JUDGMENT (Per A. Gopal Reddy, J.) Defendants 11 to 13, namely, Government of Andhra Pradesh represented by its District Collector, Medak District at Sangareddy, Revenue Divisional Officer-cum-Land Reforms Tribunal, Sangareddy, and Mandal Revenue Officer, Sangareddy respectively, in O.S.No.14 of 2003 filed this appeal challenging the judgment and decree of the District Judge, Medak at Sangareddy dt. 15-4-2004, whereunder the suit filed by the plaintiffs, who are respondents 1 to 5 herein, to declare that they are in lawful possession over the suit schedule land; to grant perpetual injunction restraining defendants 11 to 13 from dispossessing them from the suit schedule land and to declare that the plaintiffs 1 to 5 are entitled to get their names recorded in Record of Rights for having purchased the suit schedule land from their vendors, namely, defendants 5 to 10, was decreed. 2. This case has had a chequered history and is a classic example how unscrupulous litigants hoodwink the laws and exploit the loopholes in the legal system to their advantage. 3. The relevant facts as per the pleadings and evidence are summarized as under: Originally the land bearing S.Nos.450 to 452, 454, 455, 460, 461, 464 and 468 measuring about 300 acres situated at Kandi village, Sangareddy Mandal belonged to Syed Saduddin and they were in possession of Syed Khaja Azeemuddin and Syed Anwarulla. Maharaja Yadavender Singh, who died on 11-6-1974, purchased the said land popularly known as M/s. Yadavendra Plantations and raised a loan from State Bank of India, Shamsheergunj Branch, Hyderabad (4th defendant) by mortgaging the said land for the purpose of development. For non-payment of loan amount, the fourth defendant-bank filed mortgage suit, O.S.No.27/1973 on the file of Subordinate Judge, Sangareddy, which was decreed on 29-8-1975 and a preliminary decree was passed. Later, on 5-8-1976 a final decree was also passed in LA.No.145/76. In spite of final decree, the defendants 1 to 3 neither redeemed the property nor discharged the decretal amount. On enforcing Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 (hereinafter called as "the Ceiling Act"), which came into force with effect from 1-1-1975, the owners of land, namely, M/s. Yadavendra Plantations, owned by defendants 1 to 3 (2 major sons and widow of Maharaja Yada Vender Singh), filed three declarations under Section 8(1) of the Ceiling Act before the Land Reforms Tribunal, Sangareddy. On enquiry, the Land Reforms Tribunal held that out of 300 acres owned by M/s. Yadavendra Plantations, 148.74 acres of land was surplus land, excess than the ceiling limit, and is liable to be surrendered to the Government vide C.C.Nos.2325 to 2327/S/75 dt. 22-7-77. State Bank of India is not a party to the proceedings before the Land Reforms Tribunal. The Bank, against the orders of the Land Reforms Tribunal accepting the surrender of the excess land to an extent of Ac. 148.74 cents, filed three appeals, LRA Nos. 328 to 330 of 1976, before the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad, contending that Bank was not given an opportunity to put forth its case before the Primary Tribunal i.e., Land Reforms Tribunal. The Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal accepting the contention of the Bank remanded the matter for fresh enquiry with a direction to give an opportunity to the Bank and finalize the proceedings. After such remand, the Primary Tribunal after hearing the objections of the Bank and after considering the material on record, recorded the same finding by its order dt. 22-7-1977 and accepted the surrender of aforesaid 148-74 acres of land. Thereupon, the declarants filed LRA No.746/77 and the Bank filed LRA Nos. 773 to 775 of 1977 before the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal, Medak at Sangareddy against upholding its earlier order passed by the Primary Tribunal. The Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal by its order dt. 9-11-1977 disposed of all the appeals directing the decree holder-Bank to proceed, in the first instance, against the properties which are not surrendered and which are still in the possession of the judgment-debtors (declarants) and if the sale proceeds do not satisfy the claim of the Bank, then they may proceed against the lands that are surrendered by the declarants to the Government for realizing the balance of the amount due to the Bank from the declarants. Thereafter, the decree holder (Bank) filed an execution petition and brought the un-surrendered lands to sale. As the decree holder (Bank) has not realized the