JUDGMENT H.N. Sarma, J. 1. Being aggrieved by initiation of the impugned proceeding registered as C.R. Case No. 3/09 under Section 138 of the N.I. Act by the learned SDJM (M), Biswanath Chariali, against the petitioner on the basis of a complaint lodged by the respondent-complainant, the present application for quashing of the said proceeding has been filed by the petitioner in exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr.P.C. Heard Dr. B. Ahmed, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. K.R. Surana, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-complainant. 2. The complainant filed the aforesaid C.R. Case No. 03/09 before the learned Trial Court alleging dishonour of two cheques being Cheque Nos. 0638623 and 0638624 both dated 12.9.2008 drawn in favour of the complainant for a total amount of Rs. 9 lakh and non-payment of the amount even after issuance of notice to the complainant thereby committing an offence punishable under Section138 of the N.I. Act. Relevant extracts of the complaint petition having relevance to the issue are quoted hereinbelow: Para 3: That in addition to the other obligations, the accused also issued total 5 (five) Nos. of Cheques being Nos. 0638623, 0638624, 0638625, 638626 and 0638627 drawn on Ballia Kshetriya Gramin Bank, Ballia Branch for the total sum of Rs. 22,50,000/- (Rupees twenty-two lakh fifty thousand) only in favour of the complainant as a security for investment of Rs. 15,00,000/- by the complainant in business of the accused person as embodied in Clause No. 5 of the agreement. The complainant was also authorized by the accused person to present the aforesaid cheques vide Clause No. 6 of the agreement for collection of the respective amounts thereof in the event of failure on the part of the accused person in payment of the monthly instalments of Rs. 1,02,500/- and also in repayment of invested money amounting to Rs. 15,00,000/- as stipulated in the para Nos. 2 and 3 thereof. (4) That although the terms and conditions of the agreement dated 13.12.2006 were made effective from the date of execution of the same, it was mutually and verbally agreed by both the parties to give effect the conditions of payment of interest and share of profit of the business to the complainant only from 1.1.2007. 2 and 3 thereof. (4) That although the terms and conditions of the agreement dated 13.12.2006 were made effective from the date of execution of the same, it was mutually and verbally agreed by both the parties to give effect the conditions of payment of interest and share of profit of the business to the complainant only from 1.1.2007. But thereafter also as the accused person failed to pay the monthly instalments of interest and share of profit payable to the complainant regularly, the complainant sent a registered notice of demand dated 16.5.2008 through his Advocate Mr. D.K. Borah to the accused person claiming Rs. 12,37,025/- (Rupees twelve lakh thirty-seven thousand twenty-five) only as the arrear amount towards the interest and share of profit of the business calculated from 1.1.2007 to 30.4.2008, excluding the amount of Rs. 4,02,975/- paid by him. Be it mentioned that thereafter Sri Padam Kumar and Sri Sanjay Kumar Gupta, the younger brother and brother-in-law of the accused person respectively visited the residence of the complainant at Biswanath Chariali and requested him to allow time at least for 2 months to repay the invested money amounting to Rs. 15,00,000/- along with the total arrear amount of interest and share of profit payable to the complainant as per terms and conditions of para Nos. 2 and 3 of the agreement dated 13.12.2008. The brother of the accused person also received and took with him the photocopy of the demand notice dated 16.5.2008. 5. That in spite of repeated request and demand made by the complainant the accused had failed to pay the due amount as aforestated, the complainant at the advice of the accused person ultimately presented 2 (two) Cheques out of 5 (five) numbers of cheques issued by the accused person, being Nos. 0638623 and 0638624 both are dated 12.9.2008, for the total amount of Rs. 9,00,000/- (each cheque for an amount of Rs. 4,50,000/- drawn on Ballia Kshetriya Gramin Bank, Ballia Branch for collection of the cheques amount through his Bankers State Bank of India, Biswanath Chariali Branch from the Banker of the accused person which dishonoured and returned unpaid by the Banker of the accused person vide cheque returning memos dated 20.10.2008 to the complainant Banker which was intimated to the complainant vide cheque returning memo dated 20.11.2008 for the reason of insufficient fund. 6. 6. That afterwards the complainant sent a statutory notice to the accused by registered post with A/D on 3.12.2008 through his Advocate Mr. D.K. Borah, Advocate, Biswanath Chariali, under Section 138 of N.I. Act, 1881, bringing to the knowledge of the accused about the dishonour of 2 (two) cheques and requesting the accused person to make payment within a period of 15 (fifteen) days from the date of receipt of said notice. 