Judgment : 1. This appeal is filed by the State Government against the order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court on 19.12.2003 in WP No.12318/2001. 2. In the impugned order the learned Single Judge of this Court, while thought it fit to set aside the demand raised by the Revenue that is, Official of the Commercial Tax Department of the State Government demanding payment of a sum of Rs.15,49,050.00 as a sequel to the passing of an order dated 4.1.2001 produced at Annexure-G to the writ petition and consequential demand notice dated 26.2.2001 Annexure-H to the writ petition that the amount referred to above which had been passed under the provisions of Section 18AA of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ as orders suffering from want of jurisdiction on the part of the officer passing the order. 3. The State having lost the Revenue to the extent of Rs.15,49,050.00 has come up in Appeal u/s 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act. 4. The appeal had been admitted, respondent had been put on notice. The respondent is served and represented by counsel. 5. We have heard Sri Vedamurthy, learned Government Pleader appearing for the appellant State Government and its official and Sri Shreyas Jayasimha learned counsel appearing for the respondent dealer. 6. The brief facts leading to the above appeal are that the respondent – dealer is a person carrying on business in civil construction activity as a builder/developer. 7. Therespondent had undertaken certain works contract to be executed in favour of HPCL at Mangalore and it in terms of the contract, were to receive lump sum amount on the completion of the work under the contract. 8. The contract, it appears, was entered into and the work also began during the Accounting Year relevant for the Assessment Year 1995-96 and it is the version of the Respondent-writ petitioner that it had continued for 3 years and a part of works contract had been executed during the year relevant for the assessment period 196-97 that is, 1.4.1996 to 31.3.1997. 9. The dealer, it appears, had also opted for payment of tax under the provisions of Section 17(6) of the Act by way of composition in lieu of the normal tax liability of a dealer who is executing the works contract as envisaged under the regular charging Section 5B of the Act. 9. The dealer, it appears, had also opted for payment of tax under the provisions of Section 17(6) of the Act by way of composition in lieu of the normal tax liability of a dealer who is executing the works contract as envisaged under the regular charging Section 5B of the Act. 10. The facts which are not in dispute and relevant for the purpose of this appeal are, that during the relevant period the total turnover of a dealer who adopted for payment of tax by way of composition under the provisions of sub-section (6) of Section 17 of the Act was at 4% of the total turnover irrespective of the taxability or otherwise of some of the components of the turnover and that the dealer had, according to it, gathered the equivalent amount of tax liability payable in terms of subsection (6) of Section 17 from its customer, had indicated the amount so gathered, in its monthly returns and had also remitted the amount to the State. 11. It appears the Assessing Authority had also accepted the returns and had quantified the tax liability of the dealer in terms of sub-section (6) of Section 17 and found no occasion to vary the payment made by the dealer as the actual tax liability of the dealer for the period and under the provisions of sub-section (6) of Section 17. 12. It was later that attention was bestowed by the very Assessing Authority to the provisions of subsection (2) of Section 18 of the Act which in turn alerted the Assessing Authority also to look into the provisions of Section 18AA of the Act and having realized that notwithstanding the embargo on the dealer from collecting any tax from the customers, the dealer had collected the actual tax payable by it to the State and for such purpose being of the opinion that the amount so collected being in violation of the provisions of Section 18, was liable to be forfeited in favour of the State under the provisions of Section 18AA of the Act and issued a show cause notice dated 4.1.2001 as to why action in accordance with the statutory provisions should not be resorted to against the dealer. The dealer responded to this by way of his reply and assessing authority having examined the response and having passed an order dated 26.2.2001 raising a demand on the dealer for the very amount, which the dealer in fact had collected in contravention of the provisions of Section 18(2) of the Act and it is at this stage, the dealer chose to approach this Court by filing W P No. 12318/2001 to question the legality of this order of forfeiture and consequential demand inter alia on the ground that the provisions of Section 18 were not even attracted to the situation and consequently not even Section 18AA and that the Assessing Authority had no jurisdiction to pass the order of forfeiture on alleged grounds. 13. The State responded to the writ petition by filing its counter and the learned Judge after hearing the submissions on behalf of the petitioner and the State has passed an order which is now called in question in this appeal. 14. The learned Single Judge was of the view that the provisions of Section 18AA were not attracted for the simple reason that at the relevant point of time sub-section (2) of Section 18 did not make a reference to the provisions of sub-section(6) of Section 17 which alone could have placed an embargo on a dealer opting for composition from collecting the tax and there being no embargo, the collection by itself cannot be characterized as illegal or an irregular and therefore the provisions of Section 18AA were not attracted. 