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2009 DIGILAW 804 (KAR)

Commissioner, City Municipal Council v. Nagubai

2009-10-23

ARAVIND KUMAR, S.ABDUL NAZEER

body2009
Judgment :- Aravind Kumar, J. This appeal is filed by the 1st respondent-City Municipal Council, Gulbarga, being aggrieved by the award passed by the Additional Workmen’s Commissioner, Gulbarga Division, Gulbarga, in No.ALC/WCA/GLB/35/06 dated 29.12.2006 whereunder an amount of Rs.4,33,820/-together with interest at the rate of 12% p.a. from 9.12.2005 to the date of deposit has been awarded, being the total compensation to respondents 1 and 2 who are wife and daughter of late Basanna Dhore who died on 14.8.2001. 2. The facts leading to the filing of this appeal are: a) Basanna Dhore (hereinafter referred to as employee) was working under the appellant as ‘Poura karmika’ at Shahbad. It was contended by the claimants that he was on duty on 14.8.2001 and while he was assigned the duty of distribution of invitation cards for Independence Day celebrations and carrying out the said assigned work by riding a bicycle, and at about 1.30 P.M., fell down and died on the spot. b) The 1st claimant being the wife and 2nd claimant being minor daughter of the deceased filed a claim petition before the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation claiming compensation of Rs.5,00,000/ -with interest at 12% p.a. under Section 22(2) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) which came to be registered as W.C.35/06. It was contended in the petition that the deceased was the only bread winner in the family and he was getting Rs.4,000/-as wages per month and at the time of his death, he was aged 25 years and on account of the demise of Basanna Dhore, the family was left in the lunch and as such, compensation referred to above was claimed. c) The said petition was filed on 9.12.2005, that is, beyond the period of two years as prescribed under Section 10 of the Act, and as such an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act came to be filed along with the claim petition. d) On service of notice, the 1st respondent filed its detailed statement of objections, denying the contents of the claim petition in toto. The 1st claimant got herself examined as PW1 and another witness as PW2 and got marked Exs.P1 to P4. The 1st respondent examined the Commissioner of the Corporation and 2nd respondent had been placed exparte. d) On service of notice, the 1st respondent filed its detailed statement of objections, denying the contents of the claim petition in toto. The 1st claimant got herself examined as PW1 and another witness as PW2 and got marked Exs.P1 to P4. The 1st respondent examined the Commissioner of the Corporation and 2nd respondent had been placed exparte. The Commissioner adjudicated the claim petition, heard the Learned Advocates appearing on behalf of both the parties and on formulation of points for determination, came to the conclusion that the deceased was a ‘workman’ employed by the 1st respondent Corporation and accordingly allowed the claim petition in part by awarding a compensation of Rs.4,33,820/-together with statutory interest at 12%p.a. While adjudicating the same, the question of delay also came to be considered and the said application was allowed on the ground that the claimant was an illiterate lady. However, insofar as awarding of interest is concerned, the Commissioner restricted it from the date of claim petition rather than from the date of the accident, as contemplated under Section 4-A(3)(a) of the Act. 3. Questioning the said award, the Municipal Council on whom liability is fastened, is in appeal contending as follows: i) The deceased did not die during the course of employment; ii) The death caused by the accident did not arise ‘out of and in the course of employment; iii) The reason assigned by the claimants for filing the claim petition belatedly is not considered in the proper perspective; and iv) The compensation awarded is without any basis. v) Relationship of workman and employer was not there. 4. This Court had admitted the above appeal on 11.9.2009 and when the matter is taken up for hering today, we notice from the records that the substantial question of law had not been formulated, and we are, therefore, of the view that for considering the appeal on merits, substantial question of law requires to be formulated, and as such the following substantial questions of law are formulated: 1) Whether the Commissioner was justified in holding that there was a relationship of workman and employee between the deceased and the appellant? 2) Whether the Commissioner was justified in coming to the conclusion that the death of Basanna Dhore was caused to him by accident, by arising out of and in the course of employment? 5. 2) Whether the Commissioner was justified in coming to the conclusion that the death of Basanna Dhore was caused to him by accident, by arising out of and in the course of employment? 5. We have heard Sri R. V. Nadagouda, Learned Counsel for the appellant and Sri Sajjan Shetty, Learned Counsel appearing for respondents 1 and 2, perused the records, scrutinized the evidence on record and analyzed the authorities cited by the Learned Counsel for the contesting parties. 