ORDER: 1. Heard Sri Rakesh Sanghi, the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Advocate General for the respondents. 2. The Joint Collector, Hyderabad (the 2nd respondent) by proceedings bearing reference No. B2/9004/94, dated 16.12.1995 (the impugned order), in an appeal preferred by the State represented by the 4th respondent [u/Sec. 24 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act 1955 (for short Inams Abolition Act)], set aside the order of the 3rd respondent in proceedings bearing reference No. B/4867/93, dated 25.08.1994. 3. The petitioners herein applied for Occupancy Rights Certificate (ORC) in respect of an extent of Ac.5.29 gt, in Sy.No. 102/1 of Hakimpet village (the schedule lands) claiming to be inamdars of the property, granted as inam towards performing “Neerudi” service. The 3rd respondent granted ORC to the petitioners, by the order dated 25-08-1994. 4. Aggrieved thereby the State preferred an appeal u/Sec. 24 (1) of the Inams Abolition Act, to the 2nd respondent. The 2nd respondent allowed the State’s appeal. The case of the petitioners :- 1) The petitioners and their ancestors are in occupation of the schedule lands, granted to their ancestors by the Nizam for ‘Neerudi’ service rendered for a number of villages including Hakimpet. The entire Hakimpet village is Sarf-e-Khas and merged in the Diwani in 1358-F. 2) Though originally the Inams Abolition Act exempted certain inams including service inams from its purview, by the Amending Act 29/85 all inams including service inams were brought within its ambit. 3) The 4th respondent filed LGC 62/89 against the first petitioner and 17 others before the Special Court constituted under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (the Prohibition Act), alleging that they had grabbed Government land. The Special Court by the judgment dated 7.9.1992 declared that the first petitioner and the other respondents therein are not land grabbers within the meaning of the said expression as defined in the Prohibition Act; that the schedule lands are an inam granted towards ‘Neerudi’ service and that therefore an enquiry under the Inams Abolition Act should be made. The Special Court also granted liberty to the Revenue to resume the land after following due procedure. 4) The petitioners thereupon filed an application before the 3rd respondent (u/Sec. 10 of the Inams Abolition Act) for grant of ORC. Meanwhile, apprehending dispossession, the petitioners filed W.P.No. 18283/93. The Special Court also granted liberty to the Revenue to resume the land after following due procedure. 4) The petitioners thereupon filed an application before the 3rd respondent (u/Sec. 10 of the Inams Abolition Act) for grant of ORC. Meanwhile, apprehending dispossession, the petitioners filed W.P.No. 18283/93. By the order dated 8.12.1993 this court disposed of the writ petition directing maintenance of Status Quo for a period of two weeks with liberty to the petitioners to file an application before the 3rd respondent for stay of dispossession. By another order dated 24.12.1993 the order of Status Quo earlier granted (for a period of two weeks) was extended till the disposal of the application for interim relief filed by the petitioners in the application filed before the 3rd respondent for grant of ORC. 5) By the order dated 25.08.1994 the 3rd respondent granted ORC to the petitioners. 6) The 4th respondent preferred an appeal u/Sec. 24 of the Inams Abolition Act before the 2nd respondent. During the pendency of the appeal before the 2nd respondent, as the petitioners’ possession was again being threatened, they filed W.P.No. 25318/95. This writ petition was disposed of at the stage of admission by the order of this court dated 10.11.1995, directing the 2nd respondent to dispose of the appeal preferred by the 4th respondent within two months and directing the parties to maintain Status Quo with regard to possession as obtaining on 8.12.1993 (the date of the order in the earlier W.P.No. 18283/93). 7) The 2nd respondent by the impugned order allowed and the appeal. 8) The impugned order is invalid since i) the conclusions therein are contrary to the findings recorded by the Special Court in LGC No. 62/89 and the judgment of this court dated 10.11.1995 in W.P.No. 25318/95; ii) the appeal preferred by the 4th respondent to the 2nd respondent is belated. The order of the 3rd respondent is dated 25.08.1994 while the appeal was preferred on 22.12.1994, beyond 30 days, though the appeal grounds were signed by the 4th respondent on 25.11.1994; and no petition for condoning the delay was filed along with the appeal; iii) only a rival claimant to ORC would be an aggrieved party entitled to prefer an appeal and not the State; neither the State nor the 4th respondent have the locus standi to prefer the appeal u/Sec. 24(1) of the Inams Abolition Act. Case of the respondents (State) :- 5. The Special Deputy Collector (Land Protection) in the Office of the District Collector, Hyderabad has filed a counter, asserting: A) That Hakimpet is an ex-Sarf-e-Khas village. Sarf-e-Khas was abolished under the Sarf-e-Khas Merger Regulation Act 1358-F (1949 AD) and under the Jagir Abolition Regulation 1358-F. In 1330-F, during the currency of the Sarf-e-Khas regime an initial survey was conducted; the schedule lands were assigned Sy.No. 92 and described as Sarkari Kharij Khata. A revised survey was conducted in 1344-F; the earlier Sy.No. 92 was correlated to Sy.No. 102, admeasuring Ac.323.23 gts; and recorded as Poramboke Sarkari. The schedule lands are not recorded as ‘inam’ in the Inam Takhta Register of Hakimpet village but recorded as Government land. Mere payment of Sivai Jamabandi and penalty would not confer a right or title to the petitioner No.1 or his forefathers over the schedule lands. The petitioners and other claimants to this land are therefore encroachers. B) In 1961 and in 1974 the Tahsildar and Nizam-e-Zamabandi officer ordered eviction of unauthorized encroachers and these were evicted under the provisions of the AP Land Encroachment Act, 1905. C) A town survey was conducted under the AP Survey and Boundaries Act 1923 (the 1923 Act) and the schedule lands, in Sy.No. 102/1 were correlated to TS No. 14/P Block-A,Ward-12 of Hakimpet village and recorded as Government vacant land. The town survey of Hakimpet village was published in the AP Gazette No.31 dated 21.10.1979, under Sec. 13 of the 1923 Act. The entries recorded in the town survey as published in the Gazette are conclusive proof, unless modified by a decree of the Civil Court within three years from the date of publication of the Gazette notification. The TSLR having become final is binding on all persons including the petitioners. D) An essential pre-condition for treating any land as inam under the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act is that it should have been entered as inam land in the Inam Register; there should be remission of the whole or part of the land revenue; and should be entered in the village records as mafi or chowtai inam land and dastagarden after 20.07.1955, on which date all inams were abolished and the lands vested in the State. E) The land is recorded as Kancha Poramboke Sarkari even today and was never assessed to land revenue in the Revenue and Settlement Records. The schedule lands cannot therefore be considered as inam, consequently no ORC could be claimed by the petitioner in respect thereof. F) The order dated 25.08.1994 passed by the primary authority-the 3rd respondent (granting ORC to the petitioners) is clearly misconceived and unsustainable. No proper enquiry was conducted to determine fact whether the land is inam as defined in Sec. 2 (1)(c) of the Inams Abolition Act and to ascertain whether the petitioners were eligible for grant of ORC (even if the schedule lands are inam). The State therefore through the 4th respondent filed the appeal under Sec. 24(1), to the 2nd respondent. The 2nd respondent rightly set aside the 3rd respondents order, by the impugned order dated 16.12.1995. G) The petitioners failed to produce any document or furnish any proof to support their claim that the schedule lands are inam and were granted as inam. No records were produced or referred to either pertaining to the Survey Settlement and Revenue Records or other village Revenue records. The schedule lands were never treated or recorded as inam and are continuously recorded only as Poramboke Sarkari lands. The provisions of the Inams Abolition Act have thus no application. H) The Special Court under the Prohibition Act could not have and did not in fact declare the land to be inam nor directed the Inams Tribunal to issue ORC to the petitioners. In fact (in para-42 of the Judgment in LGC No. 62/89), the Special Court specifically and clearly held that an enquiry has to be made under the Inams Abolition Act. I) The appeal preferred to the 2nd respondent by the State is not belated. In the appeal petition it is clearly asserted that the 4th respondent learnt of issue of ORC (by the order of the 3rd respondent dt. 25.08.1994) only on 20.11.1994 and the appeal was filed on 21.11.1994, the very next day. The appeal is therefore filed within time from the date of knowledge. There is no question of any delay nor is there a need to condone the delay. J) The State is an interested, effected and aggrieved party since safeguarding public property is the function of the State. As a public servant this is the duty of the 4th respondent as well. There is no question of any delay nor is there a need to condone the delay. J) The State is an interested, effected and aggrieved party since safeguarding public property is the function of the State. As a public servant this is the duty of the 4th respondent as well. When public property recorded as Government land illegally, wholly without jurisdiction and on a fundamental misconception of the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act, is considered as inam and ORC granted to the petitioners who have no entitlement therefor, the State is demonstrably aggrieved and is entitled to prefer an appeal under Sec. 24. Even the Special Court in LGC No. 62/89 had observed that the land belongs to the Government. However, since the occupation by the petitioners and their predecessors was found to be ‘permissive’, this would not constitute land grabbing, held the Special Court and dismissed LGC No. 62/89. K) Possession of the schedule lands was handed over to the 5th respondent (HUDA) along with other Government lands much earlier to the order dated 25.08.1994 of the Inams Tribunal – the 3rd respondent. Analysis :- 6. The lynchpin of the petitioners case is the judgment of the Special Court dated 07.09.1992 in LGC NO.62/89. It is the principal contention on behalf of the petitioners that the findings of the Special Court have become final are binding and conclusive on all authorities including the authorities under the Inams Abolition Act and on the State as well, since the LGC is filed by the State. 7. Analysis of the orders; of the Special Court, the Inams Tribunal and of the 2nd respondent (the impugned order), is therefore apposite. Analyses of the judgment in LGC No. 62 of 1989 :- 8. The State through the 4th respondent filed LGC No. 62/89 against the first petitioner and 17 others alleging that the respondents had encroached and raised structures in the Government land of 6414 Sq.Mts, in Sy.No. 102/1 (old) corresponding to TS No. 14/P, Ward-12, Bloc-A of Hakimpet village. Respondents 2 to 18 allegedly purchased smaller extents sold by the 1st respondent -Mallesha (the 1st petitioner herein). 9. In defense Mallesha claimed that he and his father late Neeradi Muttaiah @ Muttiga were pattadars in possession of the schedule lands. Respondents 2 to 18 allegedly purchased smaller extents sold by the 1st respondent -Mallesha (the 1st petitioner herein). 9. In defense Mallesha claimed that he and his father late Neeradi Muttaiah @ Muttiga were pattadars in possession of the schedule lands. Earlier, his grandfather Neerudi Sivaiah @ Sankaraiah and his father Muttaiah were in possession and occupation of this land in their own right as pattadar and were performing Neerudi service. Apart from this patta land, Sivaiah was assigned Ac.0.06 gts, of wet land as service inam in Sy.No. 102/2 for performing Neerudi service for Hakimpet village. Initially, Sy.No. 102/1 comprised Ac.323.29 gts of which Ac.48.38 gts, was patta land and the remaining Ac.274.31 gts, Government land. The petitioners paternal grandfather Sivaiah was the pattadar of Ac.5.29 gts (in the non-government portion of the extent Ac.48.38 gts), in Sy.No. 102/1. Mallesha through his predecessors thus claimed possession and occupation since generations while admitting that he divided the schedule land into plots and sold them to several purchasers (including respondents 2 to 17 in the LGC), while retaining Ac.3.00. The other respondents claimed to be poor, landless persons who bona fide purchased plots sold by Mallesha believing his claim of title to the schedule land. All the respondents denied being land grabbers. 