JUDGMENT Tinlianthang Vaiphei, J. 1. The prayer in this writ petition is two-fold: (i) to quash FIR, dated 12.2.2009 lodged by the respondent No. 1 with the Superintendent of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, Gangtok, Sikkim and (ii) to quash the summons issued by the senior Superintendent of Police, CID, PHQ, Gangtok, Sikkim (respondent No. 3) under Section 160, Cr. PC directing the appearance of the petitioner before the Enquiry Officer at CID Office, Gangtok, Sikkim. 2. The facts giving rise to the writ petition, as pleaded therein, are that the petitioner is a manufacturer of Ferro Silicon at its factory at Byrnihat, Meghalaya while the respondent No. 1, is a private limited company having its registered office at Mamrin, Namchi District, South Sikkim. Pursuant to the telephonic request made by the respondent No. 1 for purchase of Ferro Silicon, the petitioner-company on 20.10.2008 sent a quotation through Fax message for supply of 100 M.T. of the Ferro Silicon lumps prime grade containing all particulars including the price thereof. The respondent No. 1, on receipt of the quotation, sent the purchase order dated 20.10.2008 for supplying the same for a price of Rs. 79,84,109 for Siliguri. Having received the payment of Rs. 40 lacs, the petitioner dispatched 35 M.T. of Ferro Silicon (full truck load) on 23.10.2008 through B.H. Roadways Corporation vide L.R. No. 386 dated 23.10.2008 with all the necessary documents including the lorry consignment note dated 23.10.2008. The fully laden truck reached Siliguri on 27.10.2008, and the representative of the respondent No. 1 took delivery of the consignment after weighing the goods at the Mohan Weigh Bridge, Sevok Road, Siliguri on 27.10.2008 in which the weight of the material was found to be 35,150 kg as per the copy of the weigh bridge slip sent to the petitioner. No complaint was initially made by the respondent No. 1 to the petitioner-company on the quality or quantity of the goods including any defect or damage in connection therewith. According to the petitioner-company, on 30.10.2008, three days after taking delivery of those goods, it was surprised to receive a letter from the respondent No. 1 requesting joint inspection. It is claimed by the petitioner-company that this device was employed by the respondent No. 1 with the mala fide intention of backing out from its purchase order as the price of the ordered goods had come down abruptly in the market. It is claimed by the petitioner-company that this device was employed by the respondent No. 1 with the mala fide intention of backing out from its purchase order as the price of the ordered goods had come down abruptly in the market. The petitioner accordingly sent its representative to Sikkim to show its bona fide keeping in view their hitherto cordial relationship, and the joint inspection was done on 3.11.2008 at Sikkim. 3. It is the further case of the petitioner-company that after the joint inspection, a report not reflecting the result of the joint inspection was prepared by the respondent No. 1, which was protested by the representative of the petitioner-company, namely, Mr. Mahesh Tiwari, saying that some of the entries made therein were outside the scope of the joint inspection, but he was forced to put his signature on that report bearing dated 3.11.2008. When its representative returned to Gauhati and narrated the strong-arm tactic used by the respondent No. 2 against him at Sikkim to the petitioner-company, it immediately sent a Fax message to the respondent-company on 12.11.2008 protesting their highhandedness and at the same time requesting them to deposit the balance payments so as to enable them to dispatch the balance quantity of the materials. In reply, the respondent-company in their letter dated 18.11.2008 followed by another letter dated 24.11.2008 questioned the quality of the materials sent by the petitioner on the basis of the joint analysis report dated 3.11.2008 and indicated that the balance quantity so ordered by them be treated as cancelled and requested them to refund the differential amount of Rs. 1,199,012 at the earliest, which, according to the petitioner, was a device to back out altogether from the contract. Several correspondences were thereafter exchanged between the parties, but the misunderstanding/disagreement persisted. On 28.2.2009, the petitioner-company received a Fax message sent by the respondent No. 3 addressed to the petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 to be treated as a summons for their appearance before the Enquiry Officer, CID Office, Gangtok, Sikkim in connection with the complaint lodged by the respondent-company against them for alleged supply of sub-standard quality of Ferro Silicon and of the nonpayment of the balance amount of Rs. 1,199,012; The petitioner-company thereafter requested the respondent No. 3 to send them a copy of the said complaint, but no copy was sent. 1,199,012; The petitioner-company thereafter requested the respondent No. 3 to send them a copy of the said complaint, but no copy was sent. As they believed that the respondent No. 3 was misled by the respondent-company with an intention to harass them, they, then sent a detailed letter dated 10.3.2009 (Annexure-M) apprising him of the true facts and circumstances of the case and of the absence of any criminal act on their part on the basis of the complaint so lodged and requested him to drop the investigation and not to proceed further against them thereafter. Though the respondent No. 3 did not send a copy of the complaint/FIR, the petitioner-company managed to obtain a copy of the FIR-through internet dated 12.2.2009 from a person known to them. Contending that no criminal offence is made out against them in connection with the said complaint lodged by the respondent-company, this writ petition has been filed by the petitioner-company for the relief's indicated earlier. 