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2009 DIGILAW 798 (JHR)

Sarawgi Textiles through Proprietor Santhosh Kumar Sarawgi, Gandhi Chowk, v. Ajay Modi

2009-05-19

R.K.MERATHIA

body2009
JUDGMENT : Ramesh Kumar Merathia, J.-This civil revision application has been filed under Section 14(8) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act (the Act for short) against the judgment and decree dated 17.6.2006 passed by the learned Munsif in Title (Eviction) Suit No. 28 of 2002 decreeing the suit for eviction filed on behalf of the plaintiffs/opposite parties on the ground of personal necessity of plaintiff-opposite party No. 1- Ajay Modi, under Section 11(1)(c) of the Act. 2. The case of the plaintiffs in short is as follows. The plaintiff No. 1-Ajay Modi shifted from Ranchi to Nagpur in the year 1994 and started his business of C&F of Foseco India Ltd. The said company closed down its business at Nagpur and accordingly by letter dated 2.1.2001 (Ext. -2) terminated the C&F agreement with Ajay Modi w.e.f. 13.10.2001. Ajay Modi decided to come back to Ranchi after closure of the said business as it was difficult to maintain his family at Nagpur. The suit premises was suitable for the purpose of starting the business. Plaintiff No. 2 Ashish Modi has his own business in the name and style of M/s Balaji Enterprises. The plaintiff No.1 has no other premises for starting business. The plaintiff No. 1 requires the entire suit premises as the type of business that he wants to start cannot run in a portion of the suit premises. The defendant has purchased a shop in the nearby street, but in spite of repeated request, the suit premises has not been vacated. 3. The case of the defendant in short is as follows. Ajay Modi is still living at Nagpur and is carrying on business there. The suit has been filed as the defendant did not agree for payment of enhanced rent and Pagri. The plaintiffs want to construct multi storeyed market complex and therefore the eviction is being claimed on false and concocted ground. Other premises is available in the building in which suit premises is situated, and therefore requirement pleaded was neither bona fide nor reasonable. The type of business Ajay Modi wants to start can run in portion of the suit premises. 4. The plaintiffs led oral and documentary evidences. The defendants led oral evidences. The trial court decreed the suit, against which this civil revision application has been filed. 5. Learned counsel for the parties made oral and written submissions. 6. Mr. The type of business Ajay Modi wants to start can run in portion of the suit premises. 4. The plaintiffs led oral and documentary evidences. The defendants led oral evidences. The trial court decreed the suit, against which this civil revision application has been filed. 5. Learned counsel for the parties made oral and written submissions. 6. Mr. P.K. Prasad, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the petitioner, as sailed the judgment of the trial court on various grounds: (i) His first contention that the trial court has not considered the evidence on record is not correct. It will appear that after framing the issues, from Paragraph-8 onwards, the trial court considered the evidences on record up to paragraph-19 and then held in Paragraphs-20 and 21 that the plaintiffs' requirement is bona fide. (ii) His next contention is that the finding of trial court on bona fide personal necessity is bad as there is no finding on the case pleaded in the plaint that the business of Ajay Modi was closed and he was facing difficulty in maintaining his family; and therefore he required the suit premises to start business; and moreover adverse inference should have been drawn for withholding the Income Tax Return which could disclose whether he was still running business at Nagpur or not and whether his income has decreased to such an extent that he wants to come back to Ranchi. These contentions are also not acceptable. The landlord is not required to sit idle and is riot required to live at the place where the suit premises is situated, to claim and prove his personal necessity. In the case of Maganlal Vs. Nanasaheb, (2008)13 SCC 758 , in Paragraph-25 it was observed that the person who has started litigation is not required to sit idle. The judgment dated 8.4.2009 in Civil Revision No. 3 of 2009, Ravi Kant Newatia vs. Smt. Gayatri Devi may also be seen. Ajay Modi has proved Ext. 2 to show that his G&F Business at Nagpur was closed w.e.f. 31.10.2001. The defendant (D.W. 6) himself said that he does not know as to what business Ajay Modi is doing at Nagpur (Paragraph-16). Ajay Modi has proved Ext. 2 to show that his G&F Business at Nagpur was closed w.e.f. 31.10.2001. The defendant (D.W. 6) himself said that he does not know as to what business Ajay Modi is doing at Nagpur (Paragraph-16). Therefore Ajay Modi proved that his business at Nagpur was closed and that he required the suit premises, whereas the defendant could not prove his case that Ajay Modi's business at Nagpur was not closed and he did not require the suit premises. The parties led evidences as per their pleadings on the main issue, whether the plaintiffs required the suit premises or not. Therefore no separate finding was required as contended by Mr. Prasad. Further there is nothing to show that Ajay Modi was asked to produce his Income Tax Return by the Court on the prayer of the defendant, and therefore there is no question of drawing any adverse inference. The judgments reported in AIR 1967 S.C. 1134 , Ramrati Kuer etc. (Paragraphs-9 and 10) and (2006)6 SCC 94 , Standard Chartered Bank etc. (Paragraph-53) may be seen. (iii) The next contention of Mr. Prasad that the plaintiff's witnesses were interested witnesses, is also not acceptable. There is nothing in their cross-examination to discredit their testimony. Only on the ground that they are interested witnesses, their testimony cannot be brushed aside. (iv) The other contention of Mr. Prasad is that sufficient space is available to Ajay Modi is also wholly unacceptable. In Paragraph-1 of his cross-examination, the defendant himself as D.W. 6 said that the vacant premises he referred in his chief examination is in the back portion, is in bad condition and was a small one. In Paragraph-29, he further said that he would not take the said premises even on low rent. Further D.W. 7 who is the son of D.W. 6 also said in his cross-examination in Paragraphs-14 and 15 that they are not willing to shift in the vacant space said to be available to the plaintiff No. 1 for doing his business. Thus it is clear that Ajay Modi has got no other suitable place available for his business. Moreover, by saying that other place is available to the plaintiffs, in a way the defendant accepted his need. (v) Mr. Prasad lastly contended that the mandatory provision with regard to partial eviction has not been complied by the trial Court. Thus it is clear that Ajay Modi has got no other suitable place available for his business. Moreover, by saying that other place is available to the plaintiffs, in a way the defendant accepted his need. (v) Mr. Prasad lastly contended that the mandatory provision with regard to partial eviction has not been complied by the trial Court. This contention is also not tenable. It has come in evidence that the suit premises is about 700-800 sq. ft. (P.W.1 Paragraph-16, P.W. 2 Paragraph-18), whereas as per Exts. 4 and 4/A an area of 800-1000 sq. ft. is required for the purpose of doing business to Ajay Modi. The trial court framed issue No. 4 with regard to partial eviction. It will appear that while considering the evidences relating to the main issue with regard to personal necessity, the trial court simultaneously considered the evidences relating to the issue of partial eviction and then ultimately it held that the landlord required the entire suit premises which is not enough for dividing it in two parts; and that the partial eviction will not satisfy the need of the landlord. 7. The defendant himself has attached a map with this civil revision application as Annexure-A, which is not disputed by the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs. It is the admitted position that on one side of the suit premises, plaintiff No.2 is running his own shop and on the other side of the suit premises, the cousin of plaintiffs is running his own shop and that the frontage of the suit premises on road is 17 ft. 7 inch. It has held in Paragraph-12 of the Division Bench judgment reported in 1985 PLJR 390 , Mrs. Veena Rani vs. Mrs. Ishrati Amanullah that the power to pass order of partial eviction cannot be exercised in a manner as if the court is to partition the building in question between two co-sharers. 8. 7 inch. It has held in Paragraph-12 of the Division Bench judgment reported in 1985 PLJR 390 , Mrs. Veena Rani vs. Mrs. Ishrati Amanullah that the power to pass order of partial eviction cannot be exercised in a manner as if the court is to partition the building in question between two co-sharers. 