6. Sri R. V.NadaGouda, Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant would contend that death of Sri Basanna Dhore on 14.8.2001 was not caused on account of employment with the 1st respondent and that there is no nexus of his death with his employment to the 1st respondent, and as such the award passed by the Commissioner is contrary to facts and law. Elaborating his submissions made, he would contend that it was for the claimants to establish with positive evidence to show that accidental death occasioned on account of his employment with the 1st respondent and in the absence of any positive material placed by them, the Commissioner ought not to have granted compensation and in this regard, would rely on the judgments of the Apex Court namely, .(1) SHAKUNTALA CHANDRAKANT SHRESHTI vs PRABHAKAR MARUTI GARVALI & ANOTHER1 .(2) MALLIKARJUNA G.HIREMATH vs BRANCH MANAGER, ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIITED AND ANOTHER2 And accordingly prays for allowing the appeal and seeks dismissal of the claim petition. 7. Per contra, Sri Sajjan Shetty would vehemently urge that documents placed before the Commissioner would clearly establish the fact that the deceased was a ‘workman’ emplyoyed by the 1st respondent and the materials placed outweigh the hollow claim made by the insurance company. He would further contend that the death occurred while discharging official duty namely, while distrib8ting invitation cards on 14.8.2001 for the celebrations of Independence Day on 15.8.2001 and thus, death occasioned ‘during the course of employment’ which is attributable to employment itself and as such, the 1st respondent as the employer, is liable to pay compensation to the legal heirs of the deceased. 8. 8. Learned Counsel Sri Sajjan Shetty would also submit that the Commissioner having awarded statutory interest from 9.12.2005 ought to have extended the said benefit after lapse of one month after the date of the accident and not from the dte of claim petition since the statute itself provides for award of interest. The provisions of Order XLI Rule 33, C.P.C. is pressed into service for contending that appellate Course is vested with power to do complete justice between parties and hence in exercise of its power under Order XLI Rule 33, C.P.C., appellate Court is empowered to grant interest, though no appeal is filed by the claimants or cross-objection is filed, and hence seeks award of interest from the date of lapse of one month of the accident, as per Section 4-A(3)(a) of the Act. He relies on the following judgments: 1) SHRI ALEEMUDDIN & OTHERS vs THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, M/s NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED, GULBARGA3; AND 2) THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. vs AKKAYAMA & OTHERS4 9. It is seen from the records that admittedly the deceased was employed by the 1st respondent and was discharging his duties as ‘poura Karmika.’ This fact is evidences by his Service Book produced before the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation which was marked as Ex.P2. It is seen at page 5 of the said book that the Commissioner-Municipal Council, has made an endorsement to the effect that deceased has been sanctioned minimum wages of Rs.2,500/-plus other allowances as per Govt. Order No.R/41/1999-2000 dated 2.12.1999. A further endorsement is made by the Commissioner at page 7 to the following effect: There is not even a whisper in the cross-examination of PW1 to suggest that the deceased was not an employee of the 1st respondent. On the other hand, the Commissioner who was examined on behalf of the 1st respondent, when confronted with Ex.P2, admits in cross-examination that it pertains to the service record of the deceased. The relevant portion of his evidence reads as follows: Having considered this evidence, the Commissioner has come to the conclusion that the deceased was employed with the 1st respondent as Poura Karmika. The relevant portion of his evidence reads as follows: Having considered this evidence, the Commissioner has come to the conclusion that the deceased was employed with the 1st respondent as Poura Karmika. We do not find any good ground to deviate from the said finding and as such, we confirm the said finding of the Commissioner and hold that deceased was an employee of appellant Municipal Council, and answer the first substantial question of law in favour of the legal heirs of the workman and against the employer. 10. This leaves us with the next question regarding the cause of death during the course of employment. To consider the same, it would be of assistance to extract Section 3(2) of the Act which reads thus: ‘3. Employer’s liability for compensation: .(1) If personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter: .Provided that the employer shall not be so liable- .(a) in respect of any injury which does not result in the total or partial disablement of the workman for a period exceeding (three) days; .(b) in respect of any [injury, not resulting in death (or permanent total disablement) caused by] an accident which is directly attributable to- .(i)the workman having been at the time thereof under the influence of drink or drugs, or .(ii) the willful disobedience of the workman to an order expressly given, or to a rule expressly given, or to a rule expressly framed, for the purpose of securing the safety of workmen, or (iii) the willful removal or disregard by the workman of any safety guard or other device which he knew to have been provided for the purpose of securing the safety of workman. 