Judgment ( 1. ) HEARD on the question of admission. The order passed in this appeal shall also govern the disposal of connected second appeals viz. Second Appeal No. 494/05 {khan Ali and others v. State of maharashtra Mothers) and Second Appeal No. 496/05 (Sajjad Husskv. State of Maharashtra and others ). ( 2. ) THIS second appeal has been filed against the. judgment and decree dated 12. 1. 2005 passed by the learned District Judge Ujjain in dismissing the Civil Appeal n0. 14-A/04 filed by the appellant Karim Bhai against the order and decree dated 31. 8. 2004 passed by the learned Fourth Civil Judge Class-I, Ujjain in Civil Suit no. 73-A/04, whereby the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC filed by the defendants-respondents has been allowed and the plaint has been rejected. ( 3. ) THE appellants have filed Civil Suit in the Trial Court praying to decree the civil suit for declaration that the entry made by the Registrar under M. P. Public trusts Act, 1951 (for brevity the "act") on 10. 07. 1997 entering the suit property as "public Trusts" property is illegal, nonest, nullity in the eye of law, void ab initio and is not binding on the plaintiffs-defendants. The plaintiffs have further prayed that the judgment and decree passed by the Third Joint Civil Judge, Senior division, Nagpur, in Special Civil Suit No. 143/1967 and confirming by the judgment and decree passed by the Fourth Additional District Judge, Nagpur, in Regular civil Appeal No. 16/1987 and affirming by the judgment and decree passed by the high Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur, in Second Appeal no. 132/1992 and upheld by the Supreme Court of India in a Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 25004 of 1996 and Review Petition No. 1075/1997 and the order passed by the defendant no. 6 (The Collector Nagpur, who is Registrar under M. P. Public trusts Act, 1951) in Miscellaneous Review Case No. 8/1996-97 are illegal, nonest, nullity in the eye of law, void ab initio and not binding on the plaintiffs and has been obtained by fraud. A decree of injunction has also been sought against the defendant no. 6 directing him to delete the entry made by him in the Public Trust register on 10. 7. 1997 that the suit property is a public trust property. ( 4. A decree of injunction has also been sought against the defendant no. 6 directing him to delete the entry made by him in the Public Trust register on 10. 7. 1997 that the suit property is a public trust property. ( 4. ) ACCORDING to the plaintiff, the said property was purchased by him vide registered sale deed dated 23,6. 1979 from Maulana Hasan Noorani, who is the father of defendant no. 20, namely Maulana Amiruddin. The plaintiffs brother is sajjad and the wife of Sajjad Bhai is the resident of Nagpur. The brother-in-law (wifes brother) of Sajjad Bhai also resides at Nagpur. On 27. 2. 1999, the plaintiff came to know that the disputed property is Trusts property and on being inquired, it was found that there was a long drawn litigation, which went up to the Apex court and it was held that the, suit property is the Trusts property, hence, the present suit has been filed by the plaintiff seeking the aforesaid reliefs. ( 5. ) AN application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC was filed on behalf of the defendant/respondent no. 8, namely, Salim Jafar Chirnthanawala to reject the plaint. According to the defendant, the present suit is malafide, vexatious and frivolous. In the application, it has been mentioned that the judgment delivered by the Supreme court in Civil Appeal No. 1710/95 and 1711/95 has attained finality. The Supreme court has specifically held that the properties comprised in Ex. P/249 are the Trusts properties and it was further held by the Apex Court that it is no more open to contend that the properties mentioned in Ex. P/249 are not the Trusts properties. The copies of the judgment of the Supreme Court were also filed alongwith the application. ( 6. ) IT has also been stated in the application that the present suit is meritless and is in abuse of the process of the Court. The suit property was sold to plaintiff by the father of the defendant no. 20, who was the party in the earlier round of litigation, which travelled up to the Supreme Court and attained finality. In Paragraph II of the application, it has been stated that the sale deed executed by the predecessor of the defendant no. 20 during the pendency of the Civil Suit was only with a view to do away with the Trusts property. In Paragraph II of the application, it has been stated that the sale deed executed by the predecessor of the defendant no. 20 during the pendency of the Civil Suit was only with a view to do away with the Trusts property. The predecessors of the present defendant no. 20 himself have been judicially held to be usurpers of the Trusts properties. In the sale deed (a copy of which