Judgment :- (1.) This application under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, hereinafter referred to as the 1996 Act, is for setting aside of an arbitral award dated 7th May, 2007 made by learned sole arbitrator Sri Ajit Kr. Sengupta, a retired Judge of this Court. (2.) Disputes and differences arose between the respondent and the petitioner in connection with a contract for supply of explosives and in particular the action of the petitioner in taking recourse to risk purchase of explosives at the cost of the respondent and withholding payment of bills raised by the respondent. (3.) The petitioner invoked the arbitration clause in the agreement between the petitioner and the respondent and sought reference of the disputes to arbitration. Unable to secure the appointment of an arbitrator, the petitioner made an application being A.P. No.194 of 2005, in this Court under section 11 of the 1996 Act requesting the Chief Justice to appoint an arbitrator. (4.) When the application under section 11 was moved, the appointment of an arbitrator by the Chief Justice was considered an administrative function in view of the law enunciated by the Supreme Court in Konkan Railway vs. Rani Construction Company, reported in 2002(2) SCC 388 . (5.) As per the business allotted by the then Honble Chief Justice, the Bench taking up matters under the 1996 Act was designated the function of considering a request for appointment of arbitrator except for naming the arbitrator. (6.) In view of the law then prevailing, the designate of the Chief Justice was required only to prima facie see whether there was an arbitration agreement between the parties with a valid arbitration clause and whether that clause had properly been invoked. (7.) However, with the pronouncement of the judgment of the Supreme Court in SBP Company vs. Patel Engineering, reported in 2005(8) SCC 618 , there was a change in the law and appointment of an arbitrator was held to be a judicial function and not merely an administrative function. (8.) This Bench, as designate of the Chief Justice, prima facie considered whether there was an arbitration agreement between the parties and whether that agreement had properly been invoked, allowed the request for appointment of an impartial arbitrator and directed the application to be placed before the Honble Chief Justice for naming the arbitrator. (8.) This Bench, as designate of the Chief Justice, prima facie considered whether there was an arbitration agreement between the parties and whether that agreement had properly been invoked, allowed the request for appointment of an impartial arbitrator and directed the application to be placed before the Honble Chief Justice for naming the arbitrator. (9.) However, having regard to the change in law with pronouncement of judgment in SBP Company vs. Patel Engineering (supra) the Honble Chief Justice considered the application afresh, recording a finding that there was a concluded contract between the petitioner and the respondent whereby the respondent was obliged to supply explosives to the petitioner. (10.) The Chief Justice passed a judgment and order dated 6th April, 2006 holding that there was a concluded agreement between the petitioner and the respondent for supply of explosives and appointed Sri Ajtt Kr. Sengupta as sole arbitrator to arbitrate the disputes that had arisen. (11.) Some of the findings of the then Honble Chief Justice as recorded in the said judgment and order dated 6th April, 2006 are set out herein below: "However, the only objection raised by the respondents is to be considered here as to whether there is an agreement between the parties and whether the petitioner has repudiated the contract and whether the arbitration clause still remains intact. For deciding this, recourse would have to be taken to section 4 of the Indian Contract Act. It is as under: It is obvious that the advertisement by the respondents for tenders was an invitation to make an offer. Therefore, when the petitioner submitted to the respondent the tender, that amounted to an offer in terms of section 4 of the Act. This communication of proposal and offer was complete when the offer by the petitioner was received by the respondents. It is an admitted position here that it was so received. Therefore, it is a case of completed proposal since it has come to the knowledge of the respondents. It is also an admitted position here that this offer was accepted by the respondents by letter dated 19th November, 2004. Therefore, as against the petitioner the communication of an acceptance was complete when the said letter was put in the course of transmission or when it was posted. It is also an admitted position here that this offer was accepted by the respondents by letter dated 19th November, 2004. Therefore, as against the petitioner the communication of an acceptance was complete when the said letter was put in the course of transmission or when it was posted. The moment it came to the knowledge of the petitioner, that is when he received the letter, the communication of acceptance became complete against the respondents. Under section 5 of the Contract Act, the proposal could be revoked at any time before the communication of the acceptance was complete as against the petitioner, but not afterwards. Therefore, in this case, the petitioner could not validly revoke the acceptance by the respondents because the acceptance had become complete. In this case, the proposal made was accepted absolutely in express terms. Thus here was a case, where the petitioner had become promissor by making a proposal and the respondents had become promissee by accepting the same. There was an agreement in writing in terms of LOI containing an arbitration clause. Therefore, the respondents cannot say now that merely because the petitioner had repudiated the contract, there was no contract at all. The contract would have to be held to be existing on account of the LOI having been sent by the respondents to the petitioner. This objection by the respondents, SAIL, would, therefore, has to be rejected and is rejected." (12.) By the award impugned, the learned arbitrator held that there was no concluded contract between the petitioner and the respondent whereby the respondent was obliged to supply explosives to the petitioner and as such the petitioner was not entitled to make any risk purchase. The respondent was entitled to payment of bills raised on account of casual supply of explosives. (13.) Mr. Anindya Mitra appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted and, in my view, rightly that in view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in SBP Company vs. Patel Engineering (supra), the judgment and order dated 6th April, 2006 was a judicial order. The finding of the learned Chief Justice that there was a concluded contract was thus binding on the learned Arbitrator, as argued by Mr. Mitra. (14.) Mr. The finding of the learned Chief Justice that there was a concluded contract was thus binding on the learned Arbitrator, as argued by Mr. Mitra. (14.) Mr. Majumdar appearing on behalf of the respondent argued that the application under section 11 was decided by this Bench on 23rd August, 2005 and directed to be placed before the Honble Chief Justice for naming the arbitrator. (15.) Mr. Majumdar argued that the application having been decided by this Bench, the Chief Justice sitting singly could not reconsider the application. Mr. Majumdar contended that even if delegation of authority to this Bench to decide an application under section 11 could be withdrawn, the withdrawal had to be prospective and could not be retrospective. (16.) The order of the Honble Chief Justice and/or his designate is a judicial order as held in SBP Company (supra). The order being a judicial order, the finding of the Chief Justice of there being a concluded contract is binding on the arbitrator. What was in question before the learned arbitrator inter alia was whether the petitioner was justified in making the risk purchase. (17.) The challenge to the power of the Chief Justice to pass the order does not merit consideration since the same was duly accepted and acted upon. The respondent did not file any special leave petition in the Supreme Court challenging the order of the Chief Justice referring to and relying upon SBP Company (supra). (18.) The submission of Mr. Majumdar, that the prayer of the petitioner for appointment of an independent arbitrator having been allowed, there was no scope for any appeal and/or challenge before the Supreme Court is difficult to accept. The finding of there being a concluded contract not having been questioned, the said finding has become final and binding. The said finding has in fact and in effect been accepted by the petitioner. (19.) The learned arbitrator, in my view, committed a patent error in recording a finding contrary to the judicial finding of the Chief Justice of there being a concluded contract. (20.) The impugned award cannot be sustained and the same is thus set aside. (21.) The application is disposed of accordingly.