15. The learned Single Judge was of the view that the amount collected by the dealer having already been remitted to the State along with the monthly returns and having not been retained by the dealer for himself, it was not a situation of a collection within the meaning of the expression as it occurs in sub-section (2) of Section 18 and for such reason placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of R S Joshi, Sales Tax Officer v. Ajit Mills Ltd., (1977 (4) STC 497). 16. 16. The learned Single Judge further opined that a combined reading of the provisions of Section 18, 18A and 18AA would indicate that a dealer who has collected any amount even in a situation where he has opted for composition if has not deposited the amount with the State then alone he would incur the wrath of forfeiture in view of provision of Section 18AA. In the present case, the dealer having remitted the amount to the State Government, he is not caught within the mischief of Section 18AA and on analyzing different situations contemplated in Section 18 of the Act was of the view that present situation does not attract Section 18 and consequently Section 18AA was also not attracted and therefore the Assessing Officer had assumed jurisdiction where he had no business to trade and accordingly set aside the order as one lacking in jurisdiction and consequently the demand was also set aside. It is under such circumstances, the present appeal. 17. Appearing on behalf of the Government, Sri Vedamurthy learned Government Pleader urged that the learned Single Judge has proceeded on an erroneous impression both on facts and law, that it was not a case warranting interference in exercise of powers under Articles 226 & 227, that the order did not suffer from want or jurisdiction or any illegality and therefore no interference was called for and if at all the dealer had any grievance he should have been left to workout his remedies in accordance with statutory provisions. 18. With reference to the statutory provisions, particularly provisions of Section 18 Sri Vedamurthy, learned Government Pleader would point out that the learned Single Judge has proceeded on the premise of the legal position as it revealed at the time of the order was passed, that is, during the year 2003 when sub-section (6) of Section 17 had been omitted from the body of sub-section 2 of Section 18 but the mention of sub-section (6) of Section 17 was very much there for the period relevant for the year 1996-97. That while it is no doubt true that for the earlier period namely, for the year 1995-96 such statutory provision was not omitted in the body of sub-section (2) of Section 18 and it again vanished but it stared at the face of any dealer for the period in question and the present one is the case where the mention of sub-section (6) of Section 17 is very much found within the body of sub-section (2) of Section 18 and therefore the order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from this mistake of law, not sustainable and has to be set aside. It is submitted that it is not as though the Assessing Officer lack of jurisdiction to pass an order u/s 18AA for the reason that the dealer had in fact gathered the amount prohibited in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 18 in the name of tax from its customer and mere fact that he had remitted to the State Government along with monthly returns did not make any difference to the legality of such gather or collection. 2. It is also pointed out that in the present case, the dealer has played virtually a trick on the Department by creating an impression as though the amount is passed on to the State whereas in reality it is not so for the reason that the dealer who was otherwise liable to pay the very amount from out of his own pocket as he was prevented from collecting such amount, had utilized the amount gathered or collected from its customer to discharge that liability or tax which he was otherwise liable in terms of Section 17(6) and therefore this is a clear case of misuse of misappropriation of the gathered amount to discharge the dealer’s liability and in fact the amount if has actually never reached the coffers of the State, as the amount was collected from the customers but was not passed on to the State but the amount is used for the benefit of the dealer, to discharge his liability to pay the tax by way of composition, which amounts to the Dealer who was required to pay the composition amount to the State, without passing on the amount to the customer has instead passed on the liability to the customer! 19. 19. It is, therefore, pointed out that both on facts and law, the order passed by the learned Single Judge is not sustainable, that the order suffers from both mistake on fact and as well as on law and is liable to be set aside. 