Gopika Projects Private Limited v. State f West Bengal
2009-11-19
AMIT TALUKDAR, TAPAS KUMAR GIRI
body2009
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment : AMIT TALUKDAR, J. (1.) ALPHA: Without being sucked between Scylla and Charybdis we have to absorb the impact of the decision of this Court in Tapas Biswas v. Shyama Prosad Ghosal, (2009)1 WBLR (Cal) 250, a Judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge wherein the ratio of the decision of an earlier Division Bench of this Court in Dipak Kumar Singh v. State of West Bengal and Ors., (2008)2 Cal HN 943 has been placed in the backburner. (2.) BETA: Through the narrow conspectus of our Power of Judicial Review, we have been implored to see the Order of the learned West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal in O.A. No. 1654 of 2008(LRTT) wherein the Order passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Sealdah in Ejectment Suit No. 129 of 2007 on 28.5.2008 has been stayed. (3.) GAMMA: The same has been carried at the instance of the Petitioner in this Application and we would be required to test its efficacy on the premises that the Tribunal did not have any jurisdiction to hear the Matter on the strength of the decision of Tapas Biswas v. Shyama Prosad Ghosal (supra) in the light ol the reservations of the Respondent. (4.) DELTA: Since both these Matters being W.P.LR.T. No. 31 of 2009 and W.P.LR.T. No. 84 of 2009 are analogous in nature, were heard together, they are being disposed of by this common Judgment which will govern the fate of both the Application. (5.) At the Bar Shri Lakshmi Chand Bihani, learned Senior Counsel duly assisted by Shri Nayan Chand Bihani would submit that as the learned Tribunal did not have any jurisdiction to hear the Appeal preferred at the instance of the Respondent against the Order passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Sealdah in Ejectment Suit No. 129 of 2007-the entire Order passed by the learned Tribunal on 3.7.2008 in O.A. No. 1654 of 2008(LRTT) was a pure nullity. (6.) Shri Bihani was of the view that not only the said Tribunal did not have any jurisdiction to hear the Appeal against the Order passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division but the same was an ex parte Order without affording an opportunity of hearing to the Petitioner.
(6.) Shri Bihani was of the view that not only the said Tribunal did not have any jurisdiction to hear the Appeal against the Order passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division but the same was an ex parte Order without affording an opportunity of hearing to the Petitioner. (7.) Shri Bihani also submitted that no Appeal lay against the interlocutory Order passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division before the Tribunal against the Order of a Civil Court. (8.) As a part of his submission he invited the attention of this Court to the provisions of Section 2(r) of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1955 and Section 43 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997. (9.) Summing up, Shri Bihani submitted that as the learned Tribunal did not have any jurisdiction to pass such an Order, carriage of further proceeding before the sarhe would be an abuse of the process of Law and it is required that the same be put to an end. (10.) Per Contra Shri Ashok Kumar Banerjee, learned Senior Counsel with Shri S. Chakraborty could not see eye to eye with his counterpart for the Petitioner. (11.) Shri Banerjee submitted that it was always open for the Petitioner to raise the question of jurisdiction before the Tribunal by way of submitting itself before it and then raise the said point. (12.) According to Shri Banerjee, since the Appeal was just admitted and the same was required to be heard in the presence of the Petitioner, the point of jurisdiction could be taken as a preliminary point as all the issues are kept open at the stage of Appeal. (13.) The learned Senior Counsel developed his argument further and invited our attention to the Order passed by the learned Tribunal showing the same as of 3.7.2008 whereas the returnable date was on 5.12.2008 before the Tribunal. Yet, according to the learned Senior Counsel, the Petitioner chose to remain stoic for all these period and applied for the certified copy on 11.12.2008 and even though the same was received on 9.1.2009, they approached this Court only on 3.2.2009. (14.) Shri Banerjee wondered that the Order was impugned at a very belated stage. If they could wait for such considerable period, they could have easily canvassed this point before the learned Tribunal.
