Judgment ( 1. ) THIS appeal is directed by the appellant/defendant under Section 100 of the code of Civil Procedure being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 04. 07. 2006 passed in Civil Appeal No. 39-A/06 passed by II Addl. District Judge (Fast Track Court), Maihar District Satna, affirming the judgment and decree dated 29. 09. 2005 passed in Civil Suit No. 17-A/05 by the Civil Judge, Class II, amarpatan. ( 2. ) THE facts giving rise to this appeal in short are that respondent No. 1 and his mother Smt Sunder Bai (respondent No. 2 since deceased) the predecessor in title of respondents No. 2 (a) to 2 (f), filed the suit for eviction of the appellant from non-residential accommodation situated in the town of Amarpatan, on the grounds available under Section 12 (1) (a), 12 (1) (f) and 12 (1) (c) of the M. P. Accommodation control Act, 1961 (in short the Act), the arrears of rent, bonafide genuine requirement for the business of the respondent for which he had no alternate accommodation in such town and of disclaimer of title of the respondent with respect of the suit accommodation by the appellant. As per averments of the plaint, the respondent after purchasing some land from its earlier owner, namely, bhanu Pratap through registered sale deed dated 8. 1. 88, constructed a tin-shed and the same was given to the appellant on tenancy at the rate of Rs. 300/- P. M vide dated 20. 3. 95. Thereafter, upto 20. 3. 96, the rent of such accommodation was paid by the appellant but from April, 1996 and onwards, inspite making the demand by the respondents, the same was not paid by the appellant. The appellant by fabricating a false document initiated proceedings in the Tehsil Court for recording his possession over the land of such accommodation. Such proceeding was dismissed vide order dated 5. 7. 97. By way of initiating the aforesaid proceedings in the Tehsil Court, the appellant not only committed an act contrary to the interest of the respondents but also committed an act of nuisance by denying the title of the respondents over such property. In such circumstance, after giving the demand notice to the appellant for arrears of rent and for vacating the premises, the respondents filed the impugned suit on the grounds mentioned above. ( 3. In such circumstance, after giving the demand notice to the appellant for arrears of rent and for vacating the premises, the respondents filed the impugned suit on the grounds mentioned above. ( 3. ) IN the written statement, the appellant/defendant inter alia contended that initially, he was inducted as a tenant in the tin-shed in the year 1992 and not in the year 1995, at the rate of Rs. 100/- P. M. By denying the 9x7 Sq. ft. area described in the plaint, it is stated that the same was 5x4 Sq. ft and outside such shop one tin-shed measuring 9x5 Sq. ft. was also included in such tenancy. As per further averments, after receiving the notice of the respondent, he vacated the premises and handed over its possession to the respondents. Subsequently, in the month of april,1996, on account of some need of money, respondent mortgaged the aforesaid tenanted shop and also the house in consideration of Rs. 1,00,000/- with the wife of the appellant on condition that if such mortgage money is not repaid upto December, 1997 then such transaction shall be converted into sale and, the appellant will become the owner of such property. Such mortgage money was never repaid and with intention to grab such money, the eviction suit is filed with false averments. The grounds of eviction stated in the plaint are denied with their facts. The relationship of landlord and tenant is also denied by the appellant. In support of the contention made in the written statement, various documents, except the document of alleged mortgage, have been placed on record. With these averments, the prayer for dismissal of the suit was made. ( 4. ) AFTER casting the issues and recording the evidence of the parties, on appreciation, the trial court decreed the suit by holding that respondent has proved the relationship of landlord and tenant @ Rs. With these averments, the prayer for dismissal of the suit was made. ( 4. ) AFTER casting the issues and recording the evidence of the parties, on appreciation, the trial court decreed the suit by holding that respondent has proved the relationship of landlord and tenant @ Rs. 300/- P. M with respect of the disputed premises against the appellant and the decree of eviction was passed on the ground of disclaimer of title of respondent under Section 12 (1) (c) while the prayer of eviction on the grounds of arrears of rent and bonafide genuine requirement, was refused, stating that probably the demand notice, as per requirement of Section 12 (1) (a) of the Act regarding arrears of rent was not given by the respondent and the account of available alternate accommodation with the respondent has not been putforth on the record, however, the decree regarding arrears of rent was also passed against the appellant. ( 5. ) BEING dissatisfied with such judgment and decree of the trial court, the appellant preferred the appeal before the first appellate court. On consideration, by affirming the findings of the trial court, the same was dismissed, on which, the appellant/defendant, has come forward with this appeal. ( 6. ) SHRI Ravish Agarwal, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Pranay verma, counsel of the appellant, after taking me through the pleadings and the evidence along with the documents available in the record argued that relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties with respect of the disputed premises has not been proved in the matter by any admissible and reliable evidence. In the lack of it, the decree of eviction could not be passed against the appellant under section 12 (1) (c) of the Act or any other section. Inspite proving the defence by the appellant that he is not the tenant of the respondent in such accommodation, the same was not considered and without taking into consideration the concerned pleadings, the documents placed on record and also by misreading the evidence, the impugned decree has been passed by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court. The same is not sustainable. In addition, it was argued that the transaction of mortgage of the alleged property created by the respondent in favour of the wife of the appellant, has not been considered with proper approach. The same is not sustainable. In addition, it was argued that the transaction of mortgage of the alleged property created by the respondent in favour of the wife of the appellant, has not been considered with proper approach. Apart the aforesaid, he also argued that during pendency of the suit, on demise of defendant No. 2 Kamla Bai, who was impleaded under Order 1 rule 10 of the CPC, her Legal representatives were not brought on record by the plaintiff and in such premises, the suit was abated in toto but contrary to it, by continuing the suit, the decree has been passed in abated suit. In such premises, he prayed for admission of this appeal on the proposed substantial questions of law mentioned in para-7 of the appeal memo. ( 