20. Countering the said submission Sri Jayasimha, learned counsel appearing for the respondent dealer has vehemently urged that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is sustainable not only for the reason mentioned in the order but for much more reasons that in the first instance the statutory provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 18 containing a reference of sub-section (6) of Section 17 was prevalent only for this year and not before or after and particularly expression of subsection (6) of Section 17 as it occurred in sub-section (2) of Section 18 having been omitted by way of amendment Act 7/1997 (Annexure-E to the writ petition) with effect from 1.4.1997 and it being virtually in the nature of a retro active legislation, has to operate even from an anterior date and at any rate for the purpose of the present appeal it should be so understood as to operate with effect from 1.4.1996 itself and if such should be the understanding of the Amendment Act, then it is as good as sub-section (6) of Section 17 being not contained sub-section (2) of Section 18 having been omitted by way of Amendment Act 7/1997 (Annexure –E) to the writ petition with effect from 1.4.1997 and it being virtually in the nature of retro-active legislation should be understood as to operate even from an anterior date and at any rate for the purpose of the present appeal it should be so understood to operate from with effect from 1.4.1996 also and if such should be the understanding of the Amendment Act, then it as good as sub-section (6) of Section 17 not containing a reference to sub-section (2) of Section 18 and therefore the embargo on the dealer from gathering or collecting the amount as levied and the act of gathering or collecting does not become an illegal act in which event Section 18AA is not attracted. 21. Mr. 21. Mr. Jayasimha would also point out that the dealer had opted that composition with reference to his contract that is, customer client and not with reference to particular year and contract has been worked for the years 1995-1996, 1996-97 and 1997-98 and more importantly at that beginning of the contract the statutory provision of Section 18 sub-section (2) not containing or including a mention of sub-section (6) of Section 17, the benefit of such statutory composition should be given to the dealer throughout the period of his contract with reference as he had opted for composition and if so, it should be understood that the provisions of Section 18(2) even for the year 1996-97 can only be as it prevailed at the beginning of the year 1995-96 that is, without a mention of sub-section(6) of Section 17 in the body of sub-section (2) of Section 18. 22. It is submitted if such should be the understanding and interpretation of the provisions of subsection (2) of Section 18, then again there is no violation on the part of the dealer even if the amount is collected and more importantly the dealer having in fact remitted the amount to the State along with the monthly returns, there is absolutely no reason to characterize the gathering and remittance as an illegal collection and therefore neither the provisions of Section 18 nor the provisions of Section 18AA are attracted, that the order passed by the Assessing Officer forfeiting the amount is an order clearly illegal and lacking in jurisdiction and the learned Single Judge is right in setting aside such an order that no interference is warranted and the appeal should be dismissed. 23. 23. The further argument of Sri Jayasimha is that the word ‘collection’ as it occurs in sub-section (2) of Section 18 has come in for judicial interpretation, the Supreme Court had occasion to interpret this very word ‘collection’ in the case of R S Joshi, Sales Tax Officer Vs., Ajit Mills Ltd., (1977 (4) STC 497) referred to supra, which the learned Single Judge has referred and if one should go by the definition of the word ‘collection’ occurring there as interpreted and if the same principle is applied in the context of Karnataka Enactment also, particularly the provisions being almost pari-materia the ratio should be applied to the present situation and if there is no collection in the eye of law, then Section 18 is not attracted and consequently 18AA is also not attracted and his order of forfeiture very much falls to ground. 24. Mr. Jayasimha has also submitted that though the word ‘collection’ came in interpretation in the context of Maharashtra Enactment, nevertheless the judgment of the supreme Court in the case of Joshi, having been followed by our High Court in Single Bench decisions in case of (1) K S F C vs. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and others (115 STC Page 645) and (2) India Cements Ltd., v. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Assessments-II Fast Track) City Divisional-1, Bangalore (118 STC Page 29), it should be taken that the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Joshi’s case should be made applicable even for interpreting and understanding the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 18 and therefore it should be held that there is no collection in the eye of law in the present situation and if so no violation attracting 18AA provision, no forfeiture and consequential order both forfeiture and demand following it are all bad in law; that the learned Single Judge has rightly set aside the same, no scope for interference and the appeal should be dismissed. 25. 25. In respect of declaratory relief which the writ petitioner had sought for before the learned Single Judge, which has not received any consideration of the learned Single Judge as to the manner of basis of the provisions in view of the retro-active legislation as argued by the learned counsel and as quoted above and to the effect that in terms of relief quoted and in respect of the submission reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Zile Singh vs. State of Haryana & others (2004) 8 SCC Page 1. Particular attention is drawn to Paras 24 and 25 of this judgment. 26. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Tata Motors Ltd., vs. State of Maharashtra & others reported in 136 STC Page 1 to submit that analogous provisions in the Bombay Sales Tax Act had come in for interpretation before the Supreme Court in the context of the impact of retro-active legislation and the ratio laid in this judgment is to be applied to contend that insertion of sub-section (6) of Section 17, sub-section (2) of Section 18 only for the year 1996-97 while it was not so found in the statute book for earlier and later years, is virtually an arbitrary provision, that the legislation would expose itself to the vice of being in violation of Article 14 and to save the provision one should read it down so as to remove the provision or to understand it was not there for the year 1996-97 also! 27. 27. Sri Jayasimha, learned counsel for the respondent assessee countering the argument of the learned Government Pleader relying upon the Division Bench decision of this Court dated 13.11.2003 reported in STRP 93/2003 in the case of M/s. Chemtreat Consultant Vs., Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes & another, submits that even in a situation where the dealer claims that illegally collected tax has nevertheless been remitted to the State Government, nevertheless the consequential provisions of Section 18AA are attracted and therefore the order passed by the learned Single Judge being at variance with the ratio of this judgment of the Division Bench is not sustainable, submitted that this cannot be and should not be followed by this bench for the reason there is no reference made in the course of this judgment, to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Joshi’s case and apart from it another submission is that the demand raised in terms of Section 18AA does not follow as the order is not passed by way of penalty but only by a forfeiture and if the demand cannot be sustained with reference to forfeiture order, it cannot be worked either with reference to the assessment order or as by way of penalty particularly as Revenue had chosen to invoke only forfeiture provision but not the penalty provision. 28. We have perused the statutory provisions and the factual position is that during the period relevant for the assessment period 1996-97 sub-section 2 of Section 18 did contain the provision of sub-section (6) of Section 17 which means there is an embargo on a dealer opting for payment of tax by way of composition not to collect or even to gather as the expression used by Mr. Jayasimha, from a customer and a collection per se is a statutory violation, an illegal collection and inevitably attracts the provisions of Section 18AA of the Act. 29. For attracting Section 18AA it is sufficient if there is a collection in violation of the provisions of Section 18 and nothing more is required, as to whether the amount was collected or gathered is retained or not which is not a criteria. The subsequent handling of the matter in the manner of remitting the amount to the State also will not in any way purge the illegal act in contravention of law and inevitably Section 18AA is attracted. 30. The subsequent handling of the matter in the manner of remitting the amount to the State also will not in any way purge the illegal act in contravention of law and inevitably Section 18AA is attracted. 30. On the interpretation of the word ‘collection’ as it occurred in the provisions of the Maharashtra Act and as interpreted by the Supreme Court particularly by having drawn a comparison of the provision of the Maharashtra Act with the statutory enactment as it prevailed in Australia and the interpretation by the Australian Courts of those provisions which interpretation Sri Jayasimha persuaded us to accept and to apply that to the present situation particularly in the wake of two learned Judges of this Court having imported that interpretation to understand and interpret the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 18 and 18A then the consequence of 18AA, we confess, we are not at all persuaded to share that line of logic for the simple reason that the present facts situation are totally different; that the word ‘collection’ as it occurs in the context of Maharashtra enactment, does not necessarily carry the same meaning in the context of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act 1957 and at any rate the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court interpreting the provisions of Maharashtra Act or even the Bombay Sales Tax Act and the relevant sections therein cannot be put on par with a law declared by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India to constitute a law to be followed and applied by all courts in the country, within the mandate of Article 141 of the Constitution of India, as the very legislative enactments themselves are different. 31. With respect, we find that the law is not so declared by the Supreme Court in the context of the provisions of Karnataka Sales Tax Act and therefore is not a law within the meaning of Article 141 and therefore not required to be applied or followed while interpreting the provisions of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act 1957, as amended from time to time. 32. More importantly we find on the fact situation also, the present situation is one wherein however which Sri Jayasimha would contend what the dealer had done no wrong in gathering it is nothing short of collection of an amount and admittedly in the name of tax. 32. More importantly we find on the fact situation also, the present situation is one wherein however which Sri Jayasimha would contend what the dealer had done no wrong in gathering it is nothing short of collection of an amount and admittedly in the name of tax. The fine distinction sought to be drawn between gathering and collection does not arise nor consider the case for examination here because there are no two words