decretal amount, the judgment-debtors (declarants) filed E.A.No.27/1980 before the executing, court (Subordinate Judge, Sanga Reddy) under Order XXI Rule 83 CPC seeking permission to sell the un-surrendered land by private negotiations, which was allowed on 30-6-1980. Accordingly, the unsurrendered lands were sold by private negotiations, but the sale proceeds did not satisfy the decree. Accordingly, the unsurrendered lands were sold by private negotiations, but the sale proceeds did not satisfy the decree. The Judgment-debtors (declarants) filed another petition, E.A.No.51/81, seeking permission to sell the surrendered land by private negotiations, which was allowed on 21-7-1981. The surrendered lands were sold and sale proceeds were deposited in the executing court on 22-7-1981. Aggrieved by orders passed in E.A.No.51/81 dt. 21-7-81, and before sale was confirmed and certificates of sales were issued by the executing court, the Government filed E.A.No.68/81 in E.P.No.24/81 under Order XXI Rule 90 read with Section 151 CPC to set-aside the private sale entered into between the Judgment Debtors (Declarants) and the purchasers. The Executing Court by an elaborate order dt.7-8-1981 allowed E.A.No.68/1981 and set aside the private sale ordered on 21-7-1981. Questioning the same, the Judgment Debtors (declarants) filed C.R.P.No.3364 of 1981 before this court (Ex.A-36). In the affidavit filed by the Joint Collector, Medak District in support of E.A.No.68/1981, it was contended that the surrendered lands have already vested in the State without any encumbrance and hence they are not liable to be sold. It was further contended that the order passed in E.A.No.51/81 dt. 21-7-1981 is an ex parte order, inasmuch as the State was not given notice before granting permission and it is liable to be set-aside. This court by order dt. 21-4-1982 allowed the revision and remanded the matter to the lower court (executing court) to dispose of the matter afresh by giving opportunity to adduce evidence holding that the matter requires enquiry whether there ware any irregularities in conducting the sale. 4. On remanding the matter to the executing court (Subordinate Judge, Medak at Sangareddy) for fresh enquiry, the District Court, Medak at Sangareddy transferred E.A.No.68/81 and E.P.No.24/81 from the file of Subordinate Judge, Medak at Sangareddy to the Subordinate Judge, Medak, where they were renumbered as E.A.No.6/1984 and E.P.No.9/1984 respectively. Before the Subordinate Judge, Medak, Exs.A-1 to A-36 and Exs.B-1 to B-11 were marked. The executing court after considering the evidence adduced by the parties, by its order dt. 19-12-1984 (Ex.B-37) came to the conclusion that the surrendered lands were sold under private sale for an inadequate consideration by playing fraud and thereby caused substantial injury to the State and hence they are not sustainable, and allowed E.A.No.6/1984 setting aside the private sale made by the Judgment-Debtors. 8y the aforesaid order, the earlier order dt. 19-12-1984 (Ex.B-37) came to the conclusion that the surrendered lands were sold under private sale for an inadequate consideration by playing fraud and thereby caused substantial injury to the State and hence they are not sustainable, and allowed E.A.No.6/1984 setting aside the private sale made by the Judgment-Debtors. 8y the aforesaid order, the earlier order dt. 7-8-1981 setting aside the order passed in E.A.No.51/81 dt. 21-7-1981 stood vindicted. Once again the purchasers carried the matter in revision before this court in CRP No.495 of 1985 (Ex.A-38). A learned single Judge of this court, Justice K. Ramaswamy (as he then was) after considering the matter exhaustively dismissed the revision by order dt. 18-7-1986. The result is order dt. 21-7-1981 permitting the declarants to sell the surrendered land by private negotiations has been set-aside. The said order passed by this court in CRP No.495 of 1985 dt. 18-7-1986 has become final. Thereafter, the executing court instead of treating the proposal of the judgment debtors (declarants) to sell the surrendered land by private negotiations as closed entertained E.A.Nos.225/87, 11/89, 12/89, 13/89, 14/89 and 15/89 filed by certain purchasers (vendors of the plaintiffs) for issue of sale certificates by confirming the sale, which was already held to be irregular and set-aside. The executing court instead of dismissing E.As vide its order dt. 21-2-1989 ordered for issuance of sale certificates. Later the declarants filed E.A.No.34/89 in E.P. No.9/84 under Order 21 Rule 83 and Sections 47 and 151 CPC to indicate the