4. The respondents-company and the respondent No. 3 made their appearance through their respective counsel. Affidavits-in-opposition have also been filed by them separately. The stance taken by the respondent-company is that the materials supplied by the petitioner-company were rejected by them as they were found to have silicon, percentage of only 68.19 whereas it should have been in the range of 70% to 75% and they were also in wet condition with 5% fines. They stoutly deny that the goods were found intact by their representative on the date of delivery or that no complaint was given to the petitioner-company regarding the presence of defects or damage in those materials. They also deny that their letter dated 30.10.2008 contained some unusual remarks as well as unusual conduct on their part or that they were questioning the quality of the materials so supplied with the sole intention of backing out from the purchase order: the petitioner-company were, on the contrary, making absurd statement to cover up their act of supplying sub-standard materials. They assert that the petitioner-company were obliged to supply the purchase materials, which should contain silicon grade of 70% to 75%, but it was found, upon inspection, to have contained only 68.10% of silicon and the entire lot of the goods having powdery tendency and that out of the total goods supplied by them, 30% of the said goods had turned to powder due to the soft nature of the silicon. The answering respondent also deny that the findings stated in the report after the joint inspection report was not the actual result of the joint inspection or that some statements were inserted therein which were beyond the scope of the joint inspection or that the representative of the petitioner-company protested against those entries as they were outside the scope of inspection or that their representative had to put his signature under duress and pressure of the respondent-company. It is pointed out by the answering respondent that the petitioner-company has filed Title Suit No. 102 of 2009 against the respondent-company for a declaration that the latter was bound to lift the balance quantity of 65 MT Ferro Silicon lumps from their factory by paying the balance amount. The respondent-company also points out that whereas they remitted a sum of Rs. 40 lakhs to the petitioner-company for supply of more than 50 MT of the materials out of 100 MT ordered for, the latter supplied only 35 MT of the goods, the value whereof works out to be Rs. 28,00,988 only while they still retained Rs. 1,199,012 without supplying the balance worth that amount. These are the sum and substance of the case of the answering respondents. It is contended by them that the writ petition has been filed by the petitioner-company with an ulterior motive and in order to frustrate the ongoing investigation, and the same is liable to be dismissed. The case of the respondent No. 3, as projected in his affidavit-in-opposition, is that investigation was initiated on receipt of the complaint dated 21.2.2009 for alleged supply of sub-standard quality of Ferro Silicon and for non-refund of Rs. 1,199,012 without naming the petitioners as accused. According to respondent No. 3, preliminary investigation has become necessary as the allegation involves financial irregularities, which is being done in accordance with law, and the writ petition, being devoid of merits, is liable to be dismissed with cost. 5. At the outset, Mrs. 1,199,012 without naming the petitioners as accused. According to respondent No. 3, preliminary investigation has become necessary as the allegation involves financial irregularities, which is being done in accordance with law, and the writ petition, being devoid of merits, is liable to be dismissed with cost. 5. At the outset, Mrs. N. Hazarika, the learned Counsel for respondents 1 and 2, has raised preliminary objection against the maintainability of the writ petition by contending that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the case as the FIR was lodged at Gangtok, Sikkim and not at Shillong even though the petitioners are residents of Meghalaya. It is her submission that the sub-standard goods were detected at Gangtok after joint inspection by the respondent-company and the representative of the petitioner, and the cause of action for writ petition, therefore, arose at Gangtok, Sikkim and not in any part of Meghalaya. She, thus, strenuously urges this Court to dismiss the writ petition at the very threshold, or, at least, direct the petitioner-company to approach the High Court of Sikkim for appropriate relief. Opposing the submissions of the learned Counsel for the respondent-company, Mr. R.L. Yadav, the learned Counsel for the petitioner-company, maintains that the FIR/complaint itself reveals that a part of the cause of action, if not the whole cause of action, certainly arose at Byrnihat, Meghalaya thereby conferring territorial jurisdiction upon this Court to entertain this writ petition. He relies on the decision of the Apex Court in Navinchandran N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra (2000) 7 SCC 640 and the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Bhabesh Ch. Baroowa vs. Escorts Finance Ltd. 2005 (1) GLT 67, in support of his contention. 