11. Sri Nadagouda contends that it is for the claimants to establish with necessary positive evidence that the death occasioned on account of discharge of duties during the course of employment and the respondents having failed to do so, the appellant herein was not required to prove anything further, and the only course which was left to the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation was to dismiss the claim petition. Thus, he submits that the second question formulated herein above has to be answered against the claimants and in favour of the appellant. Thus, he submits that the second question formulated herein above has to be answered against the claimants and in favour of the appellant. In support of his submission, Sri Nadagouda draws our attention to paragraph 40 of the judgment in the case of SHAKUNTALA CHANDRAKANT SHRESHTI (supra) which reads as follows: ‘A jurisdictional question will involve a substantial question of law. A finding of fact arrived at without there being any evidence would also give rise to a substantial question of law. From the order passed by the Commissioner, it appears, he has not arrived at a finding that the job involved any stress or strain. It was merely stated that he was working as a khalasi in a truck which was going to Tavarewadi village from Kolhapur to get milk. The autopsy was conducted at Chandgad District Hospital. The driver Parasharam Chandrakant Shreshti admittedly brought him to hospital. He was his brother. The post-mortem examination commenced from 6.30 A.M. on 28.9.2002 and ended at 7.30 A.M. on the same day. From the post-mortem report5, it appears that in the accompanying report, it is stated that the death was due to sudden heart attack. When exactly the death took place is not known. It will bear repetition to state that under what circumstances the death took place is also not know . There was also no pleading in this behalf. The Commissioner came to the conclusion that the death took place during the course of employment but then no evidence has been brought on record to show that it had a casual connection between accident and serious injury so as to fulfil the requirements of the terms ‘out of employment’. Indisputably, there has to be a proximate nexus between cause of death and employment,. A stray statement made by the appellant that the deceased had died while working in the vehicle and stress or strain of the work did not appear to have any foundation. Admittedly, she was not present at the spot. She had also no personal knowledge. Indisputably, there has to be a proximate nexus between cause of death and employment,. A stray statement made by the appellant that the deceased had died while working in the vehicle and stress or strain of the work did not appear to have any foundation. Admittedly, she was not present at the spot. She had also no personal knowledge. All these facts she had admitted in the cross-examination.’ and contends that it was for the claimants to establish with necessary positive evidence that the death occasioned on account of discharge of duties during the course of employment and having failed to do so, the respondent was not required to prove anything further, and the only course left to the Commissioner was to dismiss the claim petition and this issue gives rise to the consideration of question of law formulated herein above. 12. Having considered these submissions, what is to be looked into is the link that requires to be established is nexus between cause of death vis-à-vis arising out of employment. In the case of SHAKUNTALA SHRERSHTI (supra), the employee was working as a cleaner in the vehicle and while traveling, suddenly developed chest pain. On admission to the Govt.Hospital, Mangaon, doctors declared him dead, and it was indisputable that he was performing his duties. In this background, the Hon’ble Apex Court while examining onus, held as under: ’26. In case of this nature to prove that accident has taken place, factors which would have to be established, interalia, are: 1) stress and strain arising during the course of employment, 2) nature of employment, 3) injury aggravated due to stress and strain. 27. The deceased was travelling in a vehicle. The same by itself cannot give rise to an inference that the job was strenuous. 28. Only because a person dies of heart attack, the same does not give rise to automatic presumption that the same was by way of accident. A person may be suffering from a heart disease although he may not be aware of the same. The same by itself cannot give rise to an inference that the job was strenuous. 28. Only because a person dies of heart attack, the same does not give rise to automatic presumption that the same was by way of accident. A person may be suffering from a heart disease although he may not be aware of the same. Medical opinion will be of relevance providing guidance to Court in this behalf.’ And came to the conclusion that it was incumbent upon the claimants to prove that stress and strain resulted in sudden heart failure which had happened in the said case, was attributable to the work assigned and therefore, no legal fiction could be raised and accordingly sustained the order of the High Court which had held that no evidence was available to demonstrate that the workman was put through a sudden stressful condition in the course of his duties which brought on cardiac arrest. 