JUDGMENT Ghulam Mohammed, J. These two writ petitions are filed praying this Court to declare provisions of the Wakf Act, 1995 (Central Act 43 of 1995) particularly Section 14 of the Wakf Act, unconstitutional, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14, 25 and 26 of the Constitution. 2. WP No. 11349 of 1996 is filed by the Association of AP Saj jada Nasheens, Mutawallies & Khidmat Guzaran of Wakfs, Dargah Hazrath Shaikh-ji-hali, Urdu Shareef, Hyderabad, represented by its President Soofi Shah Mohd. Sabir Ali and WP No. 11728 of 1996 is filed by All India Shia Organization, Yakutpura, Hyderabad, represented by its Joint Secretary Mirza Mehdi Ali Baig. Since the relief sought for in these writ petitions is the same, they are taken up together for hearing and are being disposed of by a common judgment. 3. The facts in WP No. 11349 of 1996 are adverted to. It is stated that prior to the enactment of the Wakf Act, 1995, the Union Legislature had enacted the Wakf Act, 1954 and the provisions of the said Act held the field for the last about half a century in all the States of this country, though the Union Legislature and some of the State Legislatures have been making amendments from time to time to the provisions of the Wakf Act, 1954 according to the exigencies. The very concept of creation and administration of wakf give rise to the concept of the person or persons connected with the administration of the wakf. The said persons may either be appointed by the author of the wakfs or under a statute or by the users of the wakf and such persons are called "Mutawallis" under the Muslim Personal Law. The very purpose of enacting the Act is to provide better administration for wakfs and the matters connected thereto or incidental thereto. 4. It is further stated that the Wakf Act, 1995, provides for the better administration of Wakf and other incidental matters thereto. That while the avowed object of the Act is to democratize the functions of the wakfs and to make the Mutawallis a self-governing body, the provisions of the Wakf Act, 1995, in fact totally denude Mutawallis of the powers and functions and purport to confer powers on a body constituted by persons who are totally unconnected with wakfs or their intents and purposes. That while Sub-clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 provides for election of one or two members from the Muslim members of the Parliament, State Legislature, Muslim members of the Bar Council and the Mutawallis of the wakfs having annual income of one lac and above, Sub-clauses (c), (d) and (e) of Sub-section (1) empower the State Government to nominate certain officers or persons to the Board. That in pursuance of Section 109 Wakf Act, 1995, the Government of Andhra Pradesh framed rules for conducting elections in G.O.Ms. No. 68, dated 27-5-1996 and by subsequent G.O.Ms. No. 74, dated 11-6-1996, the Government constituted the Wakf Board by conducting elections of the members of the AP Wakf Board under Sub-clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Wakf Act, 1995, from among members of the Parliament, members of the Legislature, members of the AP Bar Council and Mutawallis of the wakfs in the State, having an annual income of one lac and above. It is further stated that only one member can be elected from among Mutawallis, whereas four members are required to be elected from other denominations. It is stated that the Government is empowered to nominate two persons from each category of persons under Clauses (c) and (d) and also appoint a government official under Clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. Thus five persons are nominated by the Government and four persons are elected from bodies which have nothing to do with the wakfs. In the result, out of ten or eleven persons which would constitute Wakf Board, nine or ten, members are persons who are not at all connected with wakfs. 5. It is further stated that the Members of the Parliament or the Legislature, or even a member of the Bar Council of the State, even though belonging to Muslim Community, are not elected thereto on account of their being Muslims muchless on account of their having to do anything with the Muslim religious institutions, such as wakfs. It is stated that wakf is essentially an institution which should take care of the affairs of Muslims which are religious, pious and charitable recognized by the Muslim personal law. It is stated that wakf is essentially an institution which should take care of the affairs of Muslims which are religious, pious and charitable recognized by the Muslim personal law. That in the earlier enactment viz., Wakf Act, 1954, although it conferred powers on the Government to appoint persons to the Wakf Board, criteria was laid down therein to the effect that the persons appointed must be known to have some knowledge, information and interest in the Muslim personal law more particularly the aspects which Islamic law considers pious, religious and charitable. If any person or persons were to be appointed unconnected with such purposes or whose bona-fides relating to Islamic religion were in doubt, the appointment of such persons was liable to be challenged in a Court of law and was liable to be corrected by the process of Judicial Review which was a check on the arbitrary power of the Government. In the impugned Wakf Act, 1995 although, the process of selection of members is purported to be by election, the criteria laid down is totally unconnected with the purpose of religion and more particularly the purposes relating to the administration of wakfs. 6. It is further stated that any person, although belonging to Muslim Community, elected to Parliament, or State Legislature or to the State Bar Council cannot avowedly say that he represents Islamic religion and is on account of his devotion to such religion or matters connected with such religion, that he has been elected thereto. The election to the concerned Legislatures or Bar Council of States is for a different purpose under different Legislations which are secular and are absolutely unconnected with the religion. That the constitutional process of holding elections to the legislatures (Central and State) is to secure a secular and democratic political structure to take care of the social, economic and political interest of the people, while keeping away the religious sentiments therefrom and, therefore, it is obvious that persons purporting to represent the secular interests of a constituency, however, big or small, cannot represent the religious objects, purposes and religious interest of Muslim Community muchless the interest of the Mutawallis and the administration of wakfs. It is further stated that many religious Muslims dedicate their properties as a Wakf for certain object which according to them are religious, pious and charitable under Muslim personal laws and, therefore, the administration of wakfs is strictly religious, and relates to religious sentiments of the persons concerned with die particular wakf. It is further stated that each Waqkif (the author of the Wakf) either nominates a Mutawalli or lays down the criteria or conditions as to how and in what manner the choice of Mutawallis be made and, the purp6ses and objects of the particular wakf be carried out. 7. It is stated that as the purported object of the Wakf Act,l995, is to safeguard the interest of the wakfs and provide better administration thereto, it cannot be gainsaid that the Board or at-least a majority thereof, dealing with such administration must necessarily comprise of the persons concerned with the wakfs viz., Mutawallis of the wakfs, but contrary to such expectation, the provisions of the Wakf Act, 1995, and more particularly the action of the State Government, in the purported exercise of such provisions totally leads to denial of that object. That in the Board which consists of 11 persons under Clauses (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act, only one member is representing the interest of the Mutawallis of the Wakfs and this is highly detrimental to the interest of the wakfs being violative of the constitutional guarantee provided under Article 14 of the Constitution. 8. It is also submitted that the provisions of the Wakf Act, 1995, are in contravention of the provisions of Article 25 and 26 of the Constitution. That Article 26 of the Constitution ordains every religious denomination or any Section thereof shall have a right to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; to manage its own affairs in matters of religion; to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and to administer such property in accordance with law, the provisions of Section 14 of the Wakf Act, 1995, are totally in contravention of these constitutional guarantees. It is stated that there are more than one Lac wakfs in the State of AP, but only 22 wakfs satisfying the criteria for the purpose of choosing a representative of wakfs by virtue of the restriction laid down under Sub-clause (iv) of Sub-clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Wakf Act, 1995 i.e. wakfs having an annual income of one lac and above; and that higher income of a wakf cannot be a criteria in choosing as a member of the Wakf Broad and this criteria is absolutely arbitrary and discriminatory and is violative of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. 9. Counter affidavit is filed by the Under Secretary, Ministry of Minority Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, representing the 1st respondent-Union of India stating that the allegation of the petitioners that the Wakf Act, 1995 purports to elect only one from amongst the Mutawallis is factually incorrect as under Sub-section (1)(b) of Section 14 of the Act, one and not more than two members, as the State Government may think fit, are to be elected from each of the four electoral colleges and, therefore, it is not correct to contend that four members of the Wakf Board are persons not concerned with the affairs and administration of the Wakfs. It is also stated that only members of the Muslim community are to be elected and in the light of definition under Clause (k) of Section 3 of the Wakf Act, 1995, it cannot be said that the members of the Wakf Board elected through the electoral colleges have nothing to do with the wakfs. It is also stated that even in the Wakf Act, 1954, the practice of nomination of members of State Legislature and Members of Parliament representing the State to Wakf Board has been continuing and no objection was ever taken though the provision had been on the statute for about 45 years till it was modified from time to time and eventually replaced by Act 43 of 1995. It is denied that matters connected with the administration of wakfs are strictly religions because wakfs are dedicated for purposes which are religions, pious or charitable as per the Muslim law and the statement of the petitioners is accepted to the extent that Wakif (endower) of the wakf either nominates a Mutawalli or lays down criteria or conditions with regard to the administration of wakfs. But it is denied that the provisions of the present Wakf Act, 1995, which provides for election of one or two Mutawallis to the Wakf Board is detrimental to the interests of Mutawallis and is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as the Wakf Act, 1995 does not interfere with the right of the Mutawallis to manage the wakf properties under their charge so long as they manage it in accordance with the intention of the Wakif and apply the income thereof to the objects and for the purposes for which the wakfs were created or intended. It is also denied that the criteria for allowing only Mutawallis of wakfs having annual income of rupees one lac and above to form electoral college of Mutawallis is either arbitrary, discriminatory or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as this restriction is imposed on a practical analysis of the matter. It is stated that even according to the petitioners there are about one lac wakfs and therefore it is practically not possible to have an electoral college for such a large number of Mutawallis and this cannot be described as discrimination against the other Mutawallis in the same way as giving right of voting to persons of above 18 years of age cannot be described as a discrimination against those citizens of Indian who are less than 18 years of age and, therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 10. Assistant Secretary to Government Minorities Welfare Department, AP Secretariat, Hyderabad, filed counter affidavit representing the 2nd respondent-Secretary, Minority Welfare & Wakf Department, Government of AP, Hyderabad. It is stated therein that the Wakf Act, 1954 was enacted to provide better administration and supervision of wakf through State Wakf Board but as the actual working of the Wakf Act, 1954 brought out many deficiencies in it, amendments were made from time to time and one such amendment related to the composition of the Wakf Board. It is stated therein that the Wakf Act, 1954 was enacted to provide better administration and supervision of wakf through State Wakf Board but as the actual working of the Wakf Act, 1954 brought out many deficiencies in it, amendments were made from time to time and one such amendment related to the composition of the Wakf Board. It is stated that Section 10 was introduced by Amendment Act 69 of 1984, under which the constitution of Board consisted of (i) four members who shall be elected among themselves by such of the muslim members of Parliament as have been elected thereto from the State or the Union Territory of the Delhi, as the case may be, and the other two shall be elected from among themselves by such of the muslim members of the State Legislative Assemblies as have been elected thereto, and as such the election shall be held in accordance with the system of the proportionate representation by means of a single transferable vote in such manner as may be prescribed, (ii) five members to be appointed by the State Government of whom one shall be Shia where there is no Shia Board in the State, (iii) one shall be a person who is a recognized Scholar in Islamic theology, (iv) one from among the members of any muslim Organization and (v) two persons possessing administrative experience and knowledge of Law and (vi) one Muthawalli to be appointed bv the State Government. The Wakf Commissioner was made the ex-officio member Secretary of the Board. It is stated that although the said amendment was made to the proviso in the year 1984 many of the provisions including Section 10 of the Wakf Act, 1995, could not be enforced in view of the strong opposition expressed by muslim Members of Parliament and also from the muslim Institutions. It is stated that the main criticism to Wakf Act, 1984 was that it facilitated gross interference by the State in the day-today management of the wakf. The other criticism related to the power given to the Wakf Commissioner which was considered to be over-riding the power of the Wakf Board in certain cases. It is stated that the main criticism to Wakf Act, 1984 was that it facilitated gross interference by the State in the day-today management of the wakf. The other criticism related to the power given to the Wakf Commissioner which was considered to be over-riding the power of the Wakf Board in certain cases. The provisions of the Wakf Act, 1984, were examined in the light of the suggestions and objections submitted to the Committee on Wakf Act, 1984, which held series of discussions with the muslim Members of Parliament, State Government Ministers, In-charge of Wakf, Members of Central Wakf Council and some other eminent muslim personalities that led to a broad consensus with regard to the various provisions and ultimately culminating into enactment of the Wakf Act, 1995. 11. It is stated that the Wakf Act, 1995 has thus been enacted with the object of providing for better administration of the wakfs and matters connected there with or incidental thereto. That as seen from the reasons and objects of the Wakf Act, 1995, the Act seeks to provide for the constitution of Wakf Board with members of which majority will comprise of such persons as are elected from amongst the muslim Members of Parliament, muslim members of State Legislative, muslim member of Bar Council in the State and Muthawallies of the wakfs having annual income of one lakh or more, nominated members from the muslims Organization and muslim Scholars and the representative of the State Government. The object clause, amongst other, provides for distribution of the powers between the Wakf Board and the Chief Executive Officer, appointment of the Executive Officer in respect of the certain institutions, strengthening of the finances of the Wakf Board, restrictions on the powers of the Muthawallies in the interest of better management of the wakf property, setting up of Wakf Tribunals and to bring uniformity in respect of wakf administration throughout the Country. 12. It is further stated that in order to achieve the aforesaid objects, the Act provides for survey of wakfs, Central Wakf Council, establishment of the State Wakf boards, registration of wakfs, maintenance of accounts of wakfs, finances of the Board, audit of the funds etc. and in order to provide for judicial remedies in the matter of disputes relating to wakfs and their managements, the Act also provides for the constitution of Wakf Tribunals. and in order to provide for judicial remedies in the matter of disputes relating to wakfs and their managements, the Act also provides for the constitution of Wakf Tribunals. The Wakf Act, 1995, has been made a self contained Code as regards the administration of Wakfs, and all the existing Wakf laws in different States have been repealed, thereby introducing a uniform law for the entire country, except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. That the establishment of Wakfs Tribunals under the Act is a distinguishing feature of the Wakf Act, 1995, and a reading of the entire provisions makes it manifestly clear that they regulate the various activities which ultimately lead to proper administration and utilization of wakfs for which the respective wakfs have been established. That none of the provisions lays down anything relating to religious practices nor do the provisions restrict the freedom of those concerned with the wakfs. Thus the various provisions of the Wakf Act, 1995, are in fact secular in nature. 13. It is added that under Article 25(2)(a) of the Constitution the State is empowered to regulate the secular activities associated with religious practice and as the various provisions of the Wakf Act, 1995, are regulatory and none of the provisions lays down any restrictions or interferes with the essentials of Islamic or its religious practices of muslims or any denomination thereof. It is also stated that the provisions of the Wakf Act, 1995, do not deprive the religious denominations of their right to administer wakf or properties owned or acquired by them. 14. It is stated that the right guaranteed under Article 26 of the Constitution not being absolute and unqualified, any reasonable regulations may be made by the State, consistent with the fundamental right. It is stated that a particular fundamental right cannot exist in isolation in water tight compartment and exercise of fundamental right of a person may have to co-exist in harmony with the exercise of other fundamental rights by others. That in the light of this scenario, the contention of the petitioners that the Wakf Act, 1995 is unconstitutional being violative of Articles 14, 25 and 26 of the Constitution, is wholly without any substance. 15. That in the light of this scenario, the contention of the petitioners that the Wakf Act, 1995 is unconstitutional being violative of Articles 14, 25 and 26 of the Constitution, is wholly without any substance. 15. With regard to constitution of the Board u/s 14 of the Wakf Act, 1995, it is stated that neither the freedom of the Mutawallies nor their rights to perform any religious functions as such has been affected by such composition of the Wakf Board. That the right of the petitioners to perform any religious rites or other activities integrally connected with religion has not been affected in any way. That u/s 32 of the Wakf Act, 1995, the Wakf Board has the power of general superintendence over all wakfs and the Wakf Board exercises its power only to ensure that the wakfs are properly maintained, controlled and administered and the income thereof is duly applied to the objects and for the purposes for which such wakfs are created or intended. That in exercising the powers under the Wakf Act, 1995, the Wakf Board shall have to act in conformity with the directions of wakif, the purposes of the wakf and any usage or custom concerned sanctioned by Muslim Law in respect of such wakfs. Thus the powers and functions of the Wakf Board, as mentioned in Section 32 of the Wakf Act, 1995, are all matters relating to good governance of the wakfs and the said powers do not interfere with any religious activities. 