JUDGMENT 1. Heard the counsel for the parties. 2. The parties are referred to by their rank before the Trial Court for the sake of convenience. 3. The appellant herein was the plaintiff before the Trial Court. The suit was for ejectment and damages for use and occupation of the suit property. The plaintiff was the lessor and defendant no.1 was the tenant in respect of the suit premises, which was non-residential, for several decades. Defendant no.2 was said to be an unauthorised sub-lessee in occupation of the suit property. 4. There was no written agreement in respect of the lease. It was treated as a tenancy from month to month. The tenancy was terminated by a notice, in writing, dated 6.9.2000. The suit was decreed directing the defendants to deliver vacant possession of the suit property, however, the plaintiff was not granted damages but only the agreed rent upto the date of delivery of possession. 5. Defendant No.1, who had contested the suit, preferred an appeal before the first appellate Court, against the said judgment. The first appellate Court has held that: a) There was no documentary or oral evidence as regards the terms of the lease. And therefore, in the absence of any such fixed term, the determination of tenancy by efflux of time was not available to the plaintiff. b) There was no notice of termination of tenancy issued to the sub-lessee. c) The plaintiff’s wife, who was found to be a co-owner had not joined the plaintiff in issuing the notice of termination of the lease and hence, the notice was void. d) Defendant no.2 being a successor-in-interest of Defendant No.1 – there was no sublease. Even if the property was sub-let, it was not impermissible or illegal. e) The plaintiff having filed a civil suit for declaration and permanent injunction in O.S.No.461/94 ought to have also sought for the relief of possession, notwithstanding the fact that the premises was governed by the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, and the Act was in force at the relevant point of time. 6. e) The plaintiff having filed a civil suit for declaration and permanent injunction in O.S.No.461/94 ought to have also sought for the relief of possession, notwithstanding the fact that the premises was governed by the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, and the Act was in force at the relevant point of time. 6. The counsel for the appellant contends that the lower appellate Court has filed to appreciate that Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act” for brevity) is attracted only in the absence of a written agreement of lease and hence the conclusion of the Court is erroneous in having held that the tenancy could not be determined as there was no term prescribed. 7. That the plaintiff having obtained a judgment from a Civil Court in the earlier Civil Suit O.S.No.461/94, as against defendant no.1 as to the transfer of tenancy in favour of defendant no.2 being illegal, the Court below was in error in holding that notice of termination of tenancy was also to be issued to defendant no.2, preceding the suit for ejectment. 8. The first appellate Court has failed to appreciate that the suit was not contested by defendant no.2 and there was no denial of the relationship of tenancy by defendant no.1. Hence, it was not justified in finding a case for defendant no.2 with reference to Section 108(j) of the Act. 9. It is contended that the first appellate Court was not justified in holding that the notice of termination of tenancy was void on account of the plaintiff’s wife, who was a co-owner of the suit property, not having joined the plaintiff in initiating the proceedings, by issuing a joint notice, when the law recognizes the right of a co-owner to initiate such proceedings. The counsel places reliance on a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of A.S.KRISHNAMURTHY v. C.N.REVANNA AND OTHERS (2009) 5 Kar.L.J.454. 10. Per contra, the counsel for the respondents seek to support the judgment of the lower appellate Court and place reliance on the following decisions to contend that the ejectment proceedings were invalid in the absence of the co-owner of the suit property MOHAR SINGH (DEAD BY LRS.) v. DEVI CHARAN ( AIR 1988 SC 1365 ) and SK. SATTAR SK. MOHD. SATTAR SK. MOHD. CHOUDHARI v. GUNDAPPA AMABADA BUKATE (AIR 1997 SC 1998) 11. In the above circumstances, this Court while admitting the second appeal has formed the following substantial question of law: “Whether the lower appellate Court was justified in holding that the tenancy of the defendants was not duly terminated and therefore the order of ejectment passed by the Trial Court was bad?” 12. While considering the above question of law – the other findings of the lower appellate Court are also considered. The finding of the lower appellate Court that as there was no evidence of the term of the lease – it could not be determined – is clearly opposed to the very language of Section 106 of the Act. The same is extracted for ready reference. “Duration of certain leases in absence of written contract or local usage:- (1) In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months’ notice; and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen day’s notice. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the period mentioned in sub-section(1) shall commence from the date of receipt of notice. (3) A notice under sub-section(1) shall not be deemed to be invalid merely because the period mentioned therein falls short of the period specified under that sub-section, where a suit or proceeding is filed after the expiry of the period mentioned in that subsection. (4) Every notice under sub-section (1) must be in writing, signed by or on behalf of the person giving it, and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or to one of his family or servants at his residence, or (if such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to a conspicuous part of the property.” Therefore, the tenancy in the instant case ought to be deemed a tenancy from month to month and the first appellate Court was in error in holding otherwise. 