JUDGMENT Deepak Gupta, J. 1. By means of this writ petition, the petitioner i.e. Himachal Pradesh Samanaya Varg Karamchari Kalyan Mahasangh has challenged the validity of the instructions dated 7th September, 2007 issued by the State of Himachal Pradesh which makes provision for reservations in the matter of promotions with consequential seniority in all classes of posts in the services under the State in favour of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. 2. The State by these instructions has taken a decision to make reservation in promotion for the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in terms of the provisions of Articles 16(4), 16(4-A) and 16(4-B) of the Constitution of India. The petitioners are aggrieved by the said instructions and certain observations made therein some of which are extracted hereinafter. 3. While making these reservations the State has referred to various judgments of the Apex Court. The judgment of the Supreme Court in M. Nagaraj and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (2006) 8 SCC 212, has been noted but the State has decided that there is no need to collect data as mandated in the said case and made the following observations: However, controlling factors or compelling reasons, namely, backwardness and inadequacy of representation which enable the State to provide for reservation keeping in mind the over all efficiency of State administration under Article 335 will con-tinue to apply with mandatory compliance of Constitutional requirement of Ceiling limit of 50% quantitative limitation. Moreover it is made clear that in the State of Himachal Pradesh the State Government has already made provision for reservation in promotion after due consideration prior to 19.10.2006, thus, collection of data as mandated by para 124 of the judgment in M. Nagaraj case AIR 2007 SC 71 is not required. 4. This portion of the circular is challenged on the ground that it is against the mandate of the Apex Court. 5. In the State of Himachal Pradesh reservations to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in promotion was being granted even prior to the constitution amendments made hereinabove. After the decision of the Apex Court in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India 1992 Supp. (3) SCC 217, such promotions could not be made. Thereafter, the Constitution was amended. Then came the decision in R.K. Sabharwal and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. (1995) 2 SCC 745. After the decision of the Apex Court in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India 1992 Supp. (3) SCC 217, such promotions could not be made. Thereafter, the Constitution was amended. Then came the decision in R.K. Sabharwal and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. (1995) 2 SCC 745. Thereafter, the State of H.P. issued instructions in the years 1996 and 1997 which were in consonance with the rule laid down in R.K. Sabharwal's case (supra). According to the State these instructions stand negated by coming into force of the Constitution (85th Amendment) Act, 2001 w.e.f. 17.6.1995. The State has also directed that where there are two posts in a cadre at least one post shall always be reserved for the reserved category candidate to mandate the balance of 50%. This portion of the instructions reads as follows: ...Thus, in a cadre of 2 posts one post will always have to be reserved to the reserved category candidates in order to maintain balance between reserved category and general category by extending permissible limit up to 50% reservation provided candidate belonging to Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe fulfilling the eligibility criteria prescribed in the relevant Recruitment and Promotion Rules are available within the zone of consideration. 6. While dealing with the creamy layer the State has given the following directions: (a) Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes Government servants shall, on their promotion by virtue of rule of reservation/roster, be entitled to consequential seniority with effect from 17.6.1995 retrospectively without introduction of concept of creamy layer as per policy decision of Central Government, contained in Government of India Ministry of Personnel Public Grievances and Pensions, Department of Personnel and Training, Letter No. 36036/2/2007-Estt.(Res.), dated 29.3.2007. 7. This Petition has been contested by the State as well as the Associations representing the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and OBCs who are permitted to be impleaded as parties in the case. 8. We have heard Sh.Dalip Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Sh. R.K. Bawa, learned Advocate General on behalf of the State, Sh. Shams Khawaja, Ms. Archana Dutt, Mr. B.C. Negi and Sh. P.P. Chauhan for respondents. 9. The case of the petitioner is that the instructions dated 7.9.2007 are totally illegal since the State has not collected any data as is mandated by the Apex Court in M. Nagraj's case. R.K. Bawa, learned Advocate General on behalf of the State, Sh. Shams Khawaja, Ms. Archana Dutt, Mr. B.C. Negi and Sh. P.P. Chauhan for respondents. 9. The case of the petitioner is that the instructions dated 7.9.2007 are totally illegal since the State has not collected any data as is mandated by the Apex Court in M. Nagraj's case. It has also been contended that in terms of the conclusion in M. Nagraj's case the concept of creamy layer is also applicable to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. 