10. The Special Court framed two principal issues: (a) Whether the Government or the respondents owned/had title to the lands in question; and (b) Whether the respondents were land grabbers. 11. On a critical analysis of the oral and documentary evidence; of the Surveyor and the M.R.O., the sketch plan of the concerned area, extracts of the TSLR of TS No.14, the classification of the land and the entries in the relevant Adangals and Pahanis, the Special Court recorded a clear finding that the State is the owner of the property and that the relevant Revenue records consistently describe this land as Government land classified as Kharij Khata, Poramboke or Kancha Sarkari, as the case may be. Analyzing the claim of the respondents (Mallesha and others) that the land was granted as inam for performing Neerudi service (to the 1st respondent Mallesha and his predecessors), the Special Court found no material to conclude that Ac.48.38 gts, (out of the total extent Ac.323.23 gts, in old Sy.No. 102/1) was patta land and held that there was no evidence of a grant of inam for Neerudi service in favour of Mallesha or his predecessors. From the oral and documentary evidence marshaled on behalf of the respondents the Special Court however found that Mallesha was the son of Neerudi Muttiga and served as Neerudi for over 20 years prior to 1961 (Para-27). Analyzing the documentary evidence on behalf of the respondents (Ex. B4 to B13) in the light of the depositions of RW’s 3 to 5, while holding that Ex.B3 does not inspire confidence, the Special Court held that the evidence confirmed occupation of the land by Mallesha and his predecessors from 1957-58 and earlier; that the respondents claim of grant of inam was to a mere extent of Ac.0.06 gts; that the ancestors of Mallesha appeared entitled for land though Neerudi service inams are not strictly inams within the meaning of the Inams Abolition Act and are not a regular grant with title deed issued but are a mere service condition for performing Neerudi service. In conclusion, the Special Court observed (Para-42) that the Government must make an inquiry under the Inams Abolition Act or the revenue authorities should resume the land by following due procedure as the lands were allowed permissive possession with the respondents towards emoluments for Neerudi service. 12. At Para-43 of its judgment, the Special Court on point No.3 framed by it, held that as the first respondent though not the owner of the property is not in unlawful possession of the property is in permissive possession thereof, such possession does not constitute land grabbing. The other respondents 2 to 18 (vendees of Mallesha) the Special Court held, were bona fide purchasers from Mallesha and cannot therefore be considered land grabbers either, within the meaning of the Prohibition Act. 13. The other respondents 2 to 18 (vendees of Mallesha) the Special Court held, were bona fide purchasers from Mallesha and cannot therefore be considered land grabbers either, within the meaning of the Prohibition Act. 13. It requires to be noticed that even in Para-50 the Special Court recorded that though Mallesha and his ancestors have no title or title deeds to hold the land towards service being rendered as Neerudi or as persons who obtained the land for cultivation along with others, the occupation of this Government land was known to the village and revenue officers and appears to have been with their implied consent; hence they are not land grabbers. 14. Mallesha (the 1st petitioner) presented a petition before the 3rd respondent seeking ORC in respect of the schedule lands, under the Inams Abolition Act, on 01.10.1993. Apprehending dispossession by the 5th respondent (the HUDA) pending consideration of the application for ORC, Mallesha filed W.P.No. 18283/93. On 08.12.1993 the writ petition was disposed of (at the stage of admission and without going into the merits of the case) granting stay of dispossession, for a period of one week while enabling the petitioner to file a representation to the 3rd respondent herein seeking stay of dispossession. By another order dated 04.12.1993 (in W.P.M.P.No. 24597/93 in W.P.No. 18283/93) this court extended the order (regarding dispossession earlier passed on 08.12.1993 in the writ petition) till disposal of the stay petition filed by Mallesha in the ORC proceedings before the 3rd respondent herein. 15. The petitioners herein filed W.P.No. 25318/95 for a direction to the 2nd respondent herein to dispose of the appeal preferred by the State (against the order of the 3rd respondent dated 25.08.1994, granting ORC to the petitioners). At the stage of admission, by the order dated 10.11.1995 this writ petition was disposed of directing the 2nd respondent herein to dispose of the appeal within two months by a speaking order and directing the parties to maintain Status Quo with regard to possession till then. Analysis of the order of the 3rd respondent dt 25.08.1994:- 16. The petitioners filed an application in Form No.1 [under Rule 5(2) of the AP (Telengana Area) Abolition of Inams Rules 1975] for grant of ORC in respect of the schedule lands. Analysis of the order of the 3rd respondent dt 25.08.1994:- 16. The petitioners filed an application in Form No.1 [under Rule 5(2) of the AP (Telengana Area) Abolition of Inams Rules 1975] for grant of ORC in respect of the schedule lands. They claimed that the land was granted as a service inam for Neerudi service performed by their ancestors, since generations, a claim not asserted before the Special Court, as already noticed. 17. The 3rd respondent in the order dt. 25.08.1994 after referring to the judgment of the Findings of the Special Court on issue (a): Special Court dated 7.9.1992 (in LGC No. 62/89) and the order dt. 8.12.1993 in W.P.No. 18283/93 observed that the petitioners application is a sequel to and based on the findings of the Special Court. The Inams Tribunal further observed that in view of the findings of the Special Court in LGC No.62/89 there was no option except to treat the land as inam within the meaning of Sec.2(1)(c) of the Inams Abolition Act; to treat the occupation of the petitioners as towards emoluments for rendering Neerudi service and the petitioners as inamdars. On this assumption the 3rd respondent concluded that the petitioners are inamdars as defined in Sec. 2(1)(b) of the Inams Abolition Act; the schedule lands are not communal or other lands falling under Sec. 4(1)(a);that none else is entitled to occupancy rights under Sections 5,6,7 and 8 of the Act; and that since the first applicant (Mallesha) had alienated certain plots of a total extent of Ac.2.00 to third parties under unregistered sale deeds, title would not pass to alienees; therefore the petitioners alone are entitled to ORC for the entire extent of land; and consequently declared the petitioners as occupants of the land u/Sec. 4(2) and directed issue of ORC in their favour. Analysis of the impugned order dated 16.12.1995 :- 18. The 1st respondent entertained and allowed the appeal by the State. Two issues were framed for consideration – (a) whether the land is inam or Government land; and (b) whether the 1st respondent (the 1st petitioner) is entitled to ORC. Analysis of the impugned order dated 16.12.1995 :- 18. The 1st respondent entertained and allowed the appeal by the State. Two issues were framed for consideration – (a) whether the land is inam or Government land; and (b) whether the 1st respondent (the 1st petitioner) is entitled to ORC. The appellate authority examined the records of the initial survey conducted in 1330-F; the revised survey in 1334-F; the Inam Takhta of Hakimpet village; the Pahanis in respect of the schedule lands for the years 1951-52, 1952-53, 1960-61, 1966-67, 1970-71, 1974-75, 1975-76 and 1981-82; the Faisal Patties for the years 1950,1951, 1953 to 1955, 1957 and 1960; and the Town Survey Land Register. 19. On analyses of the above records the appellate authority found that both under the initial Survey Sethwar of 1330-F for Sy.No.92 and the revised survey conducted during 1334-F where Sy.No. 92 was renumbered Sy.No. 102, the land is recorded as Poramboke Sarkari; that the Inam Taktha of Hakimpet village prepared in 1977 does not enumerate Sy.No.102; that the pahanies and the revenue records during the years 1951-52 to 1981-82 record and describe the land in Sy.No. 102/1 as Poramboke in the pattadar column; that the name of the father Muttaiah is shown as occupant only in the Pahani for 1966-67 and of Mallesha in 1969-70 and 1974-75; that Malleshas name is recorded as an unobjectionable encroacher in the field inspection remarks of the Revenue Inspector; and that verification of the Faisal Patties of 1951, 1953, 1954 to 1958, 1960, 1966, 1974, 1975, 1980 and 1981 show that Sivai Jamabandi and penalty was imposed on the encroachers. The appellate authority held that the schedule lands in Sy.No. 102/1 are consistently recorded and delineated as Poramboke Sarkari since 1330-F and there was no record to treat it as inam. The appellate authority observed that the 3rd respondent-the Inams Tribunal failed to examine or analyze any document nor is there any discussion or analysis justifying the conclusion that the schedule land is an inam and the petitioners inamdars, entitled to grant of ORC. The appellate authority also observed that after town survey, TS Numbers have substituted the old Sy. Nos. and the ORC does not disclose or record any TS No, Block No, Ward No, nor the boundaries of the land in question. The appellate authority also observed that after town survey, TS Numbers have substituted the old Sy. Nos. and the ORC does not disclose or record any TS No, Block No, Ward No, nor the boundaries of the land in question. The appellate authority recorded the specific finding that ORC was issued for a property which was not inam within the meaning of the Inams Abolition Act. 20. On issue-(b) the appellate authority held that while LGC No. 62/89 was concerned with determination of land grabbing in respect of an extent of 6414 Sq.Mts, the ORC was applied for a larger extent of Ac.5.29 gts; that the order of the Inams Tribunal does not refer to any record on the basis of which the grant of an inam in favour of the petitioners is established or could be legitimately inferred; as the character of the land is not established to be an inam and the records clearly establish to the contrary that the land is Government land; the petitioners failed to establish grant of inam in their favour; and the ORC having been issued by the Inams Tribunal without a basis, discussion or analysis of the relevant records and without any reasons in support of the conclusions, the order of the Inams Tribunal dt. 25.8.1994 is invalid. The appeal by the State was therefore allowed and the claim of the petitioners for grant of ORC, rejected. 21. With regard to the petitioners objection as to belated filing of the appeal by the State, u/Sec. 24 of the Act, the appellate authority held that the appeal was in time as it was filed within one month from the date of knowledge (of the order of the Inams Tribunal), of the 4th respondent. Dealing with the petitioners objection that neither the State nor the 4th respondent could be considered an aggrieved party entitled to file an appeal u/Sec.24, the appellate authority held that as the State was the respondent in the proceedings before the Inams Tribunal, the appeal was maintainable. 22. On the competing assertions and claims (of the petitioners and the respondents), the following issues arise for determination in this writ petition. 22. On the competing assertions and claims (of the petitioners and the respondents), the following issues arise for determination in this writ petition. Issues: (a) Whether the Special Court had declared the schedule lands to be Inam lands and the petitioners to be Inamdars; (b) If the Special Court had declared the schedule lands to be Inam and the petitioners Inamdars, whether such finding is binding and conclusive on the authorities executing the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act; (c) Whether the impugned order dated 16.12.1995 of the 2nd respondent is unsustainable – i) Since the State had no locus to maintain an appeal under Section 24 of the Inams Abolition Act, as an aggrieved party; and ii) Since the appeal was preferred belatedly; and (d) Does the impugned order otherwise call for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. Issue (a): 23. The petitioners’ assertion either with regard to the character of the schedule land or the nature and character of their title to it has been inconsistent throughout the several proceedings. The first petitioner was a respondent in LGC No. 62/89. The allegation of land grabbing in LGC No.62/89 was limited to an extent of 6,414 Sq.Mts. In his defense the first petitioner as the first respondent in the LGC, while denying illegal occupation of the land in question claimed that he, his father Muttaiah and Muttaiah’s father Neeradi Sivaiah (the grandfather) were in possession and occupation of the extent of Ac.5.20 gts, in Sy.No. 102/1 of Hakimpet village in their own right as pattadars (emphasis). He also pleaded that Neeradi Sivaiah was assigned Ac.0.06 gts of wet land as service inam in Sy.No. 102/2 of Hakimpet village. It was further pleaded that it was part of the patta land that was divided into plots and sold to several purchasers while a balance of Ac.3.00 continued in possession of the first petitioner herein. Clearly it was not the plea of the first petitioner (as first respondent in the LGC) that the extent of Ac.5.29 gts, in Sy.No. 102/1 (Old) of Hakimpet village was inam granted to either the first petitioner or his ancestors for performing Neeradi service. At any rate the fact that the subject matter of LGC No.62/89 was only an extent of 6,414 Sq.Mts, in Sy.No. 102/1(old) of Hakimpet village, is significant. 