JUDGMENT JAYANT PATEL, J. The petitioner by this petition is seeking appropriate writ for quashing and setting aside the order dated 11.11.2009 passed by the DRAT, Mumbai, whereby it has been held that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to the proceedings under Section 17 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as 'Securitisation Act') and therefore, the Tribunal which had earlier rejected the application for condonation of delay is directed to consider the matter in light of the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 17 of the Securitisation Act. 2. Heard Mr. Khare for Mr. Sankhla for the petitioner and Mr. Shukla with Mr. Jani for the respondent No.3 by caveat. 3. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the Debt Recovery Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal') is not a Court and as the Limitation Act applies to the Court, the provisions of the Limitation Act would not apply to the proceedings before the Tribunal, therefore, DRAT has committed error apparent on the face of record in taking view that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to the proceedings under Section 17 of the Securitisation Act before the Tribunal, therefore, this Court may interfere. 4. Whereas the learned counsel appearing by caveat for the respondents supported the order passed by DRAT and further contended that High Court of Bombay as well as Madras High Court has taken the view that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to the proceedings under Section 17 of the Securitisation Act, therefore, the view taken by the DRAT does not deserve to be interfered with. 5. It is undisputed position that DRT while exercising the power under Section 17 of the Securitisation Act, is a Tribunal and not the Court. But the question does not rest there merely because it is not a Court so far as applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is concerned. Section 5 of the Limitation Act for ready reference reads as under : “5. But the question does not rest there merely because it is not a Court so far as applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is concerned. Section 5 of the Limitation Act for ready reference reads as under : “5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases -Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation :- The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this Section.” 6. In order to examine the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, reference to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act would be relevant, which reads as under : “(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any sit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in section 5 to 24 (inclusive shall apply only in so far, as and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.” 7. Therefore, on a plain reading of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, it appears that if there is express provision made under special law or in local law, prescribing the limitation for any suit or appeal or application, such shall apply for prescription of such period. However, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 would apply to the extent unless they are expressly excluded by such special law. However, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 would apply to the extent unless they are expressly excluded by such special law. To say in other words, if the Limitation Act provides for a particular period during which the application has to be made to any Tribunal or any authority, such would not apply in view of the express provisions under Section 17(1) of the Securitisation Act providing for preferring of application within a period of 45 days. However, so far as further application of the Limitation Act is concerned and more particularly from Sections 4 to 24, which includes Section 5 for condonation of delay, such would apply. Had it been a case where Section 17(1) of the Securitisation Act, worded with the outer period of Limitation for filing of the application or for exercise of the discretion for entertainment of the application after expiry of period of 45 days, the matter would have been different. But it appears that Section 17(1) is silent on the said aspect and to say in other words, the legislature has not expressed the intention to curtail the further exercise of the power by the Tribunal for entertainment of the application after the expiry of the period of 45 days. In such circumstances, the provisions of Section 5 would apply to the discretion to be exercised by the Tribunal for entertainment of the application after the period of 45 days but taking into consideration the facts and circumstances on the aspects of sufficient cause and to condone the delay or not. 8. As such, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would only apply to the Court and not to the Tribunal or any proceedings before the authority other than the Tribunal is negatived by this Court as back as in the year 1982 in the case of Mahesh Harilal Khamar Vs. B.N. Narasimhan reported at 1982 GLH 700 , wherein this Court at para 5 observed as under : “5. Under these circumstances, two questions would squarely arise for consideration viz. (whether the first respondent could invoke the powers under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and (2) whether this was a fit case in which he ought to have entertained the appeal on merits by condoning the delay on the part of the petitioner in preferring appeal before him. Under these circumstances, two questions would squarely arise for consideration viz. (whether the first respondent could invoke the powers under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and (2) whether this was a fit case in which he ought to have entertained the appeal on merits by condoning the delay on the