8. Moreover in Paragraph-18 of the written statement, the defendant simply said that the type of business the plaintiff No. 1 wants to start may be run in a portion of the suit premises, but it is pertinent to note that no evidence whatsoever was led on behalf of the defendant to prove that the need of plaintiff No. 1 could be satisfied by partial eviction though it was categorically said by the plaintiffs that the entire suit premises was required for the purpose, Paragraph-11 of [ 2001 (1) PLJR 580 , Tarun Kumar Gupta. vs. Parwati Devi] may be seen. On the other hand, as noted above, the plaintiffs have proved by oral and documentary evidence that the area of the suit premises is about 700-800 sq. ft. and the entire suit premises is required for starting the business of electrical appliances and hardware. In the Division Bench judgment reported in 1993(1) PLJR Page 87, M/s Bata India ltd. vs. Dr. Md. Qamruzzama in Para-6 it has been held as follows:- " Para-6. It would appear that while the main clause entitles the landlord to secure eviction of the tenant on the ground mentioned therein, the proviso mandates the Court to hold enquiry as to whether the plaintiffs needs can be substantially satisfied by part eviction of the tenant from premises. The question is who has to prove that the requirement can be satisfied substantially by part eviction. In our opinion, the landlord cannot be saddled with the onus of proved in this regard. He having proved that he requires 'the building' which means the whole suit premises, he cannot be expected or asked to prove by evidence that his need can be satisfied by part eviction. That will amount to asking him to prove the negative. In our opinion, once the landlord has proved the need of the premises, onus shifts on the tenant. That will amount to asking him to prove the negative. In our opinion, once the landlord has proved the need of the premises, onus shifts on the tenant. The expression "and the tenant agrees to such occupation" strengthens the view that while holding enquiry on the question of partial eviction it is the tenant who has to express his readiness and willingness for part occupation of the premises and to show that the plaintiff's need can be substantially satisfied by evicting him from only part of the premises and allowing him to continue in occupation of the rest of it. No part of the defendant's evidence on the point of partial eviction was brought to our notice we thus fail to understand as to how the petitioner can assail the finding on the question of partial eviction on the ground that there is no specific evidence on the point." The judgment of Bata India Limited (supra) was followed in the case of Food Corporation of India vs. Vishun Properties and Enterprises & Ors. reported in 1995 BBCJ 711 and the S.L.P. against the said decision was dismissed by the Supreme Court. The judgment reported in 2003(2) PLJR 345 , Smt. Sushila Devi & Ors. vs. Sri Lakhan Lal Sah & Ors., relied by Mr. Prasad is of no help to the defendant. It appears that in the facts and circumstances of that case the case was remitted for considering the question of partial eviction. Moreover the judgment of Bata India limited (supra) was not produced before the learned Single Judge. The other judgments relied by Mr. Prasad are also of no help to him. In those cases, the question of partial eviction was remitted for consideration keeping in view the facts and circumstances of those cases. Herein this case, as already noticed above, it has been found th9-t the partial eviction will not satisfy the requirement of the plaintiffs. Moreover, the defendant did not lead any evidence on this aspect. Therefore, no case is made out for remitting the matter back for considering the question of partial eviction. 8. After considering the whole case carefully, I find that the suit has been' rightly decreed by the learned trial court. Accordingly this civil revision application is dismissed. Moreover, the defendant did not lead any evidence on this aspect. Therefore, no case is made out for remitting the matter back for considering the question of partial eviction. 8. After considering the whole case carefully, I find that the suit has been' rightly decreed by the learned trial court. Accordingly this civil revision application is dismissed. The petitioner is directed to vacate the suit premises within 30 days, failing which the plaintiffs will be entitled to recover possession of the suit premises by the process of the Court. However, no costs.