16. It is further stated that the contention of the petitioners that a person, although a muslim, elected to Parliament or State Legislature or to the State Bar Council cannot represent Islamic religion on the ground that his election has been made for a different purpose, is wholly misconceived. It is stated that a member of the Wakf Board constituted u/s 14 of the Wakf Act, 1995, is not performing any religious duty, performing his duties and discharging functions as member of the Board u/s 32 of the Wakf Act which are supervisory and regulatory in nature. That even a Muthawalli whose cause the petitioners represent in these writ petitions, does not perform any religious duties as per the definition of "Muthawalli" and a Muthawalli cannot claim to represent Islamic religion. That even a Muthawalli whose cause the petitioners represent in these writ petitions, does not perform any religious duties as per the definition of "Muthawalli" and a Muthawalli cannot claim to represent Islamic religion. A Member of Parliament, Member of Legislative Assembly or Member of State Bar council is entitled to be a member of the Wakf Board as he is as good a Muslim as any other Muslim. It is denied that the stipulation of one lakh income is for a Muthwalli to become a Wakf Board member, the provision relates to the income of a wakf, which is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable and reliance is placed on the Division Bench decision of the Karnataka High Court in Syed Shah Muhammad Al Hussaini Vs. Union of India and Others, . It is further stated that the percentage of Shia Wakfs is not more than 15% as per the record of the Wakf Board, and as such creation of a separate Shia Wakf Board is not applicable as yet. 17. It is further stated that by any stretch of imagination, it cannot be said that the provisions of Section 14 of Wakf Act, 1995 are either arbitrary, or violative of Articles 14, 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. That the provisions of Wakf Act, 1995, and more particularly Section 14 are not unconstitutional in any manner whatsoever and, therefore, the writ petitions are devoid of merits and the same are liable to be dismissed. 18. In the counter affidavit filed by the 3rd respondent-Chief Executive Officer, A.P. State Wakf Board it is stated that in matters of election of members to Wakf Board, the procedure prescribed under Rule 4 of A.P. State Wakf Board Conduct of Election Rules, 1996, is being scrupulously followed and there is no substance in the allegations of the petitioners, since the composition of the Wakf Board is such that all the members of the Muslim community from various walks of life are given fair representation in the Wakf Board and as such there is no violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. That the question of constitution of Shia Wakf Board is not tenable because as per the old Wakf Act, the entries in the Wakf register have become final by virtue of Section 6 of the old Wakf Act. That the question of constitution of Shia Wakf Board is not tenable because as per the old Wakf Act, the entries in the Wakf register have become final by virtue of Section 6 of the old Wakf Act. It is stated that even otherwise, the percentage of Shia Wakf is not more than 15% in numbers, as per the records of the Wakf Board, and as such the provisions of Section 13(2) of the Wakf Act, 1995 will not be attracted. It is also stated that Shia muslim community will not be affected by not creating separate Wakf Board as the present Wakf Board is not established for a particular community and the Wakf Board's sole motive is to protect wakf properties and to administer the wakf institutions irrespective of whether they are shia or sunni wakf. That the Wakf Board is having a member from Shia muslim community as such the rights of the Shia muslim community have also been safe guarded. It is further stated that as per the survey conducted, wakf properties identified as on 15-7-2009 are around 70795 and further as per the memo dated 16-7-2009, issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh, the survey of wakf properties is still in progress and not yet completed. 19. A reply affidavit is filed by the petitioners to the counter affidavits filed by the respondents 2 and 3. In the reply affidavit it is stated that according to all notions and concepts of Mohammedan law, the creation of a wakf and the administration thereof are religious. That it is the basic tenet of Muslim law that a wakf property vests in God Almighty to be utilized for purposes which are considered to be religious and, therefore, the administration of all wakf properties is also considered to be religious. Matters concerned with religion are beyond the legislative and administrative powers of the State for any purpose whatsoever. That it is the basic tenet of Muslim law that a wakf property vests in God Almighty to be utilized for purposes which are considered to be religious and, therefore, the administration of all wakf properties is also considered to be religious. Matters concerned with religion are beyond the legislative and administrative powers of the State for any purpose whatsoever. It is further submitted that even accepting the power or authority of the legislature to provide a procedure for formation of a regulatory or a governing body relating to any wakf, the procedure must only provide for an election by the body of the Muthawallies only and no outsider not even a Member of Parliament or Member of Assembly or a Member of Bar Council or persons belonging to "eminent Muslim organisation" or the persons purporting to be recognised scholars in the Islamic theology should be imposed. It is stated that even if the Legislature feels the necessity of including any of such members in the Board, their choice must be left to the body of the Muthawallies themselves and the State cannot import or impose any person from outside without the choice of the Muthawallies. 20. It is stated that confining the right of election to only such Muthawallies of the wakfs whose income is more than One lac per annum is unjustified on any parity of reason whatsoever and absolutely unconstitutional. The averment that there are only 22 wakfs having an income of one lac and above, is not denied by the respondents, the exclusion of 99,978 wakfs out of one lac wakfs and giving representation only to 22 out of them cannot be justified on any parity of reasons. It is submitted that the process of election to the category of Mutawallis includes the Managing Committees of some of the wakfs which are appointed by the Wakf Board and this again curtails the rights of the Mutawallis and this has been done only with a view to get persons owing allegiance to the political parties. 21. It is submitted that the process of election to the category of Mutawallis includes the Managing Committees of some of the wakfs which are appointed by the Wakf Board and this again curtails the rights of the Mutawallis and this has been done only with a view to get persons owing allegiance to the political parties. 21. Sri K. Prathap Reddy, leaned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners has contended that there are more than 70000 wakfs in the State of AP, but only 22 wakfs having annual income of one lac and above have been chosen for the purpose of participating in electoral college to elect a member to the Wakf Board from among the denomination of Mutawallis. It is stated that there is no adequate representation of the Mutawallis in the Wakf Board and the representation given to the Mutawallis was restricted to the Mutawallis of the wakf having one lac and above income, which itself is contrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is contended that when it comes to rendering of service to Allah, the Almighty, a pauper or a wealthy is equal and, therefore, categorization of Mutawallis in terms of monetary considerations, is impermissible under Islamic law. It is also contended that categorization of the wakfs and in effect categorization of the Mutawallis on the basis of monetary consideration is against the tenants of Islam besides being discriminatory offending Article 14 of the Constitution. It is stated that right to equality not only means right not to be discriminated against but also protection against any arbitrary or irrational act of State. It is further contended that when the statute itself makes a discrimination on the basis of monetary consideration, the statue would be invalidated for being in conflict with the equal protection clause, and the plea that the provision is actually working out for the benefit of the wakf would not be a material fact for consideration. 22. Learned Counsel has also drawn our attention to Section 14 of the Wakf Act, 1995, and submitted that u/s 14(1)(b)(i) to (iv) of the Act, there is every possibility of appointing persons as members of the Board not fully conversant with religious rituals of Islam, though such persons may be of Muslim community, the purpose of the Act is being subsized and the Wakf properties are not better administered. Learned Counsel further stated that composition of Wakf Board is entirely left to the discretion of the State Government and as such the provisions of the Act contravene the - guarantees in religious matters under Article 25 and 26 of the Constitution. It is stated that the law which takes away the right of administration from the hands of a religious denomination altogether and vests it in any other authority would amount to violation of the right guaranteed under Article 26(d) of the Constitution. 23. Learned senior Counsel has also drawn our attention to Sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 32 of the Act which confer power on the Wakf Board, to the effect that where the Wakf Board is satisfied that any wakf land, offers a feasible potential for development as a shopping center, market, housing flats and the like, it may with the prior approval of the Government, take over the wakf property and use it for its intended purpose, these provisions are against the will and wish of the Wakif and the terms of the Wakfnama in respect of the such wakfs, which are dedicated to Allah the Almighty by the Wakifs. Learned Counsel would contend that the wakf properties which are dedicated by the Wakifs for a lawful object recognized by Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable, cannot be utilized for a purpose not specified by the wakif and not sanctioned by the Muslim law on the ground only of being feasible potential for development on monetary considerations. 24. Learned senior Counsel has also drawn our attention to Section 51 of the Act which speaks about alienation of wakf property with the prior sanction of the Wakf Board. Learned Counsel submitted that the wakf properties which are in fact dedications made to Alah the Almighty, cannot be alienated muchless on the ground that the wakf property is fetching reasonable and adequate consideration as contemplated under Clause (iii) Sub-section (2) of Section 51 of the Act. 25. Sri Mohan Parasaran, learned Addl. Learned Counsel submitted that the wakf properties which are in fact dedications made to Alah the Almighty, cannot be alienated muchless on the ground that the wakf property is fetching reasonable and adequate consideration as contemplated under Clause (iii) Sub-section (2) of Section 51 of the Act. 25. Sri Mohan Parasaran, learned Addl. Solicitor General of India appearing for the 1st respondent-Union of India has contended that the equality Clause enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution is of wide import and the restriction imposed under Sub-clause (iv) Clause (b) Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act is based on intelligible differentia having nexus with the object sought to be achieved and forms a separate and distinct class, and, therefore, such classification is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is also stated that the capacity to administer and the experience of Mutawallis of wakfs having an annual income of more than one lac constitute a class among themselves and cannot be equated with such Mutawallis of the wakfs not having sufficient annual income from the wakfs. It is also contended that the intention in prescribing the composition of the Wakf Board and the object of the Act is to better administer the wakf properties and the scheme of the Act does not in any way interfere in matters of religion. It has nowhere been established by the petitioners that they have been prohibited or debarred from professing, practicing and propagating their religion. Amendments were made to the Wakf Act, 1954 in 1959, 1964, 1969 and 1984, but still there was criticisms as to its actual working, so a new comprehensive Bill on matters pertaining to wakf was passed in the year 1995 (Act No. 43 of 1995). Learned senior Counsel has drawn our attention to the definition of the Wakf in Section 3(r) of the Wakf Act and contended that right to administer a Wakf is not confined to any individual or association of individuals or the State and it vested in the plurality constituting denominations from all walks of the Muslim community categorized u/s 14(1)(b)(i) to (iv) of the Act. It is also contended that the functions of the Wakf Board cannot be termed as religious as if it runs a religious institution. It is stated that a mere possibility of misuse cannot be a ground in itself for striking down provisions of any law. It is also contended that the functions of the Wakf Board cannot be termed as religious as if it runs a religious institution. It is stated that a mere possibility of misuse cannot be a ground in itself for striking down provisions of any law. 26. Sri A. Sudershan Reddy, learned Addl. Advocate General appearing for the 2nd respondent-State represented by Secretary, Minority Welfare & Wakf Department, Hyderabad, submitted that under Article 25(2)(a) of the Constitution the State is empowered to regulate the secular activities associated with religious practice and as various provisions of the Wakf Act, 1995 are regulatory and none of the provisions lays down any restrictions nor interferes with activities of religion or the religious practices of muslim religion. None of the provisions of the Wakf Act, 1995, deprive the religious denominations of their right to administer the properties owned or acquired by it. It is also stated that the right guaranteed under Article 26 of the Constitution cannot exist in isolation and exercise of fundamental right of a person may have to co-exist in harmony with the exercise of other rights. It is further stated that the Wakf Act, 1995 provides for the better administration of the Wakfs and matters connected thereto and the constitution of the Wakf Board in terms of Section 14 of the Wakf Act, 1995 comprises of such persons as are elected from amongst the muslim Members of Parliament, muslim members of State Legislative, muslim member of Bar Council of the State and Muthawallies of the Wakfs having annual income of Rupees one lakh or more and nominated members from the muslims Organization and muslim Scholars and the representative of the State Government and thus representation has been given to all Sections of muslim community and stipulation of Muthawalli of a wakf having one lac income to become eligible to be a member of the Wakf Board is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable as it speaks of a class and cannot be termed as discrimination against those Muthawallis whose Wakf's income is less than one lac and it is a permissible classification. 27. 27. Learned Standing Counsel for the 3rd respondent-Wakf Board has stated that Section 14 of the Wakf Act, 1995 seeks to provide for the constitution of the Wakf Board by members of which majority comprises of such persons as are elected from amongst the muslim Members of Parliament, muslim members of State Legislature, muslim member of Bar Council of the State and Muthawallies of the Wakfs having annual income of one lac or more and a few nominated members from the muslim organizations and muslim scholars and the representative of the State Government and that the intention of the Parliament in providing such composition of the Wakf Board is to ensure effective administration of wakf properties and not merely to give representation to muslim jurists or theologists. It is stated that administration of the Wakf property is a matter of experience depending upon the nature of Wakf and, therefore, it has been righdy thought to afford only such Mutawallis an opportunity of being members of the Wakf Board as would be having adequate experience of administering the wakf properties which is ascertained and measured on the yard stick of income of the Wakfs. It is further submitted that the allegation of the petitioners that a person, although a muslim, elected to Parliament or State Legislature or to the State Bar Council cannot represents Islamic religion on the ground that his election has been made for a different purpose, is wholly misconceived. 28. The points that arise for our consideration are whether; (i) Section 14 of the Wakf Act, 1995 is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution; and (ii) composition of a Wakf Board u/s 14 of the Act interferes with the religious rights of the petitioners guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. Point (i): 29. The grievance of the petitioners who are AP Sajjada Nasheens, Mutawallis and Khidmat Guzaran as noticed above, is that in view of the provisions of Section 14 of the Wakf Act, 1995, laying down composition of Wakf Board, they do not have adequate representation in the decision making process in regard to wakfs with which they are concerned. They submit that a Wakf Board shall have members of muslim community and not muslim members of Parliament or the State Legislature who are elected by the larger Sections of the society for a different purpose. They submit that a Wakf Board shall have members of muslim community and not muslim members of Parliament or the State Legislature who are elected by the larger Sections of the society for a different purpose. Representation of the Mutawallis should be more than two in number and the restriction imposed under Sub-clause (iv) Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act, on the Mutawallis whose wakfs' income is less than one lac has to be struck down being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 30. The institution of wakf in India is about a thousand years old. Huge extents of lands have been dedicated as wakfs by muslim, rulers and the ruled alike, for religious and charitable purposes. The approximate number of registered wakf properties in India is stated to be three lacs and account for four lac acres of land through out the country and this makes wakfs the third-largest landholder after the Railways and Defence. The administration of wakfs has been subject matter of judge made law and codified law, including the present Wakf Act, 1995. 31. It is necessary to preface our discussion with the concept of 'wakf' and a general account of the various terms associated with wakfs. It is well recognized that 'wakf' under the Muslim Law means, dedication of property for purposes recognized by the Muslim Law as pious, religious and charitable. Muslim law and the religion thereof are almost synonymous expressions and are so intermixed that it is difficult to dissociate one from the other, in other words, generally, what is religious is lawful, what is lawful is religious. Muslim law and the religion thereof are almost synonymous expressions and are so intermixed that it is difficult to dissociate one from the other, in other words, generally, what is religious is lawful, what is lawful is religious. The statutory definition of 'wakf' as given under Clause (r) of Section 3 of the Wakf Act, 1995, reads: (r) "Wakf" means the permanent dedication by a person professing Islam, of any movable or immovable property for any purpose recognized by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable and includes- (i) a Wakf by user but such Wakf shall not cease to be a Wakf by reason only of the user having ceased irrespective of the period of such cesser; (ii) "grants", including mashrut-ul-khidmat for any purpose recognized by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable; and (iii) a wakf-al-al-aulad to the extent to which the property is dedicated for any purpose recognized by Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable, and Wakif means any person making such dedication; 32. The other definitions in Section 3 of the Wakf Act, 1995, to the extent relevant, read thus: (a) "Beneficiary" means a person or object for whose benefit a wakf is created and includes religious, pious and charitable objects and any other objects of public utility sanctioned by the Muslim law; (k) "Person interested in a wakf" means any person who is entitled to receive any pecuniary or other benefits from the wakf and includes- (i) any person who has a right to worship or to perform any religious rite in a mosque, idgah, imambara, dargah, khangah, maqbara, grave- yard or any other religious institution connected with the wakf or to participate in any religious or charitable institution under the Wakf; (ii) the Wakif and any descendant of the Wakif and the mutawalli; (s) "Wakf deed" means any deed or instrument by which a wakf has been created and includes any valid subsequent deed or instrument by which any of the terms of the original dedication have been varied; 33. Section 14 of the Wakf Act, 1995, impugned in these writ petitions, which deals with the composition of the Wakf Board, reads thus: 14(1) The Board for a State and the Union Territory of Delhi shall consist of.