range of price practicable and confirm the same and issue sales certificates m favour of the purchasers which was allowed on 1-4-1989 by the executing Court fixing Rs. 7000/- per acre as reasonable price instead of Rs. 3600/- and ordered to issue sale certificates by confirming the sale. The sale certificates were issued in favour of the purchasers on 20-4-1989 and the possession was delivered through court. After getting possession on 10-1-1990, the auction purchasers sold the property to the plaintiffs. While so, the District Collector, Medak District filed an application to set aside the order dt. 21-2-1989 passed in E.A.Nos. 225/87, 11/89, 12/89 to 15/89 in E.P. No.9/84 with an application, E.A.No.551/92, to condone delay of 605 days in filing the application to set-aside the above order. The said delay condonation petition, E.A. No.551/92, was dismissed on 3-12-1993. Against which, no appeal has been preferred. 5. 21-2-1989 passed in E.A.Nos. 225/87, 11/89, 12/89 to 15/89 in E.P. No.9/84 with an application, E.A.No.551/92, to condone delay of 605 days in filing the application to set-aside the above order. The said delay condonation petition, E.A. No.551/92, was dismissed on 3-12-1993. Against which, no appeal has been preferred. 5. Meanwhile, Land Reforms Tribunal passed an order directing the Mandal Revenue Officer, Sanga Reddy to prepare appropriate proposals and to get the proposals approved and to give physical possession to the beneficiaries and report compliance to the Collector, Medak District, vide orders dt. 9-4-1992 in CCNo.2325 to 2327/S/75. Questioning the correctness of the said order, plaintiffs herein and others filed LRA No.34/1992 before the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal, Medak at Sangareddy. The Appellate Tribunal by its order dated 7-2-1994 (Ex.A-31) allowed the appeal setting aside the order passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal (Revenue Divisional Officer) Sanga Reddy dt. 9-4-1992 in CCNos.2325 to 2327/S/75. Questioning the orders passed by the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal dt. 7-2-1994, the appellants/defendants 11 to 13 filed CR.P.N o. 4627 of 1997 before this court. This court by its order dt. 2-7-1998 allowed the revision holding that the lands under mortgage to Bank are not exempted from the operation of the Ceiling Act and the effect of vesting is that they vest in the Government free from all encumbrances including the liability under the mortgage subject to a right to the mortgagee enforcing liability against the amount payable under the Ceiling Act or of any other property of the owner. This court further held that by legal fiction surrendered land vested in the State without any encumbrances by way of mortgage stood transformed into the amount payable under the Ceiling Act. The order passed by the Subordinate Judge, Medak dt. 21-2-1989 in E.A.Nos.225/1987 and batch confirming the sale by private negotiations and issuing sale certificates is in utter disregard to the orders of this court in CRP No. 495 of 1985 dt. 18-7-1986 and it is without jurisdiction and non-est and the claim of the purchasers, if any, on confirming the sale is only to proceed against the amount payable under the Ceiling Act. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiffs carried the matter in Civil Appeal No.1881 of 1999 before the Honourable Supreme Court. The Supreme Court by an elaborate order dt. 18-7-1986 and it is without jurisdiction and non-est and the claim of the purchasers, if any, on confirming the sale is only to proceed against the amount payable under the Ceiling Act. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiffs carried the matter in Civil Appeal No.1881 of 1999 before the Honourable Supreme Court. The Supreme Court by an elaborate order dt. 16-4-2003 dismissed the appeal holding that even if it is assumed that the learned single Judge exceeded in his jurisdiction by passing the impugned judgment and this court may not interfere with the same as the setting aside of the judgment of the learned single Judge in CRP No.4627 of 1997 dt. 2-7-1998 would result in resurrection of a series of other illegal orders passed by the Subordinate Courts. 