part of the petitioner in preferring appeal before him. So far as the first question is concerned, the first respondent has already held in favour of the petitioner namely that Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be pressed in service by the petitioner for getting the delay in preferring appeal condoned. But Mr. Vakharia, the learned Advocate appearing for respondent No.2 Market Committee submitted before me that the aforesaid view of the first respondent is patently erroneous. Mr. Vakharia contended that Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 can apply to courts and court proceedings as its very language suggests and that the first respondent Director of Agricultural marketing and Rural Finance though acting as an appellate authority was not a court stricto sensu and consequently Section 5 of the Limitation act could never apply to the appellate proceedings before him as envisaged in Section 27(5) of the Act. In order to appreciate the aforesaid contention of Mr. Vakharia it is first necessary to have a look the necessary statutory provisions. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in s far as, and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. For the applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act what is required to be found out is whether any special or local law prescribes a different period of limitation for any suit appeal or application. For the applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act what is required to be found out is whether any special or local law prescribes a different period of limitation for any suit appeal or application. It cannot be gainsaid that Section 27(5) of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1963 does provide a period of 30 days for preferring appeal and to that extent the Agricultural Produce Market Act 1963 is a special law providing for different period of limitation. The period of 30 days for preferring appeal under Section 27(5) of the Act is certainly a period different from the one prescribed in the Schedule of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 which does not provide any period for preferring any such appeal. Therefore, it must be held that special law namely the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1963 does provide a different period of limitation. Once that conclusion is reached, the consequences laid down by Section 29(2) must follow. Accordingly, Section 3 of the Limitation Act would automatically apply as if such period was prescribed by the Schedule of the Limitation Act. Not it is necessary to note that Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act states that subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. Thus the appeal preferred by the petitioner beyond 30 days would be liable to be dismissed on the ground of limitation even though such a defence may not have been urged, as laid down by Section 3(1) of the Act. It is obvious that when special law provides for the period of limitation different from that provided by the Limitation Act and once section 3 of the Limitation Act gets attracted by virtue of Section 29(2) to the proceedings before the concerned authority acting under the Special Law which has to enforce the period of limitation, said authority will have to apply the provisions of Section 3 of the Limitation Act to the proceedings presented before it under the provisions of the concerned special law or the local law, as the case may be. It cannot be disputed for a moment that 30 days' period of limitation is provided for appeal to the first respondent under Section 27 (5). It cannot be disputed for a moment that 30 days' period of limitation is provided for appeal to the first respondent under Section 27 (5). Therefore, it is for the first respondent to apply Section 3 of the Limitation Act and to dismiss the concerned appeal if it is found to be barred by time. If the injunction prescribed by Section 3(1) has to operate by virtue of Section 29(2) the said injunction must necessarily bring in its wake all the rest of the provisions of the said sub-section (1) of Section 3. As stated above, Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act itself provides that its operation is subject to Sections 4 to 24. Consequently, if the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 are made applicable, they would necessarily override and super-impose themselves upon the operation of Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act. In other words, the legislative mandate under Section 3(1) has to be read subject to Sections 4 to 24 following the said Section. Section 5 is necessarily included in the conspectus of Sections 4 to 24. It is trite to say that if section 3 applies to the first respondent acting under Section 27 (5) of the Act then it must follow as a necessary corollary that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would equally apply by virtue of Section 29(2) read with Section 3 (1) of the Limitation Act. It cannot be urged for a moment that Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act would apply but Section 5 thereof would not apply to the first respondent's proceedings because he is not a court. While Section 29(2) is attracted the entire machinery of Sections 3 to 24 of the Limitation Act gets imported and would automatically apply to the proceedings before the concerned authority under the given special or local law has to enforce the period of limitation for any appeal or application before such authority, implicit in the power would be the power to condone the delay which would get imported as part and parcel of the entire machinery of Sections 3 to 24 of the Limitation Act that would apply by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act to such proceedings before the concerned authorities acting under the special or local law. This is the logical effect of the applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and hence the question whether the concerned authority is a court within the strict meaning of the term as envisaged by the Limitation itself, would necessarily pale into insignificance.” 