24. At any rate the fact that the subject matter of LGC No.62/89 was only an extent of 6,414 Sq.Mts, in Sy.No. 102/1(old) of Hakimpet village, is significant. 24. In the application filed before the 3rd respondent for grant of ORC under the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act the petitioners’ claim was that the schedule land (of an extent of Ac.5.29 gts in Sy.No. 102/1 of Hakimpet village) is service inam land granted towards Neeradi service performed by their ancestors since generations, a service which is continuing. The petitioners however conveniently omitted to plead in this application (for ORC) as to who was the original grantee of the claimed inam; which authority granted the Inam; when the inam grant was made; and on the basis of which Revenue or other records the claim to being inamdars is asserted. In this writ petition too the assertion is reiterated that the petitioners’ ancestors performed Neeradi service for which the schedule lands were granted as inam, however without any particulars pleaded. 25. The Special Court in LGC No. 62/89 had not even framed an issue whether the suit land (6414 Sq.Mt.) is an inam. On the first issue the Special Court held that the Government is the owner of the property as its title is undisputed. As part of issue No.3 (whether the respondent is the owner of the suit land), the Special Court observed in para-17 of the judgment that though not specifically raised in the pleadings it is claimed that the suit land was granted for Neeradi service rendered. After discussing the oral and documentary evidence on the issue of the ownership of the suit property the Special Court focused though collaterally only on the claim that the extent of Ac.0.06 gts, in Sy.No. 102/2 is inam. The Special Court found the evidence inconclusive and recorded the following observations and conclusions: 40. To sum up, after disallowing the evidence which is not acceptable, the deposition of Patwari (R.W.3) who had worked for over 20 years, from the year 1961, exhibits B-7(c) and B-7(d), entries in Pahani Patriks C-1 and A-6 confirm the occupation of suit land in S.No. 102/1 by R-1 and his predecessors from the year 1957-58 and much earlier. To sum up, after disallowing the evidence which is not acceptable, the deposition of Patwari (R.W.3) who had worked for over 20 years, from the year 1961, exhibits B-7(c) and B-7(d), entries in Pahani Patriks C-1 and A-6 confirm the occupation of suit land in S.No. 102/1 by R-1 and his predecessors from the year 1957-58 and much earlier. P.W.2 has admitted during his deposition that in Telangana Region Rs.36/- were being deducted from out of land revenue payable by Neeradies treating it as inam portion payable to the Neeradies and if Neeradi had no land, the assessment of which is equivalent to Rs.36/- was being given as Inam. The extent in S.No. 102/2 which is admitted as Inam given is only 0.06 gts, the assessment of which is Rs.1.50. It being so the respondent was entitled for further cash remuneration of Rs.34.50 to make good Rs.36/- due to Neeradi. The M.R.O. could not confirm or deny that the respondent predecessors working as Neeradies were given cash remuneration due to them, if no land was given in lieu of cash remuneration prior to 1958-59. He is also silent as how the extent of S.No.102/1 which was 323 acres 23 guntas as per pahani 1958-59, got reduced to 282 acres 28 gts, by the year 1960-61, and the reduced extent of 48 acres 36 gts, was treated as patta or inam to explain the reduction. 41. As per G.O.Ms.No. 672 dt. 16-4-1957 Revenue Department (kept on file) inam lands granted to Sethsindis (Village Servants) in Telangana area were converted to khalsa and land revenue payable in respect of these lands was ordered to be collected. It was also directed patta should be issued in respect of these lands and cash remuneration of Rs.6/- per month will be payable from 1-7-1957. Para 1103 of Dastu Bahi, which is on page 69, which was in vogue in Telangana Region clarifies that wherever Neeradies are working, if remuneration payable to them is less than Rs.36/-, they should be given inam to make good the deficiency as in the case of Sethasindis (village servants) by grant of land wherever it is feasible. Similarly para 774 of Rehanumaijama-Bandi, Sethsindi or Neeradi cannot claim a particular land in lieu of cash remuneration but it is the discretion of the authorities to grant any land (Xerox copies which are in Urdu are kept on file). Similarly para 774 of Rehanumaijama-Bandi, Sethsindi or Neeradi cannot claim a particular land in lieu of cash remuneration but it is the discretion of the authorities to grant any land (Xerox copies which are in Urdu are kept on file). The above directions bring out that the ancestors of R-1 were entitled for land, the assessment of which equaled to Rs.34.50 in addition to extent of 0.06 gts, assessed Rs.1.50 in S.No. 102/2 which was already under their occupation. 42. It is to be noted that Neeradi service inams may not be strictly “inams”, within the meaning of abolition of inam Act, as they are not regular grants, with title deeds issued, as in the case of other Inams. Both in Andhra and Telangana area, these are being treated as a service condition to the village servants, who attend this work in villages entrusted by Revenue Officials. It is pertinent to remember in this connection, that A.P. (T.A.) Abolition of Inam Act VIII of 1955, in the first instance, did not include service Inams, in its purview, but the amending Act XXIX of 1985 included in its purview service inams also. Hence the Government must make an enquiry, under Inams Abolition Act, or the Revenue Authorities should resume land, by following the procedure known to law as these lands are allowed to be in possession of village servants as emoluments attached to the office of village service of neeradi. 43. Thus, on point No.3 it is held that though R-1 is not the owner of the suit property, his possession is not illegal or unlawful pending determination of the question of resumption of land from his possession. ……… 50. The evidence on record shows that though R-1 and his ancestors have no title or title deed to hold the land towards services being rendered as Neeradi, or as one who took the land for cultivation along with others, the element of desire and design on his part is not borne out as his and his ancestors occupation is ancient and old unquestioned at any stage. The evidence also speaks that occupation of the suit land was known to the village officers and revenue officials. Apparently it was with their implied consent, the R-1 and his predecessors were in occupation of the petition schedule land even raised a compound around the land along with ‘Devalji’ and others. The evidence also speaks that occupation of the suit land was known to the village officers and revenue officials. Apparently it was with their implied consent, the R-1 and his predecessors were in occupation of the petition schedule land even raised a compound around the land along with ‘Devalji’ and others. Even viewing the matter in this perspective, the occupation of R-1 and his predecessors is patently permissive without any action at any stage to terminate their occupation. Thus R-1 and his predecessors are not land grabbers and as there was no desire or design on their part to take land illegally, stealthily or by fraud or force. We are of the opinion that statutory rights conveyed vide G.O.Ms.No. 1724 are not lost until the eligibility or otherwise of R-1 and predecessors is examined and his occupation is terminated by a valid notice, and following process of law. 26. On the context of the issues before the Special Court and the text of the relevant parts of its judgment it is manifest that the Special Court did not declare the schedule land to be an inam nor the petitioners to be inamdars entitled for benefits under the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act. The issue whether the schedule lands are inam lands and if so whether the petitioners are entitled to any benefit as inamdars, was relegated to be determined under the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act. 27. Mr. Rakesh Sanghi, the learned counsel contends that the judgment of the Special Court in LGC No. 62/89 operates as res judicata and constitutes constructive res judicata as well, not only in respect of the extent of 6414 Sq.Mts (the extent alleged to have been grabbed in Sy.No. 102/2 of Hakimpet village) but the entire extent for which the petitioners sought ORC under the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act. Reliance is placed for this contention on: Smt. Raj Laxmi Dasi and Others vs Banamali Sen and Others AIR 1953 SC 33 ; Daryao and Others vs State of U.P. and Others AIR 1961 SC 1457 ; Vithal Yeshwant Jathar vs S.M.Sardesai AIR 1963 SC 385 ; Lalchand and Others vs Radha Kishan AIR 1977 SC 789 ; Sulochana Amma vs Narayanan Nair AIR 1994 SC 152 . 28. 28. In Smt. Raja Laxmi Devi (1 supra) the Supreme Court pointed out that the test of res judicata is the identity of title in the two litigations and not the identity of the actual property involved in the two cases; that when a plea of res judicata is founded on general principles of law, all that is necessary to establish is that the court that heard and decided the former case was a court of competent jurisdiction. It is not necessary in such cases to further prove that it has jurisdiction hear the later suit. The court further held that the plea of res judicata on general principles can be successfully taken in respect of judgments of courts of exclusive jurisdiction like Revenue Courts, Land Acquisition Courts, Administration Courts etc., though it is obvious that these courts are not entitled to try a regular suit and only exercise a special jurisdiction conferred on them by the statute. 29. Applying the ratio of Smt. Raja Laxmi Devi it is clear that the judgment of the Special Court under the Prohibition Act would constitute neither res judicata nor constructive res judicata since the claim of the petitioners herein, as respondents before the Special Court, was clearly and categorically that (except an extent of Ac.0.06 gts of wet land in Sy.No. 102/2 of Hakimpet village that was assigned to grandfather Neeradi Sivaiah) Ac.5.29gts was in their occupation, in their own right as pattadars (and not as an inamdar under a Neeradi service inam). 30. In Daryao (2 supra) a Constitution Bench held that res judicata though has some technical aspects is substantially based on considerations of public policy and it is in the interest of the public at large that finality should attach to binding decisions pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction and that individuals should not be vexed twice over the same kind of litigation. On this binding statement of principle it no doubt follows that a decision of the Special Court (if competent to determine issues falling for determination by the authorities under the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act) would bind the authorities under the Inams Abolition Act as well. This principle however is inapplicable. On this binding statement of principle it no doubt follows that a decision of the Special Court (if competent to determine issues falling for determination by the authorities under the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act) would bind the authorities under the Inams Abolition Act as well. This principle however is inapplicable. The fact, law and jurisdiction analysis hereinabefore and as set out in the analysis of Issue(b) infra, would show not only had the Special Court not considered nor had occasion to consider whether the land in question was an inam granted to the petitioners or their predecessors for performing Neeradi service, but the determination as to the nature and character of the land claimed to be inam is a power exclusively consecrated to the Collector in an enquiry u/Sec. 10 of the Inams Abolition Act and neither the civil court nor the Special Court has jurisdiction, power or authority to enter upon the adjudication or to arrive at a determination on this aspect. 