10. On the other hand the stand of the respondents is that since in the State of Himachal Pradesh reservation in promotions was being granted even prior to Indra Sawhney's case it can be presumed that this reservation was being granted on the basis of certain conscious decisions taken and therefore there is no need to collect any data. The respondents also submit that the concept of creamy layer does not apply to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. 11. To appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, it would be necessary to give the constitutional history relating to reservation. 12. Article 16 of the Constitution provides that there should be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to appointments. Article 16(2) lays down that no citizen shall be discriminated against in respect of employment under the State on account of religion, race, caste, sex etc. Article 16(4) provides that nothing shall prevent the State for making provision for reservation of appointment of posts in favour of any backward class or citizen. 13. In Indra Sawhney's case, the scope of Article 16(4) was examined in detail by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court. It was held that reservation could not exceed 50%. It was further held that reservation could not extend to promotions. It was also held that the 50% rule would be applicable to each year and therefore not more than 50% of the vacancies falling vacant in a particular year could be reserved. The Apex Court further held that reservation under Article 16(4) is confined to initial appointments and cannot extend to reservation in the matter of promotions. However, the Apex Court said that its judgment would be prospective in nature and that for a period of five years reservation in promotions could continue. The Apex Court further held that reservation under Article 16(4) is confined to initial appointments and cannot extend to reservation in the matter of promotions. However, the Apex Court said that its judgment would be prospective in nature and that for a period of five years reservation in promotions could continue. To negate the law laid down in Indra Sawhney's case with regard to promotions, the 77th Amendment Act, 1995 was enacted by the parliament whereby Article 16(4-A) was introduced. 14. The Apex Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Virpal Singh Chauhan (1995) 6 SCC 684 and Ajit Singh Januja v. State of Punjab, (1996) 2 SCC 715, held that accelerated promotions on account of reservation policy will not give consequential seniority. 15. In R.K. Sabharwal's case which related to promotions, the issue was with regard to the operation of roster system. The Apex Court held that the entire cadre strength should be taken into account to determine whether reservation up to the required limit had been reached. It was also held that the rule of 50% laid down in Indra Sawhney's case applied only to initial appointments and once the entire cadre strength was filled up it would by itself ensure that reservation remained within 50%. Once 100% of the vacancies had been filled up, each post gets earmarked for a particular category of candidate and when a post fell vacant then it would be filled in by appointing a candidate belonging to the same category as the candidate who vacated the post. This is also referred to as the replacement theory. 16. The State Government thereafter issued instructions on 27.5.1996, attached as Annexure A-5 with the petition, which are in line with the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the cases of R.K. Sabharwal and Virpal Singh Chauhan (supra). These instructions were clarified and modified from time to time. 17. Thereafter, the Parliament amended the Constitution. By the Constitution (77th Amendment) Act, 1995 Clause (4-A) was inserted in Article 16 which permitted the State to make provision for reservation in matters of promotion. The Constitution (81st Amendment) Act, 2000 came into place on 9.6.2000 by which Clause (4-B) was inserted in Article 16 of the Constitution whereby the rule of 50% would not apply to the backlog or carried forward vacancies. The Constitution (81st Amendment) Act, 2000 came into place on 9.6.2000 by which Clause (4-B) was inserted in Article 16 of the Constitution whereby the rule of 50% would not apply to the backlog or carried forward vacancies. By the Constitution (85th Amendment) Act, 2001 Clause (4-A) was amended and the State was even permitted to grant consequential seniority in promotions. 18. After the aforesaid amendments Articles 16(4), 16(4-A) and 16(4-B) read as follows: 16. Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. (1) xxxxxxxx (2) xxxxxxx (3) xxxxxxx (4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointment or posts in favour of any backward class of citizen which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State. (4-A) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for reservation in matters of promotion to any class or classes of posts in the services under the State in favour of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes which, in the opinion of the State, are not adequately represented in the services under the State. (4-B) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from considering any unfilled vacancies of a year which are reserved for being filled up in that year in accordance with any provision for reservation made under clause (4) or clause (4-A) as a separate class of vacancies to be filled up in any succeeding year or years and such class of vacancies shall not be considered together with the vacancies of the year in which they are being filled up for determining the ceiling of fifty per cent, reservation