(14.) Shri Banerjee wondered that the Order was impugned at a very belated stage. If they could wait for such considerable period, they could have easily canvassed this point before the learned Tribunal. (15.) In Tandem Shri Das for the State Respondent in W.P.L.R.T. No. 84 of 2009 did not join issue with Shri Bihani, He submitted that it was absolutely beyond the purview of the Tribunal to have stayed the findings of the learned Civil Judge by way of sitting on Appeal over its interlocutory finding. That apart, Shri Das, referred to the prayer made in the Plaint and submitted that the subject-matter of the Suit is related to recovery of possession, which could not be agitated before the Tribunal. (16.) Shri Sarkarforthe State Respondent in W.P.L.R.T. No. 31 of2009 adopted Shri Das. (17.) Corrigendum In reply, Shri Banerjee, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Plaint was not only for recovery of possession but it was for mesne profit and default in payment of rent, which would bring the entire Matter within the scope of the Tribunal. (18.) EPSILON: Background facts necessary for proper appreciation of the entire issue that has surfaced for our decision in exercise of our Power of Judicial Review is required to be set out. (19.) The Petitioner presented a Plaint before the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division at Sealdah. The same figured in the Docket of the later as Ejectment Suit No. 129 of 2007. (20.) Written Statement was filed on behalf of the Respondent, who figured as Defendant in the Suit. In course of the proceeding before the learned Civil Court, a Petition was taken out on behalf of the Defendant under Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the question of jurisdiction. The same having been spurned by the learned Civil Court by its Order No. 11 dated 28.5.2008-saw him before the Tribunal invoking its jurisdiction under Section 43 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 read with Section 6 of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997. (21.) The Tribunal by its Order dated 3.7.2008 admitted the Appeal and passed an interim Order staying all further proceedings in the Ejectment Suit and fixed the date of hearing on 5.12.2008.
(21.) The Tribunal by its Order dated 3.7.2008 admitted the Appeal and passed an interim Order staying all further proceedings in the Ejectment Suit and fixed the date of hearing on 5.12.2008. (22.) In such factual backdrop, the Petitioner nurturing the grouse that the Tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to hear the Appeal-has come before this Court. (23.) ZETA: We have heard the submissions made at the Bar and have considered the points canvassed before us including the ratio of the decision in Tapas Biswas v. Shyama Prosad Ghosal (supra). (24.) Power of Judicial Review Judicial Review over an Order passed by the Tribunal is the summum bonum of this Application. In this context it would appropriate for us, even though it amounts to carrying coal to New Castle-to remind us of our Powers in this context. (25.) The Supreme Court in Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank and Anr. v. Munna Lai Jain, (2005)10 SCC 84 in Paragraph 14 has held : ".............the Court should not interfere with the administrators (read Tribunals) decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards." (26.) It further held in the same Paragraph "...........The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision" (27.) The Summit Court in State of Meghalaya and Ors. v. Mecken Singh N. Marak, JT (2008)11 SC 119 in Paragraph 9 has held : "........that the High Courts, in exercise of powers under Article 226, do not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless there exist sufficient reasons therefor. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority unless shocking to the conscience of the Court, cannot be subjected to judicial review." (28.) In all, in nothing in substance. What remains is that while exercising our Power of Judicial Review not only we would be necessitated to be extremely circumspective but tread a very cautious path so that we do not usurp the decision-makers domain in the absence of any patent absurdity or illegality.
What remains is that while exercising our Power of Judicial Review not only we would be necessitated to be extremely circumspective but tread a very cautious path so that we do not usurp the decision-makers domain in the absence of any patent absurdity or illegality. (29.) Beyond Bonds and Boundaries This is the password with which we will now proceed to demystify the situation, which has been sought to be built up by Shri Bihani on the strength of the decision of the learned Single Judge in Tapas Biswas v. Shyama Prosad Ghosal, (supra). In fact, it would be our primordial consideration to see as to whether on the strength of the said decision of Tapas Biswas v. Shyama Prosad Ghosal (supra) whether the Order passed by the learned Tribunal can pass the Muster. (30.) We need not mull over the situation and before we make our foray into the entire euphoria fancied by the Petitioner in the Glass House of the Single Bench decision, it has to be kept in mind that as a Division Bench we, under no circumstance, are bound by the decision of the Single Bench. Even though we could have fired the silver bullet to retrieve from such a situation and say amen to allow the position to remain as mellifluous as before. But we feel obligated to pee off the outer nuggets of the issue in question and take a deep look and refused to be persuaded by the razzmatazz of such situation. (31.) But we will look into the ratio of the decision of the Single Bench in Tapas Biswas v. Shyama Prosad Ghosal (supra) without any sense of affectation and see whether the same dominates the scene. (32.) Law of binding precedence We have very carefully read the decision of this Court in Tapas Biswas v. Shyama Prosad Ghosal (supra). In the said decision a Division Bench decision of co-equal strength in Dipak Kr. Singh v. State of West Bengal and Ors. (supra) has been ignored on the premises that an earlier Division Bench decision in Pashupati Adhikay v. Pradyut Kumar @ Tarapada Adhikary, (2003)4 Cat HN 347 : (2003)2 WBLR (Cal) 120 was found to be more acceptable. (33.) Since the decision of Dipak Kr. Singh v. State of West Bengal and Ors. (supra), which is of a Coordinate Division Bench, it very much stares at our face.