used in the statute. The word used is only collection and in our considered view, the act of dealer in getting the amount from its customer and in the name of tax does not leave any scope for ambiguity to understand the action as one of collection and not as anything else. The interpretation of a statutory provision is resorted to only when there is ambiguity in understanding the word and when there are more than two possibilities of understanding the particular phrase and therefore one has to resort to aid of interpretation. We have no doubt or lack of clarity in understanding the word ‘collection’ as it occurs in sub-section (2) of Section 18 and therefore we do not propose to travel to any other authority which are all based on the interpretation of the particular statutory provision in the contest of the enactment of another state and where the learned Judges of the respective courts had experienced some difficulty in understanding the word as it occurred in the context of other statutory provisions occurring the those enactments. 33. With respect we opine that the two judgments of the learned Single Judges of this Court does not necessarily lay down the correct law and the law if any as it emerges in those two orders are hereby overruled. 34. That leaves us with the next argument of Mr.Jayasimha about the declaratory relief. Particularly on the premise that the amendment in the year 1997 should be understood to be as a retro-active legislation that is, the insertion or deletion of sub-section (6) of Section 17 from the body of subsection (2) of Section 18 with effect from 1/4/1997 by Act 7/1997. 35. We arenot very persuaded to accept that the provisions of Act 7/97 bringing about the changes referred to above as one in the nature of retro-active legislation. A retro-active legislation is one which expressly and emphatically says so and not by way of implication. 35. We arenot very persuaded to accept that the provisions of Act 7/97 bringing about the changes referred to above as one in the nature of retro-active legislation. A retro-active legislation is one which expressly and emphatically says so and not by way of implication. We cannot infer or attribute an intention of the retro-active legislation. 36. This apart by way of interpretation the court cannot efface a statutory provision that is brought about in a fiscal statute for a particular year and by comparing it to the statutory provisions as it prevailed for periods earlier or later. It is well accepted in taxation laws that each year is different, and the liability in respect of payment of tax is always determined with reference to the statutory provisions as it prevails for the period governing the assessment and not by assessment order for any earlier year or later year, based on the very law as it prevailed earlier. 37. The liability by way of statutory provision for the period 1/4/1996 to 31/3/1997 can be examined only with reference to the provisions as it prevailed in reality for that period and not either by way of reference to statutory provisions as it prevailed for any other year even by way of an interpretation given to the statutory provisions to bring about a meaning from the statute other than what it actually contains. 38. We, therefore, reject this contention urged on behalf of the dealer by Sri Jayasimha Learned counsel for the respondent. 39. But more importantly a declaratory relief in writ jurisdiction is possible only in respect of declaration of the validity or otherwise of a piece of legislation and for no other purpose. In respect of all other declaratory relief, a citizen or any person can look up only before the Civil Court and not normally before a Court exercising constitutional writ jurisdiction. The declaratory relief even if is so otherwise permissible in law will not be given as a declaratory relief in respect of the provisions of the Act but on the facts situation etc., and not as a relief in rem particularly for interpretation of a statutory provision. 40. If a provision comes up for statutory interpretation and in the course of such an interpretation a view is taken, that becomes the declaration of law of the statutory provision and can operate in rem and not otherwise. 40. If a provision comes up for statutory interpretation and in the course of such an interpretation a view is taken, that becomes the declaration of law of the statutory provision and can operate in rem and not otherwise. No writ petitioner whether a citizen or other person can seek a declaratory relief in writ jurisdiction for a purpose other than for declaring the validity i.e., constitutional validity of a legislative provision. It is only for that purpose the writ jurisdiction is exercised for granting declaratory relief and in no other circumstance. For this reason also, the declaratory relief sought for cannot be granted whether the learned Single Judge has examined or not, we express our view in categorical terms on this aspect, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief on this premise. 41. In this view of the matter, we find that the writ petitioner was not entitled to any relief at all in the writ petition, within the scope of writ jurisdiction and the learned Single Judge is clearly wrong in gathering relief which the petitioner, otherwise was not entitled to and therefore this writ appeal has to be allowed and the order of the learned Single Judge is set aside and the order passed by the authority u/s 18AA and the consequential demand are sustained. It is open to the Revenue to workout enforcement of this amount from the assessee. This appeal is allowed levying a cost of Rs. 1 lakh on the respondent.