6. The question of territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India came up for consideration before a three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. Utpal Kumar Basu (1994) 4 SCC 711 wherein it has been held: (SCC pp. 716-717, paras 5-6) 5. 6. The question of territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India came up for consideration before a three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. Utpal Kumar Basu (1994) 4 SCC 711 wherein it has been held: (SCC pp. 716-717, paras 5-6) 5. Clause (1) of Article 226 begins with a non-obstante clause-notwithstanding anything in Article 32 - and provides that every High Court shall have power 'throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction', to issue to any person or authority, including in a appropriate cases, any Government, 'within those territories' directions, orders or writs, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or any other purpose. Under Clause (2) of Article 226 the High Court may exercise its power conferred by Clause (1) if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territory over which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. On a plain reading of the aforesaid two clauses of Article 226 of the Constitution it becomes clear that the High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the scat of the government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territories. In order to confer jurisdiction on the High Court of Calcutta, NICCO must show that at least a part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of that court. This is at best its case in the writ petition. 6. It is well settled that the expression cause of action means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favor by the court. In Chand Kaur vs. Partab Singh Lord Watson said. This is at best its case in the writ petition. 6. It is well settled that the expression cause of action means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favor by the court. In Chand Kaur vs. Partab Singh Lord Watson said. The cause of action has no relation whatever to the defense which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the ground set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the court to arrive at a conclusion in his favor. Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an inquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other words the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put it differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition. Therefore, the question whether in the instant case the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the writ petition in question even on the facts alleged must depend upon whether the averments made in paragraphs 5, 7, 8, 18, 22, 26 and 43 are sufficient in law to establish that a part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. 7. So far as the question of territorial jurisdiction with reference to a criminal offence is concerned, the main factor to be considered is the place where the alleged offence was committed. That apart, the fact that the consideration that arises in deciding the question of territorial jurisdiction in cases involving criminal offences may not always apply to cases involving civil disputes is brought to the fore by the Apex Court in Union of India vs. Adani Exports Ltd. (2002) 1 SCC 567 wherein it observed: (SCC p. 575, para 20) 20. Mr. Mr. Desai, however, placed reliance on a recent judgment of this Court in Navinchandra vs. State of Maharashtra wherein this Court has held that a part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court. It is to be noted that in the said petition, among other relief's, the writ petitioner had prayed for a writ of mandamus to the State of Meghalaya to transfer the investigation to Mumbai Police as also allegations of mala fides were made as to the filing of complaint at Shillong. It was also averred in that case that the petitioner was primarily aggrieved by the criminal complaint filed at Meghalaya because the bulk of the investigation was carried on at Bombay. The said writ petition was dismissed by the Bombay High Court solely on the ground that since the complaint in question was filed at Shillong in the State of Meghalaya and the petitioner had sought for quashing of the said complaint, such a writ petition was not maintainable before the High Court of Bombay. According to this Court, that finding was given by this Court without taking into consideration the alternative prayers in the writ petition to which we have made a reference hereinabove, which prayers, according to this Court, gave rise to a cause of action to move the High Court of Bombay for relief. Therefore, in our opinion, this judgment does not help the petitioner to justify its action in filing a writ petition before the Gujarat High Court. That apart, we must notice that the said judgment is delivered in a matter involving criminal dispute and consequences of such dispute have a direct bearing on the personal freedom of a citizen guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, the consideration that arises in deciding the question of territorial jurisdiction in cases involving criminal offences may not always apply to cases involving civil disputes like the special applications with which we are concerned. (Emphasis mine) 8. This then leads me to discuss in detail the Navinchandra case (supra), upon which heavy reliance is made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. That was a case where the appellant was managing director of a company IFPL having its registered office at Mumbai. (Emphasis mine) 8. This then leads me to discuss in detail the Navinchandra case (supra), upon which heavy reliance is made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. That was a case where the appellant was managing director of a company IFPL having its registered office at Mumbai. A company-known as CEL entered into an agreement with the appellant for the purchase of the entire shares of IFPL for which it paid earnest money. But CEL failed to fulfill its commitment to pay the balance purchase price within the specified time and, therefore, the appellant terminated the agreement. CEL filed a suit against the appellant in the High Court of Bombay for specific performance of the agreement. Two shareholders of CEL took over management and control of the company as directors and they formed another company JBHL at Shillong in the State of Meghalaya. Later the said suit was withdrawn upon the appellant's returning the amount paid by CEL which was earlier forfeited by the appellant. This fact was recorded in the consent terms filed in the suit. In pursuance of the agreement JBHL made payments towards purchase of shares IFPL. But according to the appellant as JBHL committed default in making the balance payment and thereby committed breach of the agreement, the said agreement stood terminated and the earnest money stood forfeited as stipulated in the agreement. It was further alleged that the JBHL filed the complaint against the appellant at Shillong which was false and has been deliberately filed there with the mala fide intention of exerting pressure and causing harassment to him so as to get the transaction relating to transfer of shares reversed. According to the petitioner since the entire transaction upon which the complaint was purportedly based has taken place at Mumbai and not at any other place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or any other place in the State of Meghalaya, the complaint could not/ought not to have been entertained by the police at Shillong. The jurisdiction, if any, to investigate/inquire into the contents of the complaint was with the police/courts in Mumbai and the action taken by the Special SP Police, CID, Shillong in entertaining the said complaint and in taking up investigation on the basis of the same was clearly oppressive, discriminatory and mala fide. The jurisdiction, if any, to investigate/inquire into the contents of the complaint was with the police/courts in Mumbai and the action taken by the Special SP Police, CID, Shillong in entertaining the said complaint and in taking up investigation on the basis of the same was clearly oppressive, discriminatory and mala fide. With the above averments, the appellant filed a writ petition before the Bombay High court praying inter alia (a) to quash the complaint lodged by JBHL or in the alternative to issue a writ of mandamus directing the State of Meghalaya to transfer the investigation being conducted by the officers of CID at Shillong to the Economic Offences Wing, General Branch of CID, Mumbai or any other investigating agency of the Mumbai Police, and (b) to issue a writ of mandamus or any other order or direction restraining the Special SP, CID, Shillong and/or any investigating agency of the Mumbai police, and (b) to issue a writ of prohibition or any other order or direction restraining the Special SP, Police, CID. Shillong and/or any investigating agency of Meghalaya Police from taking any further step in respect of the complaint lodged by JBHL with the police authorities at Shillong. The High Court dismissed the writ petition holding that it could not entertain the writ petition since the petitioner had prayed for quashing the complaint which was lodged by the complainant at Shillong. On the pleading of the parties the moot question that arose before the Supreme Court in appeal was whether the Bombay High Court was right in passing the order rejecting the writ petition on the ground that the court could not entertain the writ petition as the petitioner had prayed for quashing the complaint. The leading judgment was delivered by D.P. Mohapatra, J, which is found at paragraph 27: (SCC p. 650, para 27) The judgment of the High Court under challenge is unsustainable. The High court failed to consider all the relevant facts necessary to arrive at a proper decision on the question of maintainability of the writ petition, on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The court based its decision on the sole consideration that the complainant filed the complaint at Shillong in the State of Meahalaya and the petitioner had prayed for quashing the complaint. The court based its decision on the sole consideration that the complainant filed the complaint at Shillong in the State of Meahalaya and the petitioner had prayed for quashing the complaint. The High Court did not also consider the