6. On dismissal of the appeal by the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs instituted the above suit for the reliefs claimed as aforementioned contending that the executing court in E.A.No.9/1984 has not held that the Bank cannot proceed against the lands covered by E.P.No. 9/1984 to realize the decretal amount since the order passed in LRA Nos. 773 to 775 of 1977dt. 9-11-1977 has become final in so far as the right of the Bank to proceed with recovery of its loan amount by selling the so called surrendered lands. The executing court permitted the bank to sell suit schedule property under attachment and purchasers-defendants 5 to 10 deposited the amount fixed by the court at Rs.7000/- per acre against its earlier value at Rs. 3600/- and on confirmation of sale and on issuance of sale certificates possession was also delivered, and the plaintiffs who are bona fide purchasers purchased the said property from defendants 5 to 10. On dismissal of E.A.No.551/92 filed for condoning delay to set aside the orders passed issuing sale certificates, the State has not carried the matter in appeal and thus the said order has become final. On dismissal of E.A.No.551/92 filed for condoning delay to set aside the orders passed issuing sale certificates, the State has not carried the matter in appeal and thus the said order has become final. On filling LRA No.34/92 they requested the authorities to allow them to peruse the file relating to surrender proceedings including receipt of the orders of the Primary Tribunal, declarations or surrender statements and panchanama of taking possession of the land by the Primary Tribunal in pursuance of the so called surrender statement, but the authorities did not permit the plaintiffs to peruse the same on the ground that they are not the parties to the declaration proceedings, which goes to show that there are no such documents. There is no record evidencing taking possession of the land. When the suit schedule properties are in possession of the Government they would definitely raise an objection in E.P. No.9/84. Taking possession of the land as surplus land is barred by limitation since the orders have been passed in 1977. On allowing LRA No.34/92, the defendants 11 to 13 carried the mater in CRP No.4627 of 1997, in which the High Court has not observed anything contrary to the rights and possession of the plaintiffs over the suit schedule lands nor any direction was issued in favour of the defendants 11 to 13 to dispossess the plaintiffs. The same was confirmed by the Honourable Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 1881 of 1999, but there is no direction to the defendants 11 to 13 or any body to dispossess the plaintiffs from the suit schedule land without due process of law. They are the bona fide purchasers, without notice of earlier dispute, as such they are entitled to protect their possession, which they secured from their vendors defendants 5 to 10 who got possession from the court. 7. Defendants 1 to 3, 6 to 8 and 10 remained ex parte. Defendants 5 and 9 though represented by a counsel did not choose to file their written statement. Defendant No.4 filed a separate written statement. Defendant No.12 filed a written statement on behalf of himself and defendants 11 and 13. 8. 7. Defendants 1 to 3, 6 to 8 and 10 remained ex parte. Defendants 5 and 9 though represented by a counsel did not choose to file their written statement. Defendant No.4 filed a separate written statement. Defendant No.12 filed a written statement on behalf of himself and defendants 11 and 13. 8. The fourth defendant-Bank though admitted the ownership of defendants 1 to 3 and mortgage of the suit schedule properties with the Bank for the loan obtained pleaded that they are not aware of defendants 1 to 3 filing declarations and were declaring them as surplus landholders under the Ceiling Act. For recovery of the mortgage amount, the fourth defendant filed O.S.No.27/1973 and obtained a preliminary decree and later final decree. In the appeal filed before the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal against the orders of the Land Reforms Tribunal accepting the surrender, the Bank contended that it has first charge on the mortgage and they may be proceeded against the surrendered lands, at first, of defendants 1 to 3 for due realization of the mortgage debt. The Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal permitted the Bank to proceed against the un-surrendered lands which are still in the possession of the declarants in the first instance and if the sale proceeds do not satisfy the claim they may proceed against the lands that are surrendered by the declarants. The fourth defendant filed E.P.No.24/81 to recover balance of decretal amount by selling the remaining lands admeasuring lands ad-measuring Ac.149-22 cents since declarants have excess surplus land and the executing court permitted the fourth defendant to sell the same for recovery of the decretal amount by way of private negotiations and the sale was confirmed in E.A.No.51/81 and at that stage defendant No.11 filed E.A.No.68/81 in E.P. No. 24/81 for setting aside the private sale ordered on 21-7-1981. Aggrieved by the same, the auction purchasers filed CRP No.3364 of 1981 and same was allowed and remanded to the executing court. Defendants 5 to 10 who are auction purchasers deposited the amount fixed at Rs. 7000/- per acre. Against confirmation of sale and delivery of possession, no appeal or revision has been preferred. The fourth defendant is not aware of the plaintiffs preferring CRP and subsequent proceedings thereof. 