Judgment : 1. By this petition, the petitioner-Management takes exception to the judgment of the School Tribunal, Nagpur, whereby the Tribunal allowed respondent No.2’s appeal and directed the petitioner-Management to reinstate respondent No.2 as High School Teacher from 4-10-1993 and to pay the amount of arrears of difference of pay with effect from 4-10-1993. 2. Facts, which are material for deciding this petition, are as under: The petitioner-Management runs a School at Nagpur by name Bhola High School. Respondent No.2 Chaya Sorde was qualified to be a High School Teacher, since she was B.Sc. B.Ed. In 1986 itself. She was appointed as Assistant Teacher vide order dated 5-11-1988 in the petitioner-School on a clear vacancy and joined her duties with effect from 21-11-1988. Her appointment was approved initially for one year. On 23-6-1989, she was given another appointment letter for a period of one year, which was approved by the Education Officer. On 9-4-1990, respondent No.2 had expressed readiness to work in the Middle School, since the Education Officer had sanctioned one post of High School Teacher less. She had stated that her claim for appointment as High School Teacher should be considered after the post became available. 3. Her services were terminated by order dated 28-4-1990 with effect from 30-4-1990. On 22-6-1990, the petitioner-Management, however, issued order of continuation of respondent Nos.2’s services and made her permanent employee of the School. However, from 1-7-1991, according to respondent No.2, she was restrained by the petitioners from performing her duties. She, therefore, approached the Tribunal by filing an appeal, which was registered as Appeal No.126 of 1991, and prayed for setting aside of her oral termination effected with effect from 1-7-1991. In this appeal, the Tribunal granted stay to termination. 4. This appeal came to be disposed of in view of a pursis filed before the School Tribunal on 9-10-1992 by the petitioner-Management. The petitioners stated that they were withdrawing the termination order dated 30-4-1990 and undertook to give continuity in service to the appellant. 5. The Education Officer seems to have granted approval by letter dated 29-3-1993 to the appointment of respondent No.2 as Upper Division Teacher in the pay scale of Rs.1400-2600. On 29-9-1993, the Head Mistress wrote to the Education Officer seeking review of approval granted to the appointment of respondent No.2 stating that the appointment of respondent No.2 was not accepted by the Management of the School. On 29-9-1993, the Head Mistress wrote to the Education Officer seeking review of approval granted to the appointment of respondent No.2 stating that the appointment of respondent No.2 was not accepted by the Management of the School. It seems that there had been some change in the Management of the School in the meantime. The Head Mistress stated that since neither the Management nor the School Committee had approved of her action, the approval granted to respondent No.2’s appointment should be reviewed. Respondent No.2 was accordingly informed by letter dated 4-10-1993 and it was decided that her services should be regularized as Middle School Teacher in the pay scale of Rs.1200-2040 instead of Rs.1400 to 2600. This order was challenged by respondent No.2 by filing Appeal No.345 of 1993 before the School Tribunal. She had also sought stay of operation of the order dated 4-10-1993. 6. The petitioners filed a reply to the application for stay, which was possibly adopted as the written statement. It was submitted that respondent No.2 was appointed as High School Teacher in November 1988, but her appointment was made by unauthorized person and hence her services were terminated by the Management. In Appeal No.126 of 1991 filed by her, ad interim stay was granted and eventually the Management withdrew the termination order on humanitarian grounds. The Management, however, specifically submitted that respondent No.2 was not appointed in the pay scale of Rs.1400-2600. Therefore, they submitted that respondent No.2 was continued as Middle School Teacher and hence there was nothing wrong in the order passed. 7. After considering the rival contentions, the learned Presiding Officer of the School Tribunal passed the impugned order. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner-Management is before this Court. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that since the appointment of respondent No.2 was itself made without approval by a competent Managing Committee, she had no right to continue in employment. However, the petitioner-Management accommodated her on humanitarian grounds. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, this does not create any right in respondent No.2. He relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Jagdip Singh, reported at AIR 1964 SC 521 , where the Court was considering appointments of some Naib Tahsildars as Tahsildars. No posts were available when the persons concerned were confirmed on 23-10-1956. He relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Jagdip Singh, reported at AIR 1964 SC 521 , where the Court was considering appointments of some Naib Tahsildars as Tahsildars. No posts were available when the persons concerned were confirmed on 23-10-1956. On 24-10-1956, the Rajpramukh of Pepsu sanctioned the creation of supernumerary posts of Tahsildars. The Government of Punjab issued a notification on 31-10-1956 de-confirming the said seven Tahsildars, who had been confirmed by order dated 23-10-1956, which was challenged before the High Court. The High Court upheld the contention of the Tahsildars that the action of de-confirmation amounted to reduction in rank and that the Tahsildars could not be deprived of their status by successor to Government of Pepsu. The Supreme Court found that the order of 23-10-1956 by the Financial Commissioner confirming the persons concerned as Tahsildars had no legal foundation and, therefore, was wholly void. The Court held in para 18 that when an order is void on the ground that the authority, which made it, had no power to make it, it cannot give rise to any legal rights. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioners also relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, reported at AIR 1958 SC 36 , where too the Court held that if the Government servant has no right to the post where he is appointed and whose temporary service has not ripened into a quasi-permanent service, the termination of his employment does not deprive him of any rights and, therefore, cannot be termed as a punishment. Relying on this judgment, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that accommodating respondent No.2 as Middle School Teacher does not amount to her reversion and, therefore, calls for no interference. 10. The learned counsel for respondent No.2 submitted that the action of the petitioners in reducing rank of respondent No.2 from Upper Division Teacher to Lower Division Teacher by order dated 4-3-1993 is unsustainable. He submitted that respondent No.2 had been appointed on a clear vacant post as may be seen by the order dated 5-11-1988. This appointment was for a period of two years on probation from 16-11-1988 to 15-11-1990 in the pay-scale of Rs.365-760, which corresponded to the scale of Upper Division Teacher. He submitted that respondent No.2 had been appointed on a clear vacant post as may be seen by the order dated 5-11-1988. This appointment was for a period of two years on probation from 16-11-1988 to 15-11-1990 in the pay-scale of Rs.365-760, which corresponded to the scale of Upper Division Teacher. Respondent No.2 had agreed on 9-4-1990 to work as Middle School Teacher for the year 1989-90, since the strength sanctioned by Zilla Parishad for High School was less by one Teacher. He submitted that since respondent No. 2 had completed probation in the year 1990-91, she had been appointed from 26-6-1990 by order dated 22-6-1990, not for any fixed period. The sanction granted by the Education Officer on 29-3-1993 also shows that respondent No.2 was to be continued as Upper Division Teacher from 26-6-1990. He submitted that, therefore, the question of respondent No.2 having earlier accepted or having agreed to be accommodated to a lower post, would not arise. 11. The learned counsel for respondent No.2 drew my attention to an affidavit filed by the then Head Mistress on 1-9-1999 in this petition, whereby she had specifically stated that respondent No.2 had accepted reduction for only one Academic Session 1989-90, and from 1991 onwards, she was continuously working as Upper Division Teacher. The learned counsel for respondent No.2, therefore, submitted that there was no question of contending that respondent No.2 had accepted an appointment to a lower post. As far as the letter dated 9-4-1990 by respondent No.2 is concerned, it is clear that she had agreed to work as Middle School Teacher for want of sanctioned post for the year 198990 only. This letter would not enable the petitioners to style her appointment as that of a Lower Division Teacher. 12. The learned counsel for respondent No.2 next submitted that respondent No.2 had challenged oral termination of her services from 1-7-1991 by filing Appeal No. 126 of 1991 before the School Tribunal. This appeal was disposed of by joint pursis filed by the Secretary of the Society as well as the then Head Mistress, i.e. the petitioners herein, whereby the petitioners had withdrawn the termination order issued on 30-4-1990 and had agreed to give continuity in service to the appellant. This appeal was disposed of by joint pursis filed by the Secretary of the Society as well as the then Head Mistress, i.e. the petitioners herein, whereby the petitioners had withdrawn the termination order issued on 30-4-1990 and had agreed to give continuity in service to the appellant. This would imply that respondent No.2 would be continued in the post, which she was holding at the relevant time, which, even according to the affidavit of the Head Mistress, was that of Upper Division Teacher. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioners has not been able to point out that by this pursis, the petitioners had agreed to withdraw the termination on the condition that respondent No.2 should be continued as Middle School Teacher or Lower Division Teacher. If respondent No.2’s letter dated 9-4-1990 accepting reduction for the year 1989-90 is to be restricted for only that academic year, it would follow that respondent No.2 would be entitled to continuation as Upper Division Teacher in view of the pursis filed on 9-10-1992 in Appeal No.126 of 1991 before the School Tribunal. In any case, on 22-6-1990, respondent No.2 was again issued an appointment order with effect from 26-6-1990 on completion of probation. 