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2009 DIGILAW 81 (KAR)

Mahadevappa v. Karnataka Lokayuktha

2009-01-30

V.JAGANNATHAN

body2009
ORDER Jagannathan, J Whether the coming into force of the Karnataka Lokayuktha Act, 1984 (for short 'the State Act') has the effect of regulating the manner of investigation only in accordance with the provisions of the State Act, even in respect of the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short 'the Central Act')? Whether the provisions of Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure 'Cr.PC.' for short) are inapplicable to the investigation of the offences under the Central Act, by the Police Inspector of the Lokayuktha, and thirdly, are the Police Officers of the Lokayuktha prevented from registering the case suo motu in respect of the offences under the Central Act and finally, whether the procedure followed by the Lokayuktha police in invoking the provisions of Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. for the purpose of investigation under the Central Act, is contrary to the very provisions of the State Act, and thus amounts to an abuse of the process of law. 2. These are the questions of great importance which have been raised in this petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and they call for an answer from this court. 3. The facts which have given rise to the above questions, briefly stated, are that the Lokayuktha Police Inspector (R-2 herein) registered a case against the petitioner under Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 alleging that the petitioner is in possession of the assets disproportionate to his known sources of income, in Crime No.10/2008, which is pending on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Bagalakote, and the present petition is tiled for quashing of the said F.I.R. 4. The facts, which are not in dispute are that, there is no written complaint filed by any person nor is there any reference by the Government to the Lokayuktha and secondly, R -2 Police Inspector has set the criminal law in motion by registering an F.I.R. under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. and has issued search warrant and investigation is being conducted by R-2 in respect of the aforementioned offences under the Central Act. It is in the background of these facts, the petitioner has raised the following contentions before this court. 5. It is in the background of these facts, the petitioner has raised the following contentions before this court. 5. The first and foremost ground urged is that the Lokayuktha police have no power to initiate proceedings under the Central Act and, therefore, exercising of the suo motu power by R-2 is in derogation of the provisions contained in the State Act. 6. The next contention that is urged in the petition is that on coming into force of the Lokayuktha Act on 11.2.1985, the investigation into the offences against the Government servants including the offences of corruption will have to be regulated by the provisions of the State Act and not the Central Act. 7. The third ground put forward is that a perusal of the provisions of the State Act will make it clear that the manner of investigation is regulated by Sections 7 and 9 of the State Act and insofar as Section 7 is concerned, the Lokayuktha may investigate any action which is taken by or with the general or specific approval of the persons named therein at sub-Clauses (i) to (iv), where a complaint involving a grievance or an allegation is made in respect of such action and under Section 9 of the State Act, the investigation can proceed only following the complaint being made in the prescribed form accompanied by an affidavit of the complainant in the manner prescribed. Therefore, barring these two courses mentioned in the State Act, there is no other mode of filing the complaint nor registering a case suo motu by the Lokayuktha police is permissible and, as such, the entire proceedings initiated by R-2 is without jurisdiction and is an abuse of the process of law. 8. Therefore, barring these two courses mentioned in the State Act, there is no other mode of filing the complaint nor registering a case suo motu by the Lokayuktha police is permissible and, as such, the entire proceedings initiated by R-2 is without jurisdiction and is an abuse of the process of law. 8. The next ground of attack is that, having regard to Sections 4 and 5 of the Cr.P.C. and also having regard to the fact that the State Act is a special Act and being a local Act, a reading of the relevant provisions of the State Act and the aforementioned sections of the Cr.P.C. will, therefore, lead to the result that, by implication, the procedure prescribed under Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. are excluded from the purview of the operation of the Lokayuktha Act insofar as the manner of investigation is concerned and, therefore, the proceedings initiated by the Lokayuktha police under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. in the instant case is illegal, without jurisdiction and without the authority of law. 9. The next ground that is sought to be canvassed by the petitioner is that a close look at the provisions of the Lokayuktha Act will also make it clear that the State Act is a self-contained Code prescribing the nature of investigation to be conducted, the manner of investigation and the power given to the Lokayukta insofar as the search warrant is concerned and the Act also gives the Lokayuktha the power to direct the public servant concerned to vacate the office (suspension) and submission of the report and by virtue of Section 14 of the State Act, the Lokayuktha is also empowered to file the charge sheet and there is no need for sanction from the Government in view of the deemed sanction provision under the Act. Under the said circumstances, the entire investigation will have to proceed on the lines indicated in the State Act and recourse to Cr.P.C. provisions and particularly to Chapter XII is, therefore, rendered redundant. 10. Under the said circumstances, the entire investigation will have to proceed on the lines indicated in the State Act and recourse to Cr.P.C. provisions and particularly to Chapter XII is, therefore, rendered redundant. 