7. That the notice dated 3.12.2008 under Section 138, N.I. Act, 1881 was issued to the accused on his proper and correct address by registered post with A/D, which was received back by the complainant from the Biswanath Chariali Post Office on 30.12.2008, returned unserved with a notice (in Hindi) of the postman of Bhrigu Ashram Post Office, District Ballia, Uttar Pradesh stating that in spite of visiting the residence for several times and giving information about notice to the family members of the accused, he was not found and other members also were not interested to receive the notice. 3. The complainant submitted his statement under Section 202, Cr.P.C. in the form of an affidavit before the learned trial Court reiterating and confirming the statements made in the complainant petition. Alongwith the said evidence some documents were also submitted by the complainant. The learned trial Court upon perusal of the complaint as well as the statement of the complaint in the form of an affidavit, having found a prima facie case took cognizance of the offence under Section138 of the N.I. Act against the petitioner and issued summon, to appear and stand the trial. 4. Dr. Ahmed, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that a bare perusal of the complainant petition itself sufficiently indicates that the cheques in question were deposited to the complainant as security for certain business transaction and such business transaction can be well spelt out from the reading of the complaint. It is contended that the cheques, were deposited not for the purpose of enhancement but as a security only to the business transactions between the parties and accordingly there is no debt payable by the petitioner, within the meaning that if there is any violation of the agreement between the parties, it is open for the complainant to approach the appropriate Civil Court for necessary redressal but not to take resort to a criminal proceeding. On the aforesaid submission, learned Counsel contends that continuation of the proceedings initiated by the complainant is an abuse of the process of the Court and hence it is liable to be quashed. The learned Counsel further submits that accepting the statements made in the complaint to be true and correct and if the legal provisions are properly applied, no criminal case is made out against the petitioner. Per contra Mr. Surana submits that the petitioner having violated the terms and conditions of the agreements mentioned at Clause IV to the effect that in the event of non-payment of the monthly instalment amounting to Rs. 1,02,500/- per month, the complainant would be entitled for encashment of the cheques to realize the defaulted amount, those two cheques were deposited but those were dishonoured by the Banker and thereafter though notice of demand was served upon the petitioner he preferred not to pay the dues and accordingly the present complaint under Section 138of the N.I. Act has been filed before the learned Magistrate. It is further submitted that the case as projected by the complainant squarely covers the necessary ingredients under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and accordingly the learned Trial Court rightly took cognizance of the offence and issued process to the petitioner. Mr. Surana also pointed out that the petitioner has suppressed the vital material facts by stating that although in the agreement it is written that Rs. 15,000/- (fifteen lakh) has been paid to the petitioner but only Rs. 10 lakh has been paid which is in fact not correct and for such suppression of material facts, the ratio of the Apex Court as reflected in Jai Shiva Cement Private Ltd. and Ors. v. Allahabad Bank (2009) 8 SCC 708 and Prestige Lights Ltd. v. State Bank of India 2007 (3) CLT 296 (SC) : 2007 (4) BC 240 (SC) : (2007) 8 SCC 449 , would be applicable. Dr. Ahmed, in support of his submission has relied on the following decisions of the Apex Court: (1) Laxmi Narain Kalra v. State of U.P. AIR 1956 SC 544 . (2) V. Y. Jose and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Anr. I (2009) CCR 246 (SC) : (2009) 3 SCC 78 . (3) Vir Prakash Verma v. Anil Kumar Agarwal and Ors. (2) V. Y. Jose and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Anr. I (2009) CCR 246 (SC) : (2009) 3 SCC 78 . (3) Vir Prakash Verma v. Anil Kumar Agarwal and Ors. III (2007) DLT (Crl.) 667 (SC) : I (2007) BC 253 (SC) : III (2007) CCR 239 (SC) : (2007) 7 SCC 736. (4) Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. and Ors. III(2006) CCR 128 (SC) : (2006) 6 SCC 736 . (5) State of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore Gupta IV (2003) CCR 455 (SC) : (2004) 1 SCC 691 . (6) Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Rajvir Industries Ltd. and Ors. 2008 (1) CCR 93 (SC) : 2008 (1) DLT (Crl.) 329 (SC) : (2008) 13 SCC 678 . (7) Modi Cements Ltd. v. Kuchuil Kumar Nandi I (1999) CCR 44 (SC) : AIR 1998 SC 1057 . 5. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties and also perused the decisions cited at the bar. 6. The principle of quashing a criminal case is no longer a res integra. The basic principle of quashing of a criminal case is that in the event of acceptance of the statement made in the complaint to be true and correct, if no case is made out against the accused, the High Court has the jurisdiction to quash a criminal case. Again when the Trial Court has no jurisdiction at all either statutory or otherwise or there is express statutory bar in taking cognizance of an offence in such actuation also, a criminal case can be quashed; if in the opinion of the High Court there is an abuse of the process of the Court in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. For the principle of quashing a criminal case we may readily refer to the following decisions of the Apex Court: (i) AIR 1960 SC 866 , R.P. Kapoor v. State of Punjab (ii) III (1996) CCR 68 (SC) : (1996) 5 SCC 591 CBI v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. and Ors. and (2000) 4 SCC 168 . The Apex Court surveying all the earlier decisions has reiterated certain circumstances on fulfilment of which a criminal case can be quashed by a High Court in the case of State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. I (2006) CCR 209 (SC) : 1992(1) Suppl. SCC 335. and (2000) 4 SCC 168 . The Apex Court surveying all the earlier decisions has reiterated certain circumstances on fulfilment of which a criminal case can be quashed by a High Court in the case of State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. I (2006) CCR 209 (SC) : 1992(1) Suppl. SCC 335. In the touchstone of the principle laid down by the Apex Court we are now to see whether the present one is a fit case for quashing. 7. Upon analysis of a complaint and the initial depositions of the complainant filed in the form of an affidavit, under Section 200, Cr.P.C, it is found that at paragraph 6 of the agreement dated 13.6.2006 executed between the parties, which is an admitted document, it is proved that in the event of no compliance of the terms and conditions as stipulated in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the agreement, which pertains to the mode of repayment of amount particularly by way of monthly instalment at the rate of 1,02, 500/-. The complainant would be at liberty to present the cheque in question deposited by the petitioner and in the event of dishohour of such cheques, the complainant would be at liberty to take appropriate legal remedy. Although Dr. Ahmed has strenuously submitted that the cheque in question was deposited as a security but legally such a security is provided when there is an existing debt for repayment to a lender and accordingly on the face of those documents, the submission of the learned Counsel that there is no existing debt to be repaid by the petitioner is not acceptable. The cheques in question having been deposited and the proceeds of the cheques not being collected for insufficient fund the cheques were dishonoured. Consequently the provisions of the N.I. Act, prima facie, on the basis of those documents, attracts the ingredients under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. That apart Section 139of the Act provides for drawing of a presumption in favour of holder of the instrument to the affect that unless the contrary is proved that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. That apart Section 139of the Act provides for drawing of a presumption in favour of holder of the instrument to the affect that unless the contrary is proved that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. The said presumption is a rebuttable one and it would be open for the petitioner to rebut the said presumption during the course of trial. The decision rendered in the case of Laxmi Narayan (supra) as referred to by the learned Counsel is not applicable to the facts of the case inasmuch as it is seen from the facts of that case that there was no rule for acceptance of the cheque in question. Other decisions referred to by the learned Counsel are relating to the jurisdiction and power of the High Court ought under Section 482, Cr.P.C. when required to exercise for quashing a criminal case, which is not disputed. 8. Upon bare perusal of the complaint petitioner along with the documents filed therein as well as scrutiny of the initial deposition of the complainant, I do not find that the learned Trial Court has committed any error of jurisdiction or otherwise, in taking cognizance of the offence under Section138 of the N.I. Act nor it can be said that upon accepting the statements made in the complaint petition to be true and correct, no criminal case has been made out against the petitioner on the basis of the materials available on record. 9. In view of the above discussions, I do not find any merit in this petition and it stands dismissed. The interim order dated 5.8.2009 stands vacated. Petition dismissed