alternative prayer made in the writ petition that a writ of mandamus be issued to the State of Meghalaya to transfer the investigation to Mumbai Police. The High Court also did not take note of the averments in the writ petition that filing of the complaint at Shillong was a mala fide move on the part of the complainant to harass and pressurize the petitioner to reverse the transaction for transfer of shares. The relief sought in the writ petition may be one of the relevant criteria for consideration of the question but cannot be the sole consideration of the matter. On the averments made in the writ petition it cannot be said that no part of the cause of action for filing the writ petition arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court. (Emphasis mine) 9. It may also be relevant to reproduce the material portions of the concurring judgment of Thomas, J, which read, thus: (SCC p. 655, paras 43, 44 and 45) 43. We make it clear that the mere fact that FIR was registered in a particular State is not the sole criterion to decide that no cause of action has arisen even partly within the territorial limits of jurisdiction of another State or by making a sojourn or even a permanent residence therein. The place of the person moving a High Court is not the criterion to determine the contours of the cause of action in that particular writ petition. The High Court before which the writ petition is filed must ascertain whether any part of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial limits of its jurisdiction. It depends upon the facts in each case. 44. In the present case, a large number of events has taken at Bombay in respect of allegations contained in the FIR registered at Shillong. If the averments in the writ petition are correct then the major portion of the facts which led to the registering of the FIR has taken place at Bombay. It is unnecessary to repeat those events over again as Mohapatra, J. had adverted to them with precision and the needed details, 10. If the averments in the writ petition are correct then the major portion of the facts which led to the registering of the FIR has taken place at Bombay. It is unnecessary to repeat those events over again as Mohapatra, J. had adverted to them with precision and the needed details, 10. In the instant case, the gravamen of the charge in the complaint is that the act of omission and commission against the petitioners reveals deception with an intention to cheat the respondent-company and thereby caused a loss of Rs. 40 lakhs to them by inducing them to pay such amount by falsely promising to supply Ferro Silicon of the specified specification. As noted earlier, the petitioner-company was to supply 100 metric tons of the said goods to the respondent-company for a consideration of Rs. 79,84,109, out of which the respondent-company paid Rs. 40 lakhs in advance, but the petitioner-company supplied only 35 metric tons of the goods worth only Rs. 28,00,988, which were dispatched from Byrnihat, Meghalaya. On receipt of the goods, scientific analysis was stated to have been conducted on the said goods at Gangtok, but the same was found to be of sub-standard quality, which triggered the dispute. It is, thus, obvious that the materials were dispatched by the petitioner-company from Byrnihat, Meghalaya, but they were detected to be of sub-standard quality at Gangtok, Sikkim. These are the uncontroverted allegations of the respondent-company. From these allegations and from the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the respondents in the course of hearing, we proceeded on the assumption that the aforesaid acts of commission or omission constitute an offence punishable under Section 420, IPC. A perusal of the FIR, complaint leaves me with no doubt that the alleged delivery of sub-standard goods took place at Byrnihat, Meghalaya. That being the uncontroverted allegations in the complaint, it cannot be said that no part of the cause of action arose in Byrnihat, Meghalaya. The settled law is that even if a fraction of the cause of action arose at a particular place, the High Court within whose jurisdiction a fraction of the cause of action arose will have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The settled law is that even if a fraction of the cause of action arose at a particular place, the High Court within whose jurisdiction a fraction of the cause of action arose will have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In my opinion, this Court certainly has the territorial jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition, more so, when the subject-matter of the case, has a direct bearing on the personal liberty of a citizen guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the objection raised by the learned Counsel for the respondent-company on the maintainability of this writ petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction is bereft of merits and, therefore, fails. 