31. In Vithal Yeshwant Jathar (3 supra), explaining the contours of Sec.11 CPC, the Apex Court held that if the final decision in a matter on a issue between parties is based by a court on a decision on more than one point – each of which by itself would be sufficient for the ultimate decision – the decision on each of these points operates as res judicata between the parties. This decision is relied on by the petitioners to canvass the proposition that as the rejection of the land grabbing case was clearly based on a finding that they were holders of a Neeradi service inam (apart from the fact that they were found to be in permissive possession), the decision as to their being the holders of a service inam (Neeradi), operates as res judicata. While the principle is well settled, the proposition on factual basis must fail. The Special Court in Para 50 of its order clearly observed: The evidence on record shows that though R-1 and his ancestors have no title or title deed to hold the land towards services being rendered as Neeradi, or as one who took the land for cultivation along with others ... . The Special Court in Para 50 of its order clearly observed: The evidence on record shows that though R-1 and his ancestors have no title or title deed to hold the land towards services being rendered as Neeradi, or as one who took the land for cultivation along with others ... . There was thus no conclusion by the Special Court on facts, that either the extent of 6414 Sq.Mts (which was the subject matter of LGC No. 62/89) nor the extent of Ac.5.20 gts (which is the subject matter of the present writ petition) is inam granted in favour of the petitioners for rendering Neeradi service. In fact as already noticed, it was the specifically pleaded case of the petitioners that only the extent of Ac.0.06 gts, was assigned to the grand father Neeradi Sivaiah and the extent of Ac.5.29 gts, is patta land held by them in their own right as pattadars. 32. In Lalchand (4 supra),a case arising under the provisions of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act 1956 the Supreme Court held that where the respondent after obtaining a decree for eviction of the tenants-appellants under the Rent Control Act had applied for permission to execute the decree and permission was granted for eviction from a portion of the rented premises and in pursuance of that permission he obtained possession of that portion, it was not competent for the land lord, after working out his remedy under the Rent Control Act as modified by the Slum Clearance Act, to bring a fresh suit for evicting the appellant from the remaining portion of the rented premises. The Supreme Court held that by the second suit the respondent was again seeking the relief which was included in the larger relief sought by him in the application filed under the Slum Clearance Act and which was expressly denied to him. The court held that in the circumstances the second suit was barred by the principle of res judicata. In view of the facts in this case, this decision affords no support to the cause of the petitioners. 33. In Sulochana Amma (5 supra) explaining the provisions of Explanation-VIII to Section11 CPC, the Court held that the expression ‘the court of limited jurisdiction’ in Explanation VIII is wide enough to include a court whose jurisdiction is subject to pecuniary limitation and other cognate expressions analogous thereto. 33. In Sulochana Amma (5 supra) explaining the provisions of Explanation-VIII to Section11 CPC, the Court held that the expression ‘the court of limited jurisdiction’ in Explanation VIII is wide enough to include a court whose jurisdiction is subject to pecuniary limitation and other cognate expressions analogous thereto. The court pointed out that an order on an issue which had arisen directly and substantially between the parties or their privies and decided finally by a competent court or tribunal though of limited or special jurisdiction which includes pecuniary jurisdiction, will operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit or proceeding notwithstanding that such court of limited or special jurisdiction was not a competent court to try the subsequent suit and that the issue must directly and substantially arise in a later suit between the same parties or their privies. This decision has no application to the case of the petitioners. The Special Court (as considered supra), was not a court competent to determine whether the lands in question were inam lands. That determination was exclusively consecrated to the jurisdiction of the authorities (the Collector and on appeal the Competent Authority) under the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act. The jurisdiction of the Special Court is specifically excluded by the provisions of Sec.29. The case of the petitioners does not thus involve a decision by the Special Court which had the jurisdiction to determine issued falling within the purview of the Inams Abolition Act as well. 34. In the considered view of this court there is no basis whatsoever for the petitioners’ assertion that the Special Court under the Prohibition Act had declared the schedule lands to be inam or the petitioners to be inamdars. There is no finding of the Special Court on this aspect that could or ought to have been relied upon by the authorities under the Inams Abolition Act. Issue (a) is answered accordingly. Issue (b): 35. The answer to the issue whether even if the Special Court had declared the schedule lands to be Inam and the Petititioners, inamdars, such would bind the authorities under the Inams Abolition Act, turns upon analyses of the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act; the concomitant effect on the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts and therefore of the Special Court. The answer to the issue whether even if the Special Court had declared the schedule lands to be Inam and the Petititioners, inamdars, such would bind the authorities under the Inams Abolition Act, turns upon analyses of the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act; the concomitant effect on the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts and therefore of the Special Court. Analyses of the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act: Brief History of the Legislation: Regulation 69 of 1358 Fasli (pertaining to abolition of Jagirs) was promulgated during the Military Governor’s regime, after integration of the former Hyderabad State into the Indian Union and brought into force on 15-08-1949, setting the stage for abolition of intermediaries. The rule of the Nizam came to an end and abolition of the Sarfekhas followed. The Jagir Abolition Regulation was followed by the abolition of the cash grants by Act XXXIII of 1952. Radical policy shifts in land reforms and thus in the rural economy were entrenched by the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 and The Consolidation of Holdings Act. The Hyderabad Enfranchised Inams Act, 1952 enfranchised certain classes of Inams and to charge in lieu of relinquishment of reversionary rights of the Government and conferment of all proprietary rights on the Inamdars, a quit rent or Jodi, at a percentage of the revenue assessment. 36. The Inams Abolition Act came into force on 20-07-1955, having received the assent of the President earlier on 16-07-1955. This Act (a) abolished all Inams other than village service Inams and inam held by religious and charitable institutions; (b) converted inam lands into ryotwari lands by charging full assessment thereon; (c) the inamdars and their tenants were permitted personal cultivation on extents permissible under the Tenancy Act; and (d) provided for payment of compensation to the inamdars and others for the lands resumed form them. 37. As a consequence of the Inams Abolition Act all rights, title and interest vested in inamdars and others in respect of inam lands including communal lands, cultivated and uncultivated lands, waste lands, pasture lands, forests, mines and minerals, quarries, rivers and streams, tanks and irrigation works, fisheries and ferries stood obliterated and vested absolutely in the State free from all encumbrances. The inam lands were also made liable for payment of land revenue. All rents and land revenue in respect of inam lands after vesting were payable to the State. The inam lands were also made liable for payment of land revenue. All rents and land revenue in respect of inam lands after vesting were payable to the State. The inamdars and other persons whose rights had vested in the State were entitled only to compensation from the Government as provided in the Act. Analysis of the provisions: 38. Sec.2(1)(c) defines “inam” to mean land held under a gift or a grant made by the Nizam or by any Jagirdar, holder of Samsthan or other competent grantor and continued or confirmed by virtue of a muntakhab or other title deed, with or without the condition of service and coupled with the remission of the whole or part of the land revenue thereon and entered as such in the village records and includes (i) Arazi Makhta, Arazi Agrahar and Seri Inam; (ii) lands held as an inam by virtue of long possession and entered as inam in the village records. The proviso to Sec. 2(c) enacts that in respect of former Jagir areas the expression “inam” shall not include such lands as have not been recognized as inams by the Government after the abolition of Jagirs. 39. Section 2(1)(d) defines “inamdar” to mean a person holding an inam or a share therein, either for his own benefit or any trust and includes the successor-in-interest of an inamdar. Where the inamdar is a minor, an idiot or of unsound mind, his lawful guardian and where a joint family such joint family would constitute an inamdar. 40. Under Sections 4 to 8 of the Inams Abolition Act the inamdar, kabiz-e-kadim, permanent tenant, protected tenant and the non-protected tenant of inamdar and any person holding under a holder of the inam as against the Government was entitled only to such rights and privileges were been provided under the Act i.e., entitled to be registered as an occupant of all inam lands except those lands specified in Section 4 and in accordance with the provisions of the Act. All these persons were also entitled to compensation from the Government in respect of inam lands in their possession to the extent of excess of the limits which these sections place on their holdings. 41. Section 9 vested certain buildings and inam lands used for non-agricultural purposes in persons who owned them immediately before the date of vesting. 42. All these persons were also entitled to compensation from the Government in respect of inam lands in their possession to the extent of excess of the limits which these sections place on their holdings. 41. Section 9 vested certain buildings and inam lands used for non-agricultural purposes in persons who owned them immediately before the date of vesting. 42. Section 10 enjoins enquiry by the Collector into the nature and history of all lands in respect of which claims are made for registration as occupants under Sections 4 to 8 and empowers the Collector to decide in whose favour and in respect of which inam land a claim should be allowed; and as regards the land revenue and the premium payable in respect of such lands. Section 11 provides for saving of rights in certain cases. 43. Chapter III (Sections 12 to 22) sets out provisions with respect to determination, appointment and payment of compensation including the procedure therefor. 44. Chapter IV sets out in Sections 23 to 29 provisions as to constitution of Special Tribunals and their power, appeals from orders u/Sec.10 to the prescribed authority, references to Special Tribunal, appeals to Special Tribunal, appeals to the High Court, revision and provisions as to savings. Section 24 enacts that any person aggrieved by a decision of the Collector u/Sec.10 may within the time stipulated or such further time as the prescribed authority may for sufficient case allow, appeal to the prescribed authority and that the decision of the prescribed authority on such appeal shall be final. Section 29 enacts that except as otherwise provided in the Act, no orders passed by the Collector or by the Special Tribunal under the Act shall be liable to be cancelled or modified except by the High Court (as provided in Sections 27 and 28, by appeal or revision to the High Court in the specified circumstances) or be questioned in any court of law. 45. Chapter V sets out miscellaneous provisions including with respect to enquiries by the Collector, delegation of the power to hold enquiry, fee payable for applications and petitions, savings, repeal, power to make rules and like provisions. 46. The Inams Abolition Act initially did not bring service inams within the purview of its provisions. 