it is also settled that the findings of the enquiry officer should not be based on mere hypothesis as disciplinary proceeding though admittedly not like a criminal proceeding or a civil proceeding but it is a quasi-criminal proceeding. The aforesaid views of this Court get its support from the judgment of the Apex Court in case of Narinder Mohan Arya v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in (2006) 4 SCC 713 wherein the Apex Court also discussed as to how the appellate authority has to pass an appellate order. The Apex Court in the aforesaid case also noted that "An appellate order if it is in agreement with that of the disciplinary authority may not be a speaking order but the authority passing the same must show that there had been proper application of mind on his part as regards the compliance with the requirements of law while exercising his jurisdiction under Rule 37 of the Rules. 16. In the instant case, Rule 15 of the Rules is also pari materia to the Rule 37 of the General Insurance (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1975. From the appellate order, it appears that the appellate authority have acted, though as a disciplinary authority but did not follow even the prescription of the Rule 15 of the Rules aforementioned while disposing of the appeal of the petitioner. After going through the order of the appellate authority, as communicated by the Managing Director, vide Annexure 11 to the writ petition, there is no hesitation in mind of this Court that the appellate authority also failed to apply its mind while disposing of the appeal. After going through the order of the appellate authority, as communicated by the Managing Director, vide Annexure 11 to the writ petition, there is no hesitation in mind of this Court that the appellate authority also failed to apply its mind while disposing of the appeal. Though normally, the Writ Court should not interfere with the order of punishment, passed by the disciplinary authority and approved by the appellate authority, but as the petitioner admittedly established a case of procedural irregularities in the disciplinary proceeding, this Court has no other option except to interfere with the order of punishment. Moreso the punishment awarded by the authority is also not prescribed either Service Rules or the CCS (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. 17. For the foregoing reasons and discussions, as stated above, the impugned orders (Annexure-10 and 11 to the writ petition) cannot be sustained and are hereby set aside. As this Court set aside the impugned orders, this Court is bound to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority for consideration of the matter afresh on merit. But having regard to the facts and circumstances involved in the instant case, particularly, as the alleged misconduct is pertaining to the period w.e.f. 1990-96 and by this time, the petitioner also suffered a lot being a retired employee and as informed by the Bar, almost all the witnesses have retired by now, it would not be proper for his Court to remit the matter again to the disciplinary authority. This Court, hopes and trusts, that naturally in consequence of the quashing of the orders is that the petitioner will be entitled to the money if any deducted from his pensionary benefits in view of the order of the disciplinary authority as approved by the appellate authority. 18. In the result, the petition is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.