ORDER D.V. Shylendra Kumar, J : This writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India seeking for issue of a writ of habeas corpus in respect of one Siddaram Koli is by his wife on the allegation that her husband Mr. Koli is held in illegal custody at the Bijapur Central Prison by the second respondent. Jail authorities; that the detention of the person in the jail has become illegal as the person though had been produced before the learned JMFC, Indi in Crime No. 100 of 2008 by the Jalaki Police Station, Indi Taluk, Bijapur District and had been initially remanded to judicial custody for about two weeks as per order dated 26.12.2008 upto 9.1.2009 authorizing such detention, the further extension of the detention of the said person in terms of the order dated 9. 1.2009 and even thereafter also is contrary to the provisions of Section 167[2][b] of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 {for short 'the Code'} as admittedly the accused person had not been produced before the Court when the learned Magistrate passed orders extending the period of judicial custody. 2. It is on such premise, a writ of habeas corpus is sought for, for the release of the person from the custody at the Central Prison, Bijapur. 3. Notice had been issued to the first respondent - State and the second respondent - Superintendent of Prisons, Central Prison, Bijapur. 4. Sri. Kumman, learned Government Advocate appears for the respondents. Though no formal statement of objections have been filed on behalf of the respondents, Sri. Kumman, learned Government Advocate has made submissions opposing the writ petition and for issue of writ of habeas corpus. 5. We have heard Sri. Amresh S. Roja, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri. Kumman, learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents. 6. Submission of Sri. Kumman, learned Government Advocate has made submissions opposing the writ petition and for issue of writ of habeas corpus. 5. We have heard Sri. Amresh S. Roja, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri. Kumman, learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents. 6. Submission of Sri. Amresh S. Roja, learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the police had not produced the accused person before the learned Magistrate on 9.1.2009 when his custody was further extended; that when this was pointed out to the learned Magistrate, the learned Magistrate had specifically called upon the jail authorities to bring the accused person before the Court for further extension of custody period; that notwithstanding the jail authorities had not produced the accused person before the Court and the learned Magistrate nevertheless extending the period of detention has rendered the order illegal, being contrary to Section 167[2][b] of the Code which reads as under: "167. Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours: [2] [b] No Magistrate shall authorise detention in any custody under this section unless the , accused is produced before him," and therefore submits that the order of detention being illegal, the consequential detention of the person by the jail authorities is without proper authority in law; that the detention is illegal and therefore writ of habeas corpus may be issued. 7. In Support of the submissions, learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of K.A. Abbas Vs. Satyanarayana Rao' reported in ILR 1992 Kar 3456 to submit that even in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Court can issue not only a writ of habeas corpus but also suitable other directions including a direction to the learned magistrate to consider the request on the part of such person for release on bail or for any other relief. 8. On the other hand, Sri. 8. On the other hand, Sri. Kumman, learned Government Advocate submits that the police had practical difficulties in producing the accused person before the Magistrate on the subsequent dates; that the lack of proper security to transport the prisoner from the jail to the Court and to safely take him back to the jail had come in the way of the police producing the prisoner before the learned Magistrate; that non production of the prisoner before the learned magistrate is not a deliberate act but because of the unavoidable circumstances; that in a situation of this nature, more than the provisions of Section 167[2] [b] of the Code, the provisions of Section 269 of the Code are attracted; that the jail authorities even in response to a specific direction by the Magistrate to produce the prisoner before the Court or to secure his attendance before the Court, it is open to the officer in charge of the prison not to so produce the prisoner under some special or peculiar circumstances; that the provisions of Section 269 of the Code enables the officer in charge of the prison to abstain from giving effect to the direction issued by the learned Magistrate but the officer is required to send a statement of reasons for not complying with the directions; that if such is the position in law, an order passed by the learned Magistrate extending the period of remand even in the absence of the prisoner before the Magistrate cannot be said to be an order per se illegal and cannot also be said that the detention is also illegal and therefore submits that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be issued even in such circumstances as indicated in the writ petition. 9. The relevant statutory provisions of Sections 267[1][a] and [b] and. 269 of the Code on which reliance is placed by Sri. Kumman, learned Government Advocate read as under: "267. 9. The relevant statutory provisions of Sections 267[1][a] and [b] and. 269 of the Code on which reliance is placed by Sri. Kumman, learned Government Advocate read as under: "267. Power to require attendance of prisoners.-(1) Whenever, in the course of an inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, it appears to a criminal Court.- [a] that a person confined or detained in a prison should be brought before the Court for answering to a charge of an offence, or for the purpose of any proceedings against him; or [b] that it is necessary for the ends of justice to examine such person as a witness, the Court may make an order requiring the officer-in-charge of the prison to produce such person before the Court for answering to the charge or for the purpose of such proceeding or, as the case may be, for giving evidence. 269. Officer-in-charge of prison to abstain from carrying out order in certain contingencies.-Where the person in respect of whom an order is made under Section 267.- [a] is by reason of sickness or infirmity unfit to be removed from the prison; or [b] is under committal for trial or under remand pending trial or pending a preliminary investigation; or [c] is in custody for a period which would expire before the expiration of the time required for complying with the order and for taking him back to the prison in which he is confined or detained; or [d] is a person to whom an order made by the State Government under Section 268 applies; the officer in charge of the prison shall abstain from carrying out the Court's order and shall send to the Court a statement of reasons for so abstaining: Provided that where the attendance of such person is required for giving evidence at a place not more than twenty five kilometers distance from the prison, the officer-in-charge of the prison shall not so abstain for the reason mentioned in clause [b]". 