Judgment :- 1. The matter is coming up for Admission. The learned Assistant Government Pleader for Revenue had taken notice on behalf of 2nd respondent and Sri Adinarayana Rao had taken notice on behalf of 3rd respondent on 30-10-2009 and requested time to get instructions. 2. Sri Arun Kumar, the learned Counsel representing the writ petitioner had taken this Court through the contents of the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition and would maintain that inasmuch as the 3rd respondent is a lessee under the Government and inasmuch as the 3rd respondent is discharging certain public functions, the Writ Petition is maintainable. 3. Sri Adinarayana Rao, the learned Counsel representing the 3rd respondent, however, had taken a preliminary objection that the Writ Petition is not maintainable and even if the petitioner is aggrieved of any such action since this may fall under dispute regarding management, the remedy if any may be under Section 23 of A.P. Societies Registration Act 2001 and the Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable. 4. The Writ Petition is filed for a Writ of Mandamus declaring the action of the 3rd respondent in not calling for short tender for stadia rights in connection with the one day international day and night cricket match to be played on 5th November 2009 between India and Australia at Rajiv Gandhi International Cricket Stadium, Uppal, Ranga Reddy District which is illegal, arbitrary and contrary to law and also in violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and also in violation of A.P. Societies Registration Act 2001 and consequently to direct the 3rd respondent to call for short term tender for stadia rights (inside stadium for advertisements) as respondents 1 and 2 failed to discharge their duties by being mere onlookers to what is happening and to pass such other suitable orders. 5. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner is a Member of the Hyderabad Cricket Association and Secretary of Sagar Cricket Club, Hyderabad and he is having vast experience in contract field. It is also stated that Sagar Cricket Club is affiliated to Hyderabad Cricket Association. 5. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner is a Member of the Hyderabad Cricket Association and Secretary of Sagar Cricket Club, Hyderabad and he is having vast experience in contract field. It is also stated that Sagar Cricket Club is affiliated to Hyderabad Cricket Association. It is also stated that the 3rd respondent-Association had been registered under A.P. (Telangana Area) Public Societies Registration Act 1350 F (Act 1 of 1350 F) bearing Registration No.207 of 1961 and the said Association is functioning as per the Societies Registration Act. The Hyderabad Cricket Association is affiliated to B.C.C.I. and the 3rd respondent looks after the day-to-day affairs of the Rajiv Gandhi Cricket Stadium at Uppal, Ranga Reddy District. Several further facts had been narrated in paras 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition. The allotment of stadia rights without calling for public tender had been made the principal ground of attack. 6. The decision of the ApexCourt in M/s. Zee Tele Films Ltd and another Vs. Union of India and others 2005 (2) SCJ 121 = AIR 2005 S.C. 2677 = 2005 (3) ALT 10.3 (DNSC) had been relied upon. No doubt, minority view had been strongly relied upon by the Counsel representing the writ petitioner Sri Arun Kumar and equally Sri Adinarayana Rao representing the 3rd respondent also relied upon the said decision. The majority opinion while following the decision in Pradeep Kumar Biswas’s case ( 2002(5) SCC 111 ) was as follows (at paras 24 and 25): “To these facts if we apply the principles laid down by seven-Judge Bench in Pradeep Kumar Biswas ( 2002(5) SCC 111 ), it would be clear that the facts established do not cumulatively show that the Board is financially, functionally or administratively dominated by or is under the control of the Government. Thus the little control that the Government may be said to have on the Board is not pervasive in nature. Such limited control is purely regulatory control and nothing more. Assuming for argument sake that some of the functions do partake the nature of public duties or State actions they being in a very limited area of the activities of the Board would not fall within the parameters laid down by this Court in Pradeep Kumar Biswas’s case ( 2002(5) SCC 111 ). Assuming for argument sake that some of the functions do partake the nature of public duties or State actions they being in a very limited area of the activities of the Board would not fall within the parameters laid down by this Court in Pradeep Kumar Biswas’s case ( 2002(5) SCC 111 ). Even otherwise assuming that there is some element of public duty involved in the discharge of the Board’s functions even then as per the judgment of this Court in Pradeep Kumar Biswa’s case ( 2002(5) SCC 111 ) that by itself would not suffice for bringing the Board within the net of “other authorities” for the purpose of Article 12.” No doubt Sri Arun Kumar had pointed out to the minority opinion expressed in paras 195 and 196 which is as hereunder: “Similarly significant funding by the Government may not by itself make a body a State, if its functions are entirely private in character. Conversely, absence of funding for the functioning of the body or the organisation would not deny it from its status of a State; if its functions are public functions and if it otherwise answers the description of “Other Authorities”. The Government aid may not be confined only by way of monetary grant. It may take various forms e.g., tax exemptions, minimal rent for a stadia and recognition by the State etc. An over emphasis of the absence of the funding by the State is not called for. It is true that regulatory measures applicable to all the persons similarly situated in terms of the provisions of a statute would by itself not make an organisation a State in all circumstances. Conversely, in a case of this nature non-interference in the functioning of an autonomous body by the Government by itself may also not be a determinative factor as the Government may not consider any need therefor despite the fact that the body or organisation had been discharging essentially a public function. Such non-interference would not make the public body a private body”. 7. It is needless to say that this Court is bound to follow the majority opinion of the Apex Court as specified in the decision referred (1) supra. 8. Such non-interference would not make the public body a private body”. 7. It is needless to say that this Court is bound to follow the majority opinion of the Apex Court as specified in the decision referred (1) supra. 8. Apart from this aspect of the matter, Section 23 of A.P. Societies Registration Act 2001 dealing with Dispute regarding management reads as hereunder:- “In the event of any dispute arising among the Committee or the members of the society, in respect of any matter relating to the affairs of the society, any member of the society may proceed with the dispute under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Central Act 26 of 1996) or may file an application in the District Court concerned and the said Court shall after necessary inquiry pass such order as it may deem fit”. Section 32 of the said Act deals with Repeal and savings and the Societies Registration Act 1860 (Central Act 21 of 1860) in its application to the Andhra area of the State of Andhra Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Public Societies Registration Act, 1350 F (Act 1 of 1350F) are hereby repealed. No doubt, Section 32(2) of the said Act specifies that notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under the said Acts (including any order, rule, form, regulation, certificate or bye-laws) in the exercise of any power conferred by or under the said Acts shall be deemed to have been done or taken in the exercise of the powers conferred by or under this Act as if this Act was in force on the date on which such a thing was done or action taken. 9. In the light of the view expressed by the Apex Court, this Court is thoroughly satisfied that this remedy by way of Writ Petition is a misconceived remedy and the remedy, if any available to the writ petitioner being elsewhere, opportunity is given to the writ petitioner to pursue such remedies which are available to the writ petitioner in accordance with Law. 10. Subject to the above observation, the Writ Petition is hereby dismissed at the stage of admission. No order as to costs.