on total number of vacancies of that year. 19. The constitutional validity of the amendments made by the Parliament to Article 16 of the Constitution by the amendment Acts referred to hereinabove was challenged before the Apex Court in M. Nagraj's case (supra). The Apex Court in an extremely erudite judgment examined the entire width and amplitude of the right to equal opportunity in public employment. It referred to all the relevant law in this regard. Justice Kapadia speaking for the Bench held that the concept of equality is the essence of democracy and a basic feature of the Constitution. The following observations are relevant for our purpose: 33. It referred to all the relevant law in this regard. Justice Kapadia speaking for the Bench held that the concept of equality is the essence of democracy and a basic feature of the Constitution. The following observations are relevant for our purpose: 33. From these observations, which are binding on us, the principle which emerges is that "equality" is the essence of democracy and, accordingly a basic feature of the Constitution. This test is very important..... 34. However, there is a difference between formal equality and egalitarian equality which will be discussed later on. The Apex Court held that public appointment is a scarce commodity in economic terms. As the supply is scarce, demand is chasing that commodity. Therefore, it held that the conflicting claims of individual rights under Article 16(1) and the preferential treatment given to the backward classes has to be balanced. Both the claims have a particular object to be achieved. The question is of optimization of these conflicting interests and claims. The Court further went on to hold that while making provision for reservation a stable equilibrium has to be drawn between justice to the backwards, equity for the forwards and efficiency for the entire system. The Apex Court further went on to hold as follows: 86. Clause (4-A) follows the pattern specified in clauses (3) and (4) of Article 16. Clause (4-A) of Article 16 emphasizes the opinion of the States in the matter of adequacy of representation. It gives freedom to the State in an appropriate case depending upon the ground reality to provide for reservation in matters of promotion to any class or classes of posts in the services. The State has to form its opinion on the quantifiable data regarding adequacy of representation. Clause (4-A) of Article 16 is an enabling provision. It gives freedom to the State to provide for reservation in matters of promotion. Clause (4-A) of Article 16 applies only to SCs and STs. The said clause is carved out of Article 16(4). Therefore, clause (4-A) will be governed by the two compelling reasons "backwardness" and "inadequacy of representation", as mentioned in Article 16(4). If the said two reasons do not exist then the enabling provision cannot come into force. The State can make provision for reservation only if the above two circumstances exist. The said clause is carved out of Article 16(4). Therefore, clause (4-A) will be governed by the two compelling reasons "backwardness" and "inadequacy of representation", as mentioned in Article 16(4). If the said two reasons do not exist then the enabling provision cannot come into force. The State can make provision for reservation only if the above two circumstances exist. Further in Ajit Singh, this Court has held that apart from 'backwardness' and 'inadequacy of representation' the State shall also keep in mind 'overall efficiency' (Article 335). Therefore, all the three factors have to be kept in mind by the appropriate Government by providing for reservation in promotion for SCs and STs. 87. After the Constitution (Seventy-Seventh Amendment) Act, 1995, this Court stepped in to balance the conflicting interests. This was in the case of Virpal Singh Chauhan in which it was held that a roster-point promotee getting the benefit of accelerated promotion would not get consequential seniority. As such, consequential seniority constituted additional benefit and, therefore, his seniority will be governed by the panel position. According to the Government, the decisions in Virpal Singh and Ajit Singh bringing in the concept of "catch-up" rule adversely affected the interests of SCs and STs in the matter of seniority on promotion to the next higher grade. 88. In the circumstances, clause (4-A) of Article 16 was once again amended and the benefit of consequential seniority was given in addition to accelerated promotion to the roster-point promotees. Suffice it to state that, the Constitution (Eighty-Fifth Amendment) Act, 2001 was an extension of clause (4-A) of Article 16. Therefore, the Constitution (Seventy-Seventh Amendment) Act, 1995 has to be read with the Constitution (Eighty-Fifth Amendment) Act, 2001. Further the Apex Court held that the benefit of Clause (4-A) of Article 16 providing benefit of reservation in promotion is only available to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and not to other backward classes. In para 102 the Apex Court held as follows: 102. In the matter of application of the principle of basic structure, twin tests have to be satisfied, namely, the 'width test' and the test of 'identity'. As stated hereinabove, the concept of the 'catch-up' rule and 'consequential seniority' are not constitutional requirements. They are not implicit in clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16. They are not constitutional limitations. They are concepts derived from service jurisprudence. They are not constitutional principles. As stated hereinabove, the concept of the 'catch-up' rule and 'consequential seniority' are not constitutional requirements. They are not implicit in clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16. They are not constitutional limitations. They are concepts derived from service jurisprudence. They are not constitutional principles. They are not axioms like, secularism, federalism etc. Obliteration of these concepts or insertion of these concepts do not change the equality code indicated by Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution. Clause (1) of Article 16 cannot prevent the State from taking cognizance of the compelling interests of backward classes in the society. Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 are restatements of the principle of equality under Article 14. Clause (4) of Article 16 refers to affirmative action by way of reservation. Clause (4) of Article 16, however, states that the appropriate Government is free to provide for reservation in cases where it is satisfied on the basis of quantifiable data that backward class is inadequately represented in the services. Therefore, in every case where the State decides to provide for reservation there must exist two circumstances, namely, 'backwardness' and 'inadequacy of representation'. As stated above equity, justice and efficiency are variable factors. These factors are context-specific. There is no fixed yardstick to identify and measure these three factors, it will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. These are the limitations on the mode of the exercise of power by the State. None of these limitations have been removed by the impugned amendments. If the concerned State fails to identify and measure backwardness, inadequacy and overall administrative efficiency then in that event the provision for reservation would be invalid. These amendments do not alter the structure of Articles 14, 15 and 16 (equity code). The parameters mentioned in Article 16(4) are retained. Clause (4-A) is derived from clause (4) of Article 16. Clause (4-A) is confined to SCs and STs alone. Therefore, the present case does not change the identity of the Constitution. The word "amendment" connotes change. The question is whether the impugned amendments discard the original constitution. It was vehemently urged on behalf of the petitioners that the Statement of Objects and Reasons indicate that the impugned amendments have been promulgated by the Parliament to overrule the decision of this Court. We do not find any merit in this argument. The word "amendment" connotes change. The question is whether the impugned amendments discard the original constitution. It was vehemently urged on behalf of the petitioners that the Statement of Objects and Reasons indicate that the impugned amendments have been promulgated by the Parliament to overrule the decision of this Court. We do not find any merit in this argument. Under Article 141 of the Constitution the pronouncement of this Court is the law of the land. The judgments of this Court in Virpal Singh, Ajit Singh, Ajit Singh and Indra Sawhney, were judgments delivered by this Court which enunciated the law of the land. It is that law which is sought to be changed by the impugned constitutional amendments. The impugned constitutional amendments are enabling in nature. They leave it to the States to provide for reservation. It is well-setlled that the Parliament while enacting a law does not provide content to the "right". The content is provided by the judgments of the Supreme Court. If the appropriate Government enacts a law providing for reservation without keeping in mind the parameters in Article 16(4) and Article 335 then this Court will certainly set aside and strike down such legislation. Applying the "width test", we do not find obliteration of any of the constitutional limitations. Applying the test of "identity", we do not find any alteration in the existing structure of the equality code. As stated above, none of the axioms like secularism, federalism etc. which are overarching principles have been violated by the impugned constitutional amendments. Equality has two facets - "formal equality" and "proportional equality". Proportional equality is equality "in fact" whereas formal equality is equality "in law". Formal equality exists in the Rule of Law. In the case of proportional equality the State is expected to take affirmative steps in favour of disadvantaged Sections of the society within the framework of liberal democracy. Egalitarian equality is proportional equality. Dealing with the amendments as a whole the Apex Court held as follows: 104. Applying the above tests to the present case, there is no violation of the basic structure by any of the impugned amendments, including the Constitution (Eighty-Second) Amendment Act, 2000. The constitutional limitation under Article 335 is relaxed and not obliterated. As stated above, be it reservation or evaluation, excessiveness in either would result in violation of the constitutional mandate. Applying the above tests to the present case, there is no violation of the basic structure by any of the impugned amendments, including the Constitution (Eighty-Second) Amendment Act, 2000. The constitutional limitation under Article 335 is relaxed and not obliterated. As stated above, be it reservation or evaluation, excessiveness in either would result in violation of the constitutional mandate. This exercise, however, will depend on facts of each case. In our view, the field of exercise of the amending power is retained by the impugned amendments, as the impugned amendments have introduced merely enabling provisions because, as