( 1 ) THIS petition by an Assistant Teacher takes exception to the order passed by the School Tribunal dismissing the petitioner's appeal No. 119 of 1996 before him, thereby upholding the termination of service of the petitioner by order dated 21st March, 1996 effected by respondent No. 1 management. ( 2 ) FACTS, which are relevant for deciding this petition, are as under : on 1-7-1985 the petitioner was appointed as Assistant Teacher. He was not trained at that time. He was deputed for completing his B. Ed. course in the academic session 1992 to 1994, which he completed in March, 1994. On 4th july, 1994 approval was granted to his appointment on probation. By notice dated 21st March, 1996 his services were terminated from 30th April, 1996. This order was challenged by him before the School Tribunal, which by its impugned judgment dismissed the appeal and therefore, the petitioner is before this Court. ( 3 ) I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner as also the learned counsel for the respondent. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the notice dated 21st March, 1996 (Annexure-3) to the petition would show that it casts stigma on the petitioner. The discharge of the petitioner was not simpliciter and therefore, it was not permissible to terminate the services of the petitioner without inquiry. He further submitted that in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dipti prakash Banerjee vs. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, reported at (1999) 3 SCC 60 , if findings are arrived in an inquiry as to misconduct behind the back of the employee, without regular departmental enquiry, a simple order of termination would be treated as founded on the allegation and will be bad. He submitted that order dated 21st March, 1996 would show that the findings had been arrived at in an enquiry as to petitioner's misconduct behind the back of the petitioner and therefore, the order of termination was founded on such allegations and was, therefore, bad. ( 5 ) ORDER dated 21st March, 1996 shows that, according to the management, the petitioner's conduct was arrogant. He had been issued show cause notice which he had not replied. He refused to receive a letter sent through the peon in a closed envelope. ( 5 ) ORDER dated 21st March, 1996 shows that, according to the management, the petitioner's conduct was arrogant. He had been issued show cause notice which he had not replied. He refused to receive a letter sent through the peon in a closed envelope. He retained his service book with himself and did not hand it over to the Headmaster. He unlawfully made entries in the attendance register and misbehaved with the Headmaster. The management further recounted that it did not find it necessary to ask the petitioner to show cause about this complaint since in the past the petitioner had not replied about four letters sent by the management. Therefore, the petitioner's service was terminated. It is not that any enquiry was held behind the back of the petitioner. ( 6 ) THE observations of the Supreme Court in Mathew P. Thomas vs. Kerala state Civil Supply Corpn. Ltd. , reported in AIR 2003 SC 1789 , on which learned counsel tor the respondent relied would show that the petitioner Mathew had been given show cause notice which has been reproduced in paragraph 2 of the judgment. This show cause notice is about misconduct of the employee. It was stated that if nothing was heard, within stipulated time, the employer would terminate the services of the employee. Thereafter on 16th January, 1997 the employer recorded that the explanation given was not satisfactory and therefore, services of the employee were terminated. In this context, the Supreme Court, taking a note of the judgment in Dipti Banerjee 's case, observed in paragraphs 10 and 11 as under : "10. Paras 1 to 3 of the show-cause notice reflect about the unsatisfactory performance of the duty of the appellant. Paras 4 and 5 of the show-cause notice were not taken into consideration in passing the order of termination of services as is evident from the termination order although reference is made to the show-cause notice. The last para of the show-cause notice also indicates that the action was proposed in terms of Clause 2 of the order of appointment namely, terminating the services during probationary period. The order of termination of services refers to relevant clause in the order of appointment and explanation given by the appellant to the show-cause notice. The last paragraph of the said order shows that his explanation was found unsatisfactory. The order of termination of services refers to relevant clause in the order of appointment and explanation given by the appellant to the show-cause notice. The last paragraph of the said order shows that his explanation was found unsatisfactory. The appellant had wrongfully recommended acceptance of bad stock not once but several times; as such it was held that his services have been unsatisfactory. Hence, the order of termination was passed. From this order of termination, it is clear that the respondents did not rely on paras 4 and 5 of the show-cause notice. The Division Bench in the impugned judgment, after perusal of the files observed that the appointing authority had abandoned those charges and concentrated only on the lapses committed by the appellant in wrongfully recommending acceptance of bad stock. We have no good reason to differ with this finding recorded by the Division Bench after perusal of the relevant files and records. Even otherwise, paras 4 and 5 of the show-cause notice stand withdrawn as per the direction given by the High Court. This being the position, no prejudice is caused to the appellant to complain that High Court has exceeded its power to judicial review when such a deletion of paras 4 and 5 from the show cause notice is to the benefit and advantage of the appellant. This also protects the appellant from any adverse effect when he seeks employment elsewhere and prospective employer may not have any ground to take adverse view of the alleged misconduct contained in paras 4 and 5 of the show-cause notice. 11. An order of termination simpliciter passed during the period of probation has been generating undying debate. The recent two decisions of this Court in Deepti Prakash Banerjee vs. Satyendra Nath Bose national Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta and others, (1999) 3 SCC 60 and Pavanendra Narayan Verma vs. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical sciences and another, (2002) 1 SCC 520 , after survey of most of the earlier decisions touching the question observed as to when an order of termination can be treated as simpliciter and when it can be treated as punitive and when a stigma is said to be attached to an employee discharged during period of probation. The learned counsel on either side referred to and relied on these decisions either in support of their respective contentions or to distinguish them for the purpose of application of the principles stated therein to the facts of the present case. In the case of Dipti Prakash Banerjee (supra), after referring to various decisions indicated as to when a simple order of termination is to be treated as "founded" on the allegations of misconduct and when complaints could be only as motive for passing such a simple order of termination. In para 21 of the said judgment a distinction is explained, thus :-"21. if findings were arrived at in an enquiry as to misconduct, behind the back of the officer of without a regular departmental enquiry, the simple order of termination is to be treated as "founded" on the allegations and will be bad. But if the enquiry was not held, no findings were arrived at and the employer was not inclined to conduct an enquiry but, at the same time, he did not want to continue the employee against whom there were complaints. It would only be a case of motive and the order would not be bad. Similar is the position if the employer did not want to enquire into the truth of the allegations because of delay in regular departmental proceedings or he was doubtful about securing adequate evidence. In such a circumstance, the allegations would be a motive and not the foundation and the simple order of termination would be valid. " From long line of decisions it appears to us whether an order of termination is simpliciter or punitive has ultimately to be decided having due regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. Many a times the distinction between the foundation and motive in relation to an order of termination either is thin or overlapping. It may be difficult either to categorize or classify strictly orders of termination simpliciter falling in one or the other category, based on misconduct as foundation for passing the order of termination simpliciter or on motive on the ground of unsuitability to continue in service. It may be difficult either to categorize or classify strictly orders of termination simpliciter falling in one or the other category, based on misconduct as foundation for passing the order of termination simpliciter or on motive on the ground of unsuitability to continue in service. If the form and language of the so-called order of termination simpliciter of a probationer clearly indicate that it is punitive in nature or/and it is stigmatic there may not be any need to go into the details of the background and surrounding circumstances in testing whether the order of termination is simpliciter or punitive. In cases where the services of a probationer are terminated by an order of termination simplicter and the language and form of it do not show that either it is punitive or stigmatic on the face of it but in some cases there may be a background and attending circumstances to show that misconduct was the real basis and design to terminate the services of a probationer. In other words, the facade of the termination order may be simpliciter but the real face behind it is to get rid of services of a probationer on the basis of misconduct. In such cases it becomes necessary to travel beyond the order of termination simpliciter to find out what in reality is the background and what weighed with the employer to terminate the services of a probationer. In that process it also becomes necessary to find out whether efforts were made to find out the suitability of the person to continue in service or he is in reality removed from service on the foundation of his misconduct. " ( 7 ) APART from this, the learned counsel for the respondent pointed out that in Pavanendra Narayan Verma vs. Sanjay Gandhi P. G. I. of Medical Sciences, reported at AIR 2002 SC 23 , the Supreme Court had clearly held in paragraph 21 as under : "21. One of the judicially evolved tests to determine whether in substance an order of termination is punitive is to see whether prior to the termination there was (a) a full scale formal enquiry (b) into allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct (c) which (c)culminated in a finding of guilt. If all three factors are present the termination has been held to be punitive irrespective of the form of the termination order. If all three factors are present the termination has been held to be punitive irrespective of the form of the termination order. Conversely if any one of the three factors is missing, the termination has been upheld. " ( 8 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent submitted that since the Supreme court has categorically laid down that if any of the three factors, namely, the full scale formal enquiry, into the allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct; which culminated in a finding of guilt, the termination would have to be upheld. Since, in this case, there is neither a full scale formal enquiry, nor allegations involving moral turpitude and nor did such enquiry culminate in finding of guilt and therefore, the order of termination had to be upheld as has been done by the Tribunal. The learned counsel pointed out that the Supreme court had considered the judgment in Dipti Banerjee 's case in paragraph 26 of this judgment. ( 9 ) IN view of this categorical pronouncement by the Apex Court it may not be necessary to refer to any judgments of this Court in Indira Dnyan Prasarak mandal vs. P. O. , Additional School Tribunal and others, in Writ Petition No. 4617 of 2002 decided on 18th June, 2009 and in Shri Sant Gajanan Maharaj bahuuddeshiya Shikshan Prasarak Mandal and anr. vs. Devendra Bhagwant macode and others, in Writ Petition No. 1727 of 2007 decided on 8th October, 2008, which have been decided on the facts peculiar to these cases. ( 10 ) IN view of the foregoing the petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.