JUDGMENT 1. - By way of this writ petition, challenge is given to the order dated 01.07.1996 as passed by the Devasthan Commissioner of the State of Rajasthan at Udaipur (the Commissioner hereafter) dismissing the Appeal (No. 16/1991) preferred by the petitioner against the order dated 14.03.1991 as passed by the Assistant Devasthan Commissioner, Jodhpur (the Assistant Commissioner hereafter) whereby the temple in question was held to be a public trust and was ordered to be registered as such under the provisions of the Rajasthan Public Trusts Act, 1959 (the Act of 1959). 2. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having examined the material placed on record, this Court finds the impugned order as passed by the learned Commissioner to be essentially an unreasoned order wherein neither the contentions as urged on behalf of the appellant- petitioner have been dealt with nor the reasons behind the conclusion have been stated with reference to the material available on record; and, therefore, the appeal is proposed to be remanded to the Commissioner for decision afresh and in accordance with law. In this view of the matter, only a brief reference to the background facts and relevant aspects would suffice. 3. The dispute relates to a temple located near village Pal, Jodhpur that is sought to be claimed by the petitioner to be his private temple having been constructed and managed by his ancestors and now by himself. Upon receipt of a complaint that the temple in question was a public property and the persons incharge of the affairs of the temple were misusing the income and were intending to alienate its property, the said Assistant Commissioner got the matter examined by the Inspector concerned; and after receipt of the report suggesting that it were a public trust and liable to be registered under the Act of 1959, proceeded to issue notices under Sections 17 and 18 of the Act of 1959 for the requisite inquiry. After filing of the reply by the petitioner and so also the objections by other persons; and after taking the evidence adduced by the different parties including the petitioner, the learned Assistant Commissioner held the trust in question having commenced from installation of the deity by Kushal Dass, the ancestor of the petitioner, and the petitioner being entitled to be recognised as the hereditary trustee but then, found the trust income to be more than Rs. 3,000/- per annum and thus, held it requiring registration under the Act of 1959. 4. Aggrieved by the order so passed by the Assistant Commissioner, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Commissioner under Section 20 of the Act of 1959 that has been dismissed by the impugned order dated 01.07.1996. The learned Commissioner has referred to the facts of the case; the findings as recorded and the directions as issued by the Assistant Commissioner; and the contentions as urged on behalf of the appellant that it were a private temple and merely for visit of a few devotees did not become a public temple. The learned Commissioner, thereafter, merely observed that the evidence adduced made it clear that the temple in question was a public temple; and that the petitioner Rameshwar Dass and his ancestors were engaged in sewa-puja after the temple was constructed by their forefathers. With these observations, the learned Commissioner concluded that there was no ground to interfere with the order as passed by the Assistant Commissioner. 5. The petitioner contends that his ancestor Khushal Dass constructed this temple of Hanumanji near village Pal, Jodhpur about hundred years back on the land belonging to him and did install a family deity that was worshiped by his descendants. While claiming himself to be the present existing descendant of Khushal Dass and Mahant of the said temple, the petitioner maintains that the temple in question, wherein resides his family deity, was constructed on the land belonging to the said Shri Khushal Dass. It is submitted that though the temple was intended for private worship, the owners of the temple had been permitting the members of the public to visit the same and to worship the deity but and nevertheless, the temple remains a private trust of the petitioner's family and the petitioner is the Mahant of the said temple who had been managing the same without interference by anybody. 6. 6. It is contended that in the impugned order dated 14.03.1991, though the Assistant Commissioner recorded the findings that the temple had been managed by the petitioner Rameshwar Dass and his predecessors for 5 generations; that the petitioner was the hereditary Mahant and the sole trustee of the said temple; that the temple was established by Khushal Dass, the predecessor of the petitioner; and that the offerings are made in the temple by the visitors at their sweet will and are not collected through any donation box or receipt but then, while holding that the total collection through offerings was more than Rs. 3,000/- per annum, held it to be a public trust requiring registration under the Act of 1959 without any justification. It is further contended that in the appeal taken by the petitioner several grounds were urged but the learned Commissioner dismissed the appeal without even stating the requisite reasons. 7. The order as passed by the learned Commissioner in dismissal of the appeal preferred by the petitioner cannot be approved for the same being essentially an unreasoned order. Ordinarily, when the first Appellate Authority/Court is having the final say on the facts; and when the findings of fact as rendered in the first appeal are taken final and rather binding unless suffering from perversity or misreading or such akin shortcomings, it is, as a necessary corollary, expected that the judgment of the first Appellate Authority/Court is complete and self-contained with sufficient, even if not elaborate, discussion to show that the concerned Authority/Court has applied its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and the issues calling for determination. Even when the Appellate Authority/Court would affirm the impugned decision of the subordinate Authority/Court, a mere general expression of concurrence without giving any reasons cannot, ordinarily, be taken sufficient. 8. Moreover, it is to be imbibed that in the scheme of the Act of 1959, the findings after enquiry as recorded by the Assistant Commissioner under Section 19 of the Act of 1959, are subject to only one appeal under Section 20 of the Act and else, the entries in accordance with the findings recorded by the Assistant Commissioner follow per Section 21 of the Act. The Commissioner is invested with the powers to deal with the appeal against the finding of the Assistant Commissioner under Section 20 of the Act of 1959 and in case of taking of appeal, the entries under Section 21 are made by the Assistant Commissioner in accordance with the decision of the Commissioner on such appeal. The entries so made under Section 21 of the Act of 1959, subject to the other provisions of the said Act, are treated final and conclusive. In such a scheme of the provisions of the Act of 1959, the necessity of the Appellate Authority, i.e., the Commissioner to deal with the contentions urged before him and recording of reasons of his decision cannot be over-emphasised; and even if not requiring the detailed, elongated, and encumbered order, the decision of the Commissioner ought to speak of the reasons prevailing with him with reference to the material on record and the law applicable to the case. 9. In the present case, it is noticed that even the order as passed by the Assistant Commissioner, so far the requirement of compulsory registration under the Act of 1959 is concerned, had been more or less cursory in nature with one reference to the fact that according to the enquiry and the statements, the annual income was more than Rs. 3,000/-. And then, as noticed, the order as passed by the Commissioner is bereft of the reasons for the conclusions. The order as passed by the Appellate Authority i.e., the Commissioner, does not show if the contentions as urged on behalf of the petitioner have been bestowed requisite consideration and in this view of the matter, this Court is of opinion that interest of justice shall be served if the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remanded to the Commissioner for decision afresh in accordance with law. 10. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above; the impugned order dated 01.07.1996 is set aside; Appeal No. 16/1991 shall stand restored for reconsideration of the Devasthan Commissioner for the State of Rajasthan. The parties through their respective counsel shall stand at notice to appear before the said Commissioner on 27.04.2009.There shall, however, be no order as to costs of this writ petition.Writ Petition Allowed. *******