45. Chapter V sets out miscellaneous provisions including with respect to enquiries by the Collector, delegation of the power to hold enquiry, fee payable for applications and petitions, savings, repeal, power to make rules and like provisions. 46. The Inams Abolition Act initially did not bring service inams within the purview of its provisions. The Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams (Amendment) Act 1985 [Act 29/85] was reserved for the assent of the President and received such assent on 17.12.1985, which was published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette on 26.12.1985. This Amendment Act amends the preamble, Sections 1 and 3 of the principal Act. In the preamble the words “with certain exceptions” have been omitted ab initio. Sec. 1(2) of the principal Act has been substituted ab initio, to read: “(2) It extends t the whole of Telangana Area of the State of Andhra Pradesh and shall apply to all inams as defined in Clause (c) sub-section (1) of Section 2.” 47. In Section 3(1) of the Principal Act the expression “to which this Act is made applicable under sub-sec.(2) of Section 1 of this Act” is omitted ab initio. 48. Pursuant to the 1985 Amendment Act (Act 29 of 1985), service inams also stood abolished and the holders of service inams became entitled only to grant of occupancy rights (as other class of inamdars), under Section 4 of the Act, pursuant to an enquiry by the Collector under Section 10 of the Act. Relevant provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Rules 1975 [‘the 1975 Rules’): 49. The 1975 Rules are made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh in exercise of powers conferred under Section 35 of the Inams Abolition Act. 50. Rule 3 enjoins the Collector of each District or any other officer not below the rank of a Deputy Collector authorized by the Government by a notification in the official Gazette) to discharge the functions of the Collector under the Act, immediately after the publication of the Rules and further to prepare and maintain a register showing the nature of the inam in each village and the land revenue which is being collected under Sec. 3(1)(c) of the Act. 51. Rule 5 deals with application and enquiry by the Collector for the purpose of registration of occupancy rights. 51. Rule 5 deals with application and enquiry by the Collector for the purpose of registration of occupancy rights. This Rule provides for an enquiry for the registration; of an inamdar, kabiz-e-kadim, permanent tenant, protected tenant and non-protected tenant or his successors in interest, as an occupant under Sections 4 to 8 of the Act in respect of inam lands which were in possession of the claimant on the date of vesting and enacts that such enquiry shall be made by the Collector either suo motu at any time or on an application by the inamdar etc; that where an application is made it shall be in Form-I and signed by the applicant; and where an application is made by a person other than an inamdar, such inamdar shall be made a party to the application. The Rule further provides that in respect of inams for which no application has been filed, the Collector shall take up a suo motu enquiry. Rule-5 also mandates that no person shall be given a certificate of registration as an occupant in respect of communal land, uncultivated lands, waste lands, pasture lands, grazing lands, forests, mines and minerals, quarries, rivers and streams, tanks and irrigation works, fisheries and ferries and lands set apart for the village community which vest absolutely in the State free from all encumbrances. 52. As is apparent from the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act the expressions “inam” and “inamdar” bear a specific meaning as delineated in Sections 2(c) and (d) respectively. Accordingly, an ‘inamdar’ means a person holding an inam and ‘inam’ means lands held under gift or a grant made by the Nizam or by any Jagirdar, holder of Samsthan or other competent grantor and continued or confirmed by virtue of a muntakhab or other title deed … and entered as such in the village records and includes lands held as inam by virtue of long possession and entered as inam in the village records. The claim of a land being “inam” and the claimant an “inamdar” is therefore not determined by a bland assertion. It is clearly the burden of the claimant to prove and establish that the lands are ‘inam’ and the claimant an ‘inamdar’ in accordance as these expressions are defined in the Act. 53. The claim of a land being “inam” and the claimant an “inamdar” is therefore not determined by a bland assertion. It is clearly the burden of the claimant to prove and establish that the lands are ‘inam’ and the claimant an ‘inamdar’ in accordance as these expressions are defined in the Act. 53. Section 10 of the Act enjoins an enquiry by the Collector including as to the nature and history of all lands in respect of which a claim is asserted for registration as an occupant, including by an inamdar u/Sec.4. The Act also provides elaborate processes, for an appeal to the prescribed authority (against the decision of the Collector u/Sec.10), by a person aggrieved by such decision [Sec.24(1)] and appellate and revisional recourses to the High Court u/Sections 27 and 28 of the Act. Sec.29, as already noticed, immunizes an order passed by the Collector or by the Special Tribunal under the Act from being questioned in any court of law except by the High Court (Sections 27 and 28). Analysis of Issue (b) :- 54. In Addanki Tiruvenkata Tata Desika Charyulu vs State of Andhra Pradesh and Another AIR 1964 SC 807 a Constitution Bench held that while having regard to the terms of Sec. 9 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 there is a presumption against the ouster of the jurisdiction of an ordinary court, such presumption is over-borne where a special legislation sets out a hierarchy of judicial tribunals for determination of the question on which the applicability of the Act depends. 55. The Primary Authority – the R.D.O. Hyderabad (R-3) and the Appellate Authority – Joint Collector (R-2) are Tribunals constituted under the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act with jurisdiction conferred to determine the claim of a person to grant of occupancy rights to a land on the substantive claim of being an inamdar; and intrinsic to this enquiry the jurisdiction to determine the fact whether the property is an inam. The jurisdiction to determine whether the land is inam, is integral to the jurisdiction to determine the claim to grant of occupancy rights on the assertion of being an inamdar, for occupancy rights are to be granted (including to an inamdar) only if the land constitutes an inam as defined in Sec. 2(1)(c) of the Act. The jurisdiction to determine whether the land is inam, is integral to the jurisdiction to determine the claim to grant of occupancy rights on the assertion of being an inamdar, for occupancy rights are to be granted (including to an inamdar) only if the land constitutes an inam as defined in Sec. 2(1)(c) of the Act. Section 29 clearly bars the jurisdiction of the civil court as regards any order passed by the Collector. 56. The object of this Act is to abolish inams, to confer occupancy rights on certain specified classes of persons associated with inams either as inamdars or otherwise, pursuant to an enquiry u/Sec. 10 and determination and payment of compensation for the inams abolished under Sec.3. Therefore the condition precedent for the exercise of the statutory authority to grant occupancy rights is the determination of the fact that the property in respect of which occupancy right is claimed is an ‘inam’, as this expression is defined in Sec. 2(1)(c) of the Act. Since the Inams Abolition Act is a special legislation enacting a cornucopia of tribunals/authorities for primary, appellate and revisional determination of the matters delineated under the provisions of the Act and in view of the provisions of Sec. 29 it must necessarily follow that the jurisdiction of the civil court is excluded in respect of matters consecrated to the jurisdiction inter alia of the Collector under the provisions of this Act. 57. Under the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act, inams were abolished and occupancy rights could be registered in favour of inamdars or the other specified classes of persons. The provisions of the Act do not merely create the right in favour of an inamdar to be registered as an occupant in respect of inam lands but also specify the forum for determination of the claim, pursuant to an enquiry by the Collector after examination of the nature and history of all lands in respect of which such claim is made (Sec.10); and provide for an appeal to the prescribed authority by any person aggrieved by decision of the Collector u/Sec. 10 [Sec.24(1)]. Section 24(1) confers finality to the decision of the prescribed authority. Section 24(1) confers finality to the decision of the prescribed authority. Sec. 29 enjoins that no order passed by the Collector shall be liable to be questioned in any court of law except in the manner provided by the provisions of the Act, which is only by way an appeal to the prescribed authority under Sec. 24(1). 58. Willes, J in Wolverhamtos New Water Works Company vs Hawkesford 1859 6 CB (NS) 336 observed that where a liability not existing in common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by the statute must be pursued and it is not competent to an aggrieved party to pursue the common law remedy (of a suit before an ordinary court). This view of Willes, J was accepted by the House of Lords in Neville vs London Express Newspapers Ltd., 1990 AC 368 and quoted with approval by a constitution bench of our Supreme Court in Dhulabhai and others vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Another AIR 1969 SC 78 . 59. The learned counsel for the petitioners referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh vs Majeti Laxmi Kantha Rao and Others AIR 2000 SC 2220 which also reiterates the above principle. Reference is also made to the decision in Dewaji vs Ganpatlal AIR 1969 SC 560 and Musamia Imam Haider Bax Razvi vs R.G.Ratnabhai and Others AIR 1969 SC 439 . These decisions too reiterate the principle explicated in Addanki Tiruvenkata Tata Desika Charyulu vs State of Andhra Pradesh and Another (6 supra). 60. On behalf of the petitioners the decision in Sahebgouda and others vs Ogeppa and others AIR 2003 SC 2743 is relied upon to contend that as neither the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act nor the Rules framed thereunder provide an adjudicatory mechanism to decide disputes as to whether a land is an inam, the jurisdiction of the civil court is not excluded to decide such disputes. 61. In the considered view of this court and in the applicable legislative contracts the decision in Sahebgouda provides no support to this contention of the petitioners. 61. In the considered view of this court and in the applicable legislative contracts the decision in Sahebgouda provides no support to this contention of the petitioners. As earlier analysed the enquiry by the Collector u/Sec. 10 of the Act includes an examination of the nature and history of all lands in respect of which inter alia an inamdar claims to be registered as an occupant u/Sec.4 of the Act. The enquiry by the Collector u/Sec. 10 inherently and by specific legislative expression involves examination of the nature and history of all land in respect of which a claim to be registered as an occupant is asserted, u/Secs. 4 to 8. It requires to be noticed that even in the case of such claim asserted by an inamdar, where the inam is held by or for the benefit of a charitable or religious institution, no person is entitled to be registered as an occupant u/Sec. 5 to 8 and the institution alone would be entitled to be registered as an occupant and without restriction as to the extent prescribed for an individual claimant such as an inamdar, kabiz-e-kadim, permanent tenant, protected tenant or a non-protected tenant (Sec.4, 1st proviso). 62. In the variety and complexity of claims that may be asserted for registration as an occupant there could arise competing claims between the several categories of claimants as well or even different claims as regards a particular extent of land constituting an inam. The enquiry by the Collector u/Sec.10 is for determination of the land revenue and premium payable in respect of inam lands as also to ascertain whether the claim is in respect of inam lands excluded on account of the exclusionary provisions in Clauses (a) to (c) of Sec.4. There is thus no warrant for a restrictive construction of the scope and amplitude of the power of the Collector u/Sec.10. 63. In view of the provisions of Sec.29 and the finality conferred to the decision of the prescribed authority by Sec. 24(1), the jurisdiction of the civil court is clearly excluded. There is thus no warrant for a restrictive construction of the scope and amplitude of the power of the Collector u/Sec.10. 