- (a) a Chairperson; (b) one and not more than two members, as the State Government may think fit, to be elected from each of the electoral colleges consisting of: (i) Muslim members of Parliament from the State or, as the case may be, the Union Territory of Delhi; (ii) Muslim members of the State Legislature; (iii) Muslim members of the Bar Council of the State; and (iv) Mutawallis of the wakfs having an annual income of rupees one lakh and above; (c) one and not more than two members to be nominated by the State Government representing eminent Muslim organizations; (d) one and not more than two members to be nominated by State Government, each from recognized scholars in Islamic theology; (e) an officer of the State Government not below the rank of Deputy Secretary. (2) Election of the members specified in Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) shall be held in accordance with the system of proportional representation by means of a single transferable vote, in such manner as may be prescribed: Provided that where the number of Muslim members of Parliament, the State Legislature or the State Bar Council, as the case may be, is only one, such Muslim member shall be declared to have been elected on the Board: Provided further that where there are no Muslim members in any or the categories mentioned in Sub-clauses (i) to (iii) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1), the ex-Muslim members of Parliament, the State Legislature or ex-member of the State Bar Council, as the case may be, shall constitute the electoral college. 34. The statutory definition of the term 'wakf' in Clause (r) of Section 3 of the Wakf Act, 1995, is explained by the Apex Court in Faqruddin (Dead) through L.Rs. Vs. Tajuddin (Dead) through L.Rs., at para 27 of the judgment, thus: wakf would mean taking out something out of one's ownership and passing it on to God's ownership dedicating its usufruct-without regard to indigence or affluence, perpetually and with the intention of obtaining Divine pleasure-for persons and individuals, or for institutions or mosques and graveyards, or for other charitable purposes. Once a Wakf; always a Wakf: 35. Once a Wakf; always a Wakf: 35. Once the properties are dedicated in the name of Allah and endowed as wakf they are perpetual, irrevocable and inalienable and thereby once a wakf always a wakf. The definition of wakf in Section 3(r) of Wakf Act, 1995 also specifies 'wakf' as a "permanent dedication" and thus acknowledges the above principle because once a wakf is validly created it continues to remain as such. The principle is reinforced by the concept of wakf by user as incorporated in Section 3(r)(ii) of Wakf Act, 1995. Grants and Mashrut-ul-Khidmat: 36. The expression "Grant Mashrut-ul-Khidmat" means a grant conditioned with rendering of specified services. The definition of wakf u/s 3(r)(ii) of the Act includes this expression and therefore a valid wakf can be created by making a conditional grant. A valid wakf can be created only for a lawful object and it should be recognized by Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable. In Sayyed Ali and Others Vs. Andhra Pradesh Wakf Board Hyderabad and Others, while discussing the character of dedication of property, it was observed that the character of dedication of property need not be in favour of dargah and that grants by way of service inams for purposes recognized by Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable would constitute wakf. Wakf al-al-aulad: 37. The expression "wakf al-al-aulad" as defined u/s 3(r)(iii) of the Act means where beneficiaries of a wakf are the descendants of wakif and it is only when there is none in the line, that the usufruct passes on to poor. On dedication of any property, the wakif is free to bestow the usufruct but not the property, upon whomsoever he chooses and in whatever manner he likes, and that the benefit must endure for ever. If he bestowes the usufruct in the first instance upon those whose maintenance is obligatory on him, or if he gives it to his descendants so long as they exist to prevent their falling into indigence, it is considered a pious indeed more pious than giving to the third persons. However in order to impart permanency to the wakf which is an essential ingredient of a valid wakf, it is usually mentioned by the wakif that if the wakif s descendants fail or are not available in the long run, the income from the wakf must go-to the poor. However in order to impart permanency to the wakf which is an essential ingredient of a valid wakf, it is usually mentioned by the wakif that if the wakif s descendants fail or are not available in the long run, the income from the wakf must go-to the poor. Inclusion of the poor even after extinction of the descendants of the wakif is charitable purpose recognized by muslim law therefore wakf-al-al-aulad is included in the definition of wakf u/s 3(r) of the Act. 38. The Calcutta High Court in STP Limited Vs. Nirmaljit Singh Hoon, , examined the language of Section 3(r) of the Act and observed that the Act would have application to the Wakf-al-al-aulad or wakfs created for private and secular purposes to the extent of the provisions made therein for religious and charitable purposes. However, it was further observed that the character of the remaining portion of the wakf property would not be affected or altered merely because they would no longer be governed by the provisions of the Wakf Act, 1995 and would be governed by Mohammedan Law and enactments enacted in respect thereof, such as the Mussalman Wakf Validating Acts of 1913 and 1930, the Religious Endowments Act, 1863 and the Shariath Application Act, 1937. Thus the High Court of Calcutta held that the Legislature with deliberate intent kept private wakfs out of the ambit of the said Act and the administrative control of the authorities appointed or constituted under the Wakf Act, 1995, except to the extent that provision was made therein for religious and charitable purposes. Wakif: 39. The term wakif is applied to the person who makes the wakf. As per the definition of wakf given in Section 3(r) of the Wakf Act, 1995, a wakf is a dedication of movable or immovable property "by a person professing Islam". Therefore it is necessary that in order to be governed by the provisions of the Wakf Act, 1995, a valid wakf has to be created u/s 3(1) of the Act only by a person professing Islam. Mutawalli: 40. According to Mohammedan law, mutawalli is manager and administrator of the wakf property but not the owner of the wakf property as the ownership of the wakf property vests in Allah, the Almighty. Mutawalli: 40. According to Mohammedan law, mutawalli is manager and administrator of the wakf property but not the owner of the wakf property as the ownership of the wakf property vests in Allah, the Almighty. The position of mutawalli is very significant in the sense that he is not merely a servant or manager of the wakf to carry out the directions of the wakif (i.e. one who creates wakf) but has also to exercise his own discretion and take decisions diligently for the protection of the wakf property and proper utilisation of its income according to the directions of the wakif. Where a sajjadanashin is also a Mutawalli, he has, in addition, certain spiritual functions to perform in such a case he is not only a mutawalli, but also a spiritual preceptor and curator of the durgah where usually his ancestor would be buried, and in him is supposed to continue the spiritual line (silsilla). As is believed, durgahs are the graves of celebrated dervishes, who in their life-time were regarded as saints. Some of these men had established khankahs where they imparted religious instruction and training to their disciples. The definition of mutawalli under Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act includes other persons such as Naibmutawalli, Khadim, Mujawar, Sajjadanashin Amin or Committee appointed by the Wakf Board. All these persons are brought within the sweep of the definition of "mutawalli" to hold all such persons responsible and accountable in matters of wakf property and matters incidental thereto. 41. The concept of Wakf and Matawalli is well explained by the Privy Council in the case of Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Baluswami AIR 1922 PC 123 , the relevant para reads fhus: 13. The Mahommedan law relating to trusts differs fundamentally from the English law. 41. The concept of Wakf and Matawalli is well explained by the Privy Council in the case of Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Baluswami AIR 1922 PC 123 , the relevant para reads fhus: 13. The Mahommedan law relating to trusts differs fundamentally from the English law. It owes its origin to a rule laid down by the Prophet of Islam; and means "the tying up of property in the ownership of God the Almighty and the devotion of the profits for the benefit of human beings." When once it is declared that a particular property is wakf, or any such expression is used as implies wakf, or the tenor of the document shows, as in the case of Jewun Doss Sahoo v. Shah Kubeerooddeen (1840) that a dedication to pious or charitable purposes is meant, the right of the wakif is extinguished and the ownership is transferred to the Almighty. The donor may name any meritorious object as the recipient of the benefit. The manager of the wakf is the mutawalli, the governor, superintendent, or curator. In Jewan Doss Sahoo's case the Judicial Committee call him "procurator." That case related to a khankah, a Mahommedan institution analogous in many respects to a math where Hindu religious instruction is dispensed. The head of these khankhas, which exist in large numbers in India, is called a sajjadanishin. He is the teacher of religious doctrines and rules of life, and the manager of the institution and the administrator of its charities and has in most cases a larger interest in the usufruct than an ordinary mutawalli. But neither the sajjadanishin nor the mutawalli has any right in the property belonging to the wakf; the property is not vested in him and he is not a "trustee "in the technical sense. 42. The submission that there are more than 70000 wakfs in the State of AP, but only 22 wakfs have been chosen for the purpose of electing a representative of the wakfs by the virtue of the restriction laid down u/s 14(1)(b)(iv) of the Act and that itself is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. This contention appears to be attractive, but fails on close examination. The Wakf Act applies to the whole of India with the exception of Jammu and Kashmir. This contention appears to be attractive, but fails on close examination. The Wakf Act applies to the whole of India with the exception of Jammu and Kashmir. The argument is built on the statistics of the State of AP in regard to total number of wakfs and wakfs whose annual income is more than one lac. Nothing is placed on record to show the position either in other States or on all India basis. Even assuming that the ratio of number of wakfs having income of a lac and more vis-a-vis total number of wakfs in Andhra Pradesh [being 22: 70000] does indicate that the representation of mutawallis in Wakf Board is inadequate that itself cannot be a ground to strike down a provision as it would be irrational to declare Section 14 of the Wakf Act, which has all India application, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution merely on the position obtaining in one State. 43. Muthawallis as a class is a constituent of a Wakf Board under the Act. Dehors the Wakf Act they have no right to be on the Board. The Act included them in the Wakf Board as members subject to the qualification of representing wakfs having income of a lac and more. The Parliament having regard to the various suggestions and after realising the needs and requirements of the people, analyzing the same laid down a criteria of including only such mutawallis of wakfs whose annual income is a lac and above to form a class of mutawallis. In my view it is permissible classification as the object of fixing such ceiling is to have Mutawallis of wakfs who have better functional capabilities to represent in the Wakf Board. Permissible classification has to satisfy the twin test, namely, (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia and; (ii) that the differentia must have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved. It is settled proposition of law that presumption of a statute is always towards its constitutionality, unless the contrary is made out. In the instant case, the classification of the wakfs on the basis of its annual income has a rational nexus to the object i.e. the State Wakf Board should have Mutawlllis of functional capabilities and that is gauged in terms of income of a wakf. In the instant case, the classification of the wakfs on the basis of its annual income has a rational nexus to the object i.e. the State Wakf Board should have Mutawlllis of functional capabilities and that is gauged in terms of income of a wakf. The burden on the petitioners is very heavy and I am not satisfied that the burden is discharged by them. 44. On the principle of classification, the following pronouncements will be enlightening. 45. In Re Kerala Education Bill AIR 1957 SC 956 the constitutional Bench of seven Judges of the Apex Court considered the meaning, scope and effect of Article 14 of the Constitution, at para 15 held thus: 15. It is now well established that while Article 14 forbids class legislation it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation and that in order to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (ii) such differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different bases, namely, geographical, or according to objects or the occupations or the like and what is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. The pronouncements of this Court further establish, amongst other things, that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and that the burden is upon him, who attacks it, to show that there has been a clear violation of the constitutional principles. The Courts, it is accepted, must presume that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds. The Courts, it is accepted, must presume that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds. It must be borne in mind that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest and finally that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the Court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation. 46. In Deepak Sibal Vs. Punjab University and Another, with reference to Article 14 of the Constitution at paras 9 and 20 held thus: 9. It is now well settled that Article 14 forbids class legislation, but does not forbid reasonable classification. Whether a classification is a permissible classification under Article 14 or not, two conditions must be satisfied, namely, (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (2) that the differentia must have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. 20. In considering the reasonableness of classification from the point of view of Article 14 of the Constitution, the Court has also to consider the objective for such classification. If the objective be illogical, unfair and unjust, necessarily the classification will have to be held as unreasonable. In the instant case, the foregoing discussion reveals that the classification of the employees of Government/Semi-Government institutions etc. by the impugned rule for the purpose of admission in the evening classes of Three-Year LL. B. Degree Course to the exclusion of all other employees, is unreasonable and unjust, as it does not sub-serve any fair and logical objective.... 47. The Division Bench of Karanataka High Court in Syed Shah Muhammad Al Hussaini Vs. Union of India and Others, considered the validity of Section 14 of the Wakf Act, 1995 and the Bench while upholding the composition of the Wakf Board u/s 14 of the Act, at paras 2, 5, 11, 15, 17 observed thus: 2. 47. The Division Bench of Karanataka High Court in Syed Shah Muhammad Al Hussaini Vs. Union of India and Others, considered the validity of Section 14 of the Wakf Act, 1995 and the Bench while upholding the composition of the Wakf Board u/s 14 of the Act, at paras 2, 5, 11, 15, 17 observed thus: 2. It has been contended by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner that the scheme of the offending Section makes it possible for persons to become the member of the Wakf Board, who are not aware of the personal law of Islam, in particular Shariath, which defeats the very purpose of the wakf as recognised under the Muslim Law. It is contended that a wakf cannot be a creature of the statute, but is a concept of dedication, The purpose of wakf being wholly religious could not be permitted to be made irreligious as is alleged to have been intended in the name of secularism by reason of Section 14, which according to the petitioner jeopardises and destroys the religiosity of the wakf and administration of the wakf properties. The petitioner further contend that the Act violates Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution which guarantee inalienable rights to the petitioner. 5. It is well recognised that wakf under the Islamic Law meant dedication of property for purposes recognised by the Muslim Law as pious, religious and charitable. Such purposes cannot be given a narrow concept as has been tried to be done by the petitioner, which if followed would frustrate the purpose for which the property is dedicated by a Muslim. The Act only provides for the better administration of the wakfs and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto and does not either restrict or control the wakf or the intended purpose or object for which it was created. 11. The principles of equality does not mean the universal application of laws for all persons who are not by nature, attainment or circumstances in the same position. The Mutawallis of wakfs having an annual income of more than rupees one lakh constitute a class in themselves and cannot be equated with such Mutawallis, who do not have any annual income from the wakf or any experience of dealing with the management of the property. The Mutawallis of wakfs having an annual income of more than rupees one lakh constitute a class in themselves and cannot be equated with such Mutawallis, who do not have any annual income from the wakf or any experience of dealing with the management of the property. If a law is shown to be dealing equally with the members of a well defined class, it cannot be held to be discriminatory on the ground of not providing equal protection being allegedly not applicable to the other persons. It cannot be forgotten that the presumption is in favour of constitutionality of a law since it is presumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of the people and its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and its discriminations are based on adequate grounds. The burden to prove the discrimination is always upon the person who alleges it. 15. Freedom of conscience and religion recognises the right to profess, practice and propagate religion subject to the restrictions imposed by the State on the ground of public order, morality, health, social welfare and reform. Freedom of conscience means to acquire a knowledge or sense of right or wrong, moral judgment that opposes the violation of previously recognised ethical principles, which led to the feelings of guilt if one violates such a principle. Such freedom therefore cannot be connected with any particular religion or of any faith in God. It is commonly understood as the right of a person not to be converted into another man's religion.... 17. The scheme of the Act reflects that Chapter II has been enacted for the purposes of having a survey of the wakfs in the State and the publication of such wakfs. Disputes regarding wakfs are intended to be resolved by the Tribunal constituted for the purposes of the Act. Chapter III deals with the establishment and constitution of Central Wakf Council and Chapter IV with die establishment of State Boards and their functions. Section 14, as already noted, prescribes the composition of the Board. Section 15 prescribes the term of the office and Section 16 deals with the disqualification of a person to be a member of the Board. Section 23 authorizes the State Government to appoint a Chief Executive Officer of the Board in consultation with the Board and by Notification in the Official Gazette. Section 15 prescribes the term of the office and Section 16 deals with the disqualification of a person to be a member of the Board. Section 23 authorizes the State Government to appoint a Chief Executive Officer of the Board in consultation with the Board and by Notification in the Official Gazette. Such an officer is the ex officio Secretary of the Board and is to remain under the administrative control of the Board.... The scheme of the Act does not in any way show the interference of the State in the matters of religion thus allegedly violating the guarantees as provided under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. The writ petition appears to have been filed upon unfounded apprehensions and concocted grounds. The allegations made in the petition are based upon hypothesis, which have nothing to do with the reality. The object of the petition apparently does not appear to be genuine or in the interest of the religion for whose benefit it is proclaimed to have been filed. Quashing of Section 14 or any other part of the Act would defeat the very purpose for which the Act was enacted resulting in the mismanagement of the wakf property, which would endanger the purpose for which the wakfs are acknowledged to have been created and dedicated. All the pleas raised on behalf of the petitioner being unfounded are liable to be rejected. 