(33.) Since the decision of Dipak Kr. Singh v. State of West Bengal and Ors. (supra), which is of a Coordinate Division Bench, it very much stares at our face. We, under no circumstance, can surmount the same as the Law of stare decisis binds us. (34.) We would profitably quote from the decision of the Supreme Court in Mahadeolal Kanodia v. Administrator General of W.B., (1960)3 SCR 578 wherein it was held :: "If one thing is more necessary in law than any other thing, it is the quality of certainty. That quality would totally disappear, if Judges of coordinate jurisdiction in a High Court start overruling one anothers decisions..........." (35.) Apart from this aspect of the Matter, there are other reasons for us to follow the decision by the later Division Bench in Dipak Kr. Singh v. State of West Bengal and Ors. (supra) which has found that the previous decision of the First Bench in Pashupati Adhikary v. Pradyut Kumar @ Tarapada Adhikary (supra) ".....Is no longer a good law in view of the subsequent pronouncement of the Supreme Court to apply in this case." (36.) Their Lordships, while coming to the said conclusion, referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. Ashish Kumar Roy, (2005) 10 SCC 110 : (2005)1 WBLR (SC) 647 and quoted from Paragraph 27 of the said decision. (37.) Since the Division Bench in Dipak Kr. Singh v. State of West Bengal and Ors. (supra) had came to the said conclusion-the recourse made by the learned Single Judge in Tapas Biswas v. Shyama Prosad Ghosal (supra) in Paragraph 14 of the said Judgment, where the "Court invited all the learned Advocates of this Court to address this Court on the point" as to whether one out of the two decisions [read Dipak Kr. Singh v. State of West Bengal and Ors.
Singh v. State of West Bengal and Ors. (supra) and Pashupati Adhikary v. Pradyut Kumar @ Tarapada Adhikary (supra)] "is sound in point of law so that this Court can proceed to decide this revisional application by accepting the decision, which is better in point of law" and came to the conclusion in Paragraph 70 that"............the Division Bench decision passed in Pashupati Adhikarys case (supra) still holds good and is operative in the field and it cannot be held that views expressed in Pashupati Adhikarys case (supra) has been virtually overruled by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of State of West Bengal v. Asish Roy............."was inappropriate. (38.) The Honble Apex Court in Paragraph 26 of the decision of U.P. Gram Panchayat Adhikari Sangh and Ors. v. Daya Ram Saroj and Ors., (2007) 2 SCC 138 has held : "Judicial discipline is self-discipline. It is an inbuit mechanism in the system itself. Judicial discipline demands that when the decision of a coordinate Bench of the same High Court is brought to the notice of the Bench, it is to be respected and is binding, subject of course, to the right to take a different view or to doubt the correctness of the decision and the permissible course then open is to refer the question or the case to a larger Bench. This is the minimum discipline and decorum to be maintained by judicial fraternity." (39.) The Supreme Court in Paragraph 12 of the decision of Rajasthan Public Service Commission and Anr. v. Harish Kumar Porohit and Ors., (2003)5 SCC 480 has held : "The earlier decision of the Division Bench is binding on a Bench of coordinate strength. If the Bench hearing matters subsequently entertains any doubt about the correctness of the earlier decision, the only course open to it is to refer the matter to a larger Bench." (40.) To fructify the aforesaid well-settled position, which insulates our Judicial System, the Constitution Bench in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr.
