JUDGMENT Jasti Chelameswar, J. 1. Heard Mr. G.N. Sahewalla, learned senior Counsel for the appellants and Mr. S. Jayanta, learned Counsel for the respondent. 2. This is an appeal arising out of a judgment dated 18.9.2007 in WP(C) No. 273/07 by the respondents therein. 3. The sole respondent herein was the writ petitioner. The respondent is in the employment of a statutory corporation known as the Board of Secondary Education, Manipur created under the Manipur Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 1972, a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal. Section 12 of the said Act declares the Chairman, Secretary and the Controller of Examinations shall be the officers of the board to be appointed by the State Government Sub-section (2) of Section 12 authorises the Board to appoint such other officers and employees as it considers necessary. Section 12 of the Act reads as follows: 12(1) The following shall be officers of the Board who shall be appointed by the State Government, (i) The Chairman; (ii) The Secretary; and (iii) The Controller of Examinations. (2) The Board, may appoint such other officers and employees as it considers necessary for the efficient discharge of its functions under the Act on such terms and conditions as may be determined by regulations. 4. Undisputedly the respondent was appointed by the Board in exercise of the powers under Section 12(2) of the above mentioned Act. 5. It appears from the record that there are certain allegations against the respondent of alleged misconduct in discharge of his duties as an employee of the Board. Incidentally the respondent is categorized as the Joint Secretary to the Board. In view of the allegations (the details of which may not be necessary), the Board it its proceeding dated 7th September, 2006 ordered that the respondent is placed under suspension in contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding against him. 6. Challenging the said proceeding the respondent herein initially filed a civil suit (Original Suit No. 38/06) on the file of the Civil Judge, Jr. Divn., Imphal, Manipur at Lamphel, but withdrew the same. A copy of the order is also made available to us the relevant portion of which reads as follows: The contention of the petitioner is that there is possibility of settlement in the office of the defendant, so that plaintiff desires to withdraw the case. Divn., Imphal, Manipur at Lamphel, but withdrew the same. A copy of the order is also made available to us the relevant portion of which reads as follows: The contention of the petitioner is that there is possibility of settlement in the office of the defendant, so that plaintiff desires to withdraw the case. It is objected by the learned Counsel for the O.P., defendant and submits that there is no such proposal and prays for rejection of the present petition. I have perused the materials on record. The accd. Filed the application under Order XXIII Rule 1 of CPC. I do not see any formal defects which requires to be raised by the plaintiff? petitioner. However, I am of considered view that the petitioner/plaintiff is willing to withdraw and by such withdrawal, no injury shall be caused to the O.P./defendant. Hence, the prayer for withdrawal is allowed but the prayer for liberty bring fresh suit is turn down. Subsequently the writ petition from out of which the present appeal arises came to be filed. 7. The writ petition was allowed on the ground that the impugned order of suspension pending enquiry came to be issued pursuant to a resolution of the Board and the said resolution came to be passed in a meeting which was not convened in accordance with law. Under Section 10 of the above mentioned Act a meeting such as the one where the resolution, on the basis of which the impugned suspension order came to be passed, is required to be preceded by at least 10 days notice. Admittedly the notice issued did not satisfy the requirement of Section 10. Therefore, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the resolution passed in a meeting which was eventually convened is void ab initio. Further, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that on the date of the impugned suspension order there was no authority of law on the part of the Board to keep the respondent under suspension as there was no rule framed at that point of time by the Board nor there was anything in the parent enactment which enabled the Board to keep one of its employees under suspension. The learned Judge, therefore, concluded that in the absence of any such authority of law the Board could not legally keep an employee under suspension. 8. Mr. The learned Judge, therefore, concluded that in the absence of any such authority of law the Board could not legally keep an employee under suspension. 8. Mr. G.N. Sahewalla, learned Counsel for the appellant, argued that the conduct of the respondent in filing the Original Suit and withdrawing the same does not justify the interference of this Court in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Secondly the learned Counsel argued that the authority of the employer to keep an employee under suspension during the pendency of a disciplinary proceeding is inherent in the power of the employer and no separate law is required for valid exercise of such power and, therefore, the conclusion of the learned Judge by the judgment under appeal that the Board lack the necessary authority of law to keep the respondent under suspension is unsustainable. 9. For the sake of convenience we shall deal with the second submission of the appellant first. The nature of the power of the employer to keep an employee under suspension fell for consideration of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in V.P. Gindroniya v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. AIR 1970 SC 1494 . In the said judgment the Supreme Court recognised the authority of the state to suspend an employee of the state from service either as a measure of punishment for some misconduct or as a matter of caution either during the pendency of a disciplinary enquiry or an impending disciplinary proceeding. It is further held by the Supreme Court that in the context of ordinary law of master and servant in the matter of private employment, such-a power to keep an employee under suspension without pay could not be implied but must arise either by an express term in the contract itself or a statutory provision governing such contract. 