48. I am in respectful agreement with the reasoning and conclusion of the learned Judges. 49. Inclusion of elected muslim members of Parliament, State Legislature and Bar Council in the Wakf Board of a State is based upon consideration of their obligation and responsibility to the people in general and muslims in particular and they contribute positively for providing better administration of wakfs and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto and inasmuch as the functions of the Wakf Board are secular and supervisory in nature, no exception can be taken for such a composition. Individual grievances of specific misuse of powers by the Wakf Board can be redressed in appropriate forum and for that purpose the composition the Board cannot be declared as unconstitutional. 50. In the light of the above discussion I hold that Section 14 of the Wakf Act is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Point (ii): 51. Individual grievances of specific misuse of powers by the Wakf Board can be redressed in appropriate forum and for that purpose the composition the Board cannot be declared as unconstitutional. 50. In the light of the above discussion I hold that Section 14 of the Wakf Act is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Point (ii): 51. Now coming to point (ii), the language of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution is sufficiently clear to enable the Court to determine as to what matters come within the purview of religion and what do not. 52. We shall refer to cases relied on by the petitioners. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in The Durgah Committee, Ajmer and Another Vs. Syed Hussain Ali and Others, the relevant paras of the judgment reads thus: 33. We will first take the argument about the infringement of the fundamental right to freedom of religion. Articles 25 and 26 together safeguard the citizen's right to freedom of religion. Under Article 25(1), subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of Part III, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and their right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion. This freedom guarantees to every citizen not only the right to entertain such religious beliefs as may appeal to his conscience but also affords him the right to exhibit his belief in his conduct by such outward acts as may appear to him proper in order to spread his ideas for the benefit of others. Article 26 provides that subject to public order, morality and health every religious denomination or any Section thereof shall have the right- (a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; (b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion; (c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and (e) to administer such property in accordance with law. The four Clauses of this article constitute the fundamental freedom guaranteed to every religious denomination or any Section thereof to manage its own affairs. It is entitled to establish institutions for religious purposes, it is entitled to manage its own affairs in the matters of religion, it is entitled to own and acquire movable and immovable property and to administer such, property in accordance with law. 53. It is entitled to establish institutions for religious purposes, it is entitled to manage its own affairs in the matters of religion, it is entitled to own and acquire movable and immovable property and to administer such, property in accordance with law. 53. The Apex Court decision in Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj Vs. The State of Rajasthan and Others, , paras 61 and 62 reads thus: 61. In this connection, it cannot be ignored that what is protected under Articles 25(1) and 26(b) respectively are the religious practices and the right to manage affairs in matters of religion. If the practice in question is purely secular or the affair which is controlled by the statute is essentially and absolutely secular in character, it cannot be urged that Articles 25(1) or 26(b) has been contravened. The protection is given to the practice of religion and to the denomination's right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. Therefore, whenever a claim is made on behalf of an individual citizen that the impugned statute contravenes his fundamental right to practise religion or a claim is made on behalf of the denomination that the fundamental right guaranteed to it to manage its own affairs in matters of religion is contravened, it is necessary to consider whether the practice in question is religious or the affairs in respect of which the right of management is alleged to have been contravened are affairs in matters of religion. If the practice is a religious practice or the affairs are the affairs, in matters of religion, then, of course, the rights guaranteed by Articles 25(1) and 26(b) cannot be contravened. 62. If the practice is a religious practice or the affairs are the affairs, in matters of religion, then, of course, the rights guaranteed by Articles 25(1) and 26(b) cannot be contravened. 62. ...If an obviously secular matter is claimed to be matter of religion, or if an obviously secular practice is alleged to be a religious practice, the Court would be justified in rejecting the claim because the protection guaranteed by Article 25(1) and Article 26(b) cannot be extended to secular practices and affairs in regard to denominational matters which are not matters of religion, and so, a claim made by a citizen that a purely secular matter amounts to a religious practice, or a similar claim made on behalf of the denomination that a purely secular matter is an affair in matters of religion, may have to be rejected on the ground that it is based on irrational considerations and cannot attract the provisions of Articles 25(1) or 26(b). This aspect of the matter must be borne in mind in dealing with the true scope and effect of Articles 25(1) and 26(b) of the Constitution. 54. In Ratilal Panachand Gandhi Vs. The State of Bombay and Others, , the Apex Court observed that what Sub-clause (a) of Clause (2) of Article 25 of the Constitution contemplated was not the State regulation of the religious practices as such which were protected unless these ran counter to public health or morality but of activities which were really of economic, commercial or political character though these were associated with religious practices. It was further observed thus: ...With regard to the affairs in the matters of religion, the right of management given to a religious body was a guaranteed fundamental right which no legislation could take away. On the other hand, as regards administration of property which a religious denomination was entitled to own and acquire, it had undoubtly the right to administer such property but only in accordance with law. This meant that the State could regulate the administration of trust properties by means of law validly enacted; but under Article 26(d), it was the religious denomination itself which had been given the right to administer its property in accordance with any law which the State might validly impose. This meant that the State could regulate the administration of trust properties by means of law validly enacted; but under Article 26(d), it was the religious denomination itself which had been given the right to administer its property in accordance with any law which the State might validly impose. A law, which took away the right of administration altogether from the religious denomination and vested it in any other or secular authority, would amount to violation of the right which was guaranteed by Article 26(d) of the Constitution, The distinction between matters of religion and those of secular administration of religious properties might, at times, appear to be a thin one. But in cases of doubt, the Court should take a common sense view and be actuated by consideration of practical necessity. 55. Our attention is drawn to the decision in M.P. Gopalakrishnan Nair and Another Vs. State of Kerala and Others, wherein the Apex Court ruled that members of electoral college electing committee members of Guruvayoor Devaswom though required to be Hindus who believed in God and temple worship, but need not have the same beliefs as the committee was concerned purely with the secular aspects of management of the Temple, while religious matters had been left entirely in hands of the "Thanthri". Paras 31, 34, 36 reads thus: 31. Indisputably the State has the requisite jurisdiction to oversee the administration of a temple subject to Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. The grievance as regard the violation of the constitutional right as enshrined under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India must be considered having regard to the object and purport of the Act. For fulfilling the said requirements, the denomination must have been enjoying the right to manage the properties endowed in favour of the institutions. If the right to administer the properties never vested in the denomination, the protection under Article 26 of the Constitution of India is not available. 34. The freedom guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution is not an unconditional one. A distinction exists between the matters of religion, on the one hand, and holding and management of properties by religious institutions, on the other. 34. The freedom guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution is not an unconditional one. A distinction exists between the matters of religion, on the one hand, and holding and management of properties by religious institutions, on the other. What is necessary to be considered for determining the issue is as to whether by reason of the impugned Act the administration of the institution had been taken from the hands of the religious denomination and vested in another body. If the answer to the said question is rendered in the negative, attack to the constitutionality of the Act would not survive. 36. It is also now trite that although State cannot interfere with the freedom of a person to profess, practise and propagate his religion, the secular matters connected therewith can be the subject matter of control by the State. The management of the temple primarily is a secular act. The temple authority controls the activities of various servants of the temple. It manages several institutions including educational institutions pertaining to it. The disciplinary power over the servants of the temple, including the priest may vest in a committee. The payment of remuneration to the temple servants was also not a religious act but was of purely secular in nature. 56. To the same effect is the decision of the Apex Court in Shri Jagannath Temple Puri Management Committee and Another Vs. Chintamani Khuntia and Others, where a group of temple attendants called "Sevaks" contending that they are entitled to a share out of the collections of the offerings made by the devotees inside the Jagannath temple at Puri and the amended Section 28-B and Sub-section (9) of Section 28-C of Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1954 contravene the provisions of Articles 25, 26 and 300-A of the Constitution. Para 50, which is relevant reads thus: 50. A review of the judgments goes to show that the consistent view of this Court has been that although the State cannot interfere with freedom of a person to profess, practise and propagate his religion, the State, however, can control the secular matters connected with religion. All the activities in or connected with a temple are not religious activities. The management of .pl65 a temple or maintenance of discipline and order inside the temple can be controlled by the State. All the activities in or connected with a temple are not religious activities. The management of .pl65 a temple or maintenance of discipline and order inside the temple can be controlled by the State. If any law is passed for taking over the management of a temple it cannot be struck down as violative of Article 25 or Article 26 of the Constitution. The management of the temple is a secular act. The temple authority may also control the activities of various servants of the temple. The disciplinary power over the servants of the temple, including the priests, may be given to the Temple Committee appointed by the State. The Temple Committee can decide the quantum and manner of payment of remuneration to the servants. Merely because a system of payment is prevalent for a number of years, is no ground for holding that such system must continue for all times. The payment of remuneration to the temple servants was not a religious act but was of purely secular nature. 57. In the instant case, in providing composition of Wakf Board in Section 14 of the Act, I do not find any interference with the freedom of conscience or the right to freely profess, practice or propagate the religion by the petitioners. It has nowhere been pleaded by the petitioners that they have been prohibited or debarred from professing, practising and propagating their religion or managing the affairs of the wakfs in accordance with the principles of Islamic law or the direction of the wakifs. 58. In so far as other contentions touching the constitutionality or otherwise of Section 32 of the Wakf Act, 1995 which confers power on the Wakf Borad, to develop the wakf property, wherever feasible, into shopping center, market, housing flats and the like, and Section 51 which enumerates the grounds on which the wakf property can be subject matter of sale, we are not inclined to go into the merits or otherwise as there is no specific prayer in the writ petition seeking relief with regard to exercise of its powers under Sections 32 and 51 of the Act, except stating that some of the wakf properties are put to use other than the intention expressed by the wakif in the wakfnama. I leave the point open. 59. I leave the point open. 59. However, before parting with the case, I would observe that a large number of Wakfs have become defunct. It is noticed that over one lac properties and establishments have been either encroached upon or forcibly occupied and are hardly serving the purpose they are meant for. It cannot be gainsaid that it is the duty of the State to preserve, protect, maintain, administer and improve the wakf properties. If the wakf properties are managed properly, many problems of members of the muslim minority, such as lack of education, unemployment and resultant poverty could be resolved. A wakf can become a strong instrument not only for the preservation of religious and charitable institutions, but also for the educational and economic development of the community. Wakfs can constitute a national asset for a very large number of them can support schools, colleges, technical institutions, libraries, reading-rooms, charitable dispensaries and Musafirkhanas, etc., which benefit the public irrespective of their religion or creed for a valid wakf can be made in favour of a non-muslim if the wakif so desires. It is of utmost importance, therefore, that wakfs should be maintained properly and their resources should be utilized for the objects and the purposes of dedications. But unfortunately, many of the existing wakfs are allowed to fall into decadence by the impact of twin factors of neglect and misuse. 60. On facts of the case and also on the above analysis, I do not find merit in these writ petitions and they are accordingly dismissed. No costs. ORDER Vilas V. Afzulpurkar, J. 61. I had the benefit of reading the draft judgment prepared by my learned Brother Sri Justice Ghulam Mohammed. Though I have high regard and great respect for him, I regret my inability to concur with the views expressed therein. I, therefore, propose to give reasons in support of my conclusions separately as under. 62. As the cause tide suggests, the writ petitions are filed by Mutawallies, Sajjda Nasheens and Khidmat Guzarans of various wakfs in Andhra Pradesh and in the twin cities in particular. I, therefore, propose to give reasons in support of my conclusions separately as under. 62. As the cause tide suggests, the writ petitions are filed by Mutawallies, Sajjda Nasheens and Khidmat Guzarans of various wakfs in Andhra Pradesh and in the twin cities in particular. The provisions of the Wakf Act, 1995 and more particularly Section 14 thereof is challenged on the ground that it is opposed to guarantees given to religious denominations under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India and that even otherwise the aforesaid provisions are arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 63. The Wakf Act, 1995 (for short 'the Act') enacted by the Parliament with a view to provide better administration of Wakfs and matters connected therewith and incidental thereto. Prior to the present Act, the Wakf Act, 1954 was enacted and regarding the working of the said Act, a Wakf enquiry committee was set up. After receipt of its report, keeping in view the recommendations of the committee, Wakf Amendment Bill 1984 was introduced and after due consideration Wakf (Amendment) Act, 1984 was passed. However again on strong opposition to various provisions therein only two provisions u/s 66-G and 66-H were notified and brought into force. The said provisions deal with period of limitation for filing suits with regard to wakf property in adverse possession and the period of limitation was raised from 12 years to 30 years (Section 66-G) and wakf property was deemed to be vested in the Wakf Board (Section 66-H). The various provisions as contained in Amendment Act, 1984 were again discussed with eminent Muslim personnel and a comprehensive bill namely, Wakf Bill 1993 was introduced by the Parliament and ultimately the Wakf Act, 1995 was enacted and brought into force with effect from 01.01.1996 throughout the country except the State of Jammu & Kashmir. With regard to the Dargah Khawaja Saheb, Ajmer, separate enactment in Dargah Khawaja Saheb Act, 1955 was enforced and to that extent this Act does not apply. Constitutional Protection: 64. Since the submission on behalf of the petitioners is substantially based upon Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India, the said Articles are extracted hereunder for the sake of convenience. 25. Constitutional Protection: 64. Since the submission on behalf of the petitioners is substantially based upon Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India, the said Articles are extracted hereunder for the sake of convenience. 25. Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion.- (1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion. (2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law- (a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice; (b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and Sections of Hindus. Explanation I.- The wearing and carrying of Kirpan shall be deemed to be included in the profession of the Sikh religion. Explanation II.- In Sub-clause (b) of Clause (2), the reference to Hindus shall be construed as including a reference to persons professing the Sik, Jaina or Buddhist religion, and the reference to Hindu religious institutions shall be construed accordingly. 26. Freedom to manage religious affairs.- Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any Section thereof shall have the right- (a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; (b) to manage its own affairs in matter of religion; (c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and (d) to administer such property in accordance with law. It would be noticed from the above that Article 25 declares freedom of conscience and right to profess, practice and propagate religion. The said freedom, however, is subject to public order, morality and health. Under Clause (2) of the Article the State is empowered to make laws relating to economic, financial, political or other secular activities, which may be associated with religious practice. Thus, a distinction is maintained between religious activities and secular activities associated with religious practice. In other words, therefore, while granting freedom of conscience and right to profess, practice and propagate religion, the State reserves to itself the power to make laws with respect to secular activities associated with such religious practice. Thus, a distinction is maintained between religious activities and secular activities associated with religious practice. In other words, therefore, while granting freedom of conscience and right to profess, practice and propagate religion, the State reserves to itself the power to make laws with respect to secular activities associated with such religious practice. Further, under Article 26 freedom of right to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes as well as right to manage its own affairs in the matters of religion including owning and acquiring movable and immovable properties is granted to every religious denomination. Clause (d) further provides that such religious denomination or any Section thereof shall have right to administer such property in accordance with law. Thus, even under this Article every religious denomination or Section thereof is given freedom and right to establish, maintain and manage religious and charitable institutions in the matter of religion and the State reserves to itself the power to make laws for administration of property of such institutions and the right aforesaid is regulated by law, which is aimed at maintaining public order, morality and health. Article 19(1)(c) is also relevant as the learned senior Counsel for the petitioners placed reliance upon the said Article. A detailed discussion on the above Constitutional provisions would be made at an appropriate place in the context of considering the submission of the petitioner. Wakf Act, 1995: 65. Wakf under the Wakf Act is defined u/s 3 Sub-clause (r) as follows: 3(r). "wakf" means the permanent dedication by a person professing Islam, of any movable or immovable property for any purpose recognised by the Muslim Law as pious, religious or charitable and includes- i. a wakf by user but such wakf shall not cease to be a wakf by reason only of the user having ceased irrespective of the period of such cesser; ii. "grants", includingmashrut-ul-khidmat for any purpose recognised by the Muslim Law as pious, religious or charitable; and iii. a wakf-al-al-aulad to the extent to which the property is dedicated for any purpose recognized by Muslim Law as pious, religious or charitable, and 'wakif' means any person making such dedication; The authoritative text by renowned authors and thinkers of Mahommedan Law, has dealt with the origin as well as the law relating to Wakfs under the Mahommedan Law. Ameer Ali in his classic commentaries on Mahommedan Law (5th Edition Chapter VII Pg. Ameer Ali in his classic commentaries on Mahommedan Law (5th Edition Chapter VII Pg. 215) deals with Wakfs in the following words: The law relating to Trusts or wakf is by far the most important branch of Mahommedan Law. The doctrine has been recognized and enforced in the Mussulman system from the earliest times. Historically its origin is traced to the direct prescriptions of the Prophet. The doctrine of wakf is thus interwoven with the entire religious life and social economy of Mussulmans. According to all the schools of Muslim Law, a wakf may be created for the benefit of any person or class of persons or for any object of pity or charity. The words pity and charity have a much wider signification in Muslim religion than any other system and the test of what is good and pious or charitable is the approval of Almighty. Another point worthy of attention in the Muslim Law is that every trust for whatever purpose created is really and in fact, for the benefit of human beings. The religious and legal system of Islam is founded essentially on the service and well being of humanity. 66. Another authoritative text, Fyzee-Outlines of Muhammadan Law, by Asaf A.A. Fyzee, introduces wakf as under: The word wakf literally means 'detention'; but in Islamic law it means (i) state lands which are inalienable, used for charitable purposes; and (ii) pious endowments in India generally we are concerned with the second meaning, and wakf is thus a pious endowment which is inalienable and therefore supposed to be perpetual. The motive in a wakf is always religious and consequently wakf is financially endowed in perpetuity in the eye of law and the property belongs to God and as such the dedication is both permanent and irrevocable. Wakf, therefore, means a permanent dedication by a person professing the Mussulman faith of any property for any purpose recognized by the Mussulman Law as religious, pious or charitable. 67. Mulla's "Principles of Mohammedan Law", 19th Edition, also adopt the definition of wakf as above and further qualify that the dedication must be permanent and not for a limited period and it may relate to any property including immovable such as shares in joint stock companies, Government promissory notes and even money. 67. Mulla's "Principles of Mohammedan Law", 19th Edition, also adopt the definition of wakf as above and further qualify that the dedication must be permanent and not for a limited period and it may relate to any property including immovable such as shares in joint stock companies, Government promissory notes and even money. The property dedicated by way of wakf must belong to the Wakif (dedicator) at the time of dedication and the objects of the wakf may be religious, pious or charitable as one recognized by Mahommedan Law. Similarly, a wakf may be made either verbally or in writing and a wakf may be created by an act inter vivos or by will, if it is later, it is called testament of the wakf and a wakf inter vivos is completed by a mere declaration of intention by the owner. The first of all the legislations can be traced to Mussalman Wakf Validating Act, VI of 1913, which declares that it is lawful for a person professing the Mussalman faith to create a wakf, which in all other respects is in accordance with the provisions of the Mussalman law, for the following among other purposes: (a) for the maintenance and support wholly or partially of his family, children or descendants, and (b) where the person creating a wakf is a Hanafi Mussalman, also for his own maintenance and support during his lifetime or for the payment of his debts out of the rents and profits of the property dedicated. Provided that the ultimate benefit is in such cases expressly or impliedly reserved for the poor or for any other purpose recognized by the Mussalman law as a religious, pious or charitable purpose of a permanent character. The said legislation was followed by Wakf Act, 1913; Wakf Act, 1954; Wakf (Amendment) Act, 1984 and the present Wakf Act, 1995. In addition to the above before the present Wakf Act, 1995, the Official Trustees Act II of 1913; Charitable Endowments Act VI of 1890; Religious Endowments Act XX of 1863 and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to the extent of certain provisions therein also applied to the wakfs. Analogous challenges: 68. As mentioned above Dargah Khawaja Saheb Act is separate, but similar enactment, which is applicable only to Dargah Khawaja Saheb at Ajmer. Analogous challenges: 68. As mentioned above Dargah Khawaja Saheb Act is separate, but similar enactment, which is applicable only to Dargah Khawaja Saheb at Ajmer. Virus of certain provisions of the said Act on the grounds similar to the one with which we are concerned herein, was the subject matter of a decision of the Supreme Court in The Durgah Committee, Ajmer and Another Vs. Syed Hussain Ali and Others, . The impugned provisions of the said Act were held to be valid and not offending Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. It was held as under: Matters of religion in Article 26(b) include even practices which are regarded by the community as part of its religion. In order that the practices in question should be treated as a part of religion they must however be regarded by the said religion as its essential and integral part; otherwise even purely secular practices which are not an essential or an integral part of religion are apt to be clothed with a religious form and may make a claim for being treated as religious practices within the meaning of Article 26. Similarly, even practices though religious may have sprung from merely superstitious beliefs and may in that sense, be extraneous and unessential accretions to religion itself. Unless such practices are found to constitute an essential and integral part of a religion their claim for the protection under Article 26 may have to be carefully scrutinised; in other words, the protection must be confined to such religious practices are an essential and an integral part of it and no other. Regarding Hindu temples and endowments also similar challenges were made and were subject matter of the earliest decisions of the Supreme Court in The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras Vs. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt., (popularly known as Shirur Math's case). The constitutional validity of Madras Hindu Religious and Endowments Act (Act 2 of 1927) under which Hindu Religious and Endowments Board was constituted was under challenge with reference to Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. The said Act was later revised by Madras Hindu Religious and Endowments Act, 1951 and the new Act was also challenged. The Honourable Supreme Court in its classic judgment has laid down the legal position and it is being followed in numerous decisions thereafter. The said Act was later revised by Madras Hindu Religious and Endowments Act, 1951 and the new Act was also challenged. The Honourable Supreme Court in its classic judgment has laid down the legal position and it is being followed in numerous decisions thereafter. The Supreme Court held at Para 8 as follows: 8. The object of the legislation, as indicated in the preamble, is to amend and consolidate the law relating to the administration and governance of Hindu religious and charitable institutions and endowments in the State of Madras. As compared with the earlier Act, its scope is wider and it can be made applicable to purely charitable endowments by proper notification u/s 3 of the Act. The earlier Act provided for supervision of Hindu religious endowments through a statutory body known as the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board. The New Act has abolished this Board and the administration of religious and charitable institutions has been vested practically in a department of the Government, at the head of which is the Commissioner. The Supreme Court further, held at Paras 14 to 17 as follows: 14. We now come to Article 25 which, as its language indicates, secures to every person, subject to public order, health and morality, a freedom not only to entertain such religious belief, as may be approved of by his judgment and conscience, but also to exhibit his belief in such outward acts as he thinks proper and to propagate or disseminate his ideas for the edification of others. A question is raised as to whether the word "persons" here means individuals only or includes corporate bodies as well. The question in our opinion, is not at all relevant for out present purpose. A Mathadhipati is certainly not a corporate body he is the head of a spiritual fraternity and of virtue of his office has to perform the duties of a religious teacher. It is his duty to practise and propagate the religious tenets, or which he is an adherent and if any provision of law prevents him from propagating his doctrines that would certainly affect the religious freedom, which is guaranteed to every person under Article 25. It is his duty to practise and propagate the religious tenets, or which he is an adherent and if any provision of law prevents him from propagating his doctrines that would certainly affect the religious freedom, which is guaranteed to every person under Article 25. Institutions, as such cannot practise of propagate religion; it can be done only by individual person and whether these persons propagate their personal views or the tenets for which the institution stands is really immaterial for purposes of Article 25. It is the propagation of belief that is protected, no matter whether the propagation takes place in a church or monastery or in a temple or parlour meeting. 15. As regards Article 26, the first question is, what is the precise meaning or connotation of the expression "religious denomination" and whether a Math could come within this expression. The word "denomination" has been defined in the Oxford Dictionary to mean "a collection of individuals classed together under the same name: a religious sect or body having a common faith and organisation and designated by a distinctive name". It is well known that the practice of setting up Maths as centres of theological teaching was started by Shri Sankaracharya and was followed by various teachers since then. After Sankara came a galaxy of religious teachers and philosophers who founded the different sects and sub sects of the Hindu religion that we find in India at the present day. Each one of such sects or sub-sects can certainly be called a religious denomination, as it is designated by a distinctive name, - in many cases it the name of the founder - and has a common faith and common spiritual organization. The followers of Ramanuja, who are known by the name of Shri Vaishnabas, undoubtedly constitute a religious denomination; and so do the followers of Madhwacharya and other religious teachers. It is a fact well established by tradition that the Udipi Maths were founded by Madhwacharya himself and the trustees and the beneficiaries of these Maths profess to be followers of that teacher. The High Court has found that the Math in question is in charge of the Sivalli Brahmins who constitute a Section of the followers of Madhwacharya. It is a fact well established by tradition that the Udipi Maths were founded by Madhwacharya himself and the trustees and the beneficiaries of these Maths profess to be followers of that teacher. The High Court has found that the Math in question is in charge of the Sivalli Brahmins who constitute a Section of the followers of Madhwacharya. As Article 26 contemplates not merely a religious denomination but also a Section thereof, the Math or the spiritual fraternity represented by it can legitimately come within the purview of this Article. 16. The other thing that remains to be considered in regard to Article 26 is, what, is the scope of Clause (b) of the Article which speaks of management "of its own affairs in matters of religion?" The language undoubtedly suggests that there could be other affairs of a religious denomination or a Section thereof which are not matter of religion and to which the guarantee given by this Clause would not apply. The question is, where is the line to be drawn between what are matters of religion and what are not? 17. It will be seen that besides the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion which is given by Clause (b), the next two Clauses of Article 26 guarantee to a religious denomination the right to acquire and own property and to administer such property in accordance with law. The administration of its property by a religious denomination has thus been placed on a different footing from the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. The latter is a fundamental right which no Legislature can take away, where as the former can be regulated by laws which the legislature can validly impose. It is clear, therefore, that questions merely relating to administration of properties belonging to a religious group or institution are not matters of religion to which Clause (b) of the Article applies. What then are matters of religion? The word "religion" has not been defined in the Constitution and it is a term which is hardly susceptible of any rigid definition. What then are matters of religion? The word "religion" has not been defined in the Constitution and it is a term which is hardly susceptible of any rigid definition. In an American case 'Vide Davis v. Beason (1888) 133 US 333 at p. 342 (G), it has been said: that the term 'religion' has reference to one's views of his relation to his Creator and to the obligations they impose of reverence for His Being and character and of obedience to His will. It is often confounded with 'cultus' of form or worship of a particular sect, but is distinguishable from the latter. We do not think that the above definition can be regarded as either precise or adequate. Articles 25 and 26 of our Constitution are based for the most part upon Article 44(2), Constitution of Eire and we have great doubt whether a definition of 'religion' as given above could have been in the minds of our Constitution-makers when they framed the Constitution. Religion is certainly a matter of faith with individuals or communities and it is not necessarily theistic. There are well known religions in India like Buddhism andjainism which do not believe in God or in ay Intelligent First Cause. A religion undoubtedly has its basis in a system of belief or doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that religion as conductive to their spiritual well being, but it would not be correct to say that religion is nothing else but a doctrine or belief. A religion may not only lay down a code of ethical rules for its followers to accept, it might prescribe rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are regarded as integral parts of religion, and these forms and observances might extend even to matters of food and dress. The Supreme Court, further, held as under: ...Restrictions by the State upon free exercise of religion are permitted both under Articles 25 and 26 on grounds of public order, morality and health. Clause (2)(a) of Article 25 reserves the right of the State to regulate or restrict any economic, financial, political and other secular activities which may be associated with religious practice and there is a further right given to the State by Sub-clause (b) under which the State can legislate for social welfare and reform even though by so doing it might interfere with religious practices. ...In the first place, what constitutes the essential part of a religion is primarily to be ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself. If the tenets of any religious sect of the Hindus prescribe that offerings of food should be given to the idol at particular hours of the day, that periodical ceremonies should be performed in a certain way at certain periods of the year or that there should be daily recital of sacred texts or oblations to the sacred fire, all these would be regarded as parts of religion and the mere fact that they involve expenditure of money or employment of priests and servants or the use of marketable commodities would not make them secular activities partaking of a commercial or economic character; all of them are religious practices and should be regarded as matters of religion within the meaning of Article 26(b). Under Article 26(b), therefore, a religious denomination or organization enjoys complete autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rights and ceremonies are essential according to the tenets of the religion they hold and no outside authority has any jurisdiction to interfere with their decision in such matters 69. In another decision of the Supreme Court, in the same year, in Ratilal Panachand Gandhi Vs. The State of Bombay and Others, a distinction between the matter of religion and those of secular administration of religious properties was made and was observed that under Articles 25 and 26 religious denominations of a Section is a guaranteed right to establish and make institutions for religious and charitable purposes and to manage in its own way all affairs in the matters of religion. Under Clauses (b) and (d) of Article 26 in regard to affairs in matters of religion right of management given to religious body is a guaranteed fundamental right, which no legislation can take away. On the other hand, as regards administration of properties, which a religious denomination is entitled to own and acquire, it is undoubtedly a right to administer such properties but only in accordance with law. This means that the State can regulate the administration of trust properties by means of laws validly enacted. On the other hand, as regards administration of properties, which a religious denomination is entitled to own and acquire, it is undoubtedly a right to administer such properties but only in accordance with law. This means that the State can regulate the administration of trust properties by means of laws validly enacted. But here again it should be remembered that under Article 26(d), it is the religious denomination itself, which has been given the right to administer its properties in accordance with law, which the State may validly impose. A law, which takes away right of administration altogether from the religious denomination and vests in any other or secular authority would amount to violation of right, which is guaranteed under Article 26(d) of the Constitution of India. Thus, their Lordships considered the meaning of the word 'religion' in Paras 12 and 13, which are extracted hereunder: 12. The moot point for consideration, therefore, is where is the line to be drawn between what are matters of religion and what are not? Our Constitution-makers have made no attempt to define what religion' is and it is certainly not possible to frame an exhaustive definition of the word' religion' which would be applicable to all classes of persons. As has been indicated in the Madras case referred to above, the definition of 'religion' given by Fields, J. in the American case of Davis v. Beason (1888) 133 US 333 (B), does not seem to us adequate or precise. The term 'religion', thus observed the learned Judge in the case mentioned above, "has reference to one's views of his relations to His Creator and to the obligations they impose of reverence for His Being and Character and of obedience to his will. It is often confounded with 'culms' or form of worship of a particular sect, but is distinguishable from the latter. It may be noted that 'religion' is not necessarily theistic and in fact there are well-known religions in India like Buddhism and Jainism which do not believe in the existence of God or of any Intelligent First Cause. It is often confounded with 'culms' or form of worship of a particular sect, but is distinguishable from the latter. It may be noted that 'religion' is not necessarily theistic and in fact there are well-known religions in India like Buddhism and Jainism which do not believe in the existence of God or of any Intelligent First Cause. A religion undoubtedly has its basis in a system of beliefs and doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that religion to be conducive to their spiritual well being, but it would not be correct to say, as seems to have been suggested by one of the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court, that matters of religion are nothing but matters of religious faith and religious belief. A religion is not merely an opinion, doctrine or belief. It has its outward expression in acts as well. We may quote in this connection the observations of Latham, C.J. of the High Court of Australia in the case of Adelaide Co. v. The Commonwealth 67 C. W.L.R. 116 at p. 124 (C) where the extent of protection given to religious freedom by Section 116 of the Australian Constitution came up for consideration. It is sometimes suggested in discussions on the subject of freedom of religion that, though the civil government should not interfere with religious 'opinions', it nevertheless may deal as it pleases with any 'acts which are done in pursuance of religious belief without infringing the principle of freedom of religion. It appears to me to be difficult to maintain this distinction as relevant to the interpretation of Section 116. The Section refers in express terms to the 'exercise' of religion, and therefore, it is intended to protect from the operation of any Commonwealth laws acts which are done in the exercise of religion. Thus the Section goes far beyond protecting liberty of opinion. It protects also acts done in pursurance of religious belief as part of religion. In our opinion, as we have already said in the Madras case, these observations apply fully to the provision regarding religious freedom that is embodies in our Constitution. 