10. The next ground that is urged by the petitioner concerns the control by the Lokayuktha, over the duties of the Police Officers on deputation to Lokayuktha and by virtue of Section 15(4) of the State Act, the officers and other employees of the Lokayuktha are under the administrative and disciplinary control of the Lokayuktha and, therefore, R-2, being subjected to the said control of Lokayuktha, cannot suo motu register the case by taking the aid of Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. It is, therefore, contended that it is not open to any Police Officer on deputation to Lokayuktha to carry on the investigation in respect of the offence under the Central Act by taking recourse to Cr.P.C. provisions of Chapter XII and ignoring or overlooking the specific provisions of the State Act and, as such, suo motu initiation of action by R-2 against the petitioner is per se illegal and arbitrary and such an Act cannot be sustained in the eye of law. As the State Act has come in place of the then existing Vigilance Commission, having regard to the object behind the passing of the State Act, it is but obvious that the legislature intended that the cases of corruption against public servant., will have to be investigated into by the authorities under the State Act. 11. Last of the contentions raised is that a look at the definition of 'corruption' in the State Act will also lead to the inference that cases of corruption against a public servant under the Lokayuktha Act also includes anything that is made punishable under Chapter XI of the I.P.C. or under the Central Act and, therefore, having regard to the wider definition of the term 'corruption', it has to be understood that it is the Lokayuktha Act which will hold the field in the State of Karnataka and not the Central Act insofar as the offences relating to corruption, nepotism and lack of integrity on the part of public servants are concerned. As such, it is not the object of the legislature which enacted the State Act, to permit both the State Act and the Central Act to operate in the same field. 12. As such, it is not the object of the legislature which enacted the State Act, to permit both the State Act and the Central Act to operate in the same field. 12. Learned counsel Shri S.M. Chandrasbekar for the petitioner dealt with each one of the above contentions in great detail and also placed reliance on a number of decisions both of the Apex Court, this court and other High Courts apart from placing the Debates Proceedings pertaining to the discussion before the State Legislature when the State Act was sought to be introduced and made reference to the views expressed by the Hon'ble Members of the State Assembly. 13. Referring to the object behind the enactment of the State Act and the history behind it, the learned counsel at the outset submitted that in interpreting the statute in question, the court will have to look into the object and the intent of the legislature and the well known Heydon's principles will have to be kept in view while considering the object behind an enactment. In other words, the submission made is that the court will have to see as to what was the law before making the Act, what was the mischief or defect for which the law did not provide, what is the remedy that the Act has provided, and what is the reason for the remedy and referring to these principles, it is submitted that the courts must adopt the construction which suppresses the mischief and advances the remedy. The decision referred to in this connection is the one in the case of RAIPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs ANUPAM SAHKARI GRIHA NIRMAN SAMITI. 14. It is also contended that in interpreting a statute, the court has to ascertain the will and policy of the legislature as discernible from the object and scheme of the enactment and the language used therein and, in this connection, reliance placed was on the decisions reported in AIR 1987 SC 2034 and AIR 1988 SC 603 . 15. 14. It is also contended that in interpreting a statute, the court has to ascertain the will and policy of the legislature as discernible from the object and scheme of the enactment and the language used therein and, in this connection, reliance placed was on the decisions reported in AIR 1987 SC 2034 and AIR 1988 SC 603 . 15. Nextly it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that having regard to the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the Cr.PC., it is clear that the object of Section 5 of the Cr.P.C. is to "exclude the applicability of the Code in respect of proceedings under any special or local law or any special jurisdiction or form of procedure prescribed by any other law and, where there is a special enactment in force relating to the manner of investigation, enquiry or otherwise dealing 'vi\h such offence, the other powers under the Cr.P.C. should be subjected to such special enactment. The decisions which lay down the above proposition of law, according to the learned counsel, are the ones reported in AIR 1987 SC 1646 and AIR 1991 SC 558 . 16. Referring to the decision of this court in the case of M.MAHESHAN vs STATE OF KARNATAKA, the learned counsel for the petitioner argued that though the decision of the learned Single Judge was set aside by the Division Bench later in the case of C.RANGASWAMAIAH vs STATE OF KARNATAKA, in and the Apex Court also affirmed the Division Bench decision later in the case reported in AIR 1998 SC 2496 , yet, the effect of Sections 4 and 5 of the Cr.P.C. in the light of the provisions contained in Sections 7 and 9 of the State Act were not the subject matter of discussion in all these cases and, therefore, the submission made is that the contentions now raised by the petitioner were not directly involved in the aforementioned cases and, as such, those decisions will not have any binding effect insofar as the instant case before this court is concerned. 17. 17. In this connection, the learned counsel also drew my attention to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI vs GURNAM KAUR, to contend that obiter dicta and per incuriam decisions and those which can be bracketed under the expression sub silentio are not binding decisions and it is further contended that a decision should be treated as given per incuriam when it is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule having the force of a statute and as far as a decision which passes sub silentio is concerned, it is contended that a decision is said to pass sub silentio when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the court or present to its mind. Therefore, the point that is sought to be canvassed in relying on the aforementioned ruling is that Sections 4 and 5 of the Cr.P. C. were not in consideration before this court or before the Apex Court either in Maheshan's case or in C.Rangaswamaiah's case and, as such, the observations and the law laid down in both the cases, therefore, cannot come in the way of the present contentions put forward by the petitioner in the instant case. 18. The last of the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is the one in the case of VIJAY SHEKHAR vs UNION OF INDIA5, to submit that when the provisions of Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. are by implication taken out of the purview of the Lokayuktha Act, the exercise of suo motu powers by R -2 by registering the case and following the procedure contemplated under Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. is nothing but an Act of abuse of the process ol1aw and such an Act, therefore, cannot be permitted to stand. 19. 19. In other words, fraud on power voids the order if it is not exercised bonafide for the end design and, therefore, when the State Act does not permit taking the assistance of Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. particularly in the light of the specific provisions contained in Sections 7 and 9 of the State Act and other relevant sections, the use of the said provisions of the Cr.P.C. by R-2 by registering the case and proceeding under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. is, therefore, nothing but an act, outside the scope of the powers conferred under the State Act and, as such, the proceedings initiated right from the time of registering the F.IR against the petitioner cannot stand the test of law. Particular reference was made to paragraph-9 of the aforesaid decision. 