7. The legal position as regards a master's right to place his servants under suspension if now well settled by the decisions of this Court. In Management of Hotel Imperial, New Delhi v. Hotel Workers' Union (1960) SCR 476 : AIR 1959 SC 1342 , the question whether a master could suspend his servant during the pendency of an enquiry came up for consideration by this Court. In Management of Hotel Imperial, New Delhi v. Hotel Workers' Union (1960) SCR 476 : AIR 1959 SC 1342 , the question whether a master could suspend his servant during the pendency of an enquiry came up for consideration by this Court. Therein this Court observed that it was well settled that under the ordinary law of master and servant the power to suspend the servant without pay could not be implied as a term in an ordinary contract of service between the master and the servant but must arise either from an express term in the contract itself or a statutory provision governing such contract. 10. In the absence of such power that undoubtedly the employer has the authority to direct an employee not to attend to work the employee sic is bound to pay the wages during the period of so called suspension. It was further observed therein that ordinarily in the absence of such a power either in express terms in the contract or under the rules framed under some statute would mean that the master would have no power to suspend a workman and even if he does so in the sense that he forbids the employee to work he will have to pay the wages during the so-called period of suspension. Where, however, there is power to suspend either in the contract of employment or in the statute or the rules framed thereunder, the suspension has the effect of temporarily suspending the relationship of master and the servant with the consequence that the servant is not bound to render service and the master is not bound to pay. 11. After examining such legal position the Supreme Court on a survey of the various earlier cases summarized at para 8 as follows: The general principle is that an employer can suspend an employee of his, pending an enquiry into "his misconduct and the only question that can arise in such a suspension will relate to the payment of his wages during the period of such suspension. It is now well settled that the power to suspend, in the sense of a right to forbid a employee to work, is not an implied term in a ordinary contract between master and servant, and that such a power can only be the creature either of a statute governing the contract, or of an express term in the contract itself. Ordinarily, therefore, the absence of such a power either as an express term in the contract or in the rules framed under some statute would mean that an employer would have no power to suspend an employee of his and even if he does so in the sense that he forbids the employee to work, he will have to pay the employee's wages during the period of suspension. Where, however, there is power to suspend either in the contract of employment or in the statute or the rules framed thereunder, the order of suspension has the effect of temporarily suspending the relationship of master and servant with the consequence that the servant is not bound to render service and the master is not bound to pay. It is equally well settled that an order of interim suspension can be passed against the employee while an enquiry is pending into his conduct even though there is no such term in the contract of employment or in the rules, but in such a case the employee would be entitled to his remuneration for the period of suspension if there is no statute or rule under which. It could be withheld. The distinction between suspending the contract of a service of a servant and suspending him from performing the duties of his office on the basis that the contract is subsisting is important. The suspension in the latter case is always an implied term in every contract of service. When an employee is suspended in this sense, means that the employer, merely issues a direction to him that he should not do the service required of him during a particular period. In other words the employer is regarded as issuing an order to the employee which because the contract is subsisting, the employee must obey. 12. Examined in the light of the above mentioned decision of the Supreme Court we are of the opinion that the impugned suspension order in substance is an order prohibiting the respondent from attending the work. In other words the employer is regarded as issuing an order to the employee which because the contract is subsisting, the employee must obey. 12. Examined in the light of the above mentioned decision of the Supreme Court we are of the opinion that the impugned suspension order in substance is an order prohibiting the respondent from attending the work. Though the contract of employment itself is not terminated by the employer, that is the Board, in view of the contemplated disciplinary enquiry thought it fit to tell the employee not to attend the work. But in the absence of any specific provision under the Act referred to above or the Rules made thereunder on the relevant date which enabled the Board to keep away the respondent from work without payment, the only inference that can be drawn is that though the employer Board is undoubtedly entitled in law to tell the respondent employee not to attend the work it is bound to pay the employee all the salaries and other allowance to which he is entitled in terms of the contract of employment. The impugned suspension order states that during the