63. In view of the provisions of Sec.29 and the finality conferred to the decision of the prescribed authority by Sec. 24(1), the jurisdiction of the civil court is clearly excluded. In Sahebgouda the question was whether a suit filed in the Court of the Principal Munsif, Bijapur by the appellant claiming only to be ancestral poojaries of Amogsidda Temple in Jalgeri, Bijapur Taluq, (while not claiming to be trustees of any Trust as defined u/Sec. 2(18) of the Bombay Public Trust Act 1950) was within the jurisdiction of the civil court. The trial court held on the point of jurisdiction in favour of the plaintiffs-appellants. The first appellate court dismissed the appeal of the respondents while in the appeals preferred by the plaintiffs on another aspect modified the decree of the trial court. In the further and second appeal preferred by the respondents the High Court allowed the second appeal holding that the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred u/Sec. 80 of the Bombay Public Trust Act 1950. On the plaintiffs’ appeal the Supreme Court reversed and held that as the appellants had merely claimed to be ancestral poojaris of the temple and that such a declaration and the relief sought of a permanent prohibitory injunction on the basis of such claim (while not claiming to be trustees nor seeking a declaration regarding existence or otherwise of a Trust or seeking any other relief coming within the purview of the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner under Sections 19 or 79 of the Act), the jurisdiction of the civil court is not excluded and the bar of such jurisdiction enacted in Sec. 80 of the Act would not apply. 64. In the case on hand the case of the State as asserted before the Special Court under the Prohibition Act was that the respondent-petitioners herein are encroachers on Government land of an extent 6414 Sq.Mts, in Sy.No. 102/1 of Hakimpet village. 64. In the case on hand the case of the State as asserted before the Special Court under the Prohibition Act was that the respondent-petitioners herein are encroachers on Government land of an extent 6414 Sq.Mts, in Sy.No. 102/1 of Hakimpet village. The specific case pleaded by the petitioners herein, in defense in LGC No.62/89 was that in respect of the said extent (of 6414 Sq.Mts), he and his father Muttaiah were the pattadars and possessors to an extent of Ac.5.29 gts, in Sy.No. 102/1, that earlier Muttaiah and his father Sivaiah were in possession of the extent Ac.5.29 gts, in their own right as pattadars. They further asserted in the LGC that apart from the patta land Neeradi Sivaiah (grandfather of the 1st petitioner-Mallesha) was assigned Ac.0.06 gts, (about 726 Sq.Yds) in Sy.No. 102/2 for discharging the duties of Neeradi of Hakimpet village. It was also their defense before the Special Court that originally Sy.No. 102/1 was of an extent Ac.323.29 gts, of which Ac.48.38 was patta land and the balance Ac.274.31 gts, Government land. In the patta land of Ac.48.38 gts, there were several pattadars including the first petitioner Mallesha’s grandfather Sivaiah (to the extent of Ac.5.29 gts), was the specific plea. The petitioners’ herein did not plead in the Special Court that the extent Ac.5.29 gts in Sy.No. 102/1 of Hakimpet village was an inam granted either to the grandfather Sivaiah, the father Muttaiah or the first petitioner Mallesha, for performing Neeradi service. Therefore even on facts there was no occasion for the Special Court to consider the claim/defense of the petitioners’ herein that they were inamdars in respect of the extent Ac.5.29 gts, in Sy.No. 102/1. The claim of being inamdars to the extent of Ac.5.29 gts was asserted for the very first time in the application before the 3rd respondent-primary authority and contrary to their specific pleain LGC No. 62/89. Even with regard to the extent of Ac.0.06 gts, in Sy.No. 102/1, the petitioners herein asserted an assignment for performing Neeradi service in Hakimpet village. 65. Even with regard to the extent of Ac.0.06 gts, in Sy.No. 102/1, the petitioners herein asserted an assignment for performing Neeradi service in Hakimpet village. 65. Consequent on the analysis of the precedents, this court holds that the jurisdiction of the civil court is excluded as regards the issue whether a claimant is entitled to be registered as an occupant of a land as well on the aspect integral to such determination viz., whether he is an inamdar and the land in question an inam land, as these aspects fall for exclusive determination within the jurisdiction and powers of the authorities under the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act. 66. The question whether the Special Court under the Prohibition Act has jurisdiction to decide the question of title and ownership was considered by the Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh vs Smt. Prameela Modi and Others 2006 AIR SCW 5615. On an analysis of the provisions of the Prohibition Act, in particular Sec.8 thereof, the Supreme Court held that the Special Court could exercise the jurisdiction of a civil court and decide disputed questions of title and possession as well; and in three specific situations, viz: (A) in regard to a case in respect of the alleged act of land grabbing; (B) in a case where the determination of a question of title and ownership is involved; and (C) where lawful possession of any land grabbed under the Act is involved. In Smt. Prameela Modi the Supreme Court held that the condition precedent for assuming jurisdiction by the Special Court is that the case must have arisen out of an alleged act of land grabbing and that a Judge while acting as a Special Court merely acts as a Presiding Officer of the Court. It was also observed that having regard to the provisions of Sec. 8(2) r/w Sec.15 of the Prohibition Act, no suit for title in respect of the disputed land which was alleged to be grabbed could be entertained by the civil court and the civil court was barred from trying matters which fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Court. 67. 67. In the light of the decision in Smt. Prameela Modi it follows that in the context of an allegation of land grabbing it is the Special Court which is invested with the exclusive jurisdiction, a jurisdiction which is exclusive even qua the civil court, only where a case arises out of alleged act of land grabbing. In such circumstances it is the Special Court and not the civil court that could determine question of title and ownership as well. 68. The Smt. Prameela Modi ratio however and per se does not assist in elucidation of the issue whether the question of a particular land being an inam or a person an inamdar could also be determined by the Special Court as integral to its jurisdiction to determine questions of title and ownership in a case of alleged land grabbing. As the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act clearly and specifically exclude the jurisdiction of a civil court as regards matters consecrated to determination by the authorities under that Act, in the considered view of this court, as a logical corollary the jurisdiction to determine whether a land constitutes an inam, the claimant is an inamdar as also whether such claimant is entitled to be registered as an occupant, would be beyond the jurisdiction of both the Civil Court and the Special Court. 69. It also requires to be noticed that nowhere in the judgment of the Special Court dated 07.09.1992 in LGC No. 62/89 was the nature of the land of even the extent of 6414 Sq,Mt, [in old Sy.No. 102/1 of Hakimpet (v)] examined in the context of whether the land was inam. The provisions of the Inams Abolition Act nor the definition of ‘inam’ under the said Act were neither analysed or even considered in passing. The analysis of the evidence by the Special Court disclosed that the land in Sy.No. 102 was classified either as Kharij Khata, Poramboke or Kancha Sarkari. The Special Court was considering the issue whether the petitioners-claimants were land grabbers in the context of the provisions of the Prohibition Act. Their claim to being in occupation of the schedule lands (Ac.5.29 gts), in their own right as pattadar was noted by the Special Court. The Special Court was considering the issue whether the petitioners-claimants were land grabbers in the context of the provisions of the Prohibition Act. Their claim to being in occupation of the schedule lands (Ac.5.29 gts), in their own right as pattadar was noted by the Special Court. It is in this factual context that the Special Court, after holding that the Government was the owner of the property observed that though Neeradi service inam may not be strictly inam within the meaning of Inams Abolition Act, as they are nor a regular grant with title deeds issued as in the case of other inams, the claim of the petitioners herein to legitimate occupation of the land may have to be considered under the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act or the revenue authorities could resume the land by following the due process of law (Paras 40 to 42 of the judgment in LGC 62/89). 70. In the facts and circumstances and on the analysis above, neither the Civil Court nor the Special Court has jurisdiction to determine whether the lands in respect of which the petitioners seek registration as occupants on the assertion of being the inamdars thereof. The exclusive jurisdiction in this behalf is consecrated to the primary and appellate authorities under the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act. Issue (b) is answered accordingly. 71. Another contention on behalf of the petitioners, generically falling within Issue (b), may be considered. 72. It is contended that it is a settled principle that mere entries in the revenue records do not constitute proof of title and on a parity of logic the self-serving entries of revenue officials in revenue records would not extinguish the petitioners’ claim to being inamdars. In amplification of this contention it is urged that merely as the revenue records specify the schedule lands to be Government poramboke but not inam, the right, title and interest of the petitioners in the lands cannot be extinguished. 73. In amplification of this contention it is urged that merely as the revenue records specify the schedule lands to be Government poramboke but not inam, the right, title and interest of the petitioners in the lands cannot be extinguished. 73. In Rani Sundarammani vs Government of A.P. and others 2006 (4) ALT 374 a decision cited by Sri Rakesh Singhi to support the above contention, a learned single Judge of this court placing reliance on the decisions in Corporation of City of Bangalore vs M.Papaiah (1989) 3 SCC 612 ; Wawarni vs Inder Kaur (1996) 6 SCC 223 ; State of H.P. vs Keshav Ram (1996) 11 SCC 257 ; Yeluri Vijayabharathi vs Yeluri Manikyamba 1998 (2) ALT 623 ; Sajana Granites vs M.Srinivasa Rao 2002 (1) ALT 466 ; and B.G.Laxmanan vs Joint Collector 2003(1) ALT 3 , reiterated the principle that mutation of entries in the revenue records would not confer title as revenue records are not documents of title. Mutation of property in the revenue records neither creates nor extinguishes title nor has the presumptive value of title, held Ramesh Rnganathan, J. This court further observed that revenue entries merely enable the person in whose favour the mutation is ordered, to pay land revenue and title questions ought to be decided by the competent civil court. 74. In a somewhat different context but stating the same theme and principle is the decision in Baleshwar Tewari and Ors vs Sheo Jatan Tiwary and Ors AIR 1997 SC 2089 . The factual issue in this precedent was, where the land is sold by an intermediary and remained in the possession of the lessee for several years, since 1925 and this possession could be obtained by the purchaser only in execution of a decree passed for declaration of his title to the land, the land could be said to have remained in possession of the tenant in his own right as a raiyat though he was paying rent to the intermediary prior to abolition. The Apex Court held that in the absence of proof by the purchaser, by unequivocal evidence that the intermediary retained his intermediary rights in the land, the suit for declaration of title to the land in question filed by the purchaser was liable to be dismissed. The Apex Court held that in the absence of proof by the purchaser, by unequivocal evidence that the intermediary retained his intermediary rights in the land, the suit for declaration of title to the land in question filed by the purchaser was liable to be dismissed. It is in the context arriving at this conclusion that the Supreme Court considered the value of revenue entries and observed that entries in revenue records being “the paradise of the patwari and the tiller of the soil being rarely associated with the recording of the entries”, so long as tiller’s possession and enjoyment is not interdicted by the due process of law, he is least concerned with the entries and that revenue entries would be a camouflage to defeat the just and legal rights of the tiller/raiyat on whom the Act (The Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950) confers title to the land he tills. 