v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. reported in (2005)2 SCC 673 at Paragraph 8 has held : "...........The Constitution Bench reaffirmed the doctrine of binding precedents as it has the merit of promoting certainty and consistency in judicial decisions, and enables an organic development of the law, besides providing assurance to the individual as to the consequence of transactions forming part of his daily affairs." (41.) Sitting in a Coordinate Bench, we are squarely bound by the ratio of the Division Bench decision of Dipak Kr. Singh v. State of West Bengal and Ors. (supra). The learned Single Bench was very much imbibed with the earlier decision of the First Bench in Pashupati Adhikary v. Pradyut Kumar @ Tarapada Adhikary (supra). But since the same has been found to be not a good Law by the subsequent Division Bench decision in Dipak Kumar Singh v. State of West Bengal and Ors. (supra) in the light of the Supreme Court decision in State of West Bengal v. Asish Kumar Roy, (2005) 10 SCC 110 - we are bound by the decision of Dipak Kumar Singh (supra). (42.) In view of the well-settled proposition of Law laid down by the Supreme Court in the Constitution Bench decision in Dawoodi Bohra Community and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr.(supra), the Division Bench decision of this Court in Dipak Kumar Singh (supra) binds us. (43.) We are in the Division Bench and being bound by a sense of Judicial discipline, necessarily, without a whimper-would abide by the ratio of Dipak Kumar Singhs decision (supra), which has been rendered by a preceding Division Bench of co-equal strength. It is a later decision. We would choose to follow the Maxim; JUDICIA posteriora sunt in leoe fortiora. (44.) While coming to the said conclusion, we have no better portion to apply than quote the Speaking Voice of G.S. Sanghvi, J. writing the Judgment of a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Official Liquidators. Dayanand and Ors. reported in JT (2008) 11 SC 467 where in Paragraph 70, the situation is beautifully summed up. "70. We are distressed to note that despite several pronouncements on the subject, there is substantial increase in the number of cases involving violation of the basics of judicial discipline.
Dayanand and Ors. reported in JT (2008) 11 SC 467 where in Paragraph 70, the situation is beautifully summed up. "70. We are distressed to note that despite several pronouncements on the subject, there is substantial increase in the number of cases involving violation of the basics of judicial discipline. The learned Single Judges and Benches of the High Courts refuse to follow and accept the verdict and law laid down by coordinate and even larger Benches by citing minor difference in the facts as the ground for doing so. Therefore, it has become necessary to reiterate that disrespect to constitutional ethos and breach of discipline have grave impact on the credibility of judicial institution and encourages chance litigation. It must be remembered that predictability and certainty is an important hallmark of judicial jurisprudence developed in this country in last six decades and increase in the frequency of conflicting judgments of the superior judiciary will do incalculable harm to the system inasmuch as the Courts at the grass root will not be able to decide as to which of the judgment lay down the correct law and which one should be followed. We may add that in our constitutional set up every citizen is under a duty to abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals and institutions. Those who have been entrusted with the task of administering the system and operating various constituents of the State and who take oath to act in accordance with the Constitution and uphold the same, have to set an example by exhibiting total commitment to the Constitutional ideals. This principle is required to be observed with greater rigour by the members of judicial fraternity who have been bestowed with the power to adjudicate upon important constitutional and legal issues and protect and preserve rights of the individuals and society as a whole. Discipline is the sine qua non for effective and efficient functioning the judicial system. If the Courts command others to act in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and rule of law, it is not possible to countenance violation of the Constitutional principle by those who are required to lay down the law". (45.) What next? In view of the Matter, the question would arise as to whether we can take a different view by resorting to the principles of per incurrium or sub silentio ?
(45.) What next? In view of the Matter, the question would arise as to whether we can take a different view by resorting to the principles of per incurrium or sub silentio ? Or simply go by the safe choice of binding precedence? (46.) In the event we would have found ourselves unable to agree with the ratio of the decision in Dipak Kumar Singhs (supra), we would not have bat an eyelid to have refused to concur and refer the Matter before the First Bench for composition of a larger Coram but as we have found the same to be sound (which, of course, we are not supposed to say but in the trajectory of the learned Single Bench decision, we have to say)-we feel the ratio of the Dipak Kumar Singhs (supra) case is of binding value upon us. (47.) Discussion For reasons more than one, we cannot break bread with the Single Bench decision of this Court in Tapas Biswas v. Shyama Prosad Ghosal (supra). It should be borne in mind that neither we are sitting in Appeal over the same, nor we would be engaged in any epistolary activities while abiding by the same. (48.) As a fall out of the situation, which has developed in course of the argument of Shri Bihani in assailing the impugned Order of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal in the light of the Single Bench decision, we will be required to look into the.same for the limited purpose of appreciating as to whether the same can come to any rescue for Shri Bihani to scuttle the Order of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal, which has formed the subject matter of discussion in this Application. (49.) The decision of Tapas Biswas v. Shyama Prosad Ghosal (supra) cannot be of any avail to Shri Bihani to recluse himself from the impact of the Order passed by the learned Tribunal. (50.) Q.E.D. The Order of the learned Tribunal was passed on 3.7.2008 whereas the Single Bench Judgment was rendered on 28.11.2008. As such, in our humble view, on this very score itself the decision of Tapas Biswas v. Shyama Prosad Ghosal (supra) will have no manner of application on the Order passed by the learned Tribunal in view of the decision of Kailash Chand Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and Ors.