has been filed by the plaintiff) there is a specific clause that in case any defect is found in the title, the defendant no. 20 will re-compensate the plaintiff. It has further been stated in the application that the property in dispute has been throughout held to be the Trusts property, which attained finality since stamp of approval was put by the Apex Court. ( 7. ) REPLY of the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC was filed by the plaintiff. ( 8. ) THE learned Trial Court did not pass any order on the application filed under order VII Rule 11 CPC and directed the defendants to file written statement. Against the said order, the defendants filed Civil Revision before this Court, which was dismissed. The order passed by this Court was assailed by the defendants in the Supreme Court and the Apex Court by setting aside the order of this Court as well as that of the Trial Court directed to the learned Trial Court to decide the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. ( 9. ) ACCORDING to the direction of the Supreme Court, the learned Trial Court decided the application under Order VII Rule 11, CPC holding that the plaint is liable to be rejected. ( 10. ) THE plaintiff feeling aggrieved by the order of the learned Trial Court preferred first Appeal, which has been dismissed by the impugned judgment and decree. In this manner, this second appeal has been filed by the appellants. ( 11. ) I have heard Shri Deepak Sharma, learned counsel for the appellants and also heard Smt. Rashmi Pandit and Shri S. D. Bohare, learned Government advocates for respondents 1 to 6, Shri M. L. Pathak, Advocate for respondent no. 7 and Shri Ashok Kutumble, Senior Advocate with Shri Amit Purohit, Advocate for respondent no. 14. ( 12. ( 11. ) I have heard Shri Deepak Sharma, learned counsel for the appellants and also heard Smt. Rashmi Pandit and Shri S. D. Bohare, learned Government advocates for respondents 1 to 6, Shri M. L. Pathak, Advocate for respondent no. 7 and Shri Ashok Kutumble, Senior Advocate with Shri Amit Purohit, Advocate for respondent no. 14. ( 12. ) I have also heard Shri Z. A. Haque, the learned counsel for the appellants in second Appeal No-496/2005. ( 13. ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the learned trial Court has allowed the application on three grounds that, (1) the suit of plaintiff is hit by the doctrine of lis pendens; (2) barred by the dictum of res judicata; and (3) the plaintiff is not having any cause of action to file the suit and, hence the plaint has been rejected. The Appellate Court has also affirmed* the order of learned Trial Court. The contention of learned counsel is that this could hardly be a ground to allow the application under Order VII Rule 11, CPC and to reject the plaint at the threshold. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has placed heavy reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court State of orrisa v. Klockner and Co. , AIR 1996 SC 2140 . ( 14. ) ON the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents argued in support of the impugned judgment and submitted that the cogent reasons have been assigned by the learned two Courts below in passing the impugned judgment and no interference is required since no substantial question of law is involved in this appeal, therefore, this appeal and connected second appeals be dismissed. In support of their contention, the learned counsel have placed reliance on the decisions Smt. Sulochana v. Rajendra Singh, 2008 (4) MPHT 136 (SC); Arjan singh v. Punit Ahluwalia, 2009 (1) MPLJ 495; Kedarnath v. Sheonarain, AIR 1970 SC 1717 ; and Sales Tax Commissioner, lndore v. M/s. J. Singh, AIR 1967 SC 1454 . ( 15. In support of their contention, the learned counsel have placed reliance on the decisions Smt. Sulochana v. Rajendra Singh, 2008 (4) MPHT 136 (SC); Arjan singh v. Punit Ahluwalia, 2009 (1) MPLJ 495; Kedarnath v. Sheonarain, AIR 1970 SC 1717 ; and Sales Tax Commissioner, lndore v. M/s. J. Singh, AIR 1967 SC 1454 . ( 15. ) LEARNED counsel for the respondents have further invited my attention by submitting a certified copy of the judgment of the High Court of judicature at bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur in Second Appeal No. 529/05 (Amiruddin Hasan noorani Malak Saheh v. Salimhhai Mukhtar Jafarbhai Chimthanawala and others) dated August 24, 2007, directing Wakf Board to take note of recitals of paragraph 3 of the joint pursis mentioned in the order and in view of the Joint pursis all Civil Applications were stood disposed of. ( 16. ) HAVING heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that this appeal and the connected Second Appeals No-494/05 (Khan Ali and others v. State of Maharashtra and others) and No. 496/05 (Sajjad Hussain v. State of maharashtra and others) deserve to be dismissed since no substantial question of law is involved in these appeals. ( 