13. 13. Further, the lower appellate Court having held that the plaintiff was obliged to issue a notice of termination to the alleged sub-tenant, defendant no.2 and in the absence of the same, the proceedings were vitiated etc., is also incorrect – in the light of the admitted circumstance that any induction of new partners into the firm and the constitution of a different firm in a different firm name, which was admittedly in occupation of the suit property – was without the consent of the plaintiff. A sub-tenant claiming under a tenant is not entitled to notice. The termination of the tenancy would, as a matter of course, affect the sub-lease as well. The finding of the lower appellate Court in this regard, is hence, not in order. In any event, the lower appellate Court has found that there was no sub-letting, and therefore the question is irrelevant, if ejectment can be sustained inspite of it. 14. The observation of the Court below, that the plaintiff ought to have sought for the relief of possession in the earlier suit filed for a declaration and injunction, in O.S.No.461/94, is not tenable. In the light of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, then being applicable – such a relief could not have been sought. 15. The other infirmity according to the first appellate Court, in the ejectment proceedings was that the wife of the plaintiff not having joined him from the stage of issuance of notice of termination, is now to be considered. 16. Since reliance is placed on the decision in Mohar Singh’s case supra – we may examine the applicability of the same. It was a landlord’s appeal, challenging the judgment of the High Court, which had set-aside concurrent findings of the Courts below allowing the landlord’s petition under an Act governing tenancy. The tenant had obtained a single lease in respect of two adjacent shops, from two co-owners. One of the co-owners transferred his right and interest in favour of the appellant and the other co-owner transferred her share to another independently. There was suit for partition between the appellant and the other co-owner that was decreed. The appellant thereafter, initiated proceedings for eviction in respect of one shop. One of the co-owners transferred his right and interest in favour of the appellant and the other co-owner transferred her share to another independently. There was suit for partition between the appellant and the other co-owner that was decreed. The appellant thereafter, initiated proceedings for eviction in respect of one shop. An order of eviction having been passed by the prescribed authority at the instance of the appellant – the same was affirmed by the first appellate Court, in an appeal by the tenant. 17. The tenant had then petitioned the High Court. What was urged by the tenant before the High Court and accepted by the High Court was the contention that severance of the reversion and assignment of that part of the reversion in respect of the suit shop in favour of the appellant did not clothe the appellant with the right to seek eviction without the other lessor joining in the action and that in claiming possession of a part of the subject matter of the original lease the appellant was seeking to split the integrity and unity of the tenancy, which according to the tenant was impermissible in law. The Supreme Court has concluded thus: “It is trite proposition that a landlord cannot split the unity and integrity of the tenancy and recover possession of a part of the demised premises from the tenant. But S.109, T.P. Act, provides a statutory exception to this rule and enables an assignee of a part of the reversion to exercise all the rights of the landlord in respect of the portion respecting which the reversion is so assigned subject, of course, to the other covenant running with the land. This is the true effect of the words ‘shall possess all the rights …. of the lessor as to the property or part transferred ….’ occurring in S.109, T.P. Act. There is no need for a consensual attornment. The attornment is brought about by operation of law. The limitation n the right of the landlord against splitting up of the integrity of the tenancy, inhering in the inhibitions of his own contract, does not visit the assignee of the part of the reversion. There is no need for the consent of the tenant for the severance of the reversion and the assignment of the part so served. This proposition is too well settled to require any further elucidation or reiteration. There is no need for the consent of the tenant for the severance of the reversion and the assignment of the part so served. This proposition is too well settled to require any further elucidation or reiteration. Suffice it to refer to the succinct statement of the law by Wallis, C.J. In Kannyan v. Alikutty, AIR 1920 Mad 838 at p.840 (FB): “………A lessor cannot give a tenant notice to quit a part of the holding only and then sue to eject him from such part only, as pointed out quite recently by the Privy Council in Harihar Banerji v. Ramasashi Roy (AIR 1918 PC 102). Consequently, if the suit is brought by the original lessor the answer to the question referred to us must be in the negative because such a suit does not lie at all. Other consideration, however, arise where as in the present case, the original lessor has parted in whole or in part with the reversion in part of the demised premises. Under the general law such an assignment effects a severance, and entitles the assignee on the expiry of the term to eject the tenant from the land covered by the assignment.” 