20. One other contention put forward by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that though the police officers functioning under the Lokayuktha are deemed to be police stations for the purpose of investigation under the Cr.P.C., yet, when the entire field is covered by the special enactment passed by the State i.e., the State Act, any order of the Government by way of Notification would be violative of Article 162 of the Constitution. Therefore, when the powers of the police officers are regulated under Sections 7 and 9 of the State Act, in the guise of issuing Notification, it is impermissible for the police officers functioning under the control of the Lokayuktha to function as police officers and exercise power under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. 21. Hence, any Government order, which transgresses the specific provisions of the local Act i.e., the State Act, will be violative of the aforementioned Article of the Constitution. As such, any circular or Notification issued in derogation of Section 7 of the State Act is void to the extent of conferring suo motu powers on the police officers functioning under the control of the Lokayuktha. 22. As such, any circular or Notification issued in derogation of Section 7 of the State Act is void to the extent of conferring suo motu powers on the police officers functioning under the control of the Lokayuktha. 22. As far as the suo motu powers of the Lokayuktha is concerned, the learned counsel, referring to the various sections of the Lokayuktha Act, submitted that the Act confers suo motu powers on the Lokayukta not only to initiate enquiry to look into the allegations made against the persons concerned or in respect of their actions, but the Act also gives the Lokayuktha power to direct the public servant to vacate the office if, upon investigation, the Lokayuktha or the Upa Lokayuktha is satisfied that the complaint involving the allegations against the public servant is substantiated and that the public servant concerned should not continue to hold the post held by him. This power is conferred by Section 13 of the State Act and the protection is given to the innocent persons under Section 20 from being falsely prosecuted. 23. Finally, referring to Section 14 of the State Act, it is submitted that if prior sanction of any authority is required for prosecution of a public servant concerned, notwithstanding anything contained in any law, such sanction shall be deemed to have been granted by the appropriate authority on the date of such order and in the face of this provision contained in the State Act, the submission made is that there are enough provisions in the Act indicating suo motu powers given to the Lokayuktha. But, nevertheless, in respect of the case that is registered against the present petitioner by R-2 is concerned, without following the procedure contemplated under the State Act, R-2 could not have suo motu taken upon himself the powers conferred by Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. 24. In the light of the aforesaid contentions urged and the decisions cited, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the FI.R. registered against the petitioner, therefore, needs to be quashed as the entire procedure followed and the manner of investigation taken up by R-2 is nothing but an abuse of the process of law and, as such, this court, under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. has the necessary inherent power to interfere and quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice. 25. 25. On the other hand, learned counsel Shri Jagadish Patil for the respondents contended that the case is registered against the petitioner in respect of the offence alleged under the Central Act and not under the State Act and, therefore, the question of the provisions of Chapter XII of the Cr.PC. not being applicable to the instant case does not arise. Therefore, notwithstanding the provisions contained in Sections 7 and 9 of the State Act and notwithstanding the provisions contained in Sections 4 and 5 of the Cr.P.C., R-2 can proceed against the petitioner by initiating action as contemplated under Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. and, therefore, the question ofR-2 abusing the process of law does not arise. 26. As far as R-2 suo motu initiating the proceedings is concerned, it is submitted that, as he is the competent police officer who can initiate and investigate the case against the petitioner by virtue of the provisions contained in the Central Act, the question ofR-2 acting in contravention of the provisions of the State Act, therefore, does not arise. It is further contended that the Police Officers of the Lokayuktha act independently and they are entitled to register the case and investigate the matter and file the charge sheet in respect of the offences under the provisions of the Central Act. Therefore, notwithstanding their deputation to the Lokayuktha, the Police Officers working in the Lokayuktha are entitled to investigate the matter and file the charge sheet after obtaining necessary sanction as required under Section 19 of the Central Act. 27. Therefore, notwithstanding their deputation to the Lokayuktha, the Police Officers working in the Lokayuktha are entitled to investigate the matter and file the charge sheet after obtaining necessary sanction as required under Section 19 of the Central Act. 27. Referring to the decision rendered by a Division Bench of this court in the case of Rangaswamaiah, the submission is made that all the contentions urged by the petitioner's counsel in the instant case have been considered by the Division Bench in the batch of writ petitions and writ appeals, which was disposed of on 18.3.1998 and, therefore, having regard to the law laid down by the Division Bench in the said batch of cases, there could be no confusion as to the legal position as far as the Police Officer of the Lokayuktha investigating the offences under the Central Act is concerned and the learned counsel, in this regard, submitted that the intention of the State legislature in enacting the Lokayuktha Act is not to render the Central Act inoperative and the provisions of the Central Act and the State Act are complementary and supplementary to each other, but in no way contradictory. Therefore, the observations made in the said batch of petitions by the Division Bench covers all aspects of the contentions now put forward by the learned counsel for the petitioner and, as such, the question of the provisions of Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. being excluded from the purview of the operation does not arise merely because R-2 happens to work in the Lokayuktha office and is under the control of the Lokayuktha . 28. As far as the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge in Maheshan's case is concerned, the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents is that the said decision no longer holds good following the Division Bench ruling and the Apex Court ultimately confirming the decision rendered by the Division Bench in the case reported in AIR 1998 SC 2496 . 