As such, in our humble view, on this very score itself the decision of Tapas Biswas v. Shyama Prosad Ghosal (supra) will have no manner of application on the Order passed by the learned Tribunal in view of the decision of Kailash Chand Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. reported in (2002)6 SCC 562 and the unreported Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Sankar Ghosh v. Nilanjan Kr. Dey and Anr. in W.P.LR.T. No.194 of 2008 delivered on 17.6.2009 as the question of prospective overruling cannot arise. (51.) This is one aspect of the Matter. (52.) We also cannot abide by the ratio of the decision of the Single Bench in its interpretation of the word authority in Section 2(b) the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act. After all, procedural Law, even though forms the mosaic of the Judicial System-yet, in the Perestroika of the advent of various social changes, special Laws have to be given its due place in the Justice Delivery System. (53.) Being bogged down to archaic provisions of the procedural Laws, which no doubt binding and solid, as it has stood the times; yet, the same has to be mareonated with the provisions of the new Acts, which has been brought in the Statute Book necessitated by various social changes. (54.) Law cannot be static. It has to be dynamic. Similarly, our thinking should also be progressive and not retrograde. (55.) Interpretation of the learned Single Judge with regard to the Power of the Tribunal to hear an Appeal over the decision of a Civil Court, in our view, does not appeal to us. (56.) Section 2(b) of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act defines the word "Authority", which means an officer or authority or functionary exercising powers or discharging functions as such under a specified Act. The word "specified Act" has been defined in Section 2(r)of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, which includes the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. (57.) Now, if we proceed to Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, we find the exclusion of jurisdiction of Courts include Civil Court also and the High Court except its Writ jurisdiction.
(57.) Now, if we proceed to Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, we find the exclusion of jurisdiction of Courts include Civil Court also and the High Court except its Writ jurisdiction. (58.) The analogy adopted in the Single Bench decision that Appeal or Revision would lie before the High Court against the Civil Courts Order bypassing the Tribunal, would not hold water in view of our reading of Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act. (59.) With the advent of West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, the dimension in this jurisprudence has undergone a substantive change. To appreciate the Legislative intent behind enactment of a particular Act, the Court has to read into the long Title as well as the Preamble of the Act, which is an admissible aid to construction as the Preamble expresses the Scope, Object and Purpose of the Act. (60.) The Preamble shows that the Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal has been constituted for the adjudication of disputes amongst other Matters, tenancy in land and other Matters under the specified Act or Matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. (61.) Now, easily we can draw a conclusion that the Legislature in their wisdom to give thrust in this direction, enacted the said Act, which will deal with tenancy and other allied problems under the specified Act, which also includes West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. (62.) That way we can gain much control over the entire issue. (63.) A very narrow interpretation of the word "Authority" has been adopted before the learned Single Bench, which we cannot approve. The word "Authority" in Section 2(b) of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act has to be read in conjunction with Section 2(r) of the said Act which defines specified Act and it includes the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. (64.) The learned Single Bench was oblivious of this position. (65.) Similarly, we find the provisions of Section 6 of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act was also overlooked. Section 6(d) of the said Act empowers the Tribunal to hear any Matter under any provision of a specified Act.
(64.) The learned Single Bench was oblivious of this position. (65.) Similarly, we find the provisions of Section 6 of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act was also overlooked. Section 6(d) of the said Act empowers the Tribunal to hear any Matter under any provision of a specified Act. By necessary implication that would have to be understood to mean to include West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act in view of the provisions of Section 2(r) of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act. (66.) Noscitur A Sociis Francis Bennion in his fame Treatise STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, Third edition in Part XXVIII at Page 949 defined the principle of Noscitur a sociis as "A statutory term is recognised by its associated words. The Latin maxim nose/fur a sociis states this contextual principle, whereby a word or phrase is not to be construed as if it stood alone but in the light of its surroundings. While of general application and validity, the maxim has given rise to particular precepts such as the ejusdem generis principle and the rank principle." (67.) He quoted from Francis Bacon to illustrate the principle of copulatio verborum indicat acceptationem in eodem sensu which means the linking of words suggests treatment of them in the same sense. (68.) This principle of Noscitur a Sociis are wider in application than ejusdem generis principle, A word or phrase in an enactment must always be construed in the light of the surrounding text. Isolatedly a word in an enactment cannot be interpreted as it has to be understood with reference to the word found in company with the former. (69.) This principle of Noscitur A Sociis received its approval long back in the Constitution Bench decision of State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1960 SC 610 followed by several other decisions including the decision of the Supreme Court in Rainbow Steels Ltd. v. CST, (1981) 2 SCC 141 and the later Constitution Bench decision of the Apex Court in Godfrey Phillips India Ltd. and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Anr., (2005)2 SCC 515 as well as in the decision of Supreme Court in Philips Medical Systems (Cleveland) Inc. v. Indian Mri Diagnostic and Research Ltd., (2008) 10 SCC 227 .