7. ) HAVING heard the counsel at length, I have carefully examined the record and also gone through the judgments of both the courts below. So far identity of the disputed premises is concerned, the plaintiff/respondent has described the boundaries of the tenanted premises in the plaint and the same was admitted by the appellant/defendant in his written statement by disputing the area of such shop. As per findings of the courts below based on evidence, the respondent has proved the disputed accommodation of his own by its description and boundaries while the appellant/defendant could not prove the different identity ofsuch shop by any admisssible evidence as stated in his written statement. Such findings being concurrent and based on factual appreciation does not give rise any question of law much less the substantial question of law. ( 8. ) SO far the relationship as landlord and tenant between the parties is concerned, as per the written statement of the appellant/defendant, initially he was inducted as tenant in the suit premises by the respondent in the year 1992 at the rate of Rs. 100/- P. M and not in the year 1995, at the rate of Rs. 300/- P. M, but in the year 1995 by vacating the premises, he handed-over its possession to the respondent. Thereafter such property along with other property, was mortgaged by the respondent with the wife of the appellant. 100/- P. M and not in the year 1995, at the rate of Rs. 300/- P. M, but in the year 1995 by vacating the premises, he handed-over its possession to the respondent. Thereafter such property along with other property, was mortgaged by the respondent with the wife of the appellant. On appreciation of the evidence by both the courts the relationship of landlord and tenant between the appellant and the respondents with respect of alleged premises has been found to be proved, while vacating the premises by the appellant and handing over its possession to the respondent in the year 1995 and creating the alleged mortgage with the wife of appellant in the year 1996, have not been found to be proved. Such concurrent finding, being based on appreciation of evidence, is a finding of fact and could not be interfered under the provision of Section 100 of the CPC. The concurrent findings of the courts below holding the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties being finding of fact, is not open for correction or interfered at the stage of second appeal as laid down by the Apex court in the matter of Kalyan singh Vs. Ramswaroop and another- 1996 JLJ 247 in which it is held as under :-"the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that it was not established that the appellant was a tenant of Smt. Gyasibai and that he was a tenant of the two sons. We are afraid this contention cannot be accepted in view of the findings of the two Courts below and such finding of fact is not open to challenge before this Court in appeal under Article 136 of the constitution. " The aforesaid dictum is further followed by this Court in the matter of machala Bai Vs. Nanak Ram-2006 (2) MPLJ 484. In view of the aforesaid, this ground also does not give rise to any substantial question of law. ( 9. ) SO far the decree under Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act is concerned, as per the concurrent findings of both the courts below after purchasing the land and constructing the non-residential tin-shed, the appellant was inducted in it by the respondent as tenant at the rate of Rs. 300/- P. M Subsequent to it, he paid the rent of it upto 20. 3. 300/- P. M Subsequent to it, he paid the rent of it upto 20. 3. 96 and thereafter he became defaulter in payment of the rent. As per further findings, on the basis of forged and fabricated document, he initiated the proceedings in the Tehsil Court for recording his possession over the land of alleged premises. In such way, it is apparent that the title and interest of the respondent with respect of the aforesaid property was challenged by the appellant and taking into consideration such factual matrix, the decree on the ground of nuisance under Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act has been passed by the trial court and on reappreciation, the same is affirmed by the appellate court. Such finding also, being based on factual matrix does not give rise to any question of law much less the substantial question of law as laid down by this court in the matter of bharosilal Vs. Kishorilal- MPWN-77 in which it was held as under :- "shri P. L. Goyal was at pains in taking the Court through the entire evidence, but there is no substantial explanation to the averments which have been made in written statement and reply notice Ex. P/8 through which the title of the respondent-plaintiff was denied by the tenant-defendant and the two Courts on the appreciation of the evidence led by both the parties and also considering the averments made in the documents, written statement and reply notice Ex. P/8 have found the appellant-tenant liable to eviction for having denied the title of the respondent-plaintiff. No reason could be shown to take a different view from the findings, which are the findings of fact. " The aforesaid principle is further followed by this Court in the matter of radheshyam Vs. Mansharam-1992 (1) MPWN-174 in which it was held as under :- "the learned counsel for the appellant very fairly conceded that in view of the case of Majati Subbarao ( AIR 1989 SC 2187 ) the disclaimer need not necessarily be anterior to filing of the suit. Denial of title even in written statement would be enough to constitute forfeiture and hence ground under section 12 (1) (c) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. " The aforesaid principle is further followed by this Court in the matter of meenamal Vs. Madan Mohan Agrawal- 2005 (2) MPLJ-583. ( 10. Denial of title even in written statement would be enough to constitute forfeiture and hence ground under section 12 (1) (c) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. " The aforesaid principle is further followed by this Court in the matter of meenamal Vs. Madan Mohan Agrawal- 2005 (2) MPLJ-583. ( 10. ) IT is apparent that the impugned suit was initially filed by the respondents/plaintiffs only against the appellant. In pendency of the case, One kamla Bai was impleaded as defendant No. 2 under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC but no relief was prayed against her. In pendency of first appeal, she died and her legal representatives are not brought on record. Merely, on account of non-bringing the legal representative of such defendant No. 2 on record, the suit could not be treated to be abated in toto because the executable decree could have been passed in the matter in presence of the parties available on record. In such premises, the appellate court has not committed any error in deciding such question against the appellant. ( 11. ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion, I have not found any substantial question of law in the appeal requiring any consideration under section 100 of the cpc, hence it appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed at the motion hearing stage.