17. ) THE learned counsel for the appellants did not dispute that in the earlier round of litigation, the predecessor of the plaintiff was party. The said litigation attained finality. The Supreme Court has categorically held in Paragraph 9 of the order that the properties. mentioned in Ex. P/249 are Trusts properties and the said finding has become final and it is not open to contend that the properties mentioned in Ex. P/249 is not the Public Trusts properties. The learned counsel for the appellants did not dispute rather has admitted that the suit property is also included in Ex. P/249. This decision of Supreme Court has been reported in salimbhai Mukhtar Jafarbhai Chimthanawala v. Amiruddin S/o Hasan Noorani and anr. , 1991 (1) SCALE, 389. ( 18. ) LEARNED counsel for the appellants has also admitted passing of the order of high Court of judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur, in Second Appeal no. 529/05 dated 24. 8,2007. ( 19. ) IN the earlier round of litigation, Hasan Noorani, who is the father of defendant-respondent no. 20, was the party and during the pendency of the earlier litigation, the plaintiff-appellant bought the suit property on 23. 529/05 dated 24. 8,2007. ( 19. ) IN the earlier round of litigation, Hasan Noorani, who is the father of defendant-respondent no. 20, was the party and during the pendency of the earlier litigation, the plaintiff-appellant bought the suit property on 23. 6. 1979. Thus, the plaintiff purchased the suit property from a person who was already a party in earlier round of litigation, which travelled up to the Supreme Court and the point was put to rest, since in Ex. P/249 of the earlier suit, the Supreme Court has categorically held that for all practical purposes, the properties mentioned in this Exhibit (including the suit property) is the Trusts property and, therefore, now the plaintiff cannot re-agitate this point by filing the present suit. ( 20. ) THE learned counsel for the appellants could not point out that how and in what manner, the judgment passed in the earlier suit is not binding on him. Merely suit has been filed on the basis of alleged fraud, according to me, in view of the finding of the Supreme Court on Ex. P/249 and since the suit property has been sold by the predecessor of defendant no. 20 and because the predecessor of defendant no. 20 was the party in the earlier suit, the doctrine of lis pendens would be applicable as well as the decision passed in earlier suit would also operate as res judicata in the present suit. ( 21. ) ON reading of the plaint it appears to be manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue and therefore, the Trial Court has rightly exercised its power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned in the said provision is fulfillea. ( 22. ) UNDER Order VII Rule 11 CPC, a plaint shall be rejected on the ground mentioned in the Rule, but the instances as given cannot be regarded as exhaustive of all the cases, in which the Court can reject the plaint or is limiting the inherent powers of the Court in respect thereof. The provisions of Order VII Rule 11 CPC are procedural and they are enacted with an aim and object to prevent vexatious and frivolous litigation. The provisions of Order VII Rule 11 CPC are procedural and they are enacted with an aim and object to prevent vexatious and frivolous litigation. The Court is also required to see that the vexatious and frivolous litigation should not be allowed to proceed so as to kill the time of the court for nothing. ( 23. ) ACCORDING to me, the given case in hand is nothing but a vexatious and frivolous litigation, which is not permitted to proceed. ( 24. ) I have gone through the reasonings assigned by the learned Appellate Court dismissing the appeal and I find those reasonings to be cogent. The decision of klockner (Supra) placed reliance by the learned counsel for the appellants speaks that the powers under Order VII Rule 11 (a), CPC should not be exercised only on the ground that the plaintiff has no cause of action. According to me, the said decision is not applicable because taking the cumulative effect, apart from the reasonings, which have been assigned by the learned First Appellate Court and by this Court hereinabove, the plaint does not disclose a cause of action. Mere writing that the plaintiff is having cause of action would in itself is not sufficient to hold that the plaintiff has disclosed the cause of action. If all the circumstances are taken into cumulative effect, I am of the view that plaint does not disclose any cause of action. ( 25. ) FOR the reasons stated hereinabove, this appeal and the connected second Appeals No. 494/05 (Khan AH and others v. State of Maharashtra and others) and No-496/05 (Sajjacl Hussain v. State of Maharashtra and others) are hereby dismissed since no substantial question of law is involved in these appeals. Appeal dismissed.