29. 29. Yet another submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents is that a close examination of the provisions of the Lokayuktha Act will indicate that it is only in respect of the action that is taken that the question of application of Section 7 of the State Act comes into picture and the Lokayuktha can investigate any such action as defined in Section 2 of the State Act. As far as the complaint is concerned, the learned counsel for the respondents argued that it is only in respect of the complaint that is made under the State Act that the provisions of Section 9 of the State Act come into operation and the said section has no relevance insofar as a complaint that is lodged before the police officer attached to the Lokayuktha office in respect of an offence under the PC. Act. Therefore, the question of compliance of the provisions of Section 9 will arise only in such of the cases where complaint is made under the provisions of the State Act and not in respect of a complaint alleging the offences under the Central Act. As such, the question of forwarding the complaint copy to the concerned public servant and affording him opportunity to offer his comments will arise only in such of the cases where the complaint is filed under the State Act. 30. As far as sanction is concerned, the learned counsel argued that by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 14 of the State Act, it is only in respect of the investigation that is undertaken under the provisions of the State Act and where the Lokayuktha or the Upa Lokayuktha is satisfied that the public servant has committed any criminal offence and should be prosecuted in a court of law for such offence, then, in such an event, the order passed by the Lokayuktha to initiate prosecution will not require the prior sanction of any authority, as such a sanction is deemed to have been granted by the appropriate authority on the date of the order. However, in respect of the offences under the provisions of the Central Act, previous sanction is necessary by virtue of Section 19 of the Central Act. However, in respect of the offences under the provisions of the Central Act, previous sanction is necessary by virtue of Section 19 of the Central Act. As such, the question of no previous sanction being necessary merely because of the existence of the provisions in the State Act as per Section 14 will not arise in respect of the offences alleged under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 of the Central Act. 31. Nextly it is contended that the very object of the State Act is also made clear in the very objects and reasons and a bare look at the objects and reasons would make it clear that the State Act has been brought into operation for making enquiries into administrative action pertaining to matters specified in List II and List III of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution, in respect of the action taken by or on behalf of the Government of Karnataka or other certain authorities in the State of Karnataka (including any omission or commission in connection with or arising out of such action) in certain cases and for matters connected therewith or ancillary thereto. Therefore, on a careful reading of the said objects and reasons behind passing of the State Act, it can very well be said that the legislature did not intend to take away the operation of the Central Act nor can it be said that with the coming into force of the State Act, the Central Act has no role to play. The learned counsel therefore, contended that in respect of the offences alleged against the petitioner, which are under the Central Act, the procedure followed by R -2 is not in derogation of any of the provisions contained in the State Act nor can it be said that the procedure followed by R-2 is an Act of abuse of the process of law. 32. In support of the above submissions, the learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the decisions reported in ILR 2003 Karnataka 3589, AIR 1998 SC 2496 , a Division Bench ruling of this court in a batch of writ petitions in W.P.No.24215/1997 and others in C. Rangaswamaiah's case, decided on 18.3.1998, and also ILR 2008 Karnataka 5160. 32. In support of the above submissions, the learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the decisions reported in ILR 2003 Karnataka 3589, AIR 1998 SC 2496 , a Division Bench ruling of this court in a batch of writ petitions in W.P.No.24215/1997 and others in C. Rangaswamaiah's case, decided on 18.3.1998, and also ILR 2008 Karnataka 5160. Therefore, the learned counsel for the respondents argued that the present petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is liable to be dismissed particularly having regard to the scope of interference by this court under the said section. 33. In the light of the contentions put forward by the learned counsel for the parties and the decisions cited, the following points arise for consideration: (i) Whether in respect of the offences alleged under the Central Act, the procedure contemplated under the State Act alone is required to be followed? (ii) Whether the provisions contained in Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. are completely excluded in respect of an investigation into the offences under the Central Act merely because of passing of the State Act? (ill) Whether the suo motu initiation of the case by R-2 can be said to be an abuse of the process of law in the face of the provisions contained in Sections 4 and 5 of the Cr.P.C. read with Sections 7 and 9 of the State Act? Point No. (i) 34. It is not in dispute that the offences alleged against the petitioner are under Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the Central Act. It is also not in dispute that R-2 Police Officer is working in the Lokayuktha under the control of the Lokayuktha. By virtue of his deputation to Lokayuktha, will R-2 cease to be a Police Officer is the point to be considered at first. This question has been answered by this court in several decisions. 35. In the case of H.NAGARAJ vs STATE BY LOKAYUKTHA POLICE, BELGAUM, this court had laid the following proposition of law: "The investigation conducted under the P.C. Act by the Lokayuktha Police under Section 17 constitute a distinct and a different investigation not related with the enquiries or investigations conducted by Lokayuktha/UpaLokayuktha under Regulation 14-A. The enquiries or the investigations conducted by Lokayuktha/Upa-Lokayuktha are only in the nature of administrative enquiries and not a police investigation. Pursuant to such enquiry, however, the Lokayuktha/Upa-Lokayuktha may recommend for criminal prosecution. Pursuant to such enquiry, however, the Lokayuktha/Upa-Lokayuktha may recommend for criminal prosecution. However, in respect of offences committed under P.C. Act, the Lokayuktha Police have independent original jurisdiction to conduct investigations and to lay final report before the competent court for prosecution after obtaining necessary sanction as envisaged under the P.C. Act." 36. In another decision in the case of MOHAMMED SALEEM vs STATE BY LOKAYUKTHA POLICE, BANGALORE', this court has taken the view that