v. State of U.P. and Anr., (2005)2 SCC 515 as well as in the decision of Supreme Court in Philips Medical Systems (Cleveland) Inc. v. Indian Mri Diagnostic and Research Ltd., (2008) 10 SCC 227 . (70.) In all these citations it has been laid down that the said principle is merely a rule of construction and cannot prevail in cases where the meaning is clear and the wider words have been used in such a purposive fashion so as to make the scope of the defined work correspondingly wider. (71.) This principle can safely be used in cases where the intention of the Legislature in associating wider words with words of narrower significance in doubtful or otherwise in clear premises. (72.) While applying the principle of Noscitur A Sociis in construing Section 6(d) of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act-obviously, we have to give a much wider meaning to the word "application" in comparison to its narrower cousin "specified Act". (73.) In the event these two words are read either in a different sense or in segregation with each other, then we will do utmost violence to the Legislative intent. The basic test of the application of principle of Noscitur A Sociis is to require the related words to be treated as used in the same sense. (74.) The two words "application" and "specified Act" cannot be treated, as distant cousins. To give an import to the meaning of the word "application" it has to be read in association with the word "specified Act". They cannot be segregated in a truncated fashion. (75.) If we apply the principles of Noscitur A Sociis, we are bound to abide by the legitimate rule of construction to read the word with reference to the preceding words found in immediate connection with them. In other words, the rule of Noscitur A Sociis shows the word requiring interpretation has to be understood with reference to the word found in company with the former. The interpretation of the word "application" and "specified Act" in Section 6(d) of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act would, at once bring us to the conclusion that the Tribunal cannot be divested of the Power, as have been held by the learned Single Bench. (76.) Within the Constitutional Sweep It is time that we should also cook our pie in the Constitutional cauldron.
(76.) Within the Constitutional Sweep It is time that we should also cook our pie in the Constitutional cauldron. Being restricted to narrow contours of procedural Law would, only lead us to a blind alley. (77.) Entire spectre of the present case riles under the appreciation of the decision of Tapas Biswas v. Shyama Prosad Ghosal (supra). In the gossamer white of the same the finding of the Tribunal has been assailed. (78.) In our appreciation of the situation we feel that the powers of the Tribunal in its interpretation of the aforesaid Acts have been profusely undermined in the decision of Tapas Biswasv. Shyama Prosad Ghosal (supra). (79.) The felt necessity of incorporating Part-XIV A in the Constitution housing both Articles 323A and B by Parliament did not receive any forensic appreciation before the learned Single Judge in the decision of Tapas Biswas v. Shyama Prosad Ghosal (supra). (80.) Whole situation has been viewed through a Nelsons Eye resulting in an eclipse of the entire profile. The Division Bench in Dipak Kr. Singh v. State of West Bengal and Ors. (supra) in Paragraph 10 has held ; ".............that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain any appeal and only the appropriate Civil Court viz. District Judge has jurisdiction to entertain the same is not acceptable to this Court." (81.) The said Division Bench thereafter concluded "Hence we hold that the Tribunal is competent to entertain the challenge against the order passed by the Civil Judge under the said Act." (82.) Tribunal ahoy! It is a well-settled principle of interpretation of Statute that provisions excluding jurisdiction of Civil Courts and the Powers conferring jurisdiction on Authorities like Tribunals etc. other than Civil Courts has to be strictly construed. It is ordinary rule of prudence that existence of jurisdiction of the Civil Courts are the general rule, while exclusion thereof are exception. (83.) It is equally correct that burden of proof to show that jurisdiction is excluded by virtue of any special Act rests with the party raising such a contention. (84.) After we have seen that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to try all suits of civil nature is very expansive, yet there are statues which excludes such jurisdiction. The same require strict interpretation and no conclusive decision should be arrived at in the absence of any alternative remedy.