11. I shall now come now to the contention of Mr. R.L. Yadav, the learned Counsel for the petitioner-company, that even if the allegations made against the petitioner-company are taken at their face-value and their defense not being taken into account also, no offence of cheating took place at Gangtok, where investigation of the case is being carried out. To appreciate this submission, I may refer to the decision of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of State vs. Chuni Lal AIR 1965 Patna 103. That was a case where the accused booked at Gauhati (Assam) 125 chests, said to contain tea, in five consignments, to Howrah (West Bengal), the consignee being himself, but the consignment being endorsed in favour of different persons. In the course of transit it was discovered at Jamalpur (Bihar) that 115 out of 125 chests contained paddy husks in place of tea and the remaining 10 chests were found to contain rubbish tea and dust. The Jamalpur Government Railway Police submitted charge sheet against the accused before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Monghyr, who took cognizance of the case and transferred the same to the file of Shri S.N. De, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, for trial. Before the Magistrate, a question was raised as to whether Monghyr had the jurisdiction to try the case. The Jamalpur Government Railway Police submitted charge sheet against the accused before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Monghyr, who took cognizance of the case and transferred the same to the file of Shri S.N. De, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, for trial. Before the Magistrate, a question was raised as to whether Monghyr had the jurisdiction to try the case. When the matter ultimately reached the Patna High Court, it was held: (3) From the facts stated above, it is manifest that the offence of cheating, if any, was committed at Gauhati from where instead of tea, husks were dispatched by the offender or where the endorsement of the consignments was made in favour of different persons. At Jamalpur, nothing was done except the discovery of the fact that the consignment contained husks, instead of tea, which showed that the offence of cheating had been committed. (4) Section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lays down that when a person is accused of the commission of any offence by reason of anything which has been done and of, any consequence which has ensued, such offence may be inquired into or tried by a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any such thing has been done, or any such consequence has ensued. In the present case, the offence of cheating that is said to have been committed by the accused was committed at Gauhati where instead of tea, husks were booking in the consignments. The discovery of this fact at Jamalpur could not be said to be of any consequence which had ensured from the fact cheating by the accused at Gauhati. In other words, no consequence ensued at Jamalpur in respect of the offence of cheating that was committed at Gauhati. It is, therefore, manifest that the court at Monghyr, within whose jurisdiction Jamalpur lies, could have no jurisdiction to try the case. (5) The above view taken by me gains full support from a Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Prayag Das Bhargava vs. Daulat Ram 16 Cri. LJ: AIR 1915 All 428 (1). In that case, the complainant was induced to part with his money at Meerat on the false representation that certain barrel contained certain amount of spirit. At Agra it was discovered that the barrel did not contain the amount of spirits that it had been represented to contain. LJ: AIR 1915 All 428 (1). In that case, the complainant was induced to part with his money at Meerat on the false representation that certain barrel contained certain amount of spirit. At Agra it was discovered that the barrel did not contain the amount of spirits that it had been represented to contain. It was held that the Magistrate at Agra had no jurisdiction to try the case under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code as discovery of the alleged fraud at Agra after the goods were delivered could not be a consequence which had ensued within the meaning of Section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 12. With due respect, in my judgment, the view taken by the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Chuni Lal (supra) is a correct exposition of law on Section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That apart, the facts in that ease and those in the instant case are also somewhat similar in all respects. Consequently, the criminal court, for that matter, the police, at Gangtok, Sikkim on the facts of this case, have no territorial jurisdiction to investigate the complaint/FIR lodged by the respondent-company against the petitioners. To allow them to carry on the investigation of such case and thereafter to transfer the same to the police in Meghalaya will be an abuse of process of court. By saying this, I should not be understood to hold that the criminal complaint/FIR is liable to be quashed. I cannot do this at this stage. It shall be open to the respondent No. 3 to endorse the complaint/FIR to the police having territorial jurisdiction in Meghalaya to take up the investigation of the case. Alternatively, it shall also be open to the respondent-company to file the complaint/FIR before the police having the territorial jurisdiction for carrying out the investigation of the case. As for the power of the respondent No. 3 under Section 160, Cr. PC to require the attendance of the petitioners being beyond the limits of his own or adjoining police station, I had considered this issue in WP (C) No. 147 (SH) of 2008 Pusma Investment (P) Ltd. and other vs. The State of Meghalaya. As for the power of the respondent No. 3 under Section 