9. Therefore, the contention as such, can be said as having considered and negatived by this Court, as already ruled as per the above referred decision that the Section 5 of the Limitation Act would also apply to the statutory authority under the special law when it is not expressly barred or prohibited. 10. If the matter is to be considered in light of the provisions of the Securitisation Act read with the provisions of Non Performing Assets Act and the Limitation Act, taking into consideration that the Securitisation Act is new Act and the DRT is assigned with such power under the special Act, then also, the position would not be altered for application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. At this stage, it would be profitable to refer to the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of UCO Bank Vs. M/s. Kanji Manji Kothari & Ors. in Writ Petition No.3566 of 2007 decided on 19.12.2007. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the said decision, inter alia observed at para 69 to 77 as under : “69. In this case, we are concerned with a special law which prescribes a different period of limitation so far as application made by the borrower under section 17(1) are concerned. Section 17(1) reads as under : “17. Right to appeal : (1) Any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in subsection (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorized officer under this Chapter, (may make an application along with such fee, as may be prescribed) to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within forty five days from the date on which such measures had been taken.” 70. So far as secured creditor is concerned, section 36 of the NPA Act states that the period of limitation as prescribed in the Limitation Act would be applicable. Section 36 reads as under : “36. So far as secured creditor is concerned, section 36 of the NPA Act states that the period of limitation as prescribed in the Limitation Act would be applicable. Section 36 reads as under : “36. Limitation : No secured creditor shall be entitled to take all or any of the measures under subsection (4) of section 13, unless his claim in respect of the financial asset is made within the period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963).” 71. Therefore, the Legislature has made two different provisions for the borrower and the secured creditor so far as period of limitation is concerned. On a proper reading of the NPA Act and the DRT Act, we are unable to come to a conclusion that this indicates that the legislature has consciously excluded the application of the Limitation Act to applications made by the borrower or the aggrieved person under section 17 of the NPA Act. 72. Section 35 of the NPA Act gives it an overriding effect. Section 37 states that application of other laws is not barred. It reads thus : “37. Application of other laws not barred. The provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 (42 of 1956), the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act 1992 (15 of 1992), the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) or any other law for the time being in force.” 73. Section 17(7) states that the DRT shall, as far as may be, dispose of the applications in accordance with the DRT Act and the Rules made thereunder. Under section 22 of the DRT Act, the DRT is not bound by the procedure laid down by the Civil Procedure Code, but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and shall have power to regulate its own procedure. Under the said section, Debts Recovery Tribunal, Maharashtra & Goa Regulations of Practice, 2003 have been enacted. Under Regulation 3(7), “interlocutory application” inter alia means application for condonation of delay. 74. Section 24 of the DRT Act states that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall, as far as may be apply to an application made to a Tribunal. Under the said section, Debts Recovery Tribunal, Maharashtra & Goa Regulations of Practice, 2003 have been enacted. Under Regulation 3(7), “interlocutory application” inter alia means application for condonation of delay. 74. Section 24 of the DRT Act states that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall, as far as may be apply to an application made to a Tribunal. In Transcore's case (supra), the Supreme Court has, after considering the statement of objects and reasons of the NPA Act, the scheme of the NPA Act and the nature of its provisions, held that the enactment of NPA Act is not in derogation of the DRT Act. Their object is recovery of debts by non adjudicatory process and they provide cumulative remedies to the secured creditor. In fact, section 37 of the NPA Act states that the provisions of the NPA Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation to the DRT Act. If we examine the relevant provisions of the NPA Act and the observations of the Supreme Court in Transcore's case (supra), the conclusion is irresistible that section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to the NPA Act. There is no express exclusion of the Limitation Act. So far as borrower's applications under section 17(1) are concerned, a different period of limitation is prescribed. Hence, on a bare reading of section 29 (2), section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to them. So far as the secured creditor is concerned, he can take measures under section 13(4) within the period prescribed under the Limitation Act. Though section 35 gives overriding effect to the NPA Act, section 37 states that application of other laws is not barred