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2009 DIGILAW 832 (MAD)

Then Indiya Tharaivazhi Pokkuvarathu Uzhiyargal Sangam, rep. by its General Secretary, Chennai v. ACC Concrete Limited, rep. by its Facatory Manager & Another

2009-03-26

K.N.BASHA

body2009
Judgment The petitioner has come forward with this petition seeking for clarification and modification of the order passed by this Court in Cri. O.P.No. 3194 of 2009 dated 12. 2009, directing the second respondent in this petition to give police protection to the first respondent herein to carry out their lawful activities in respect of their business affairs for removing materials, operating the Vehicles and for having free ingress and egress to take the materials and officials and for making arrangements for the inspection by the statutory body namely, Sales Tax Authorit5ies and the official’s of the other statutory bodies, to the-extent that the workers are given employment and salary for the last three months failing which they should not be given police protection to take away the goods and machineries. 2. Mr. N.G.R.Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner vehemently contended that the first respondent suppressed certain material facts in respect of dispute between the employees and management. It is also submitted that the first respondent has not permitted the workers to work in the factory and has also not paid their lawful wages and more over, the first respondent has not followed the directions given by the Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Chennai dated 12. 2008. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that taking advantage of the order passed by this Court, the first respondent has obtained police protection from the second respondent and threatened the workers and also indirectly denied work to the members of the petitioner Sangam in the factory as well as denied their lawful wages to be paid. It is also contended by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that in view of such denial by the first respondent, the members of the petitioner Sangam have been put into great hardship and irreparable loss and as such, the petitioner sangam has come forward with this petition seeking for clarification and modification of the order passed by this Court dated 12. 2009. 3. Mr. 2009. 3. Mr. V. Karthick, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent, on the other hand, contended that the order was passed by this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. directing the second respondent to give adequate police protection to the life of the first respondent’s company management personnel, officials, staff and other workmen enabling them to carry out their lawful activities in respect of their business affairs for removing materials, operating the vehicles and for having free ingress and egress to take the materials and officials and for making arrangements for the inspection by the statutory body namely, Sales Tax Authorities and the officials of the other statutory bodies. It is contended that the first respondent has not suppressed any material facts and only sought for police protection to carry out their lawful business affairs as they have apprehended that the workers attached to the petitioner Sangam may indulge in causing disturbance to the law and order situation. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the first respondent that in view of specific bar under Section 362 Cr.P.C, the order already passed by this Court cannot be reviewed or modified. It is also submitted that the prayer made in this petition by the petitioner would amount to reviewing the order of this Court dated 12. 2009 and as such, the petition itself is not maintainable. 4. I have carefully considered the rival sub-missions made by both sides and also perused the typed set of papers filed in support of this petition and other connected materials including the earlier order passed by this Court dated 12. 2009. 5. The fact remains that this Court passed the order on 12. 2009 on the basis of the materials placed before it viz. averments made in the petition as well as representations of the company dated 12. 2008 and 2. 2009 made before the police viz. the second respondent herein seeking for the relief of police protection. Admittedly, there was a dispute between the management and the workers and as the Management expressed apprehension of likelihood of breach of peace, this Court thought it fit to direct the second respondent to give police protection to the first respondent company for carrying out their lawful business affairs. Now the petitioner has come forward with this petition seeking for the relief of clarification and modification of the order passed by this Court dated 12. Now the petitioner has come forward with this petition seeking for the relief of clarification and modification of the order passed by this Court dated 12. 2009 on the ground that the first respondent suppressed certain material facts in respect of the dispute to the effect that the management denied employment and wages to the workers. Therefore, it is contended that the petitioner has come forward with this petition seeking for the relief of modification and clarification of the order passed by this Court 12. 2009. In order to consider such contention and prayer, it is relevant to refer the provision under Section 362 Cr.P.C, which reads hereunder: “362. Court not to alter judgment-Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error”. A reading of the above said Section makes it crystal clear that once an order is passed, more particularly in a criminal matter, this Court cannot alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetic error. 6. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State rep. by D.S.P., S.B.C.I.D., Chennai, v. K.V.Rajendran (2008) AIR SCW 6911 by following the earlier decisions held as follows: “18. Section 482 enables the High Court to make such order as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The inherent powers, however, as much are controlled by principle and precedent as are its express powers by statutes. If a matter is covered by an express letter of law, the Court cannot give a go-by to the statutory provisions and instead evolve a new provision in the garb of inherent jurisdiction. 19. In the case of Smt. Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lai and Another AIR 1981 SC 736 L1981) SCC (Cr) 188 : (1981) I MLJ(Crl)392, this Court held “that the inherent power of the Court cannot be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code.” 20. 19. In the case of Smt. Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lai and Another AIR 1981 SC 736 L1981) SCC (Cr) 188 : (1981) I MLJ(Crl)392, this Court held “that the inherent power of the Court cannot be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code.” 20. Similar view was expressed in the case of Sankatha Singh v. State of U.P. AIR 1962 SC 1208 : (1962)Supp.2SCR 817 : (1963) I MLJ (Crl) 473, in which it was held: “It is true that the prohibition in Section 362 against the Court altering or reviewing its judgments is subject to what is “otherwise provided by this Code of by any other law for the time being in force.” Those words, however, refer to those provisions only where the Court has been expressly authorized by the Code or other law to alter or review its judgment. The inherent power of the Court is not contemplated by the saving provision contained in Section 362 and, therefore, the attempt to invoke that power can be of no avail.” 7. In view of the settle principle of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the decision cited supra, this Court cannot modify or clarify the earlier order passed by this Court dated 12. 2009. The prayer of the petitioner seeking for the relief of clarification and modification of the earlier order passed by this Court dated 12. 2009 to the extent that the workers are given employment and salary for the last three months failing which they should not be given police protection to take away the goods and machineries would definitely amount to reviewing the order passed by this Court. Therefore, for the aforesaid reasons, this petition is liable to be dismissed. 8. However, it is made clear that it is open to the petitioner to work out their remedies by taking appropriate action including preferring a complaint to the concerned police in accordance with law in view of the contention of the workers that they have denied their lawful claim of employment and wages. With the above said observations, this petition is hereby dismissed.