10. We have examined the submissions made at the bar in the light of the statutory provisions and the authority relied upon by Sri Amresh S. Roja, learned Counsel for the petitioner. 11. In the present case, on facts it is not in dispute that when the Magistrate passed order for extension of judicial custody of the prisoner on subsequent occasions after initial order dated 26. 11. In the present case, on facts it is not in dispute that when the Magistrate passed order for extension of judicial custody of the prisoner on subsequent occasions after initial order dated 26. 12.2008, the prisoner had not been physically produced before the Court, but nevertheless the learned Magistrate had extended the period of custody. 12. Two questions arise in this context. One is as to whether this order can be characterized as per se an illegal order and as to what consequences should follow, but more importantly for the purpose of issue of a writ of habeas corpus whether the continued detention of the prisoner at the central prison can be said to be an illegal detention inspite of the order passed by the learned Magistrate extending the period of custody and even if such an order is not in any way interfered. 13. So far as the second question is concerned, we find that the jail authorities who are keeping the husband of the petitioner in custody are armed with an order passed by the learned magistrate authorizing them to hold him in custody as of now. Therefore it cannot be said that the jail authorities are keeping the accused person in illegal custody. 14. Sri Amresh S. Roja, learned Counsel for the petitioner realizing this position has also submitted that even in a writ of habeas corpus, a related relief can be sought for; that on the authority of the decision relied upon and referred to above, the petitioner can seek for quashing of the order extending the period of custody and as a consequence seek for issue of writ of habeas corpus. 15. We are conscious that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is a very wide jurisdiction and there are no fetters placed on the exercise of this jurisdiction, but nevertheless the jurisdiction which is within the discretion of the Court and the discretion is exercised on well delineated lines and on settled legal principles which have been time and again enumerated by a good number of Judgments of the High Courts as well as the Supreme Court. The one accepted principle for exercising discretion or not to exercise discret10n for issue of a writ is when normal statutory remedies are available to a person this jurisdiction is not usually exercised. 16. The one accepted principle for exercising discretion or not to exercise discret10n for issue of a writ is when normal statutory remedies are available to a person this jurisdiction is not usually exercised. 16. In a case where the petitioner complains that any statutory power is abused, misused or even exercised in an arbitrary manner so as to victimize a citizen notwithstanding the statutory remedies this Court may exercise discretion to issue an appropriate writ. 17. In the present case, we find that if the order passed by the Magistrate extending the period of custody in respect of the accused person stands as it is, it may not be possible to issue a writ of habeas corpus directing the jail authorities to release the person. If at all, it can be a consequential relief if this Court finds occasion to quash the order. 18. On the very authority of the decision referred to and relied upon by Sri. Amresh S. Roja, learned Counsel for the petitioner, we find that the orders of this nature are not to be characterized as per se illegal and cannot be characterized as a nullity in law even as per the observations of the Supreme Court made in the case of Raj Narain Vs. Superintendent Central Jail, reported in AIR 1971 SC 178 which is also referred to in K.A. Abbas's case [supra]. 19. If the order per se cannot be characterized as an illegal order, perhaps the examination of the nature of the order, particularly, the remand order passed by the learned magistrate may not be undertaken in a petition for issue of a writ of habeas corpus. 20. However, we hasten to add that it does not mean that we are opining on the merits of the order nor do we express as to what possibilities should follow. While we refrain to issue a writ of habeas corpus at this stage and in the circumstances sought for in this petition, we are nevertheless constrained to observe that it was incumbent on the part of the learned magistrate to have exhibited a little more awareness and to have insisted upon the jail authorities/police to physically produce the accused person before the Court as a condition precedent for passing any order extending the custody period of the accused person. 21. 21. In this regard, we are only compelled to recollect that in the wake of the decision of this Court in K.A. Abbas's case [supra], circulars had been issued and circulated among the Magistrates before whom accused persons were being taken and remand was sought for judicial custody to show awareness to the statutory provisions. 22. We only reiterate that the learned Magistrates should acquaint themselves with such circulars and show greater awareness to the requirements of law, particularly, to the requirements in terms of Section 167[2] [b] of the Code before passing the orders extending the period of custody and such orders should not be passed in a casual or in laconic manner. 23. We also observe that it is open to the petitioner or accused person to question the legality of such order extending the period of judicial custody in any other manner provided for in law and to seek for other consequential reliefs also. 24. Before passing orders for extending the period of custody and on special occasions when the police or jail authorities plead that due to circumstances beyond their control they are unable to produce the accused person before the Court on that day, it is for the Magistrate to be fully satisfied about it such reasons or explanation offered and only on being satisfied about the same, orders can be passed on the application for extension and not as a matter of routine. This is a matter involving the liberty and safety of the citizens and in such matters Courts should always show commensurate awareness to protect the procedural safeguards given in law to an accused person. 25. We direct the Registrar General of this Court to ensure that the circulars already issued in this regard are re-circulated for the guidance of the Magistrates and other judicial officers dealing with such proceedings. 26 . With such observations, this writ petition is disposed of.