where the investigation into complaint of offence was taken up by police officer authorised to investigate into such offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, on receipt of first information report filed by complainant, sanction for prosecution has to be given by Government and sanction is mandatory and cannot be dispensed with by referring matter to Upalokayuktha for his opinion and treating his opinion as deemed sanction if it is in favour of initiating prosecution, as provided for in Lokayuktha Act. Such deemed sanction for prosecution provided for in Lokayuktha Act is applicable only to cases investigated into by Lokayuktha/Upalokayuktha and is not attracted to cases investigated into by police officer authorised to investigate into complaint of misconduct under Prevention of Corruption Act. 37. Theq1iestion whether it was permissible for the Government to entrust the Police Officer sent on deputation to Lokayuktha with additional duties under the P.C. Act, 1988 was considered by the Apex Court in the case of CRANGASWAMAIAH vs KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTHA, and the very question that was raised for consideration by the Apex Court needs to be mentioned at this juncture and it is as under: "Question is whether these police officers of the State can be invested with powers of investigation under Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 by the State under its statutory powers traceable to the same section?" The said question was answered by the Apex Court in paragraph-23 thus: "23 .... In our opinion, from a jurisdictional angle, the entrustment being under statutory powers of the State traceable to Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 the same cannot be said to be outside the jurisdiction of the State Government. In our opinion, from a jurisdictional angle, the entrustment being under statutory powers of the State traceable to Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 the same cannot be said to be outside the jurisdiction of the State Government. May be, if it is done without consulting the Lok Ayuktha and obtaining its consent, it can only be treated as an issue between the State and the Lokayuktha and is none of the concern of those public servants against whom these police officers on deputation are conducting the investigation. Such entrustment of duties has statutory backing and obviously also the tacit approval of the Lokayuktha. Once there is such tacit approval of the Lokayuktha, the writ petitioners cannot have any grievance that the Lokayuktha ought not to have permitted such a course." 38. In another decision of this court in the case of P.R.VENUGOPAL vs GPRAJASHEKAR, it was held that the Lokayuktha Police under the Prevention of Corruption Act independently function as Investigating Officer and their subordination to Lokayuktha under the Lokayuktha Act has nothing to do with their functions as Investigating Officer under the Prevention of Corruption Act, whenever a complaint is referred for investigation under the Prevention of Corruption Act and the Inspectors of Lokayuktha Police are duty-bound to register and investigate complaints. 39. In fact, the question concerning the police officers on deputation to Lokayuktha registering the case and conducting investigation in respect of the cases under the Central Act was also raised before the Division Bench of this court in C.Rangaswamaiah's case (WP.No. 24215/1997 and others) and the Division Bench answered the said question thus: "A conjoint reading of the Central Act and the State Act and the Rules made under the State Act clearly envisage the dual authority of the Police Officers sent on deputation to the Lokayuktha. For all practical purposes including the disciplinary control and superintendence, such Police Officers are deemed to be part of the staff of the Lokayuktha and under its Defacto control for all purposes including disciplinary action. For all practical purposes including the disciplinary control and superintendence, such Police Officers are deemed to be part of the staff of the Lokayuktha and under its Defacto control for all purposes including disciplinary action. They, however, cannot be held to be incompetent to investigate into an offence assigned to them under a statute by a competent authority and not excluded to be investigated by the Lokayuktha." Thus, the above legal position makes it clear that in respect of an offence under the Central Act, the police officer, though on deputation to Lokayuktha, is empowered to investigate the case independently of the provisions of the State Act. Point No.(i) is thus answered accordingly. Point No. (ii) 40. The pith and substance of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that, by virtue of Sections 4 and 5 of the Cr.P.C. and Sections 7 and 9 of the State Act, the provisions of Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. are excluded from the purview of investigation by a police officer working in the Lokayuktha. It is in this connection that the contention was put forward that the investigation by the police officer is in derogation of the provisions contained in the State Act. Before I answer this point, it is very pertinent to refer to the very provisions referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 41. Section 4 of the Cr.P.C. reads as under: "4.Trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and other laws - (1) All offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained. (2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences." 42. Section 5 of the Cr.P.C. reads thus: "5. Saving - Nothing contained in this Code shall, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, affect any special or local law for the time being in force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by any other law for the time being in force." 43. Saving - Nothing contained in this Code shall, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, affect any special or local law for the time being in force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by any other law for the time being in force." 43. Referring to the above provisions, it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in view of the special Act i.e., the State Act, coming into operation in the State of Karnataka, the procedure prescribed in the State Act alone will have to be followed and not the provisions of the Cr.P.C. The decisions referred to by the learned counsel also lay down the Proposition of law that the powers under the Cr.P.C. should be subjected to such special enactment and the effect of Section 5 of the Cr.P.C. is to clearly exclude the applicability of the Code in respect of the proceedings under any special or local law. 44. A careful reading of sub-Section (2) of Section 4 will make it clear that not only the offence under the I.P.C. shall be investigated, enquired into, tried or otherwise dealt in accordance with the provisions of the Cr.P.C. But, sub-Section (2) makes it further clear that even all offences under any other law shall be investigated, enquired into, tried or otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions meaning thereby, the provisions of the Cr.P.C. itself, but with a rider i.e., subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner and place of investigation or enquiry or trying or otherwise dealing with such offences. Therefore, it will have to be seen whether the provisions of the State Act regulates the manner of investigation of the offences under any other law or for instance, the offences under the Central Act and, if the provisions of the State Act regulates even the manner of investigation of the offences under the Central Act, then, it may be Possible to say that the argument of the petitioner's counsel requires to be considered seriously. This takes us to the provisions of the State Act viz., Karnataka Lokayuktha Act, 1984. 