and the NPA Act is in addition to DRT Act and not in derogation thereof. It is important to note that under section 17(7), the DRT has to dispose of the applications in accordance with the DRT Act and the rules made thereunder and section 24 of the DRT Act makes provisions of the Limitation Act applicable to the application before the DRT. Since after considering the scheme, provisions and object of the NPA Act, the NPA Act and the DRT Act are held complementary to each other by the Supreme Court in Transcore's case (supra), we hold that the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act are applicable to the provisions under the NPA Act. Since after considering the scheme, provisions and object of the NPA Act, the NPA Act and the DRT Act are held complementary to each other by the Supreme Court in Transcore's case (supra), we hold that the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act are applicable to the provisions under the NPA Act. This will also lead to even treatment to the secured creditor as well as to the borrower or any aggrieved person. We may quote the observations made by the Supreme Court in Mardia Chemical's case (supra), while disposing of the matter. The Supreme Court observed as under : “Before we part with the case, we would like to observe that where a secured creditor has taken action under section 13(4) of the Act, in such cases, it would be open to borrowers to file appeals under section 17 of the Act within the limitation as prescribed therefor, to be counted with effect from today.” 75. We are aware that the powers of the Supreme Court are far more extensive and perhaps the above observations were made by the Supreme Court because the matters with which it was concerned were pending for a long time. But we draw some support from these observations to strengthen our view that if section 5 of the Limitation Act is held to be applicable to the appeal/application under section 17 (1) of the NPA Act that will be in the interest of justice. 76. We are mindful of the fact that expeditious and speedy disposal of proceedings is the essence of the NPA Act. This is seen from section 17(5) which requires DRT to dispose of an application within 60 days from the date of the application. Under proviso thereof, DRT can extend the said period for reasons to be recorded in writing but the total period of the application shall not exceed four months from the date of the application. If the application is not disposed of by the DRT within four months, any party to the application may make an application to the DRAT for appropriate direction to the DRT for expeditious disposal and the DRAT shall make an order for expeditious disposal. If the application is not disposed of by the DRT within four months, any party to the application may make an application to the DRAT for appropriate direction to the DRT for expeditious disposal and the DRAT shall make an order for expeditious disposal. In the light of the settled legal principles as regards applicability of the Limitation Act and in the interest of justice, we have held that section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to the proceedings under section 17 (1) of the NPA Act. However, while dealing with applications for condonation of delay, the DRT must bear the scheme of the NPA Act in mind and should not allow any person to procrastinate the proceedings by making frivolous applications for condonation of delay. 77. The above discussion leads us to the following conclusions : (a) Forty-five days' period of limitation prescribed under section 17(1) of the NPA Act starts running from the date when symbolic possession is taken or from the date when actual possession is taken as there is no dichotomy between the two. (b) The provision of section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to the proceedings under section 17(1) of the NPA Act.” 11. The reference may also be made to the another decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Ponnusamyi & Anr. Vs. The Debts Recovery Tribunal & Anr. in CRP (NPD) No.253/08 decided on 09.02.2009. In the said decision, the High Court of Madras inter alia observed at paras 36 to 39 as under : “36. Therefore it is clear that Section 5 would apply even to some types of applications, though it may not apply to suits. The proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, though original in nature, should be treated as applications and not strictly like suits. Therefore the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in my considered view would apply to applications under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. The proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, though original in nature, should be treated as applications and not strictly like suits. Therefore the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in my considered view would apply to applications under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. But the same logic cannot be extended to applications filed under Section 19 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, since Section 24 of the 1993 Act makes the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to an application under the Act, meaning thereby that an application under Section 19 of the 1993 Act is to be treated as a suit. 37. Section 17 (1) of the SARFAESI Act, prescribes a period of limitation of just 45 days for filing an application, challenging any of the measures taken by the secured creditor under Section 13 (4) of the Act. The remedy under Section 17 (1) is virtually a remedy in respect of a right of redemption. Therefore, to hold that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, will not apply to an application under Section 17 (1) would virtually defeat the valuable right of redemption available to a mortgagor. This right of redemption normally gets extinguished after the sale of the property. Therefore the apprehension expressed by the learned counsel for the Bank that the parties may come up with applications after a huge delay and defeat the object of the Act for speedy recovery of dues, may not be well founded for the simple reason that after losing possession of the property under Section 13 (4), a debtor cannot afford to wait for long. If he waits for long, the property may get sold and his rights may get extinguished. Hence the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, to proceedings under Section 17 (1) of the SARFAESI Act, would neither defeat the rights of the secured creditor nor cause irreparable hardship to the secured creditor. 