75. The afore cited decisions or the observations therein are not wholly dispositive of nor elucidate the generic principle and do not apply on all fours to entries regarding the nature and character of lands, made in Inam Registers. In Arunachallam Chetty vs Venkatachalapathy AIR 1919 PC 62, inam proceedings were described as a great act of State and that the value to be attached to the entries in the Inam Register is substantial. This statement of the Privy Council was reiterated in several decisions including in Harihar Mahapatra and Ors vs Hari Otha and Ors. AIR 1960 Orissa 257. In Harihar Mahapatra, Jagannath Das, J further observed that while entries in the Inam Register are not conclusive do constitute a strong piece of evidence, not to be lightly disregarded except for solid and substantial reasons or on the basis of documents rebutting or contrary to the evidence. 76. The observations of the judicial committee of the Privy Council in Arunachallam Chetty is quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale vs Gopal Vinayak Gosavi and Ors AIR 1990 SC 100 . Pardhasarathi, J speaking for the Division Bench of this court in Palacherla Hymavathamma vs R.D.O., Parvathipuram AIR 1971 AP 103 observed: 12. It is therefore apparent that from the very ancient times accounts and registers were maintained by the village establishment and the maintenance of such accounts, was accorded a statutory basis since 1802. Pardhasarathi, J speaking for the Division Bench of this court in Palacherla Hymavathamma vs R.D.O., Parvathipuram AIR 1971 AP 103 observed: 12. It is therefore apparent that from the very ancient times accounts and registers were maintained by the village establishment and the maintenance of such accounts, was accorded a statutory basis since 1802. As indicated earlier, both expressions ‘accounts’ and ‘registers’ were used in the relevant statutes. In the Inams Abolition Act and also in the Madras Estates Land Act, the expression ‘revenue accounts’ alone is used. Though there is no reference to the registers or other books that were prescribed to be kept, it appears to us that in using the expression ‘revenue accounts’, in the Madras Estates Land Act and in the Inam Abolition Act, the Legislature never intended to exclude registers kept by the village establishments from the purview of ‘Revenue accounts’. It is not unreasonable to infer that ‘revenue accounts’ has been used to the Inams Abolition Act and in the Madras Estates Land Act in comprehensive sense so as to include accounts and also registers that were prescribed to be maintained by the Board of Revenue or other authorities pursuant to the Karnams Regulation and the subsequent enactments. It is necessary to bear in mind that it is open to the authorities concerned including the Board of Revenue, to add from time to time to the list of accounts or registers that are to be kept by the village establishments. The expression ‘revenue accounts’ therefore cannot be said to refer to any permanent or unalterable list. The relevant statutes clearly provided for the addition to the list of village accounts and registers. 77. In Konduru Ramana Reddyand Others vs State of A.P. and Another 1975 (1) APLJ 385 another Division Bench of this court observed that if the deed by which the grant was made is not available, then the entries in the Inams Fair Register will form the important source of material from which those matters could be gathered. 78. In the light of the guidance available from the precedents above the inference is compelling that entries in the village records relating to the character and nature of the lands as constituting inam, as this expression defined in Sec. 2(1)(c) of the Inams Abolition Act cannot be equated with general revenue entries made as part of the mutation process. 78. In the light of the guidance available from the precedents above the inference is compelling that entries in the village records relating to the character and nature of the lands as constituting inam, as this expression defined in Sec. 2(1)(c) of the Inams Abolition Act cannot be equated with general revenue entries made as part of the mutation process. In any event the clear mandate of the legislative definition of ‘inam’ cannot be avoided on the plea that all revenue entries must be considered suspect. The definition of ‘inam’ in sec. 2(1)(c) clearly requires that the land must be so described in the village records. Rule-3 of the 1975 Rules provides for preparation and maintenance of registers for each village. If the village registers do not verify the character and the nature of theland as inam, in view of the definition of ‘inam’ in the Act, the claim of being inamdars to such land cannot be entertained and consequently no ORC could be issued. 79. Rule-3 of the 1975 Rules ordains that immediately after the publication of the Rules in the official Gazette (the Rules were published in the Gazette dated 28.06.1975), the Collector of each District or any other officer not below the rank of Deputy Collector (who is authorized by the Government by a notification published in the Gazette to discharge the functions of the Collector under the Act), shall prepare and maintain a register showing the nature of the inam in each village and the land revenue which is being collected u/Sec. 3(1)(c) of the Inams Abolition Act. As defined [in Sec. 2(1)(c)], ‘inam’ inter alia means a land entered as an inam in the village records. 80. As is apparent from the impugned order as well as the several observations recorded in the judgment in LGC No. 62/89 the schedule lands were invariably recorded as a sarkari kariz khata, sarkari poramboke, kancha poramboke, sarkari or poramboke. Even the Inam Takhta Register of Hakim pet village does not record the schedulelands as inam but as Government lands. The impugned order clearly finds that the pahanies of Hakimpet village show that the lands in Sy.No.102/1 are recorded since 1951-52 to 1981-82 as poramboke. 81. Even the Inam Takhta Register of Hakim pet village does not record the schedulelands as inam but as Government lands. The impugned order clearly finds that the pahanies of Hakimpet village show that the lands in Sy.No.102/1 are recorded since 1951-52 to 1981-82 as poramboke. 81. The petitioners have neither pleaded nor established either before the primary or the appellate authority under the Inams Abolition Act or even before this court that the Inam Takhta Register of Hakimpet village, drawn up and maintained (under the provisions of Rule-3 of the 1975 Rules records the schedule lands as an inam granted for discharging Neeradi service nor have the petitioners assailed the Hakimpet village records before any appropriate authority or forum. In the absence of any evidence whatsoever marshalled by the petitioners to establish that the schedule lands are inam and that they are inamdars within the meaning of these expressions as defined in Sections 2(1)(c) and (d) of the Inams Abolition Act, the petitioners have fundamentally failed to discharge their burden, of establishing their claim to be inamdars, which is the substratum of their application for accord of registration as occupants. Inam proceedings being a great act of State [as observed by the Privy Council in Arunachallam Chetty (23 supra)] in the absence of strong and probative evidence marshaled by the petitioners establishing their claim, no credence could be accorded to a mere assertion that the schedule land is inam or that they are inamdars thereof. In any event without relevant evidence qua the village records, the schedule lands cannot be held to be ‘inam’, in view of the definition in Section 2(1)(c). Issue (c): 82. The entertainment of the 4th respondent’s appeal by the 2nd respondent u/Sec. 24 (1) of the Inams Abolition Act leading to the impugned order is assailed on two grounds: (i) that the State had no locus to maintain an appeal u/Sec. 24 claiming to be an aggrieved person; and (ii) that the 2nd respondent-appellate authority erred in entertaining the belated appeal. These are the two facets of this issue. (i) Regarding Locus - Issue (c)(i): 83. The issue of locus is spelt out in Para 10(ix) of the writ petition. This objection suffers from a normative misconception. According to the petitioners the State cannot be considered an aggrieved person entitled to prefer an appeal u/Sec. 24(1) of the Inams Abolition Act. These are the two facets of this issue. (i) Regarding Locus - Issue (c)(i): 83. The issue of locus is spelt out in Para 10(ix) of the writ petition. This objection suffers from a normative misconception. According to the petitioners the State cannot be considered an aggrieved person entitled to prefer an appeal u/Sec. 24(1) of the Inams Abolition Act. The petitioners’ analysis underlying this objection is that all inam lands in Telangana area are vested in the State after their abolition in 1955 and therefore in all matters where ORCs are applied for and granted (u/Secs. 4 to 8 of the Act) the State could not prefer appeal styling itself to be an aggrieved party as this is not the intention of the Act. According to the petitioners only a rival claimant under Sections 4 to 8 (whose claim to an ORC is refused) would be an aggrieved person entitled to maintain an appeal u/sec. 24. 84. The above contention proceeds from a fundamental misconception of principle and a misconstruction of the text of the Inams Abolition Act. In the case on hand the State is a party to the proceedings before the 3rd respondent-primary authority – the sole respondent. If as a respondent, the State is aggrieved by the order of the primary authority, it can well maintain an appeal; whether on merits the appeal is well conceived is another matter. The petitioners’ contention that only a rival claimant could be an aggrieved person entitled to prefer an appeal is without substance. In the context of the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act, the State could have a variety of claims adverse to a claimant. It may claim that the land is an inam but the petitioners not inamdars entitled to the benefits of Sec.4; that the land is not an inam but is Government land falling outside the purview of the Inams Abolition Act; that the land in question though an inam and the petitioners inamdars, the land falls within the excluded class of lands, enumerated in Clauses (a) to (c) of Sec. 4(1) of the Act disentitling registration of an occupancy right in favour of the claimant-inamdar; or the State may even claim ownership, title or a right to possession in itself on any other grounds, under any other law. In any of the above contingencies the State would be a rival claimant in the generic sense as well. The petitioners’ contention that the State has no locus to maintain an appeal under Section 24(1) of the Act before the 2nd respondent is therefore a contention that is fundamentally misconceived. In the case on hand the State asserts that the schedule lands are Government lands and not inam. The State is thus an aggrieved person. This contention is accordingly rejected. (ii) Regarding limitation - Issue (C)(ii): 85. Section 24(1) enables an appeal to the prescribed authority by a person aggrieved by the decision of the Collector, within thirty dates from the date of decision, or such further time as the prescribed authority may for sufficient cause allow. 86. The averment in the writ petition on this aspect of the issue is that the order of the primary authority – the 2nd respondent is dated 25.8.1994 while the appeal was filed on 22.12.1994 (as per the endorsement of the 2nd respondent), beyond thirty days from the date of the 3rd respondent’s order, though the appeal was signed by the 4th respondent on 22.11.1994, which date is also beyond the period of thirty days from the date of the 3rd respondent’s order. No petition to condone the delay was filed along with the appeal. The 2nd respondent failed to rationally advert to the petitioners’ objections that the appeal was time barred. The impugned order merely observes that “the affidavit then states that the appeal was filed within one month of the knowledge of the order which is correct” and at another place in the impugned order it is recorded: “with regard to Para-7 of the counter, it is to be mentioned that it was not filed within time, is not correct.” Since in view of the provisions of Sec. 24 the period of limitation runs from the date of the order against which the appeal is to be preferred, an application to condone the delay ought to have been filed by the State and such application considered by the 2nd respondent-appellate authority. The delay in preferring the appeal could be condoned only on recording satisfaction as to sufficient cause made out for the belated appeal. 