13. In the instant case. Admittedly the deceased was working as Poura Karmika and while discharging his duties, he met with the accident. We find from the records as also evidence on hand that he was assigned with the job of distributing invitation cards to councillors of the Corporation on the eve of Independence Day and while doing so, he fell down from the bicycle he was riding and died. 14. On a perusal of the original records, we find that the claimant has categorically contended in the claim petition that there is relationship of workman and employer, and accident occurred while riding the bicycle at the time of distribution of Independence Day invitation cards and the deceased-Basanna Dhore expired during the course of his duty. The relevant plea is at paras 1 and 6 of the claim petition. This is also corroborated by the wife of the deceased in her evidence and nothing worthwhile has been elicited in her cross-examination. The Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation has considered and appreciated the said evidence and after having formulated points for determination, has come to the conclusion that the deceased-Basanna Dhore who was employed by the 1st respondent, expired while discharging his duties which was in the course of employment. As such, we find that the death has occurred ‘in the course of employment’. As such, we find that the death has occurred ‘in the course of employment’. Further the accident having been denied by the 1st respondent, it was incumbent upon them to lead such evidence to demonstrate that the death was not the result of employment and it was for ‘physiological reasons not attributable to employment’. This burden having not been discharged by the 1st respondent, it would be too far fetched for the 1st respondent to contend that the death caused was not on account of employment and to deny compensation on this technical snag. In this background, after having reconsidered and scrutinized the pleadings and evidence, we do not find any ground having been made out by the appellant to dislodge the conclusion arrived at by the Commissioner and accordingly we uphold the same by confirming the said reasoning. 15. Sri Nadagouda would submit that the words used in Section 3(1) of the Act is to the effect that “accident arising out of and in the course of employment’ and contends that the accident did not occur in the course of employment. In support of this judgment, he would rely on the judgment reported in the case of MALLIKARJUNA G.HIREMATH (referred to supra) and draws our attention to para 15 of the judgment which reads as follows: ‘An accident may lead to death but that an accident had taken place must be proved. Only because a death has taken place in course of employment will not amount to accident. In other words, death must arise out of accident. There is no presumption that an accident had occurred.’ The dicta laid down by Their Lordships cannot be a subject matter of debate as it is binding on us. However, it has to be examined whether the said judgment would be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. In the said case, it was found that the deceased was a driver of the truck and had proceeded to a temple withy certain passengers as per the directions of the appellant. When he was sitting on the steps of the pond, he accidentally slipped and fell into the water and died due to drowning. Hence, their Lordships held that liability cannot be fastened wither on the insurer or insured and accordingly dismissed the claim petition. When he was sitting on the steps of the pond, he accidentally slipped and fell into the water and died due to drowning. Hence, their Lordships held that liability cannot be fastened wither on the insurer or insured and accordingly dismissed the claim petition. We find from records that in the present case deceased Basana Dhore, working as Poura Karmika was entrusted to do the job of an attender which includes delivery of tappal, handing over files/papers to concerned offices/officers and such other jobs. On the fateful day, he was entrusted with the job of distribution of invitation cards to councillors for Independence Day celebrations and while doing this job he accidentally fell down and expired. Thus, by no stretch of imagination it can be construed that the deceased was not discharging his duties at the time of his death, or that the death did not occur on account of the accident. Hence, we are afraid that the judgment relied by Sri Nadagouda would be applicable to the facts of this case at all and hence, we hold that the said judgment is of no assistance to the appellant. 