13. Religious practices or performances of acts in pursuance of religious belief are as much a part of religion as faith or belief in particular doctrines. In our opinion, as we have already said in the Madras case, these observations apply fully to the provision regarding religious freedom that is embodies in our Constitution. 13. Religious practices or performances of acts in pursuance of religious belief are as much a part of religion as faith or belief in particular doctrines. Thus if the tenets of the Jain or the Parsi religion lay down that certain rites and ceremonies are to be performed at certain times and in a particular manner, it cannot be said that these are secular activities partaking or commercial or economic, character simply because they involve expenditure of money or employment of priests or the use of marketable commodities. No outside authority has any right to say that these are not essential parts of religion and it is not open to the secular authority of the State to restrict or prohibit them in any manner they like under the guise of administering the trust estate. Of course, the scale of expenses to be incurred in connection with these religious observances may be and is a matter of administration of property belonging to religious institutions; and if the expenses on these heads are likely to deplete the endowed properties or affect the stability of the institution, proper control can certainly be exercised by State agencies as the law provides. We may refer in this connection to the observation of Davar, J. in the case of Jamshed Ji. v. Soonabai 33 Bom 122 (D), and although they were made in a case where the question was whether the bequest of property by a Parsi testator for the purpose of perpetual celebration of ceremonies like Muktad bai. Vyezashni, etc. which are sanctioned by the Zoroastrian religion were valid charitable gifts, the observations, we think are quite appropriate for our present purpose. "If this is the belief of the community," thus observed the learned Judge, and it is proved undoubtedly to be the belief of the Zoroastrian community, - a secular Judge is bound to accept that belief - it is not for him to sit in judgment on that belief, he has no right to interfere with the conscience of a donor who makes a gift in favour of what he believes to be the advancement of his religion and the welfare of his community or mankind. These observations do, in our opinion, afford an indication of the measure of protection that is given by Article 26(b) of our Constitution. Thus, the matters of religion and those of secular administration of religious properties clearly made out and stand on a different footing and with respect to the latter the State is empowered to make laws. In the light of this exposition on legal position relating to Hindu religious endowments and wakfs under Mahommedan Law, we have to examine the challenge posed by the learned senior Counsel for the petitioner. Contentions of the Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners: 70. Sri K. Pratap Reddy, learned senior Counsel for the petitioners, primarily, contended that the freedom of religion as guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India read with Article 19(1)(c), which is relevant for the present purpose, would show that the Mutawallies and Sajjada Nasheens have been guaranteed a complete freedom to administer and manage their respective wakfs and the impugned Wakf Act, 1995 tends to interfere with the said guarantees and freedom. It is contended that the provisions of the Act are such mat for every activity of a Mutawalli the board's approval is required to be taken. The freedom to manage guaranteed under the Constitution is completely diluted by the provisions of the Act. 71. Learned Counsel made reference to various provisions of the Act to which we will make a reference shortly hereafter. He had, further, contended that based upon the authoritative texts of Ameer Ali, Fyzee as well as Mulla, as briefly referred to above, every wakf is purely religious in character and it has no secular functions as is sought to be distinguished and every activity of the wakf is nothing but a religious activity. The wakf created being a part of the religion, the pious and religious character of the wakf cannot be denied. He has also relied upon the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Vidya Varuthi v. Baluswami AIR 1922 PC 123 , which also contains the expositions relating to wakf by Ameer Ali J. He relied upon the following portion of the said judgment: But the Mohammedan Law relating to trusts differs fundamentally from the English Law. He has also relied upon the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Vidya Varuthi v. Baluswami AIR 1922 PC 123 , which also contains the expositions relating to wakf by Ameer Ali J. He relied upon the following portion of the said judgment: But the Mohammedan Law relating to trusts differs fundamentally from the English Law. It owes its origin to a rule laid down by the Prophet of Islam; and means "the trying up of property in the ownership of God at Almighty and the devotion of the profits for the benefit of human beings." When once it is declared that a particular property is wakf, or any such expression is used as implies wakf, or the tenor of the document shows, as in the case of Jewan Doss Sahoo v. Shah Kubeeroddeen (1837) 2 M.I.A. 390, that a decision to pious or charitable purposes is meant, the right of the wakf is extinguished and the ownership is transferred to the Almighty. The donor may name any meritorious object as the recipient of the benefit. The manager of the wakf is the Mutwali the governor, superintendent, or curator. In Jewan Doss Sahoo's case the Judicial Committee call him "procurator." IT related to a Khanka, a Mahommedan institution analogous in many respects to a Mutt where Hindu religious instruction is dispensed. The head of these Khankas, which exist in large numbers in India, is called a sajjada-nashin. He is the teacher of religious doctrines and rules of life, and the manager of the institution and the administrator of its charities, and has in most cases a larger interest in the usufruct than ordinary Mutwalli. But neither the sajjada-nashin nor the Mutwalli has any right in the property belonging to the wakf, the property is not vested in him and he is not a "trustee" in the technical sense. It was in view of this fundamental difference between the juridical conceptions on which the English law relating to trusts is based, and those which from the foundations of the Hindu and the Mahommedan systems that the Indian Legislature in enacting the Indian Trusts Act (II of 1882) deliberately exempted from its scope the rules of law applicable to wakf and Hindu religious endowments. 72. Learned senior Counsel has made serious criticism of powers and functions of the board u/s 32 of the Act, particularly, Sub-clauses (4) and (5). 72. Learned senior Counsel has made serious criticism of powers and functions of the board u/s 32 of the Act, particularly, Sub-clauses (4) and (5). It is contended that the power under Sub-clauses (4) and (5) is such that irrespective of the consent of the Mutawalli the property of a wakf may be ordered to be developed into a commercial complex destroying the very nature of the wakf. The aforesaid Sub-clauses of Section 32 of the Act, further, provide that the Government would have the ultimate say in deciding as to how to develop a wakf property without reference to the consent of Mutawalli. The learned senior Counsel would, therefore, contend that provisions of this nature gives enormous powers to the board and the Government, which the Mutawalli himself does not possess under the deed of wakf. Inalienability of wakf property is completely destroyed by such provisions. Further, Section 53 of the Act puts restriction on the power of Mutawalli to purchase any property, which is unintelligible. Section 64 of the Act empowers the board to remove a Mutawalli, which includes removal for not following the direction of the board, which leads to arbitrary exercise of power by the board. Section 65 of the Act gives the board the power to assume direct management by removing the Mutawalli or by substituting the Mutawalli. Similarly, the power to appoint the Chief Executive Officer of the board is vested with the Government under Sections 23, 25 and 26 of the Act, which ultimately shows that it is the Government, which exercises the complete control over the board and thereby on all the wakfs. Sections 50 to 53 of the Act, which prescribe duties of Mutawalli, does not refer to the duties envisaged under Wakfnama and the board itself is empowered to alienate the property of the wakf. 73. Section 14 of the Act, in particular, is attacked on the ground that a wakf board is created by constituting a collegium of persons, who are unconnected to the administration of the wakf. So far as Mutawallies, who are directly administering the wakf, are concerned a fraction of a representation is given to them and that too is restricted only by limiting one or two representatives on their discretion from out of Mutawallies of such wakfs, whose income is above Rs. 1 lakh. So far as Mutawallies, who are directly administering the wakf, are concerned a fraction of a representation is given to them and that too is restricted only by limiting one or two representatives on their discretion from out of Mutawallies of such wakfs, whose income is above Rs. 1 lakh. A very serious criticism is made on this part of the Sub-clause of Section 14 of the Act, which amounts to creating two classes among Mutawallies namely, one class of Mutawallies whose wakfs have income less than Rs. 1 Lakh and the other having more than Rs. 1 Lakh. Under the aforesaid Section 14(b)(iv) of the Act the right to elect one or two representatives as a part of the board is restricted only to such wakfs and their Mutawallies whose income is Rs. 1 lakh and above. Learned senior Counsel also submits that Members of Parliament or Members of Assembly, who are made part of the wakf board would not have any direct relationship with the wakf institution and as such, the entire governance by constituting the board in such a manner amounts to entrusting superintendence and virtual management of the wakfs by persons unconnected with the wakf. So far as Mutawallies are concerned, not even a sprinkling minority is available whereas it ought to be the opposite. Learned senior Counsel, therefore, submits that apart from the said provisions being opposed to Constitutional guarantees under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India, the same is also arbitrary under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 74. Learned senior Counsel has relied upon a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in P. Chandramonli v. Government of Andhra Pradesh 1980 (1) APLJ 120 . In the aforesaid decision the market committees formed for the benefit of growers and agriculturists was questioned on the ground that the Government nominates grower member of the Committee after consultation with the Director and it was held as under: The statutory purpose underlying the provision providing representation for market committee is to provide for promotion and protection of interest of growers and traders, who are directly affected parties under the Act. The statute accepts broadly the principle that these interests are best protected by permitting the affected owners of those interests to elect their representatives to the market committee in whose hands the management of the market yard and the enforcement of the entire Act is placed.... A proper representation on the market committee, therefore, is all important to subserve the interests of the Act. If elections are regarded by the statute as the method appropriate for choosing the traders representatives, on what intelligible ground are they forsaken by the statute in the case of growers? And ultimately Section 5(1)(i) of the impugned Act was struck down. Drawing a similar analogy the learned senior Counsel would contend that there must be complete, if not, effective representation by the Mutawallies and Sajjada Nasheens in the composition of the board instead of the present position envisaged under the impugned provisions. 75. Learned Additional Solicitor General, who is appearing on behalf of the first respondent, has contended that the very Wakf Act is not intended to affect or interfere with either the religion or personal law of Mohemmadans. The Act is intended only to regulate the secular activities of such wakf institutions. He has contended that every wakf institution, apart from discharging its religious activity, has also a secular activity to discharge and it is only the latter, which is regulated by the Act. He has, therefore, tried to make a clear distinction between the religious affairs and religious activities of such denominations or sects thereof. He has also relied upon the text of Ameer Ali's authoritative work to contend that the religious duties of Mutawallies and Sajjada Nasheens are quite different from the secular acts they have to perform. In fact, according to him, the Sajjada Nasheens are only entrusted with perpetual and religious duties whereas Mutawalli, who is in a position of a manager or a superintendent, has religious and secular activities also and only the latter are regulated by the Act. He, therefore, contends that Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India are aimed at securing religious freedom, which remains uninterfered with by the Act and it is only the secular part of the activities of the wakf that are regulated by this Act. The Act, therefore, does not intend and does not violate any freedom guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. 76. The Act, therefore, does not intend and does not violate any freedom guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. 76. Learned Solicitor General has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in John Vallamattom and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI), in support of his submission regarding Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India as above. The relevant Para 44 is extracted as under: 44. Before I part with the case, I would like to state that Article 44 provides that the State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India. The aforesaid provision is based on the premise that there is no necessary connection between religious and personal law in a civilized society. Article 25 of the Constitution confers freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion. The aforesaid two provisions viz. Articles 25 and 44 show that the former guarantees religious freedom whereas the latter divests religion from social relations and personal law. It is no matter of doubt that marriage, succession and the like matters of a secular character cannot be brought within the guarantee enshrined under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. Any legislation which brings succession and the like matters of secular character within the ambit of Articles 25 and 26 is a suspect legislation. Although it is doubtful whether the American doctrine of suspect legislation is followed in this country. In Smt. Sarla Mudgal, President, Kalyani and others Vs. Union of India and others, , it was held that marriage, succession and like matters of secular character cannot be brought within the guarantee enshrined under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. It is a matter of regret that Article 44 of the Constitution has not been given effect to. Parliament is still to step in for framing a common civil code in the country. A common civil code will help the cause of national integration by removing the contradictions based on ideologies. 77. Learned Additional Solicitor General has also relied upon a decision of the Karnataka High Court in Syed Shah Muhammad Al Hussaini Vs. Union of India and Others, where a similar challenge with respect to Section 14 of the Wakf Act was negatived. He also relied upon a decision of the Gujarat High Court in Maulana Kureshi Gulam Mustafa Vs. 77. Learned Additional Solicitor General has also relied upon a decision of the Karnataka High Court in Syed Shah Muhammad Al Hussaini Vs. Union of India and Others, where a similar challenge with respect to Section 14 of the Wakf Act was negatived. He also relied upon a decision of the Gujarat High Court in Maulana Kureshi Gulam Mustafa Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, ; a decision of the Madras High Court in P.A.G. Hassain Moulana Vs. The Union of India (UOI), The Government of Tamilnadu and The Secretary, Tamilnadu Wakf Board, ; a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Bashir Ahmed Vs. The State of West Bengal and Others, and a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Nawab Usman Ali Khan and Others Vs. Choudhry Faezulla and Others, . 