45. Section 7 of the State Act reads as under: "7. This takes us to the provisions of the State Act viz., Karnataka Lokayuktha Act, 1984. 45. Section 7 of the State Act reads as under: "7. Matters which may be investigated by the Lokayuktha and an Upa-Lokayuktha - (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Lokayuktha may investigate any action which is taken by or with the general or specific approval of:- (i) the Chief Minister; (ii) a Minister or a Secretary; (iii) a Member of the State Legislature; or (iv) any other public servant being a public servant of a class notified by the State Government in consultation with the Lokayuktha in this behalf, in any case where a complaint involving a grievance or an allegation is made in respect of such action. (2) Subject to the provisions of this act, an Upa-Lokayuktha may investigate any action which is taken by or with the general or specific approval of, any public servant not being the Chief Minister, Minister, Member of the Legislature, Secretary or other public servant referred to in sub-Section (1), in any case where a complaint involving a grievance or an allegation is made in respect of such action or such action can be or could have been, in the opinion of the Upa-Lokayuktha, the subject of a grievance or an allegation. (2-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-Sections (1) and (2), the Lokayuktha or an Upa-Lokayuktha may investigate any action taken by or with the general or specific approval of a public servant, if it is referred to him by the State Government. (3) Where two or more Upa-Lokayukthas are appointed under this Act, the Lokayuktha may, by general or special order, assign to each of them matters which may be investigated by them under this Act: Provided that no investigation made by an Upa-Lokayuktha under this Act, and no action taken or things done by him in respect of such investigation shall be open to question on the ground only that such investigation relates to a matter which is not assigned to him by such order. (4) Not withstanding anything contained in sub-Sections (I) to (3), when an Upa-Lokayuktha is unable to discharge his functions owing to absence, illness or any other cause, his function may be discharged by the other Upa-Lokayuktha, if any, and if there is no other Upa-Lokayuktha by thc Lokayuktha. " 46. (4) Not withstanding anything contained in sub-Sections (I) to (3), when an Upa-Lokayuktha is unable to discharge his functions owing to absence, illness or any other cause, his function may be discharged by the other Upa-Lokayuktha, if any, and if there is no other Upa-Lokayuktha by thc Lokayuktha. " 46. Section 9 of the State Act relating to complaints and investigation provides thus: "9. Provisions relating to complaints and investigations - (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, any person may make a complaint under this Act to the Lokayuktha or an Upa-Lokayuktha. (2) Every complaint shall be made in the form of a statement supported by an affidavit and in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed. (3) Where the Lokayuktha or an Upa-Lokayuktha proposes, after making such preliminary inquiry as he deemed fit, to conduct any investigation under this Act, he.- (a) shall forward a copy of the complaint to the public servant and the Competent Authority concerned; (b) shall afford to such public servant an opportunity to offer his comments on such complaint; (c) may make such order as to the safe custody of documents relevant to the investigation, as he deems fit. (4) Save as aforesaid, the procedure for conducting any such investigation shall be such, and may be held either in public or in-camera, as the Lokayuktha or the Upa-Lokayuktha, as the case may be, considers appropriate in the circumstances of the case. (5) The Lokayuktha or the Upa-Lokayuktha may, in his discretion, refuse to investigate or cease to investigate any complaint involving a grievance or an allegation, if, in his opinion (a) the complaint is frivolous or vexatious or is not made in good faith; (b) there are no sufficient grounds for investigating or, as the case may be, for continuing the investigation; or (c) other remedies are available to the complainant and in the circumstances of the case it would be more proper for the complainant to avail of such remedies. (6) In any case where the Lokayuktha or an Upa-Lokayuktha decides not to entertain a complaint or to discontinue any investigation in respect of a complaint he shall record his reasons therefor and communicate the same to the complainant and the public servant concerned. (6) In any case where the Lokayuktha or an Upa-Lokayuktha decides not to entertain a complaint or to discontinue any investigation in respect of a complaint he shall record his reasons therefor and communicate the same to the complainant and the public servant concerned. (7) The conduct of an investigation under this Act against a public servant in respect of any action shall not affect such action, or any power or duty of any other public servant to take further action with respect to any matter subject to the investigation. " 47. Excepting these two sections of the State Act, the rest of the sections deal with matters relating to issue of warrant (Section 10), evidence (Section 11), reports of Lokayuktha (Section 12), public servant to vacate office if directed by Lokayuktha (Section 13), initiation of prosecution by Lokayuktha or Upa-lokayuktha (Section 14), staff of Lokayuktha (Section 15), and secrecy of information (Section 16). The investigation that is contemplated under Section 7 is in respect of any action which is taken by or with the general or specific approval of the authorities mentioned in the said section at I to IV, and where a complaint involving a grievance or allegation is made in respect of such action. Sub-Section (2-A) of Section 7 also provides that the Lokayuktha or Upa-lokayuktha may investigate any action taken by or with the general or specific approval of a public servant, if it is referred to him by the State Government. Section 9 of the Act provides for making a complaint under the Act by any person and in that event, the complaint shall be in the form of a statement supported by an affidavit as prescribed. 