16. An accident during the course of employment can occur while driving or in the course of journey, by electrocution, etc, and no straight-jacket formula can be made to hold as to whether the employee suffered injuries or the accident resulted in death during and in the course of employment or otherwise. The same requires to be appreciated in the facts and circumstances of each case. In the instant case, the Commissioner as fact-finding authority, having examined and considered this fact, has come to the conclusion that while distributing invitation cards and travelling on bicycle for discharge of such duty, the accident occurred due to fall from the cycle and it was in the course of employment. Hence, we refrain ourselves from taking the contrary view. 17. A co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. vs SMT. MARIAMMA & OTHERS5 has held thus: ‘The words ‘being carried in the vehicle, need not be interpreted technically and rigidly. Hence, we refrain ourselves from taking the contrary view. 17. A co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. vs SMT. MARIAMMA & OTHERS5 has held thus: ‘The words ‘being carried in the vehicle, need not be interpreted technically and rigidly. A person employed in a goods vehicle as a cleaner is deemed to be in employment and deemed to be ‘being carried in the vehicle’ even in a situation where the vehicle is stopped temporarily in the course of the journey, the accident if it happens in the course of employment and the risk of accident is inherent in the nature of employment, it is deemed to be in the course of and out of employment under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.’ Keeping in mind the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court, we will have to examine the scope and object with which the Workmen’s Compensation Act has been enacted. 18. Insofar as grant of interest is concerned, the Commissioner has held that there is delay namely, the petition is filed beyond the period of two years. In fact, the delay is 2 years, 4 months and 14 days and while condoning such delay, it is held by him that the same is not attributable to the employer but on account of the claimants themselves the delay has occurred, and has come to the conclusion that while granting interest, the same cannot be granted as contemplated under Section 4-A(3)(a) of the Act. 19. Learned Counsel for the respondent, Sri Sajjan Shetty would hasten to add that appeal is a continuation of original proceedings and the provision of Order XLI Rule 33, C.P.C. would be squarely applicable to the facts of this case, and in view of this power vested with the appellate Court, it does not put any fetters on the Court to grant interest from the date of entitlement, viz., one month from the date of the accident. He submits the Commissioner was in error in not awarding such interest. He submits the Commissioner was in error in not awarding such interest. It is also contended by Sri Sajjan Shetty that Section 4-A(3)(a) of the Act itself contemplates levy of interest by the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation in the event of default by the employer in not paying compensation due under the Act, and thus, it has to be construed as an ‘in-built’ provision for delayed payment and thus, it cannot be construed in any other manner other than giving a beneficial interpretation. In this regard, Learned Counsel would rely upon two judgments referred to supra i.e. ALEEMUDDIN’S CASE AND AKKAYAMMA’S CASE and submits that in similar circumstances the Court in exercise of its appellate powers under Order XLI Rule 33, C.P.C., had granted interest and prays that the same benefit of grant of interest be extended to the claimants in the instant case. 20. For appreciation of the said submission, it would be beneficial to extract the provision of Section 4-A(3)(a) which reads as under: 4A. Compensation to be paid when due and penalty for default: .(1) … .(2) … .(3) Where any employer is in default in paying compensation due under this Act within one month from the date it fell due, the Commissioner shall- a) direct that the employer shall, in addition to the amount of arrears, pay simple interest thereon at the rate of 12% p.a. or at such higher rate not exceeding the maximum of lending rates of any scheduled Bank as may be specified by the Central Government, by Notification in the Official Gazette, on the amount due; and b) … In the instant case, we find that admittedly the claim has been lodged under Section 22 of the Act on 9.12.2005, and there is a delay of 2 years, 4 months and 14 days in filing the claim petition. Taking a broader view and not taking a pedantic approach, the Commissioner has rightly come to the conclusion that the delay in approaching the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation was not attributable either directly or indirectly to the employer and the legal heirs of the employee were solely responsible for the delay in staking their claim for compensation, and therefore, for the said period of delay, the claimants would not be entitled for interest. Accordingly, he has denied interest for the said period. 21. Accordingly, he has denied interest for the said period. 