stated above, merit, efficiency, backwardness and inadequacy cannot be identified and measured in vacuum. Moreover, Article 16(4-A) and Article 16(4-B) fall in the pattern of Article 16(4) and as long as the parameters mentioned in those articles are complied-with by the States, the provision of reservation cannot be faulted. Articles 16(4-A) and 16(4-B) are classifications within the principle of equality under Article 16(4). The Apex Court in M. Nagaraj's case (supra) also held that the power given to make reservation in favour of the backward classes can only be exercised if the State has quantifiable data to show backwardness and inadequacy of representation in the services of the State. It added that the reservations can only be made keeping in mind the maintenance of efficiency. The concepts of efficiency, backwardness, inadequacy of representation are required to be identified and measured. The Apex Court while upholding the amendments made, observed that equity is not violated by mere conferment of powers but it is breached by arbitrary exercise of the power conferred. The Apex Court held that any law made by the State would have to conform to the various principles laid down by the Apex Court. The tests as laid down by the Apex Court are as follows: 110. As stated above, the boundaries of the width of the power, namely, the ceiling-limit of 50% (the numerical benchmark), the principle of creamy layer, the compelling reasons, namely, backwardness, inadequacy of representation and the overall administrative efficiency are not obliterated by the impugned amendments. At the appropriate time, we have to consider the law as enacted by various States providing for reservation if challenged. At that time we have to see whether limitations on the exercise of power are violated. At the appropriate time, we have to consider the law as enacted by various States providing for reservation if challenged. At that time we have to see whether limitations on the exercise of power are violated. The State is free to exercise its discretion of providing for reservation subject to limitation, namely, that there must exist compelling reasons of backwardness, inadequacy of representation in a class of post(s) keeping in mind the overall administrative efficiency. It is made clear that even if the State has reasons to make reservation, as stated above, if the impugned law violates any of the above substantive limits on the width of the power the same would be liable to be set aside. The Apex Court in conclusion held as follows: 121. The impugned constitutional amendments by which Articles 16(4-A) and 16(4-B) have been inserted flow from Article 16(4). They do not alter the structure of Article 16(4). They retain the controlling factors or the compelling reasons, namely, backwardness and inadequacy of representation which enables the States to provide for reservation keeping in mind the overall efficiency of the State administration under Article 335. These impugned amendments are confined only to SCs and STs. They do not obliterate any of the constitutional requirements, namely, ceiling-limit of 50% (quantitative limitation), the concept of creamy layer (qualitative exclusion), the sub-classification between OBC on one hand and SCs and STs on the other hand as held in Indra Sawhney, the concept of post-based Roster with in-built concept of replacement as held in R.K. Sabharwal. 122. We reiterate that the ceiling-limit of 50%, the concept of creamy layer and the compelling reasons, namely, backwardness, inadequacy of representation and overall administrative efficiency are all constitutional requirements without which the structure of equality of opportunity in Article 16 would collapse. 123. However, in this case, as stated, the main issue concerns the "extent of reservation". In this regard the concerned State will have to show in each case the existence of the compelling reasons, namely, backwardness, inadequacy of representation and overall administrative efficiency before making provision for reservation. As stated above, the impugned provision is an enabling provision. The State is not bound to make reservation for SC/ ST in matter of promotions. In this regard the concerned State will have to show in each case the existence of the compelling reasons, namely, backwardness, inadequacy of representation and overall administrative efficiency before making provision for reservation. As stated above, the impugned provision is an enabling provision. The State is not bound to make reservation for SC/ ST in matter of promotions. However if they wish to exercise their discretion and make such provision, the State has to collect quantifiable data showing backwardness of the class and inadequacy of representation of that class in public employment in addition to compliance of Article 335. It is made clear that even if the State has compelling reasons, as stated above, the State will have to see that its reservation provision does not lead to excessiveness so as to breach the ceiling-limit of 50% or obliterate the creamy layer or extend the reservation in-definitely. 20. From the law laid down by the Apex Court, quoted in extenso hereinabove, it is clear that the Apex Court has upheld the constitutional amendments but has laid down that this does not obliterate the constitutional requirements of ceiling limit of 50%, the concept of creamy layer, the sub-classification between OBCs on the one hand and SCs and STs on the other hand, and the concept of post based roster with inbuilt concept of replacements. It has also been clearly laid down that the State is not bound to make reservations for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. However, if it chooses to exercise the powers vested in it to make such reservations, the State must collect quantifiable data showing backwardness of the class and inadequacy of representation of that class in public employment. In addition thereto Article 335 relating to efficiency must be also complied with. It is subject to these guidelines that the constitutional validity of the amendments was upheld. 