38. In Karnataka State Financial Corporation Vs. N. Narasimahaiah ( 2008 (5) SCC 176 ), the Supreme Court held as follows :- "40. Right to property, although no longer a fundamental right, is still a constitutional right. It is also human right. 38. In Karnataka State Financial Corporation Vs. N. Narasimahaiah ( 2008 (5) SCC 176 ), the Supreme Court held as follows :- "40. Right to property, although no longer a fundamental right, is still a constitutional right. It is also human right. In the absence of any provision either expressly or by necessary implication, depriving a person therefrom, the Court shall not construe a provision leaning in favour of such deprivation." "In a case where a Court has to weigh between a right of recovery and protection of a right, it would also lean in favour of the person who is going to be deprived therefrom. It would not be the other way round." 39. Viewed in the context of the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court extracted above, it could be seen that the right conferred upon the secured creditor under Section 13 (4) of the SARFAESI Act, is a right of recovery. The right conferred upon the debtor or the surety under Section 17 is a right to save one's own property. To hold that the fate of a debtor or surety will be sealed in a period of 45 days from the date of initiation of the measures under Section 13 (4) and that he would be left remediless after the said period on account of non-availability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, would defeat the right to property. Therefore the Court has to choose an interpretation which would lean in favour of the right to property. If so done, the conclusion is irresistible that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, would apply to applications filed under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act.” 12. In view of the above, even if the matter is examined in light of the provisions of the Securitisation Act for applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the position would remain the same as was held by this Court in the case of Mahesh Harilal Khamar Vs. B.N. Narasimhan (supra). 13. However, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner heavily relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Nahar Industrial Enterprises ltd. Vs. Hong Kong and Sanghai Banking Corporation reported at 2009 (8) SCC 646 and contended that the Tribunal is held to be not a Court, therefore, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply. Vs. Hong Kong and Sanghai Banking Corporation reported at 2009 (8) SCC 646 and contended that the Tribunal is held to be not a Court, therefore, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply. In furtherance to his submission, he also relied upon the another decision of the Apex Court in the case of Consolidated Engineering Enterprises Vs. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department & Ors. reported at 2008 (7) SCC 169 and contended that as per the view expressed by the Apex Court, (speaking through Hon'ble Mr. Justice Raveendran) the Limitation Act would not apply when there is already a special Act providing for special limitation for the Tribunal. Therefore, it was contended that when the period of 45 days has been expressly provided under the special law, i.e. Securitisation Act, provision of Limitation Act would not apply. Therefore, the learned counsel contended that the error of law is committed by the Tribunal apparent on the record. 14. As observed earlier, even if the contention of the learned counsel is considered and accepted that it is a Tribunal and not the Court as per the view taken by the Apex Court in the case of Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. (supra), then also in view of the observations made hereinabove, it cannot be accepted that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply to the proceedings under Section 17 of the Securitisation Act before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. The reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Consolidated Engineering Enterprises (supra) is ill-founded inasmuch the observations of the Apex Court are to be considered and applied to the facts of that case. If such observation are considered, what is being held by the Apex Court that if there is express period prescribed in the special law, such would apply and not the prescription as provided under the Limitation Act, but the same cannot be read in absolute so as to excluded the applicability of other provisions of the Limitation Act which may apply, more particularly in view of the no express bar provided under the special law. Therefore, such a decision is of no help to the learned counsel for the petitioner. 15. Therefore, such a decision is of no help to the learned counsel for the petitioner. 15. In view of the above, it cannot be said that the Tribunal has committed any error apparent on the face of the record which may call for interference by this Court in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 16. Hence, no case is made out for interference. Therefore, rejected. (SBS) Petition rejected.