160, Cr. PC to require the attendance of the petitioners being beyond the limits of his own or adjoining police station, I had considered this issue in WP (C) No. 147 (SH) of 2008 Pusma Investment (P) Ltd. and other vs. The State of Meghalaya. This is what I said: Conjoint reading of both the Sub-sections and the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 160 plainly indicates, firstly, that the person to be summoned by the officer making the investigation must reside within the local limits of his own police station or within the adjoining area and, secondly, that in the case of a male person under the age of fifteen years or woman, their attendance cannot be enforced at any place other than their residence even if they reside within the limits of the police station of the police officer making the investigation or within the limits of the adjoining police station and, thirdly, that reasonable expenses of every person other than a male person under the age of fifteen years of women attending such requisition at any place within the limits of the police officer making the investigation or the adjoining police station shall have to be paid by the concerned police officer as per rules fraud by the State Government. If the contention of the learned Additional Advocate General that under Section 160, the police officer making the investigation is not disabled from requiring the attendance of a witness residing beyond the local limits of his police station or adjoining police station is accepted, that will amount to ignoring the words "being within the limits of his own or any adjoining station". In my opinion, such interpretation is against all canons of interpretation. It is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surplus age, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute (see Ashwini Kumar Ghosh vs. Arabina Base AIR 1952 SC 369 ). In the interpretation of statute, observed Das Gupta, J. in J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of U.P. AIR 1961 SC 1170 (at page 1174), the courts presume that the Legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. In the interpretation of statute, observed Das Gupta, J. in J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of U.P. AIR 1961 SC 1170 (at page 1174), the courts presume that the Legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. The Legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say any thing in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the Legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. When the language of Section 160 is plain and unambiguous, this Court cannot plunge headlong into a discussion of the reason which motivated the Legislature into enacting this provision and took into consideration the hardship and inconvenience being caused to the investigating agency if they are not allowed to enforce the attendance of witnesses residing beyond their police station or adjoining police station. The rule of purposive construction cannot also be invoked in this provision. The correct principle, according to the learned author, G.P., Singh, J., after the words have Loon construed in the context and it is found that the language is capable of bearing only one construction, the rule in Hoyden's case ceases to be controlling and gives way to the plain meaning rule. But the rule cannot be used to the length of applying unnatural meanings to familiar words or of so stretching the language that its former shape is transformed into something which is not only significantly different but has a name of its own especially when "the language has no evident ambiguity or uncertainty about it" (see Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 9th edition, pp. 119-120). In the view that I have taken, the impugned notices are ultra vires the provisions of Section160 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and cannot be sustained in law. I have carefully gone through the case of Antrudha S. Bhagat (supra) cited by the learned Additional Advocate General, but, with due respect, I find myself unable to agree with the view taken by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court for the reasons already stated in the foregoing. 13. I have carefully gone through the case of Antrudha S. Bhagat (supra) cited by the learned Additional Advocate General, but, with due respect, I find myself unable to agree with the view taken by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court for the reasons already stated in the foregoing. 13. For the reason stated in the foregoing, this writ petition is disposed of with the following directions:- (a) Let a writ of prohibition issue directing the respondent No. 3 not to proceed with further investigation arising out of or in connection with the complaint dated 12.2.2009 lodged by the respondent-company against the petitioners. (b) The summons dated 28.2.2009 issued by the respondent No. 3 in connection with the aforesaid complaint is hereby quashed, (c) It shall be open to the respondent No. 3 to transfer/endorse the complaint lodged by the respondent-company to the Meghalaya Police having the territorial jurisdiction for investigation thereof. (d) Alternatively, liberty is given to the respondent-company to lodge a fresh complaint with the Meghalaya Police having the territorial jurisdiction to investigate the same. (e) The parties are, however, directed to bear their respective costs.