48. Therefore, it is clear from the above provisions of Sections 7 and 9 that it is only in respect of a complaint under the State Act that the procedure prescribed in Sections 7 and 9 will have to he followed and there is no mention in either of the two sections referred to above or for that matter in the entire State Act that even in respect of an offence under the Central Act, the investigation shall be conducted in the manner prescribed under the State Act. Therefore, in the absence of there being a specific form or procedure provided under the State Act in respect of the offences under the Central Act, the question of the procedure prescribed under the State Act being followed in respect of an offence under the Central Act does not arise. What is not expressly provided cannot be read in by implication from a reading of the provisions of the Lokayoktha Act. It is not for the court to read into a statute that which is not provided. 49. As far as the decision in the case of AJMER SINGH vs UNION OF INDIA, is concerned, that was a case where the question involved was whether the set-off provision contained in Section 428 of the Cr.P.C. can be pressed into service in respect of the proceedings under the Army Act. The Apex Court considered Sections 4 and 5 of the Cr.P.C. and found that neither the investigation nor the enquiry and not even the trial were conducted by the Courts-Martial under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. but, they were conducted in accordance with the special procedure prescribed under the Army Act. Therefore, the Apex Court held that such being the position, the provision of set-off in Section 428 of the Cr.P.C. can never be attracted in the case of persons convicted and sentenced by Courts-Martial to undergo imprisonment. In the case on hand, no such situation exists because, as already stated, nowhere in the State Act, do we find any express provision forbidding a police officer from conducting investigation in accordance with Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. in respect of the offence under the Central Act. 50. Therefore, it can be very well said that the State Act does not prohibit the police officers functioning under the Lokayoktha to investigate the offences relating to the Central Act in accordance with the provisions of the Cr.P.C. and taking recourse to Chapter XII of the Cr.P. C. The legislature, while enacting the State Act, did not and cannot be said to have intended that, by virtue of the State Act, the operation of the Central Act, which was in existence much prior to the 1988 Act itself (P.C.Act, 1947), was to be excluded and it cannot be said that once the State Act comes into application and occupies the field, the Central Act also cannot co-exist. In fact, the learned counsel for the petitioner also did not dispute the fact that there is no repugnancy between the Central Act and tile State Act, but his only contention was that the State Act was enacted with twin objectives viz., to see that the administration is toned up and high standards are maintained in the administration and the persons guilty of corruption are punished and the second object is equally an important one viz., to protect the innocent persons from false prosecution. 51. Merely because these two objectives were behind the enactment of the State Act, it cannot be said that, with the coming into force of the State Act, the Central Act will have no role to play and that is neither the intention of the legislature nor can it be gathered from a reading of the provisions of the State Act. In fact, the Division Bench of this court in C.Rangaswamiah's case did refer to this aspect in great detail and has made the following observations: 12. xxx xxx xxx Applying the aforesaid tests it cannot be said that the Legislature had not intended to make the provisions of the Central Act as inoperative or the State Act was enacted to be a substitute for the Central Act or that the rule of total control by the Lokayukta over its staff was ever intended to be totally excluded. xxx xxx xxx 16. In view of our finding that Police Officers on deputation as staff of the Lokayuktha does not cease to be the Police Officers under the Police Act and in view of the Notification dated 26th of May, 1996 they being attached to the Police Stations are held having jurisdiction to investigate the offences legally entrusted to them under the provisions of the Central Act. Accepting the contentions of the petitioners would amount to rendering the provisions of the Central Act redundant and not enforceable in the State of Karnataka, which was never the intention of the State Legislature while enacting the State Act. The provisions of the Central Act and the State Act are complimentary and supplementary to each other, but in no way contradictory despite there being overlapping in some cases. xxx xxx xxx 19. The provisions of the Central Act and the State Act are complimentary and supplementary to each other, but in no way contradictory despite there being overlapping in some cases. xxx xxx xxx 19. There cannot be any repugnancy unless the two Acts are shown to be whol1y incompatible with each other or when taken together can be shown to lead to absurd results. The argument of the petitioners in this behalf is fal1acious having no legs to stand both factually as well as legally. Sub-Article (2) of Article 254 protects such laws made by the State Legislature which are enacted and are repugnant to an earlier law made by the Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter provided that the State enactment has received the assent of the President. It is true that the State Act received the assent of the President on 16th January, 1985, but it cannot be denied that the Central Act was enacted much later and received the assent of the President on 9th September, 1988. Clause (2) of Article 254 is an exception to the general Rule laid down in Clause (1) thereof providing that if the President assents to a State law, it will prevail notwithstanding its repugnancy to an earlier law of the Union Legislature. The Central Act being a subsequent law cannot be brought within the purview of the exception contemplated under Clause (2) of Article 254. Section 28 of the Central Act itself provides that the provisions of the Central Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any other law for the time being in force and nothing contained herein shall exempt any public servant from any proceeding which might apart from the said Act be instituted against him. Section 28 apparently appears to have been incorporated under proviso to Clause (2) of Article 254 for the purposes of removing the doubts regarding the circumstances and pleas as have been raised before us. The provisions of both the Acts in no way are repugnant despite dealing substantially with the same filed of legislation as both are complimentary and supplementary to each other. The provisions of both the Acts in no way are repugnant despite dealing substantially with the same filed of legislation as both are complimentary and supplementary to each other. The State Act being an earlier Act does not affect the implications and consequences of the Central Act admittedly a later enactment." In the light of the aforestated law laid down by this court, it is also necessary to refer back to the observations of the Apex Court in C. Rangaswamaiah's case ( AIR 1998 SC 2496 ) and to the relevant paragraphs, which have been culled out earlier in the course of the judgment. 