subsistence of the order the respondent is entitled to receive subsistence allowance admissible to him during the period of his suspension. As on the date of the impugned suspension order admittedly there was no rule or law which enabled the Board to keep the respondent under suspension only on the payment of subsistence allowance though subsequently by virtue of the notification dated 10.11.2006 rules known as the Board of Secondary Education Manipur Service rules for the Officers of the Board of Secondary Education came to be framed and Rule 21 of the said rules declares that the Manipur Government Servants Conduct Rules and the rules regarding suspension, discharge, removal from service etc. shall be applicable to the officers of the Board pending the creation of its own rules by the Board. We are informed that in the Manipur Government Servants Conduct rules suspension of an employee of the state of Manipur is permissible on payment of subsistence allowance. We do not propose to go into that question at this stage. Rule 21 referred to above obviously by incorporation makes the Manipur Government Servant Conduct rules applicable to the employees of the Board. We do not propose to go into that question at this stage. Rule 21 referred to above obviously by incorporation makes the Manipur Government Servant Conduct rules applicable to the employees of the Board. Whatever are the consequences following from the Manipur Government Servant Conduct rules may follow from the date of its incorporation, that is, 10.11.2006 but until such time we are of the opinion that though the Board is entitled to tell the respondents to abstain from work during the pendency of the disciplinary proceeding the Board is bound to pay the full salary and other allowances, if any, that were being paid to the employee. The question as to what is the effect of the incorporation of Rule 21, referred to above is a matter that can be examined by the Board afresh and pass appropriate orders in this regard for the period subsequent to 10.11.2006. 13. We are left with the first issue identified by us as to the maintainability of the present writ petition from out of which the present appeal arises. 14. The learned Counsel for the appellant relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Gwalior and Ors. AIR 1987 SC 88 , submitted that in view of the principle laid down in the said judgment this Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition as permitting a petition such as the one in the background of the petitioner's earlier conduct would be inconsistent with the requirement of the public policy. The issue before the Supreme Court in the above case was whether a person who approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution at an earlier instance and withdrew the proceedings half way can be permitted to litigate the same issue in the second round of litigation by way of a fresh writ petition. The Supreme Court took note of the provisions of Order 23, Rule 1, Sub-rule (4) of the CPC which precludes a plaintiff, who had earlier filed a suit and withdrew the suit without leave of the court for filing a fresh suit, from instituting a fresh suit and came to the conclusion that the said rule is based on principles of public policy and is not the same as the rule of res judicata.... The principle underlying the above mentioned rule should be extended even to the proceedings under Article 226 "in the interest of administration of justice to the cases of withdrawal of writ petition also". The learned Counsel for the appellant, therefore, argued that the same principle would apply in the instant case also. 15. On the other hand Mr. S. Jayanta, learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that the Supreme Court in the above case did not consider the situation where a civil suit is filed and withdrawn and a subsequent writ petition on the same cause of action came to be filed. On the other hand the learned Counsel submitted that the Supreme Court at para 9 of the judgment observed.... "...While the withdrawal of a writ petition filed in High Court without permission to file a fresh writ petition may not bar other remedies like a suit or a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution...." It is, therefore, submitted that it is to be implied from the said judgment that the respondent ought not to be debarred from approaching this Court on the ground that had earlier filed a suit, on the same cause of action and withdrew the same. 16. We express our inability to accept the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent for the following reason: First of all a judgment of the court is an authority only for the proposition that is decided by it but not for a proposition that may follow as a logical consequence of such a decision. Secondly, it is well established that existence of an effective alternative remedy is a factor which is required to be considered by the High Court while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction under Article226 of the Constitution of India. In an appropriate case the court can always decline to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 226 on the ground that there is an efficacious alternative remedy available to the petitioner. If that is the legal position the fact that an efficacious alternative remedy by way of a suit in which all the questions of both fact and law can be adjudicated upon, is available and was availed by the respondent at an earlier point of time would certainly be a factor which ought to have weighed this Court in entertaining the writ petition. 17. 17. In the background of the above mentioned discussion, though as a proposition of law, we accept the submission of the appellant that the writ petition ought not to have been entertained but in the facts and circumstances of the case we do not propose to non-suit the respondent on that ground. 18. In the circumstances, the order under appeal stands modified as indicated above. The appeal stands disposed of.