18. As can be seen, the facts of that case indicate that the tenancy was split between two owners and it was held that eviction could be sought as a part of the premises that had been transferred to one of the owners – whereas in the instant case the plaintiff and his wife are admittedly co-owners without the property being divided by metes and bounds. It is not the case of the respondents that a part of the rent was being paid to her as a co-owner. There is no apparent conflict of interest as between the plaintiff and his wife. Hence, the above decision does not aid the respondent at all. 19. In the next decision relied upon by the respondent, namely, Sk. Sattar Sk. Mohd. Choudhari Supra, the facts are as follows: The land lord was in appeal challenging a judgment of the High Court by which the judgment and decree for eviction passed by the Rent Controller and that of the District Judge affirming that judgment were set-aside and the suit for eviction of the tenant from a shop premises stood dismissed. 20. Mohd. Choudhari Supra, the facts are as follows: The land lord was in appeal challenging a judgment of the High Court by which the judgment and decree for eviction passed by the Rent Controller and that of the District Judge affirming that judgment were set-aside and the suit for eviction of the tenant from a shop premises stood dismissed. 20. The landlord had urged that the premises originally belonged to his father – who had died, leaving behind the appellant and his brother Shaik Jaffar, as well as two other brothers as legal heirs. At a partition between the brothers, a portion of the shop premises fell to the share of the appellant and the remaining to his brother Jaffar. Notice was issued to the tenant by the appellant calling upon him to pay part of the rent to the appellant. As the tenant is said to have defaulted, proceedings were initiated before the Rent Controller and an order of eviction was passed, after contest. This order was affirmed by the Court of the District Judge. The matter was carried to the High Court. The High court reversed the decisions of the Rent Controller and the District Judge principally on the ground that the tenancy of the shop in question, held by the tenant, was indivisible. The partition, if any amongst the brothers would not affect the lease which would still remain indivisible and consequently, eviction proceedings at the instance of only one of the co-landlords would not be maintainable. 21. During the pendency of the appeal before the Supreme Court – the tenant purchased the share of Jaffar and became the owner thereof. 22. After a review of the case law, the Supreme Court has held as follows: “In view of the above discussion, it is obvious that the law with regard to the splitting of tenancy is not what the High Court has set out in the impugned judgment. As pointed out earlier, a co-sharer cannot initiate action for eviction of the tenant from the portion of the tenanted accommodation nor can he sue for his part of the rent. The tenancy cannot be split up either in estate or in rent or any other obligation by unilateral act of one of the co-owners. As pointed out earlier, a co-sharer cannot initiate action for eviction of the tenant from the portion of the tenanted accommodation nor can he sue for his part of the rent. The tenancy cannot be split up either in estate or in rent or any other obligation by unilateral act of one of the co-owners. If, however, all the co-owners or the co-lessors agree among themselves and split by partition the demised property by metes and bounds and come to have definite, positive and identifiable shares in that property, they become separate individual owners of each severed portion and can deal with that portion as also the tenant thereof as individual owner/lessor. The right of joint lessors contemplated by Section 109 comes to be possessed by each of them separately and independently. There is no right in the tenant to prevent the joint owners or co-lessors from partitioning the tenanted accommodation among themselves. Whether the premises, which is in occupation of a tenant, shall be retained jointly by all the lessors or they would partition it among themselves, is the exclusive right of the lessors to which no objection can be taken by the tenant, particularly where the tenant knew from the very beginning that the property was jointly owned by several persons and that, even if he was being dealt with by only one of them on behalf of the whole body of the lessors, he cannot object to the transfer of any portion of the property in favour of a third person by one of the owners or to the partition of the property. It will, however, be open to the tenant to show that the partition was not bona fide and was a sham transaction to overcome the rigours of Rent Control laws which protected eviction of tenants except on specified grounds set out in the relevant statute.” 23. It may be seen that in the case on hand, it is not canvassed by the respondent-tenant that the suit property was divided between the plaintiff and his wife. Nor is it the case of the tenant that the plaintiff’s wife was a joint lessor. It is also not demonstrated that rent was being paid to the plaintiff’s wife as a co-owner. Nor is it the case of the tenant that the plaintiff’s wife was a joint lessor. It is also not demonstrated that rent was being paid to the plaintiff’s wife as a co-owner. There is no apparent conflict of interest as between the plaintiff and his wife and the tenant is hence estopped from denying the plaintiffs authority to institute the suit. The alleged infirmity of the wife of the plaintiff not having joined him in the proceedings is therefore not an infirmity having due regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. The view taken as above finds support in the case of A.S.KRISHNA MURTHY supra, cited by the counsel for the appellant. 24. Hence, the judgment of the first appellate Court is hereby set-aside and the judgment and decree of the Trial Court is affirmed. The respondents are granted one month’s time to quit and deliver vacant possession of the suit premises to the appellant.