78. It is, no doubt, true that the Karnataka High Court has rejected a similar challenge including the contention that two classes of Mutawallies are created u/s 14(b)(iv) of the Act in giving right of representation only to such wakfs whose income is above Rs. 1 Lakh. The Karnataka High Court has held that such classification is valid and upheld the provision. With respect, I am unable to subscribe to the said view. The decision of the Gujarat High Court in Maulana Kureshi Gulam Mustafa's case (8 supra), however, does not directly deal with the issue as is involved in the present case. Similarly in the decision of the Madras High Court in P.A.G. Hussain Moulana's case (9 supra) there is hardly any discussion on his question. The decision of the Calcutta High Court in Bashir Ahmed's case (10 supra) as above is relating to Article 13 and the Bengal Wakf Act (13 of 1934), where the validity of the said Act was questioned on the ground that it is contrary to Mohammedan Law of wakf. The High Court had held that the provisions of the Act do not in anyway interfere with the freedom of conscience or the right to freely profess, practise or propagate the religion and the Commissioner of the Board of the Wakf only regulate the economic and financial activity associated with the religious practice. The High Court had held that the provisions of the Act do not in anyway interfere with the freedom of conscience or the right to freely profess, practise or propagate the religion and the Commissioner of the Board of the Wakf only regulate the economic and financial activity associated with the religious practice. None of the religious rights are interfered with as right of administration remains with the religious body but to be administered in accordance with law and the provisions of the Act being essentially for preservation, protection and improvement of the wakf property, they do not destroy the right to management of the wakf properties. The decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Usman Ali Khan's case (11 supra) related to the board appointing the committee of management pending decision of dispute and it was held that under Article 26(d) of the Constitution of India the administration of a wakf is subject to law made by the Parliament and there is nothing in the impugned provisions which deprives the religious denomination of the right of administration altogether under the Wakf Act, 1954. 79. Learned Additional Solicitor General places, further, reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court regarding Shri Jagannath Temple, Puri, which arose on account of Hundis being installed in the temple disentitling the Sevaks of the temple to any portion of the money placed in the Hundis. The said decision is reported in Shri Jagannath Temple Puri Management Committee and Another Vs. Chintamani Khuntia and Others, where Constitutional validity of the offending provisions was questioned by the Sevaks as violative of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court negatived the said challenge by making a distinction with respect to the right of religious ceremonies being entirely different from collection of offerings made by the devotees after the religious ceremony ends and as such, religious rights are not anywhere interfered with by the said act of Hundis installed in the temple. Para 49 of the judgment is relevant and is extracted as under. 49. A review of all these judgments goes to shows that the consistent view of this Court has been that although the State cannot interfere with freedom of a person to profess, practise and propagate his religion, the State, however, can control the secular matters connected with religion. Para 49 of the judgment is relevant and is extracted as under. 49. A review of all these judgments goes to shows that the consistent view of this Court has been that although the State cannot interfere with freedom of a person to profess, practise and propagate his religion, the State, however, can control the secular matters connected with religion. All the activities in or connected with a temple are not religious activities. The management of a temple or maintenance of discipline and order inside the temple can be controlled by the State. If any law is passed for taking over the management of a temple it cannot be struck down as violative of Article 25 or Article 26 of the Constitution. The management of the temple is a secular act. The temple authority may also control the activities of various servants of the temple. The disciplinary power over the servants of the temple, including the priests, may be given to the Temple Committee appointed by the state. The Temple Committee can decide the quantum and manner of payment of remuneration to the servants. Merely because a system of payment is prevalent for a number of years, is no ground for holding that such system must continue for all times. The payment of remuneration to the temple servants was not a religious act but was of purely secular nature. 80. Learned Additional Solicitor General relied upon another decision in Pannalal Bansilal Patil and others etc. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and another, which arose out of Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987. In Shri Jagannath Temple's case (12 supra) referred to above, the above decision was specifically referred to in Para 47. In the said decision in Pannalal's case (13 supra) the abolition of hereditary trusteeship was upheld as being part of the due administration which is a secular function and protected under Article 25(2) and not violative of Article 25(1). Learned Additional Solicitor General made a reference to another important decision of the Supreme Court in M.P. Gopalakrishnan Nair and Another Vs. State of Kerala and Others, (popularly known as 'Guruvayur Temple's case). Paras 21, 31, 34 to 36 and 46, which are relevant are extracted as under. 21. The management or administration of a temple partakes to a secular character as opposed to the religious aspect of the matter. State of Kerala and Others, (popularly known as 'Guruvayur Temple's case). Paras 21, 31, 34 to 36 and 46, which are relevant are extracted as under. 21. The management or administration of a temple partakes to a secular character as opposed to the religious aspect of the matter. The 1978 Act segregates the religious matters with secular matters. So far as, religious matters are concerned, the same have entirely been left in the hands of the 'Thanthri'. He is the alter ego of the deity. He gives mool mantra to the priests. He holds a special status. He prescribes the rituals. He is the only person who can touch the deity and enter the sanctum sanctorum. He is the final authority in religious matters where for a legal fiction has been created in Section 35 of the Act in terms whereof the Committee or the Commissioner or the Government is expressly prohibited from interfering with the religious or spiritual matters pertaining to Devaswom. His decision on all religious, spiritual, ritual or ceremonial matters pertaining to Devaswom is final unless the same violates any provision contained in any law for the time being in force. The impugned provisions of the Act must be construed having regard to the said factor in mind. By reason of Section 4(1) of the 1978 Act, the Committee will consist of nine members. The nomination of one person from the Council of Ministers as a representative of the employees of the Devaswom and five persons, one of whom shall be a member of a Scheduled Caste, are required to be nominated by the Hindus among the Council of Ministers from amongst the persons having interest in the temple. The area within which such nomination can be made by the Hindus amongst the Council of Minister is, thus, limited. .... 31. Indisputably the State has the requisite jurisdiction to oversee the administration of a temple subject to Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. The grievance as regard the violation of the constitutional right as enshrined under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India must be considered having regard to the object and purport of the Act. For fulfilling the said requirements, the denomination must have been enjoying the right to manage the properties endowed in favour of the institutions. The grievance as regard the violation of the constitutional right as enshrined under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India must be considered having regard to the object and purport of the Act. For fulfilling the said requirements, the denomination must have been enjoying the right to manage the properties endowed in favour of the institutions. If the right to administer the properties never vested in the denomination, the protection under Article 26 of the Constitution of India is not available. 34. The freedom guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution is not an unconditional one. A distinction exists between the matters of religion, on the one hand, and holding and management of properties by religious institutions, on the other. What is necessary to be considered for determining the issue is as to whether by reason of the impugned Act the administration of the institution had been taken from the hands of the religious denomination and vested in another body. If the answer to the said question is rendered in the negative, attack to the constitutionality of the Act would not survive. .... 35. Furthermore, it is permissible for a legislature to take over the management of the temple from the control of a person and vest the same in a Committee of which he would remain the Chairman. See Raja Birakishore Vs. The State of Orissa, . 36. It is also now trite that although State cannot interfere with the freedom of a person to profess, practise and propagate his religion, the secular matters connected therewith can be the subject matter of control by the State. The management of the temple primarily is a secular act. The temple authority controls the activities of various servants of the temple. It manages several institutions including educational institutions pertaining to it. The disciplinary power over the servants of the temple, including the priest may vest in a committee. The payment of remuneration to the temple servants was also not a religious act but was of purely secular in nature. See Shri Jagannath Temple Puri Management Committee and Another Vs. Chintamani Khuntia and Others, , Pannalal Bansilal Patil and others etc. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and another, and Bhuri Nath and Others Vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir and Others, . .... 46. See Shri Jagannath Temple Puri Management Committee and Another Vs. Chintamani Khuntia and Others, , Pannalal Bansilal Patil and others etc. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and another, and Bhuri Nath and Others Vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir and Others, . .... 46. We have noticed hereinbefore that it is one thing to say that prejudice may be caused if the management of temple is entrusted to a person who has no faith in temple worship but it is another thing to say that such persons are nominated by those who may not have any such faith but those nominated would not only be believers in God but also in temple worship. The function of a statutory and constitutional authority while exercising its power of nomination cannot be equated with the power of management of a temple, particularly, in relation to the religious aspects involved therein. 81. He also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sri Adi Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple, Varanasi and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others, , which arose out of U.P. Sri Kashi Viswanath Temple Act, 1983 Act, wherein a question that fell for consideration was secular function of administration and management of temple was taken out from Pandas and was entrusted to the board created under Act. The Supreme Court held at Para 28 as follows: 28. The religious freedom guaranteed by Articles 25 and 26, therefore, is intended to be a guide to a community life and ordain every religion to act according to its cultural and social demands to establish an egalitarian social order. Articles 25 and 26, therefore, strike a balance between the rigidity of right to religious belief and faith and their intrinsic restrictions in matters of religion, religious beliefs and religious practices and guaranteed freedom of conscience to commune with his Cosmos/Creator and realize his spiritual self. Sometimes, practices religious or secular, are inextricably mixed up. This is more particularly so in regard to Hindu religion because under the provisions of the ancient Smriti, human actions from birth to death and most of the individual actions from day-today are regarded as religious in character in one facet or the other. They sometimes claim the religious system or sanctuary and seek the cloak of constitutional protection guaranteed by Articles 25 and 26. They sometimes claim the religious system or sanctuary and seek the cloak of constitutional protection guaranteed by Articles 25 and 26. One hinges upon constitutional religious model and another diametrically more on traditional point of view. The legitimacy of the true categories is required to be adjudged strictly within the social progress, well-being and reforms, social intensification and national unity. Law is a tool of social engineering and an instrument of social change evolved by a gradual and continuous process. As Benjamin Cardozo has put it is his judicial Process, life is not logic but experience. History and customs, utility and the accepted standards of right conduct are the forms which singly or in combination all be the progress of law. Which of these forces shall dominate in any case depends largely upon the comparative importance or value of the social interest that will be, thereby, impaired. There shall be symmetrical development with history or custom when history or custom has been the motive force or the chief one in giving shape to the existing rules and with logic or philosophy when the motive power has been theirs. One must get the knowledge just as the legislature gets it from experience and study and reflection in proof from life itself. A}1 secular activities which may be associated with religion but which do not relate of constitute an essential part of it may be amenable to State regulations but what constitutes the essential part of religion may be ascertained primarily from the doctrines of that religion itself according to its tenets, historical background and change in evolved process etc. The concept of essentiality is not itself a determinative factor. It is one of the circumstances to be considered in adjudging whether the particular matters of religion or religious practices or belief are an integral part of the religion. It must be decided whether the practices or matters are considered integral by the community itself. Though not conclusive, this is also one of the facts to be noticed. The practice in question is religious in character and whether it could be regarded as an integral and essential part of the religion and if the court finds upon evidence adduced before it that it is an integral or essential part of the religion, Article 25 accords protection to it. The practice in question is religious in character and whether it could be regarded as an integral and essential part of the religion and if the court finds upon evidence adduced before it that it is an integral or essential part of the religion, Article 25 accords protection to it. Though the performance of certain duties is part of religion and the person performing it is required to be carefully examined and considered to decide whether it is a matter of religion or a secular management by the State. Whether the traditional practices are matters of religion or integral and essential part of the religion and religious practice protected by Articles 25 and 26 is the question. And whether hereditary archaka is an essential and integral part of the Hindu religion is the crucial question. The relevant portion from Para 31 is as follows: 31. ...It has outward expression in acts as well. It is not every aspect of the religion that requires protection of Articles 25 and 26 nor has the Constitution provided that every religious activity would not be interfered with. Every mundane and human activity is not intended to be protected under Constitution in the garb of religion. Articles 25 and 26 must be viewed with pragmatism. By the very nature of things it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to define the expression "religion" or "matters of religion" or "religious beliefs or practice". Right to religion guaranteed by Articles 25 and 26 is not absolute or unfettered right to propagate religion which is subject to legislation by the State limiting or regulating every non-religious activity. The right to observe and practise rituals and right to manage in matter of religion are protected under these articles, But right to manage the Temple or endowment is not integral to religion or religious practice or religion as such which is amenable to statutory control. These secular activities are subject to State regulation but the religion and religious practices which are integral part of religion are protected. It is a well-settled law that administration, management and governance of the religious institution or endowment are secular activities and the State could regulate them by appropriate legislation. This Court upheld the A.P. Act which regulated the management of the religious institutions and endowments and abolition of hereditary, rights and the right to receive offerings and plate collections attached to the duty. This Court upheld the A.P. Act which regulated the management of the religious institutions and endowments and abolition of hereditary, rights and the right to receive offerings and plate collections attached to the duty. (emphasis supplied) 82. Learned Additional Advocate General has supplemented the aforesaid contentions by drawing our attention to a Full Bench decision of this Court in Muslim Minority Front Vs. The Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, . The said case arose out constitution of the board under the 1995 Act when the existing board under the 1954 Act was functioning. The question as presently involved did not arise for consideration and a passing reference is found in Para 9 of the said decision and neither Section 13 nor Section 14 of the Act, as challenged in the present case, was the subject matter of the challenge in the said decision. He has referred to Seervai on Constitution IV Edition Para 12.9, which is extracted hereunder: 12.9. The words "the right...to manage its own affairs in matters of religion" in Article 26(b) suggested that there were other affairs of a denomination which were not matters of religion and the question was, where was a line to be drawn? Contrasting Article 26(b) with Article 26(c) and (d) the Supreme Court said that the contrast showed that no legislature could take away the right of a denomination to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, whereas the right to acquire, own and administer property were not matters of religion and could be regulated by valid laws. "Religion" was not defined in our Constitution and it was not susceptible of any rigid definition. The definition suggested in Davis v. Benson (1889) 133 U.S. was neither precise nor adequate. Religion was certainly a matter of faith but it was not necessarily theistic; Buddhism and Jainism, for example, do not invoke a belief in any God, or in any Intelligent First Cause, Article 25 protected not only the freedom of religious opinion but also acts done in pursuance of religious belief as was clear from the expression "practice of religion", used in Article 25. The Supreme Court adopted the following observations of Latham C.J. Adelaide Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses Inc. The Supreme Court adopted the following observations of Latham C.J. Adelaide Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses Inc. v. Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116, 124 as fully applicable to the protection of religion under our Constitution: It is sometimes suggested in discussions of the subject of freedom of religion that, though the civil Government should not interfere with religious opinions, it nevertheless may deal as it pleases with any acts which are done in pursuance of religious belief without infringing the principle of freedom of religion. It appears to me to be difficult to maintain this distinction as relevant to the interpretation of Section 116. The Section refers in express terms to the exercise of religion, and therefore it is intended to protect from the operation of any Commonwealth laws acts which are done in the exercise of religion. Thus the Section goes far beyond protecting liberty of opinion. It protects also acts done in pursuance of religious belief as part of religion. 83. In the light of the above submissions, the questions that arise for consideration are as follows: (i) Whether the provisions of the Wakf Act are in conflict with the religious freedom and guarantees under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India? (ii) Whether Section 14 of the Wakf Act, particularly, Section 14(1)(b)(iv) is discriminatory and arbitrary? 84. So far as the first question is concerned, the earliest decisions starting with Vidya Varuthi's case (4 supra) and the authoritative texts of learned authors of Mohammedan Law clearly shows that creation of a wakf is an activity ordained by the Mohammedan religion and as such, primarily a religious part of their personal law. Further, the expositions of legal position by the Honourable Supreme Court under the Mohammedan Law with reference to Khawaja Saheb's Act and regarding Hindu Law under the Mutt's case referred to above clearly establish that a wakf or a religious or charitable endowment; apart from the religious nature, may also deal with secular part, which includes the administration of the properties in accordance with law. The State has reserved to itself the right to regulate such secular activities of all the religious endowments and the wakfs. The State has reserved to itself the right to regulate such secular activities of all the religious endowments and the wakfs. It is also evident that the object and purpose of the Wakf Act being only to regulate the secular part of the activities of a wakf it cannot be said that the same is in violation of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. To my mind, therefore, the exposition of law is very aptly summarized in the decision of the Supreme Court Sri Adi Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple's case (15 supra) which is already extracted above. 