21. It is to be noted that W.C.Act is a self-contained Code, the provisions of C.P.C. have to be applied to the extent enumerated in the said Act, namely Section 23 read with Rule 41 of Workmen’s Compensation Rules, which reads as follows: Section 23: Powers and procedure of Commissioners: The Commissioner shall have all the powers of a Civil Court under Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the purpose of taking evidence on oath (which such Commissioner is hereby empowered to impose) and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of documents and material objects, and the Commissioner shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all purposes of Section 195 and of Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Rule 41 of Workmen’s Compensation Rules, 1924: Certain provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to apply. Save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act or these rules the following provisions of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, namely, those contained in Order V, Rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30; Order IX; Order XIII, Rules 3 to 10; Order XVI, Rules 2 to 21; Order XVII and Order XXIII, Rules 1 and 2, shall apply to proceedings before Commissioners, insofar as they may be applicable thereto: Provided that,- a) for the purpose of facilitating the application of the said provisions the Commissioner may construe them with such alterations not affecting the substance as may be necessary or proper to adapt them to the matter before him; b) the Commissioner may, for sufficient reasons, proceed otherwise than in accordance with the said provisions, if he is satisfied that the interests of the parties will not thereby be prejudiced. The other glaring aspect which requires to be noticed is that it is only an oral plea now made in this appeal for grant of interest, Admittedly the respondent-claimants have not challenged the award of the Commissioner whereunder the Commissioner while condoning the delay in filing the claim petition, has categorically held that the claimants would not be entitled to interest for the period of delay. In other words, it has been held that the claimants are entitled for interest only from the date of filing of the petition. In other words, it has been held that the claimants are entitled for interest only from the date of filing of the petition. This order not having been challenged and there being no cross-appeal, we are of the opinion that Order XLI Rule 33, C.P.C. cannot be made applicable to a claim arising under Workmen’s Compensation Act since it is a self-contained Code, as state supra. The application of provisions of C.P.C. has to be restricted to the extent it is made applicable in Section 23, namely for the purpose of taking evidence on oath, enforcing attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of documents and material objects, and no other provision of C.P.C. can be imported into Workmen’s Compensation Act. The rules are also restrictive in nature. Hence, we hold that the provision of Order XLI Rule 33, C.P.C. would not be applicable to the appeal arising out of an order passed by the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation in the facts and circumstances of the case when the respondents have not challenged the order of the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation whereunder grant of interest has been restricted only from the date of claim petition. Hence, in our opinion, the said finding of the Commissioner does not require interference and accordingly it is not disturbed. 22. We have perused the judgments relied on by the Learned Counsel and find that the same cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case for the following reasons: Insofar as ALEEMUDDIN’S case is concerned, it was a case where interest had been denied by the Commissioner and the appellant had preferred appeal before this Court and on that basis, this Court in exercise of its appellate power, had granted interest as contemplated under Section 4-A(3)(a) of the Act. Hence, the said case is of no assistance to the claimants. Insofar as AKKAYAMA’S case is concerned, the appeal was filed by the insurance company under the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act where the words used are ‘just compensation’ within whose ambit Interest is also included. As such, this Court in exercise of appellate power, this Court had granted interest. Hence, the said case is of no assistance to the claimants. Insofar as AKKAYAMA’S case is concerned, the appeal was filed by the insurance company under the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act where the words used are ‘just compensation’ within whose ambit Interest is also included. As such, this Court in exercise of appellate power, this Court had granted interest. The present case being one arising under W.C.Act, 1923, the provisions of M.V.Act cannot be read into the said Act, particularly the Workmen’s Compensation Act being a self-contained Code and provisions of C.P.C. having been made applicable in a restricted manner, viz., only certain provisions of C.P.C. having been made applicable. Admittedly, the claimants herein have neither preferred any appeal nor filed cross-objections seeking statutory interest and hence, we are unable to extend the benefit of granting statutory interest as required under Section 4-A(3)(a) of the Act. 23. We, therefore, confirm the finding of the Commissioner whereunder interest has been awarded from the date of claim petition. 24. In view of the above, we answer the substantial questions of law holding that the Commissioner was justified in coming to the conclusion that the death of Basanna Dhore had arisen during and in the course of employment and that there is relationship of workman and employer between the deceased and appellant. Accordingly, the following order is passed: ORDER The appeal fails and it is hereby dismissed. Parties are directed to bear costs of this appeal.