52. In the light of the legal position laid down by the Apex Court as well as this court in the above mentioned cases and the State Act not expressly or by implication forbidding the police officers attached to Lokayuktha from investigating the offences under the Central Act in accordance with Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C., I am of the view that in view of the law laid down by the Division of this Court in C.Rangaswamaiah's case as well as the Apex Court in the very same case reported in AIR 1998 SC 2496 , the settled legal position that emerges from all these decisions is directly on the point and covers the entire gamut of the contentions put forward by the learned counsel for the petitioner. As such, it cannot be accepted that the provisions of Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. are inapplicable in respect of a case investigated by a police officer of the Lokayuktha in respect of the offences under the Central Act. Point No.(iii) 53. The contention put forward by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Stale Act only contemplates two modes of complaints being filed before the Lokayuktha as detailed in Sections 7 and 9 of the Act and, therefore, the police officer could not have suo motu initiated the proceedings against the petitioner and, as such, the action taken by R-2 is nothing but an abuse of the process of law is concerned, no doubt, in the instant case, no complaint as such was lodged by anyone before R-2. Yet, the fact that R-2 is a police officer and is bound to register a case, where he has reasons to believe commission of an offence which he is empowered to investigate under Section 156, cannot be lost sight of. Merely because no complaint was received by R-2, it cannot be said that he cannot act suo motu. No such inference can be drawn having regard to the provisions contained in Section 157 of the Cr.P.C. Since this court has now taken the view that there can be no bar for a police officer to investigate a case under the Central Act in accordance with the provisions of the Cr.P.C. viz., Chapter XII, the provisions contained in Section 157, therefore, can be pressed into service in order to clear the doubt in respect of the case being registered by R-2. 54. Section 157 of the Cr.P.C., dealing with the procedure for investigation, provides in sub-Section (1) thus: "157. Procedure for investigation. - (1) If, from information received or otherwise, an officer-in-charge of a police station has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered under Section 156 to investigate, he shall forthwith send a report of the same to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such offence upon a police report and shall proceed in person, or shall depute one of his subordinate officers not being below such rank as the State Government may, by general or special order, prescribe in this behalf, to proceed, to the spot, to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case, and, if necessary, to take measures for the discovery and arrest of the offender: Provided, " Therefore, it is clear that the police officer can press the law in motion not only on the basis of the information received by him but also otherwise. As such, the question ofR-2 \lot having necessary power under the Cr.P.C. to register the case in the absence of a complaint being filed before him does not arise. 55. As far as the contention put forward concerning the decisions rendered by this court in cases referred to above concerning the police officer being on deputation to Lokayuktha and the powers of such police officers to investigate an offence under the Central Act, and that in all those cases including the Division Bench decision in C.Rangaswamaiah's case, Sections 4 and 5 of the Cr.PC. and Sections 7 and 9 of the State Act were not the subject matter of the decision and, therefore, those decisions cannot have any binding effect is concerned, I am unable to agree with the said proposition put forward. 56. In the Division Beach ruling, which has been referred to above earlier, this court has dealt with all the aspects of the matter including the operation of the Central Act as well as the State Act and whether they contradict each other and the Division Bench has laid down the law very clearly to the effect that the investigation by a police officer of the Lokayuktha in respect of the offence under the Central Act cannot be held to be without jurisdiction and this court refuted the argument that no case can be registered or investigated under the Central Act in view of the provisions of the State Act and the observations of the Division Bench, which have been excerpted earlier also make it clear that all the contentions now put forward were considered by the Division Bench and merely because there was no specific reference made to Sections 4 and 5 of the Cr.P.C., or to Sections 7 and 9 of the State Act, it cannot be said that the legal position has not been clearly stated by the Division Bench in respect of the investigation conducted by a police officer of the Lokayuktha as regards the offences under the Central Act are concerned. 57. Therefore, I find enough merit in the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents Shri Jagadish Patil, that all the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner have already been fairly and squarely met by the Division Bcnch in its decision in the batch of writ petitions decided on 18.3.1998. 58. Corning to the question of interference by this court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., no doubt, the said section gives this eoul1 the power to interfere where it is shown that the ends of justice require interference or that interference is called for to prevent an abuse of the process of law. 58. Corning to the question of interference by this court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., no doubt, the said section gives this eoul1 the power to interfere where it is shown that the ends of justice require interference or that interference is called for to prevent an abuse of the process of law. Since I have taken the view that the procedure followed by R-2 police officer in investigating the case, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. in respect of the offences under the Central Act being not in derogation of any of the provisions of the State Act, and the State Act also not excluding the operation of Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. in respect of the investigation conducted by the police officer into the offences under the Central Act, the question of the abuse of the process of law does not arise and, as such, the decision referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard also cannot come to his aid. Point No.(iii) is thus answered. 59. Since no other contentions are put forward by the petitioner's Counsel excepting the above ones, I do not find any case made out for this court to interfere under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and, as such, the question of quashing the F.I.R. registered against the petitioner does not arise. 60. In the light of the conclusions reached in respect of the points raised for consideration, the petition is, therefore, liable to be dismissed and hence, I pass the following order: The petition is dismissed.