9. Defendants 5 to 10 who are auction purchasers deposited the amount fixed at Rs. 7000/- per acre. Against confirmation of sale and delivery of possession, no appeal or revision has been preferred. The fourth defendant is not aware of the plaintiffs preferring CRP and subsequent proceedings thereof. 9. Defendant No.12 filed a written statement on behalf of himself and defendants 11 and 13 while narrating the events which took place from the date of declaration till orders were set-aside by the High Court in C.R.P.No.4627 of 97 and dismissal of SLP by the Supreme Court contended that on the declarations filed by defendants 1 to 3 they were declared as surplus land holders to an extent of AC.148-74 cents. Harichand Singh, the agent of the defendants 1 to 3/declarants filed statement of surrender of lands required under the law on 8-10-1975 and the possession of the said land was taken on 25-2-1976 in Form-X prescribed under the Ceiling Act, which has been confirmed by the Supreme Court. On dismissal of Civil Appeal No.1881 of 99 dt. 16-4-2003 the plaintiffs cannot re-agitate the same. The Civil Court's jurisdiction is barred to question any order or proceedings taken by any of the authorities under the Ceiling Act in view of Section 26 of the Ceiling Act. Grant of sale certificates was set-aside by the High Court in CR.P.N 0.4627 of 97, which has been confirmed by the Supreme Court. 10. On filing written statement by D-12, the plaintiffs filed a rejoinder stating that the stand of D-12 as to the dates of order of surrender and acceptance are self contradictory and manifest the fraud played by the Government. The Government has played a fraud in passing an order by the Land Reforms Tribunal and the Land Reforms Tribunal did not follow the procedure prescribed under the Statute and it cannot claim that the land is vested in it without surrender by the declarants. In the absence of any mandatory notice under Form No.6 served on the declarants or any other notice required under the Statute, to save the skin the defendant No.12 has introduced one Harichand Singh as the agent of defendants 1 to 3 and it is for them to prove the competency of Harichand Singh to surrender the land on behalf of defendants 1 to 3. The Tribunal has not followed the procedure prescribed under the Ceiling Act. The Tribunal has not followed the procedure prescribed under the Ceiling Act. In the absence of any change effected in the revenue records, the Government is not in possession of the property. Fraudulent acts have been suppressed before High Court as well as the Supreme Court and there was no occasion for the High Court or the Supreme Court to consider the fraudulent acts of the State in taking the surplus land. The very surrender and acceptance of the land and vesting in the Government and even passing the order declaring D-1 to D-3 as surplus landholders is a fraud and they are null and void, as such there is no land of D-1 to D-3 vested in the Government and as long as the land is not vested in the Government, it cannot be held to be in possession of the Government. Fraud was not brought to the notice of High Court in C.R.P.No.4627 of 97 and before Supreme Court in C.A.No.1881 of 99 and it was noticed after filing the written statement by D-12. The orders passed by High Court and Supreme Court are not binding on defendants 1 to 3 since they are not parties to the said proceedings, therefore suit has to be decreed as prayed for. 11. On the above pleadings, the trial court framed the following issues for trial: 1. Whether the plaintiffs are in lawful possession of the suit schedule lands on the date of suit? 2. Whether the defendants 1 to 3 have surrendered the lands before the Tribunal and the Tribunal selected and accepted the same? 3. Whether the matter is barred by res judicata in view of orders in LRSNo.773 to 746 of 1977 and E.A.No.53 of 92 on the file of Sub-Court, Medak? 