21. The instructions now issued by the State, in our considered opinion, totally violate the law laid down by the Apex Court. The State as per the judgment in M. Nagaraj's case is bound to collect data to show that the so called backward classes are actually backward and they are inadequately represented in the service under the State. The State also has to carry out an exercise to ensure that the efficiency of administration is not adversely affected. A balance has to be struck between the competing interests. 22. The State also has to carry out an exercise to ensure that the efficiency of administration is not adversely affected. A balance has to be struck between the competing interests. 22. In the present case, admittedly, the State before issuing the instructions has not carried out any such exercise to collect such data. The reason given by the State is that in the State of Himachal Pradesh there was already a provision for reservation in promotion prior to the judgment in Indra Sawhney's case and thus collection of data as mandated in M. Nagaraj's case is not required. This submission is totally without any basis. In Himachal Pradesh reservation was provided in promotion prior to the judgment in Indra Sawhney's case. After Indra Sawhney's case such reservation could not have been permitted beyond the period of 5 years. To get over this judgment the constitutional amendments were enacted. The Apex-Court in no uncertain terms while upholding the constitutional amendments held that the collection of quantifiable data to establish backwardness and inadequacy of representation keeping in view the efficiency of administration of the State is necessary before making reservations. This requirement never existed prior to the judgment. According to the State it had after due consideration decided to make provision for reservations in promotion much earlier. "Due consideration" is totally different from collecting quantifiable data. This exercise has to be conducted and no reservation in promotion can be made without conducting such an exercise. Therefore, the State cannot be permitted to make reservations till such exercise is carried out and clear-cut quantifiable data is collected on the lines indicated in M. Nagaraj's case. We may also point out that other than making vague reference to "due consideration" having been done, till date the State has not produced before us any clear-cut quantifiable data which could establish the need for reservation. 23. Merely because the amended provision of the Constitution enable the State to make reservation is no ground not to collect data. Therefore, the instructions have to be struck down as being violative of the law laid down in M. Nagaraj's case by the Apex Court. 24. 23. Merely because the amended provision of the Constitution enable the State to make reservation is no ground not to collect data. Therefore, the instructions have to be struck down as being violative of the law laid down in M. Nagaraj's case by the Apex Court. 24. No doubt under the provisions of Article 16(4-B) the State is entitled to grant consequential seniority on promotion to the members belonging to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes but there must be data available with the State Government to show that the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes are inadequately represented in the services or in the cadre to which promotions have to be made. Therefore, also these instructions are illegal and liable to be set-aside. 25. It has also been contended on behalf of the petitioners that the observations of the Apex Court in M. Nagaraj's case in para 121 introduce the concept of creamy layer even with regard to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. This argument cannot be accepted. The observations made in para 121 are general in nature. It would be pertinent to mention that in Indra Sawhney's case it was clearly stated that the concept of creamy layer was only applicable to OBCs. In M. Nagaraj's case the Apex Court has only stated that the concept of creamy layer should be kept in mind while making reservations. It has nowhere specifically held that the concept of creamy layer is applicable to SCs and STs also. The reference made to the concept of creamy layer in para 121, appears to be a general observation with regard to the concept of reservation in respect of all classes including OBCs and not in respect of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes only. 26. In view of the above discussion, we allow the writ petition and hold that until the State collects data and material establishing the need for reservation by collecting quantifiable data to show backwardness, inadequacy of representation and keeping in mind the overall efficiency of State administration, the State is not entitled to make reservation in promotion for the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. The impugned instructions are accordingly quashed. 27. Since we have quashed the impugned instructions on these grounds we have not gone into the other arguments raised with regard to the challenge to different portions of the instructions.