(84.) After we have seen that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to try all suits of civil nature is very expansive, yet there are statues which excludes such jurisdiction. The same require strict interpretation and no conclusive decision should be arrived at in the absence of any alternative remedy. (85.) The Supreme Court in Dhruv Green Field Ltd. v. Hukam Singh and Ors. reported in (2002)6 SCC 416 has summed up the situation and quoted from the Seven Judge Bench decision in Kamala Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay reported in AIR 1965 SC 1942 . In Paragraph 9 of the said decision of Dhruv Green Field Ltd. v. Hukam Singh and Ors. (supra), the finding of the Seven Judge Bench decision in Kamala Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay (supra) was quoted. We feel it would be of abiding interest and immense value if we reproduce the same as the situation cannot be better described : "........If a statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right and liability to be dealt with by tribunals specially constituted in that behalf, and it further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, it is pertinent to enquire whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not." (86.) A Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court little later in K. A. AbdulJaleel v. T.A. Shahida reported in (2003)4 SCC 166 : (2003)2 WBLR (SC) 122 while dealing with the jurisdiction of Family Courts held :: "............The Family Courts Act was enacted to provide for the establishment of Family Courts with a view to promote conciliation in, and secure speedy settlement of, disputes relating to marriage and family affairs and not for matters connected therewith by adopting an approach radically different from that adopted in ordinary civil proceedings" and cannot be construed in any other sense so as to exclude its jurisdiction from the Civil Court. (87.) Similarly, the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997 as we have found from its Preamble, was brought in the statute book by the Legislature in its wisdom, for the purpose of adjudication and trial regarding disputes, claims, objections and applications relating to or arising out of land reforms or tenancy in land etc. etc.
(87.) Similarly, the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997 as we have found from its Preamble, was brought in the statute book by the Legislature in its wisdom, for the purpose of adjudication and trial regarding disputes, claims, objections and applications relating to or arising out of land reforms or tenancy in land etc. etc. and for the exclusion of the jurisdiction of all Courts. We would be of the view that no more would the Civil Court be treated as a sanctum sanctorum in this respect and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal can be spurned. (88.) The decision of Tapas Biswas v. Siiyama Prosad Ghosal (supra) did not, at all, abide by the findings of the Division Bench in Dipak Kr. Singh v. State of West Bengal and Ors. (supra), which although, binding on the former-was skirted seeking recluse to the decision of the First Bench in Pashupati Adhikary v. Pradyut Kumar @. Tarapada Adhikary (supra), which was found "no longer a good law" by the Division Bench in Dipak Kr. Singh v. State of West Bengal and Ors.(supra). (89.) If we make any other interpretation of the word "Authority" as understood in Clause (b) of Section 2 of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997 other than the repository of the Tribunal, we will be doing violence to the said provision. (90.) Chalk and Cheese One has to proceed a little further to the salutary provisions of Section 7, 8 and 10 of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997 which speak of the powers and exclusion of jurisdiction of other Courts. (91.) Immediately we will find that no other interpretation can be effected so as to exclude the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. (92.) At once it will be clear that there has been exclusion of jurisdiction in respect of Orders passed by the Civil Court in such type of Matters and the only recourse would be before the Tribunal. (93.) At the Crossroads While forming an opinion on this issue with regard to the sustainability of the Order of the Tribunal we feel if we abide by the decision of Tapas Biswas v. Shyama Prosad Ghosal (supra) it will not be Just Desert. (94.) Back of the Beyond Entire issue has been viewed from the forecourt of a Civil Court losing sight of the Constitutional horizon.
(94.) Back of the Beyond Entire issue has been viewed from the forecourt of a Civil Court losing sight of the Constitutional horizon. (95.) Lex terra In our endeavour to form an opinion on the subject matter so as to reach a conclusion, we have been propelled by a sense of Justice-Justice not according to our perception but Justice according to the Constitution. It is in such a curve that we have arrived at our decision, which we feel would be Just Justice and hold that the Tribunal is very much competent to entertain the Appeal against the Order passed by the learned Civil Judge and thereby reverse the finding of the learned Single Judge in Tapas Biswas v. Shyama Prosad Ghosal (supra) which, in our view, is absolutely not a good Law. (96.) Decision We feel elaborating any further discussion on this issue would be nothing but a title tattle. The decision of the learned Single Judge was not in consonance with the Constitutional empathy and the rendition thereof was like the old wives tale. (97.) The Gordian knot has been snapped. (98.) We have walked up a negative terrain and perhaps, have taken an extra mile. In doing so we have meandered through a uncharted route which militates against the Latin saying : "Via trita via Ma". (99.) We would be of the humble view that notwithstanding the binding precedence of the decision in Dipak Kumar Singh (supra), which has considered the decision of the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. Ashish Kumar Roy (supra) - it was not incumbent upon the learned Single Judge in Tapas Biswas (supra) to adopt a different meaning to the Division Bench decision as the later was bound by the same. (100) ( 100.) IOTA: To wrap up-we would be of the view that the submissions of Shri Bihani, learned Senior Counsel in support of this Application, would not have any lasting effect in our decision making process.