4. Whether the plaintiffs are the bona fide purchasers in peaceful possession? 5. Whether the court is having jurisdiction to entertain the suit? 6. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to declare them as owners of the suit schedule lands and they are entitled for the consequential relief of injunction? 7. Whether there was any misrepresentation, suppression of facts and fraud on the part of defendants, if so, what is its effect? 8. To what relief? 12. In order to substantiate the case of the plaintiffs, the third plaintiff himself examined as P.W.1 and their GPA as P.W.2 and marked Exs.A-1 to A-8. 7. Whether there was any misrepresentation, suppression of facts and fraud on the part of defendants, if so, what is its effect? 8. To what relief? 12. In order to substantiate the case of the plaintiffs, the third plaintiff himself examined as P.W.1 and their GPA as P.W.2 and marked Exs.A-1 to A-8. on behalf of the defendants 1 to 3, D.W.1 was examined and Exs.B-1 to B-16 were marked. 13. The trial court after considering the oral and documentary evidence and after hearing the arguments on both sides, on issue No.5, held that civil court has jurisdiction to try the suit since the evidence adduced by the parties shows that the Primary Tribunal under the Ceiling Act has not followed the prescribed mandatory provisions of law and has not acted in conformity with the fundamental judicial principles and procedure laid down under the Ceiling Act. The trial Court on issue No.7 held that there is no record to show regarding service of mandatory notice before taking possession and there is no panchanama showing that the possession of the land was taken by the Government. When the Government represented before the Appellate Tribunal that the defendants 1 to 3 have surrendered their lands and surrender was accepted and possession was taken and as such the lands are vested in the Government suppressing the fact that the surrender statement was not signed by declarants and the same was signed by a stranger, Harichand Singh who has no authority. When the plaintiffs have distinctly pleaded in their pleadings and proved that defendants 11 and 12 played fraud, and the judgments obtained from the Honourable High Court in CR.P and the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.1881 of 99 by suppressing material facts amount to fraud. In view of answering issue No.7 in favour of the plaintiffs, issue No.2 was answered in favour of the plaintiffs holding that the defendants 1 to 3 have not surrendered the land and it was not vested in the Government. On issue No.3, it was held that once the judgment of the High Court in CR.P.No.4627 of 1997 and Supreme Court in CA.No.1881 of 99 were obtained by fraud and misrepresentation, judgment in LRA Nos. 773 to 775 of 1997 automatically revived, and it is not open that the said orders have been set-aside. On issue No.3, it was held that once the judgment of the High Court in CR.P.No.4627 of 1997 and Supreme Court in CA.No.1881 of 99 were obtained by fraud and misrepresentation, judgment in LRA Nos. 773 to 775 of 1997 automatically revived, and it is not open that the said orders have been set-aside. When the plaintiffs have been in possession of the suit schedule property from the date of purchase and prior to that their purchasers, they are entitled to declaration and holding so decreed the suit. 14. Learned Special Government Pleader for the appellants submitted that when the defendants 1 to 3/declarants have been declared as surplus landholders under the Ceiling Act, whatever rights the bank, which obtained mortgage decree over the suit schedule land, will have, can only be claimed by the vendors of the plaintiffs or the plaintiffs. Since the bank or the original declarants have not questioned the validity of finalization of declarations/surrender proceedings, the plaintiffs who purchased the suit schedule property from defendants 5 to 10 are not the bona fide purchasers and will not acquire better rights than their vendors. When the executing court set-aside the sale by its order dt. 19-12-1984 by allowing E.A.No.6/81 permitting to sell surrender land by private negotiations, which has been confirmed in CR.P.No.495 of 85, sale certificates issued after said date are nullity and any proceedings undertaken thereafter will be non-est in the eye of law, as held by this court in CR.P.No.4627 of 97, which has been confirmed by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 1881 of 1999. In view of the same, the present suit filed by the plaintiffs to declare that they are in possession basing on the sale certificates, which were held to be illegal, is not maintainable. The learned trial court cannot go into the validity or correctness of the surrender proceedings in view of the jurisdictional bar envisaged under Section 26 of the Ceiling Act. To buttress the said submission, reliance is placed on the judgment of this court in Ramaiah v. Venkata Reddy (1) 1978 (2) ALT 413 (D.B). 