14. A detailed affidavit has been filed on behalf of the petitioners by one Shri Joydeb Majumdar, Secretary of the Society. He has given details about the disputes in the Management. He has referred to the appointment of respondent No.2 in the year 1988 by the Head Mistress without any authority, by defying the orders of the Management. Now this ground is not open to the petitioners in view of the fact that the petitioner-Society has thereafter undertaken to withdraw termination order issued to respondent No.2 and had agreed to grant her continuity in service by pursis dated 9-10-1992 before the School Tribunal. Therefore, now it would not be open for the petitioners to rake up the disputes as to whether the Head Mistress had the authority at the relevant time to appoint respondent No.2. It has not been stated by Shri Majumdar in his affidavit that when the pursis was filed before the School Tribunal on 9-10-1992, any dispute in the Management continued or that the petitioners do not own this pursis. 15. It has not been stated by Shri Majumdar in his affidavit that when the pursis was filed before the School Tribunal on 9-10-1992, any dispute in the Management continued or that the petitioners do not own this pursis. 15. The learned counsel for respondent No.2 submitted that the time-table, which had been annexed by respondent No.2 to her return in this petition, would show that respondent No.2 was taking High School classes in the year 1993-94, i.e. before the impugned order of reversion was passed on 4-10-1993. He submitted that changing the status of respondent No.2 unilaterally without holding an enquiry was impermissible. Sub-section (6) of Section 4 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 provides that no employee of a private school shall be reduced in rank by the Management except in accordance with the provisions of the Act or the Rules made thereunder. Under the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981, penalty of reduction in rank could be imposed under Rule 29 only after following the procedure for imposing major punishment. It is not in dispute that no such procedure has been followed in the present case, because, even according to the petitioners, no such enquiry was contemplated, as, in their view, respondent No.2 was only not entitled to hold the post of Upper Division Teacher. 16. Reliance by the learned counsel for the petitioners on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1958 SC 36 , and State of Punjab v. Jagdip Singh, reported at AIR 1964 SC 521 , is misplaced, since it is not that respondent No.2 was not qualified for appointment at the relevant time or that post was not available. It may be seen from the affidavit of Shri Joydeb Majumdar that there were factions in the Management and, therefore, the Management wanted interviews scheduled to be held on 18-6-1988 to be postponed. It was stated that the then Head Mistress of the School had unauthorizedly issued a press clarification that interviews were not postponed and the candidates could attend the interviews on 19-6-1988. It was stated that the then Head Mistress of the School had unauthorizedly issued a press clarification that interviews were not postponed and the candidates could attend the interviews on 19-6-1988. Shri Majumdar was also candid in stating in para 11 of his affidavit that no record was available with the School Management to indicate that respondent No.2 was duly selected pursuant to any valid and legal selection process undertaken by competent Selection Committee. This does not imply that the selection of respondent No.2 was not valid. Factions in the Management cannot be allowed to determine the fortunes of employees appointed under the orders of the Head of the School, who, it seems, was forced to subsequently seek a change in the approval granted by the Education Officer at the instance of changed Management. At the cost of repetition, it has to be stated that if the Management did hold the view that the appointment of respondent No.2 was at its inception invalid, it need not have agreed before the School Tribunal in the earlier round of litigation to withdraw the order terminating her services and to grant her continuity in service. Having done so, it is not now open to the Management to contend that the appointment of respondent was ab initio void. Once the Management agrees to suffer the appointment of respondent No.2 in their School if they wanted to effect any change in her status to her disadvantage, it could be done only by the procedure prescribed under the MEPS Act and Rules. It is nobody’s case that respondent had indulged in any misconduct or was, therefore, liable to be reverted. 17. To sum up, it has to be held that the School Tribunal was justified in quashing the order dated 4-10-1993, since the Management had absolutely no business to revert respondent No.2 merely because, in their view, her initial appointment was without any authority. 18. In view of this, the petition fails and is dismissed.