85. As held by the Supreme Court the right to manage a temple or for that matter a wakf is not integral to religion or religious practices. The secular activities relating to such management are subject to statutory control. The essential religious practices and beliefs are integral part of the religion, but, how a particular temple or for that matter a wakf is to be administered, is a matter which can be regulated by the State and it cannot be said that Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India are in any way infringed thereby. The objects and purpose of the present Wakf Act being to supervise and regulate the wakfs and the matters relating thereto and a survey of the various provisions of the Wakf Act clearly show that the Act deals with only the secular part of the administration of the wakf institutions does not infringe or violate the Constitutional guarantees under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. The first question is accordingly answered in negative. 86. So far as the second question relating to Section 14 of the Act is concerned, however, 1 broadly express my agreement with the contentions of the learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, reasons for the same are as follows. 87. The validity of a legislation, it is well-settled, can be questioned only on two grounds: (1) Lack of Legislative competence and (2) Violative of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India or of any other Constitutional provision. 88. 87. The validity of a legislation, it is well-settled, can be questioned only on two grounds: (1) Lack of Legislative competence and (2) Violative of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India or of any other Constitutional provision. 88. There is no challenge in the present case with regard to the legislative competence of the Parliament to enact the Wakf Act and the only ground pressed by the learned senior Counsel for the petitioners is that the impugned provision of Section 14(b)(iv) of the Wakf Act is discriminatory as it violates the equality Clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Bihar State + 2 Lecturers Associations and Ors. 2007 (5) SCJ 812 : 2007 (5) Supreme 557 : 2008 (2) ALT 212 (DNSC), the Honourable Supreme Court reviewed several earlier judgments of the Supreme Court. It would, therefore, be profitable to extract the following paragraphs, for appreciating the contentions of the learned senior Counsel for the petitioners, as under: 11. Now, it is well settled and cannot be disputed that Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees equality before the law and confers equal protection of laws. It prohibits the State from denying persons or class of persons equal treatment; provided they are equals and are similarly situated. It, however, does not forbid classification. In other words, what Article 14 prohibits is discrimination and not classification if otherwise such classification is legal, valid and reasonable. 12. Before more than half a century, a Constitution Bench of this Court was called upon to consider ambit and scope of Article 14 of the Constitution in a celebrated decision in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952) SCR 2840. There, constitutional validity of certain provisions of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950 was challenged on the ground that they were discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 13. There, constitutional validity of certain provisions of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950 was challenged on the ground that they were discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 13. Dealing with the contention, S.R. Das, J. (as his Lordship then was) made the following instructive observations which were cited with approval in several subsequent cases; It is now well established that while Article 14 is designed to prevent a person or class of persons from being singled out from others similarly situated for the purpose of being specially subjected to discriminating and hostile legislation, it does not insist on an 'abstract symmetry' in the sense that every piece of legislation must have universal application. All persons are not, by nature, attainment or circumstances, equal and the varying needs of different classes of persons often require separate treatment and, therefore, the protecting Clause has been construed as a guarantee against discrimination amongst equals only and not as taking away from the State the power to classify persons for the purpose of legislation. This classification may be on different bases. It may be geographical or according to objects or occupations or the like. Mere classification, however, is not enough to get over the inhibition of the article. The classification must not be arbitrary but must be rational, that is to say, it must not only be based on some qualities or characteristics which are to be found in all the persons grouped together and not in others who are left out but those qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. In order to pass the test, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are grouped together from others, and (2) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. The differentia which is the basis of the classification and the object of the Act are distinct things and what is necessary is that there must be a nexus between them. The differentia which is the basis of the classification and the object of the Act are distinct things and what is necessary is that there must be a nexus between them. In short, while the article forbids class legislation in the sense of making improper discrimination by conferring privileges or imposing liabilities upon persons arbitrarily selected out of a large number of other persons similarly situated in relation to the privileges sought to be conferred or the liability proposed to be imposed, it does not forbid classification for the purpose of legislation, provided such classification is not arbitrary in the sense I have just explained. 16. In Confederation of Ex-Servicemen, after considering leading cases on equal protection Clause enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution, speaking for a five-Judge Bench, one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) stated: In our judgment, therefore, it is clear that every classification to be legal, valid and permissible, must fulfil the twin test, namely, (i) the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which must distinguish persons or things that are grouped together from others leaving out or left out; and (ii) such a differentia must have rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the statute or legislation in question. Applying the tests laid down as above, I have examined the submissions of the learned senior Counsel for the petitioners. 89. While it is considered that every wakf institution is administered and managed by a Mutawalli there may be cases where Wakfnama or Deed of Wakf is available and the Mutawalli is required to act in terms thereof. In the absence of such wakfnama the Mutawalli is to act in furtherance of the objects and spirit of the wakf and purpose for which the wakf is created. The freedom of management of the wakf in accordance with the object thereof or the wakfnama, as the case may be, therefore, is left to the Mutawalli, who is held to be a Manager or a Superintendent of a wakf. u/s 14 of the Act, a board is created to supervise or oversee the management of such wakfs. The freedom of management of the wakf in accordance with the object thereof or the wakfnama, as the case may be, therefore, is left to the Mutawalli, who is held to be a Manager or a Superintendent of a wakf. u/s 14 of the Act, a board is created to supervise or oversee the management of such wakfs. The board, therefore, discharges the functions of a watchdog over the Mutawallies and the function of the board essentially is to ensure and take corrective actions wherever it feels that the action of the Mutawalli is not in accordance with the wakfnama or the objects of the wakf. Viewed at from this angle, therefore, the board, which is to be constituted of persons from various fields including the Mutawalli must, therefore, be of such character where, if not complete, an effective representation to Mutawallies must be given. The Mutawallies themselves must elect among themselves their representatives whereby the persons actually administering the wakfs would represent the wakfs in general, on the board. The administrative experience including the better management of the wakfs can be ensured only by an effective representation of Mutawallies into such board. Such representative body if aided and assisted by eminent and experienced members of Muslim community including Members of Parliament, Members of Assemblies, Scholars, representatives of eminent Muslim Organizations would, therefore, hold and assist the body of Mutawallies in better administering and supervising the wakfs in general. 90. On the contrary, however, I find that under the impugned provisions of Section 14 of the Act, the Mutawallies are given only a nominal representation. The learned senior Counsel representing the petitioner is, therefore, right in contending that the boards and Mutawallies are governed, supervised and their actions are judged by outsiders, who may or may not have any concern with the wakf or the wakf institutions. The aforesaid contention raised by the learned senior Counsel for the petitioner, to my mind, is well founded. The provisions of Section 14(1)(b)(iv) of the Act, in that view is clearly arbitrary and is liable to be struck down. It is also to be noticed that another vice that is evident from the aforesaid provision is that the representation is confined to send one or two representatives, which is restricted only to such Mutawallies whose wakfs have an income over Rs. 1 Lakh. It is also to be noticed that another vice that is evident from the aforesaid provision is that the representation is confined to send one or two representatives, which is restricted only to such Mutawallies whose wakfs have an income over Rs. 1 Lakh. This clearly creates two different classes among the Mutawallies namely, the poor ones and the rich ones. The law does not envisage two different classes of Mutawallies for the purpose of composition of a wakf board and such classification, therefore, is clearly artificial, unintelligent and unsupported by any reason. The very basic idea of giving representation to Mutawallies stands negated if the choice is restricted only among Mutawallies of richer wakfs by leaving out the poorer wakfs. In other words, wakfs having an annual income of Rs. 99,999/- would have no voice in sending its representative to the board whereas other wakfs having an annual income of Rs. 1/- more than the earlier would be in a position to participate in the process to send one or two representatives to represent them on the board. 91. On the pleadings of this case, the petitioners have specifically alleged that there are 1,00,000 wakfs in the State and there are hardly 22 wakfs having an income of over Rs. 1 lakh. The present board comprises of only one member from the Mutawalli category and none of the respondents in their separate counter affidavits have denied the aforesaid factual position. The first respondent, on the contrary, has proceeded in the counter affidavit by claiming that it is not practicable to hold elections among the 1,00,000 Mutawallies representing all the wakfs and therefore, they have given the restricted right only to such Mutawallies having wakfs of more than Rs. 1,00,000/- income. In a country like ours where General Elections are successfully held giving a right of adult franchise to billions of voters, it is impossible to accept the contention of the first respondent that it is not practicable to hold elections for 1,00,000 electorate representing all the wakfs. 92. I may also mention that we have come across a very sorry state of affairs regarding the present administration of the wakf board. 92. I may also mention that we have come across a very sorry state of affairs regarding the present administration of the wakf board. We h.ne repeatedly asked the learned Counsel representing the wakf board including the learned Additional Advocate General to furnish us the statistics as to the number of wakfs in the State and the classification among them as to how many are having income over Rs. 1,00,000/-. A District wise, category wise institutional chart is placed before us, which shows that the total number of wakfs are said to be 38,529. It is also stated that the survey of the wakfs is still going on and it transpires that there are about 70,000 wakfs so far found in the surveys. Out of 38,529 wakfs shown in the list placed before us, it was represented that there are 20 wakfs, which are having an income of over Rs. 1,00,000/-. It is, thus, evident that out of 38,529 wakfs, 38,509 wakfs are excluded from having any say in sending their representatives over to the board and the rest of the 20 wakfs send 1 representative over to the board. I am unable to appreciate the stand of the board that the survey relating to wakfs is still going on though such surveys were contemplated not only under 1954 Act but also under 1995 Act. More than fifty years have passed since 1954 Act was enacted and 1995 Act is in force for the last 14 years. Even after so many years, survey of wakfs in the State is said to be still incomplete and the board is not in a position to identify, leave alone supervise, the number of wakf institutions in the State. It also reflects on the working of wakf board, which is supposed to supervise the wakfs in general, is not aware of number of wakfs in the State and as such, it is evident that there may be several wakfs, which are not within the radar of the wakf board and as such are outside any supervisory control of the board. This state of affairs, I feel, defeats the very object and purpose of the Wakf Act and the purpose for which the board exists. I hope and trust that suitable remedial action is taken by the first and second respondents forthwith to improve the situation. This state of affairs, I feel, defeats the very object and purpose of the Wakf Act and the purpose for which the board exists. I hope and trust that suitable remedial action is taken by the first and second respondents forthwith to improve the situation. In order to sensitise the respondents of urgency of situation and to arrest their inertia, I direct the respondents 1 and 2 in particular, to forthwith ensure completion of survey of all wakfs in the State in the next six months and file compliance report before this Court by the end May 31, 2010. 93. It is, therefore, evident that there is hardly any representation among the Mutawallies over the board and it is also possible that on account thereof, the effective supervisory administration of the board is not reaching down to the wakfs in the State and the mutawallies and ultimately the purpose for which the wakf and the board are created is likely to be defeated. Keeping in view, all these aspects, therefore, I am of the view that the provisions of Section 14(1)(b)(iv) of the Act are clearly discriminatory as they discriminate Mutawallies by treating them in two different classes. The said differentiation among the Mutawallies as a class is unsupported by any intelligent criteria and the said differentiation has absolutely no nexus with the object of giving representation to the Mutawallies over the board. The composition of the board giving representation to the eminent Muslims from different Sections of the society apart from the Mutawallies conveys the object behind the composition of the board to give wide representation to various categories. The said object, therefore, is defeated if large number of Mutawallies are to be excluded from consideration on the ground that the income of the wakfs under their management is less than Rs. 1,00,000/-. The said classification, therefore, has no apparent justification and it is clear and apparent that all Mutawallies, who are equals, are being treated unequally and thereby Article 14 of the Constitution of India is violated. Point No. 2 is answered accordingly. 94. Before parting with the case, it is necessary to refer to one more contention of the learned senior Counsel for the petitioner regarding Section 32(4) & (5) of the Act. Point No. 2 is answered accordingly. 94. Before parting with the case, it is necessary to refer to one more contention of the learned senior Counsel for the petitioner regarding Section 32(4) & (5) of the Act. As has been referred to above, the powers under the aforesaid provisions, which are vested with the board and the Government, are such that a property of a wakf may be developed into a commercial complex destroying the sanctity and purpose of the wakf. Such power is vested with the board and the Government that they can overrule any objections of the Mutawalli in that regard. It is, however, evident that no such power vests with the Mutawalli even in the course of administration and management of wakf and as such creation of such power within the board and the Government would amount to giving the latter the power, which the Mutawalli himself does not possess. 95. During the hearing, we have pointed out the aforesaid position to the learned Additional Solicitor General. According to him the said provisions of Sub-clauses (4) and (5) must be read along with the provisions of Section 32(1) of the Act and the proviso thereunder. Learned Additional Solicitor General would contend that the powers and functions of the board u/s 32(1) of the Act are of general superintendence on all wakfs with a view to ensure that the objects and purposes, for which such wakfs are created and intended, are fulfilled. Further, the actions of the board shall be in confirmity with the directions of the Wakif, the purpose of the wakf and any usage or custom of the wakf sanctioned by the School of Muslim Law to which the wakf belongs as per the proviso to Sub-clause (1). 96. As per the basic rules of interpretation Sub-clause (1) and the proviso thereunder and the Sub-clauses (4) and (5) are independent of each other. The proviso under Sub-clause (1) controls only Sub-clause (1) alone, though Sub-clauses (4) and (5) are couched in a language, which tends to give overriding and overwhelming powers to the board and the Government. A bare reading of Sub-clauses (4) and (5) alone would be destructive to the very scheme of the wakfs and the concept of wakf under the Mohammedan Law. A bare reading of Sub-clauses (4) and (5) alone would be destructive to the very scheme of the wakfs and the concept of wakf under the Mohammedan Law. The Sub-clauses (4) and (5), therefore, cannot be read in such a manner as to empower the board and the Government to alienate, deface or destroy the property of the wakf, in such a manner, including to construct commercial complexes, shopping malls etc. without any safeguards relating to the wakf institutions. To my mind, therefore, the Sub-clauses (4) and (5) have to be read in conjecture with Sub-clause (1) and the proviso thereunder and thereby every action of the board or the Government will have to conform to the test of the objects and purposes of the Wakf Act under which the wakf is created or intended and that the actions of the board and the Government are in conformity with the directions of the Wakif, the purpose of the wakf and any usage or custom of the wakf sanctioned by the school of Muslim Law to which the wakf belongs. 97. As the learned senior Counsel for the petitioners has made reference to these provisions in the context of highlighting the validity of the Wakf Act and the main thrust of the submissions being on the validity of Section 14(1)(b)(iv) of the Wakf Act, we are not directly called upon to adjudicate the validity of the said provisions. However, since there was a debate on these provisions in the context of point No. 1, I have thought it fit to place my views on record relating to the said provisions. In the result, the writ petitions are allowed declaring that Section 14(1)(b)(iv) of the Wakf Act, 1995 is discriminatory, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and is arbitrary and accordingly struck down. There shall be a direction to the respondents 1 and 2 to forthwith ensure completion of survey of wakf institutions in the State, within a period of six (6) months from today, containing all particulars thereof as required under the Wakf Act and the respondents shall file a compliance report relating to the above direction before the Registry of this Court on or before 31.05.2010. There shall be no order as to costs.