87. The delay in preferring the appeal could be condoned only on recording satisfaction as to sufficient cause made out for the belated appeal. 87. Section 24 in terms enjoins that an appeal may be filed within thirty days from the date of decision, or such further time as the prescribed authority may for sufficient cause allow. There being no textual ambiguity justifying dynamic or a strained construction, an appeal should be filed within thirty days from the date of the decision of the Collector u/Sec. 10, to the prescribed authority, so as t be within the specified time. On appropriate construction of the legislative phraseology there appear no warrant to hold that an appeal filed beyond thirty days from the date of receipt of the order of the Collector by an aggrieved person would be within time. The language of the provision excludes such a construction. It must however be noticed that a discretion is conferred on the appellate authority to consider an appeal filed beyond thirty days, for sufficient cause shown for the delay. 88. The memorandum of appeal (signed by the 4th respondent on 22.11.1994) asserts: “I came to know yesterday that an occupancy certificate was issued by the Revenue Divisional Officer in D.Dis.No.B/4867/1993, dated: 1.9.1994 Us. (4) read with section (10) of Andhra Pradesh (Telengana Area) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955 in favour of Sri S.Mallesha, S/o. Late S.Muthaiah, S.Janardhan and S.Raju, sons of S.Mallesha, R/o. H.No.9-4-32, Hakeempet village, Golconda Mandal, Hyderabad, registering them as an occupants in respect of the land bearing Sy.No.102/1, measuring (5.29) Acs of Hakeempet village.´ 89. In para-7 of the counter to the appeal, filed by the petitioners it was pleaded that the appeal was filed beyond time and unless accompanied by a petition for condoning the delay and on satisfaction that there are sufficient reasons for not filing the appeal within time, the appellate authority has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. 90. The appellate authority held that the objection that the appeal was filed beyond time is not correct. The appellate order noted and recorded the assertion of the appellant (R4) in the memorandum of appeal that the appeal was filed within a month from the date of knowledge of the order and therefore there is no delay in filing the appeal. 91. The appellate order noted and recorded the assertion of the appellant (R4) in the memorandum of appeal that the appeal was filed within a month from the date of knowledge of the order and therefore there is no delay in filing the appeal. 91. Though the reasoning of the appellate (impugned) order in dealing with the objection as to the appeal being time barred is not as clinically precise as may be expected in a judicial order, the exercise of discretion and the satisfaction of the appellate authority is clearly inferable. The appellate authority accepted the contention of the 4th respondent-appellant that the appeal is filed within a month from the date of knowledge of the primary authority’s (R3’s) order. The contention of Sri Sanghi that the delay could not be condoned without an application in that behalf by the appellant is too technical to merit consideration. The 2nd respondent-the prescribed authority u/Sec. 24 (1) of the Inams Abolition Act is a quasi judicial tribunal not strictly governed by the technical rules of Civil Procedure Code and may follow a reasonable procedure so long as such procedure is fair and conduces speed and efficiency in the discharge of the quasi judicial appellate functions. The technical procedure of filing an application for condonation of delay and on such application being filed, recording elaborate reasons for allowing such application is not mandated by the scheme of the Inams Abolition Act nor on general principles applicable to the procedural requirements of a quasi judicial tribunal. 92. This court is satisfied that the 2nd respondent/appellate authority applied his mind to the circumstances of the time of filing of the appeal and the reasons for filing it by such date, and was rationally satisfied that the appeal should be entertained and adjudicated. Since the appeal was filed within a reasonable time from the date of knowledge of the primary authority’s order by the 4th respondent, the entertainment of the appeal by the 2nd respondent cannot be faulted on the jejune and technical ground that no application for condonation of delay accompanied the appeal and that no clear satisfaction of reasonable cause for the delay was recorded in greater detail, by the appellate authority. Issue (d): 93. Issuance of a writ in the nature of Certiorari or other appropriate writ to quash the impugned order dated 16.12.1995, is sought. 94. Issue (d): 93. Issuance of a writ in the nature of Certiorari or other appropriate writ to quash the impugned order dated 16.12.1995, is sought. 94. On Issues (a), (b) and (c)(i) findings have already been recorded against the petitioners (supra). On issue (c)(ii) as well this Court found no revisable pathology in the exercise of discretion by the appellate authority (in entertaining and adjudicating the appeal preferred by the State (R-4), u/Sec. 24(1) of the Inams Abolition Act). On a hyper-technical scrutiny of the impugned order as regards the reasons recorded for entertaining the appeal despite the petitioners’ objection to such entertainment on the ground of the bar of limitation, it is perhaps possible to conclude that the appellate order does not clearly set out reasons for the satisfaction as to sufficient cause and the impugned order must therefore perish. No such clear reasoning is apparent in the impugned appellate order. But nevertheless, in the considered view of this court no case is made out for interference on this ground. 95. A writ of Certiorari, as in the case of Mandamus, is discretionary. It is not issued merely because it is lawful to do so. The mere fact that an order is without jurisdiction or that there is an error apparent on the fact of the record is not sufficient to justify the issue of a writ. In addition it must be established that the impugned order has resulted in the manifest injustice – vide G.Veerappa Pillai vs Raman and Raman Ltd., Kumbakonam AIR 1952 SC 192 ; K.S.Rashid and Son vs Income Tax Investigation Commission AIR 1954 SC 207 and Champalal Binani vs commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal AIR 1970 SC 645 . The object of Certiorari is to keep the exercise of power by the inferior judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal within the limits of its jurisdiction assigned by law and to restrain it from acting in excess of authority – Bharat Bank vs Employees of Bharat Bank AIR 1950 SC 188 . In Certiorari no interference is called for on mere formal or technical error even of law – vide Prem Singh vs Deputy Custodian General, Eavacuee Property AIR 1957 SC 804 . 96. In Certiorari no interference is called for on mere formal or technical error even of law – vide Prem Singh vs Deputy Custodian General, Eavacuee Property AIR 1957 SC 804 . 96. Since Certiorari is a discretionary remedy it will not issue to perpetuate an illegality; to revive another illegal order; or to direct the State to do a thing which it has no legitimate power to do – vide A.M.Mani vs State Electricity Board, Kerala AIR 1968 Ker 76 (FB); Devender Prasad Gupta vs State ofBihar AIR 1977 Pat 164; Narinder Chand Hem Raj vs Lt. Governor (1971) 2 SCC 747 and Gadde Venkaeswara Rao vs Government of A.P. AIR 1966 SC 828 . 97. Analysis of the relevant facts of this case and of the applicable principles of law has revealed that the petitioners have been ambiguous and inconsistent as regards their status in relation to the schedule lands; initially claiming to be the owners and pattadars; and in the ORC proceedings for the first time claiming to be the inamdars. The petitioners have failed to plead any basis whatsoever for the claim in the ORC proceedings, except a speculative assertion to being inamdars; or in support of the underlying assumptive claim that the schedule lands is inam. The Special Court did not record any conclusions that either the schedule lands are inam or the petitioners inamdars; the 3rd respondent primary authority totally the quasi judicial obligation to evaluate and to record conclusions on the jurisdictional facts including from revenue records and also failed to record an independent finding on the question whether the schedule lands are inam as defined and therefore the petitioners inamdars. The analysis of the relevant facts, both by the Special court in LGC NO.62/89 and by the appellate authority in the impugned proceedings clearly shows that there is no evidence whatsoever on record to substantiate the claim of the petitioners that the schedule lands are inam, as the expression is defined in Sec. 2(1)(c) of the Inams Abolition Act. The entire evidence on record is to the contrary, that the schedule lands are consistently recorded as Government lands, never Inam. 98. The entire evidence on record is to the contrary, that the schedule lands are consistently recorded as Government lands, never Inam. 98. If the order of the primary tribunal – the 3rd respondent, is allowed to stand on the ground that the appellate order is vitiated by the irregularity (in failing to record precise reasons for condoning the delay in filing of the appeal), the result would be grave injustice to the public interest and productive of a clear illegality. As the schedule lands clearly are not an inam within the meaning of Inams Abolition Act no ORC could be registered in favour of the petitioners and such registration is what the 3rd respondent – primary order directs and in clear contravention of the provisions of the Act. 99. This court is therefore of the view that discretion should not be exercised to grant Certiorari and thereby quash the impugned order, on the technical view that the appellate authority has failed to precisely deal with the issue of limitation of the appeal. Issue (d) is answered accordingly. 100. The petitioners have raised a few other contentions which are considered. 101. In the memorandum of written submissions filed on 01.09.2008 and on 09.04.2009 it is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the appellate authority failed to examine the effect of the petitioners and their ancestors being in possession of the schedule lands as ‘unobjectionable encroacher, since 1951-52. This contention proceeds on the assumption that long standing possession legitimizes an inference of an inam grant, an inference that the schedule lands are inam and the petitioners’ inamdars. The precedings analysis in this judgment shows that none of these factors, even if true, legitimizes a conclusion that the schedule lands are inam, as this expression is defined in Sec. 2(1)(c) of the Inams Abolition Act. 102. The petitioners also contend that in view of their long possession of the schedule lands even if as ‘unobjectionable encroacher’ they are entitled to protect such possession and are eligible for consideration for grant of a patta under the Board Standing Orders of the State Government and its assignment policy. Reliance is placed for this contention on the decision of the Supreme Court in Rame Gowda vs M.Varadappa Naidu and Another AIR 2004 SC 4609 . This contention is totally irrelevant and extraneous to the scope of this writ petition. Reliance is placed for this contention on the decision of the Supreme Court in Rame Gowda vs M.Varadappa Naidu and Another AIR 2004 SC 4609 . This contention is totally irrelevant and extraneous to the scope of this writ petition. No relief in the nature of a permanent injunction is sought herein nor a Mandamus to the State Government to consider any application filed by the petitioners for grant of a patta. No such plea is asserted in the writ petition. The impugned order of the 2nd respondent does not either expressly or by any compelling implication of its text, direct the eviction of the petitioners. In exercise of the appellate jurisdiction u/Sec. 24(1) of the Inams Abolition Act, the 2nd respondent by the impugned order has set aside the primary order on the grounds and for the reasons enumerated elsewhere in this judgment. This contention does therefore not merit acceptance. 103. For all the aforesaid reasons the writ petition must fail and is accordingly dismissed. By an order dated 28.12.1995 interim suspension of the impugned order was granted in WPMP No. 36282/95. By a further order dated 31.12.2008 in WPMP No. 33349/08 an interim direction was issued to the respondents restraining them from carrying on constructions in the schedule lands for a period of four week. This interim order was extended until further orders, by the order of this court dated 20.01.2009. These several interim orders stand dissolved in view of the dismissal of the writ petition. 104. There shall however be no order as to costs.