(100) ( 100.) IOTA: To wrap up-we would be of the view that the submissions of Shri Bihani, learned Senior Counsel in support of this Application, would not have any lasting effect in our decision making process. (101.) As we have found that the Tribunal is the proper Authority for entertaining the Appeal and as we are referring the Matter before the Tribunal, we do not feel imbibed with the submission of Shri Bihani, the learned Senior Counsel that he has stood to suffer any prejudice on account of the ex pane Order passed by the learned Tribunal as it would remain open for him to canvass all points touching on the question of merit. (102.) On the contrary, we find much substance in the forceful contention forwarded by Shri Banerjee, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent Particularly, the submission of Shri Banerjee with regard to the delay made by the Petitioner in approaching this Court assailing the Order passed by the Tribunal very much captivates our mind and we find it is very much intriguing and passes beyond our comprehension. (103.) As rightly pointed out by Shri Banerjee, learned Senior Counsel, we find that the Order was passed by the learned Tribunal on 3.7.2008, which has been assailed in this Application at the instance of Shri Bihani. (104.) Even though the said Order was passed on 3.7.2008, the same has been brought forward before this Court only on 3.2.2009. Amazingly, the Certified copy of the Order passed on 3.7.2008 was applied for on behalf of the Petitioner only on 11.12.2008. In the meanwhile the returnable date before the Tribunal on 5.12.2008 was conveniently bypassed. (105.) The conduct of the Petitioner in this direction remains unexplained and speaks volumes against its sincerity in pursuing the Matter. (106.) Finding Having a wholesome view of the entire gamut, we do not find any merit in this Application and feel the same is required to be dismissed. (107.) KAPPA: Conclusion After we have found there is no merit in the prayer of the Petitioner, he will submit himself to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and file his objection. The Tribunal will now hear out the entire Appeal, preferably within a period of one year from the date of communication-of this Order.
(107.) KAPPA: Conclusion After we have found there is no merit in the prayer of the Petitioner, he will submit himself to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and file his objection. The Tribunal will now hear out the entire Appeal, preferably within a period of one year from the date of communication-of this Order. (108.) Direction It is put on Record that in course of hearing of the Appeal the Petitioner would not be permitted to raise the question of jurisdiction on the strength of the Single Bench decision, which we have found to be not a good Law. (109.) Guideline It should be clearly understood that at the time of disposing of the Appeal, the learned Tribunal would not be bound by any observations made by us in the foregoing Paragraphs as the same has been made for the sole purpose of disposing of this Application and cannot be construed to impinge on the merit of the case. (110.) OMEGA: The decision of Tapas Biswas v. Shyama Prosad Ghosal (supra) not being a good Law, is overruled. (111.) REGISTRY: In view of the impact this Order would have, we would kindly request the learned Registrar (Judicial) to put on circulation a copy of the Judgment before all the District Judges, who would, in turn, make circulatory information to concerned Officers under their respective Judgeship and also to the Chairman of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal. CONSEQUENTIAL ORDER: Application dismissed. Interim Order stands vacated. Parties to bear their own costs Giri, J.-I agree. Later On 19.11.2009 After the aforesaid Judgment was pronounced in open Court, which appeared as Item Nos. 1 and 2 in the Daily Cause List, the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner in the midst of hearing of Item No.5, has mentioned before us that he seeks to pray for stay of the operation of the Order and urgent xerox Certified copy be supplied to him. The learned Counsel for the Respondent raises objection and the learned Advocate for the State in W.P.L.R.T. No. 84 of 2009 supports the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner. We have applied our mind and have considered with utmost circumspection the impact of the prayer made by the learned Senior Counsel for suspending the operation of this Judgment.
We have applied our mind and have considered with utmost circumspection the impact of the prayer made by the learned Senior Counsel for suspending the operation of this Judgment. Upon deep consideration thereof - we are of the view that since the decision that has been arrived at by us is based on the Law of the Land as laid down by the Honble Apex Court, we see no reason as to why the same should be suspended, as prayed for by the learned Senior Counsel for a period of four weeks. Accordingly, such, prayer is considered and rejected after hearing the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner, the State in W.P.L.R.T. No.84 of 2009 and the Respondent. So far as the other portion of the prayer made by the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner in respect of obtaining xerox Certified Copy of the Judgment is concerned, we feel the same may be made available to the parties in accordance with the Rules after the Registry complies with our direction.