15. Per contra, Sri J.V. Suryanarayana, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents plaintiffs strenuously contended that the surplus lands never vested in the Government for non-observing the rules/formalities contemplated for vesting the lands in Government. To buttress the said submission, reliance is placed on the judgment of this court in Ramaiah v. Venkata Reddy (1) 1978 (2) ALT 413 (D.B). 15. Per contra, Sri J.V. Suryanarayana, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents plaintiffs strenuously contended that the surplus lands never vested in the Government for non-observing the rules/formalities contemplated for vesting the lands in Government. To buttress the said submission, a strong reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in D. Ramakrishna Reddy v. Add1. Revenue Divisional Officers (2) (2000) 7 SCC 12 = 2000 (5) AL T 24.2 (DNSC). Since no-where stated that any statement of Form-IX has been served on the declarants and Form No.VII has not been issued as contemplated under Rule 16, there is no surrender at all and there is no evidence to show that Harichand Singh is the agent of declarants/defendants 1 to 3 and service of notice on him and surrender of land by him is invalid. Since there are no proceedings of surrender by declarants, declarations have not attained any finality. The evidence of D.W.1 clearly shows that the proceedings did not go beyond Form No.VII and the illegality in surrender is known to Collector and when the lands have not been vested in the State, affidavit filed by him that the land is vested in State amounts to misrepresentation and therefore all subsequent proceedings are vitiated. For the said proposition, a reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in State of A.P. v. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao (3) (2000) 3 SCC 689 . When the Statutory Tribunal is expropriating the land, it has to strictly follow the procedure contemplated under law. Since the required procedure has not been followed the civil court will have jurisdiction to go into to declare the proceedings as nullity. For the said proportion, reliance is placed on the following judgments: 1. CCE v. Orient Fabrics (P) Ltd. (4) (2004) 1 SCC 597 2. CIT v. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala (5) (2002) 1 SCC 633 3. Nawabkhan v. State of Gujarat (6) AIR 1974 SC 1471 4. Hanmanth Reddy v. Nagamma (7) 1983 (1) ALT 199 Since the plaintiffs are not aware of the proceedings under the Ceiling Act, bar contained under Section 26 of the Ceiling Act has no application and they can always maintain a suit. Nawabkhan v. State of Gujarat (6) AIR 1974 SC 1471 4. Hanmanth Reddy v. Nagamma (7) 1983 (1) ALT 199 Since the plaintiffs are not aware of the proceedings under the Ceiling Act, bar contained under Section 26 of the Ceiling Act has no application and they can always maintain a suit. For the said proposition, a reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in Bhaurao Dagdu Paralkar v. State of Maharashtra (8) 2005 (6) SCJ 638 = (2005) 7 SCC 605 = 2005 (6) ALT 51 .2 (DNSC). 16. After arguing the matter by the learned Senior Counsel, counsel on record also filed a written submission, numbering about 38 pages, contending that the order dt. 9-11-77 passed by the Land Reforms Appel1ate Tribunal on the appeals filed by the fourth defendant-bank was without notice to the declarants/defendants 1 to 3, which fact has not been brought to the notice of the Supreme Court and it is a gross material violation of the constitutional rights. On remand, at the instance of the plaintiffs sale was set-aside on 19-12-1984 and on dismissal of C.R.P.No.495 of 1985 by this court, the executing court did not hold in E.P.No.9 of 1984 that the bank could not proceed against the lands in execution and the High Court also did not say that the lands could not be sold and the sale was set aside on the ground of inadequate price and the lands never vested in the Government and on deposit of the sale amount by the defendants 5 to 10 the executing court fixed the market value and the sale certificate was never successfully questioned and possession was delivered to the auction purchasers/defendants 5 to 10, who in turn sold the same to the plaintiffs. Several procedural irregularities have been mentioned in surrender proceedings and non-service of notice as contemplated under the Ceiling Act. The provisions of Ceiling Act should be strictly construed as held by the Supreme Court in CCE v. Orient Fabrics (P) Ltd. (4 supra). The jurisdiction of the civil court is not excluded when the prescribed procedure is not strictly followed as held by the Supreme Court in State of A.P. v. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao (3 supra), CIT v. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala (5 supra) and Dhananjaya Reddy v. State of Karnataka (9) (2001) 4 SCC 9 = 2001 (3) ALT 1 .2 (DNSC). The jurisdiction of the civil court is not excluded when the prescribed procedure is not strictly followed as held by the Supreme Court in State of A.P. v. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao (3 supra), CIT v. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala (5 supra) and Dhananjaya Reddy v. State of Karnataka (9) (2001) 4 SCC 9 = 2001 (3) ALT 1 .2 (DNSC). Since there is no voluntary alienation by the holders on or after notified date, prohibition bf alienation does not operate. Surrender of land and vesting in the Government on 25-2- 1976 is not borne out by any record. Misrepresentation of the Joint Collector about vesting of the land amounts to fraud, therefore, the civil suit is maintainable. 17. In view of the submissions, as referred to above, the points that arise for consideration in this appeal are: 1. Whether the civil court will have jurisdiction to go into the correctness of the proceedings under the Ceiling Act in view of specific bar contained under Section 26 of the Ceiling Act? 2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to declaration as claimed? 18. Point No.1: The whole gamut of the arguments of the learned Senior Counsel is that fraudulent acts of the Primary Tribunal in treating the lands as vesting on surrender of surplus land by the declarants who were declared as surplus landholders, have been conceived by record, therefore the civil court will have jurisdiction to go into the correctness of the surrender proceeding and declare that the lands are not vested in the Government as per the dicta laid down by the Supreme Court in D. Ramakrishna Reddy v. Addl. Revenue Divisional Officers (2 supra). 19. Before we proceed to answer the point framed, it is appropriate to notice the statutory provision which oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Section 26 of the Ceiling Act reads as follows: "26. Bar of jurisdiction:- Save as otherwise provided in this Act no order passed or proceedings taken by an officer or authority under this Act shall be called in question in any court, in any suit or application, and no injunction shall be granted by any Court in respect of any action taken or to be taken by such officer or authority in pursuance to any power conferred by or under this Act. 20. 20. His Lordship Sri Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy (as he then was) speaking for the Bench in Ramaiah (1 supra) held that "the effect of Section 26 is that an order passed or proceedings taken under the Act, shall not be called in question in any Court except in the manner provided by the Act itself. No suit or application shall be lie for impugning an order, or proceedings, passed or taken under the Act. Section 26 further provides that no injunction shall be granted by any Court in respect of any action taken or to be taken by an officer or authority in pursuance to any power conferred by or under the said Act. On the facts, it was further held that the plaintiffs cannot be permitted to challenge the validity of the surrender in the present suit. That could be done only in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Act itself. The plaintiffs do not claim or assert an independent title to the suit lands and they are claiming only under the agreement of sale executed by declarants, which was the subject matter of adjudication by the Tribunal constituted under the Ceiling Act. If the suit is filed only after surrender of the said land has been accepted by the Tribunal under Section 10, they are not entitled to temporary injunction. 21. Learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiffs emphatic in his submission that when the statutory tribunal failed to comply the statutory provisions in vesting the land in the State and failed to act in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, the civil court will have jurisdiction to declare the proceedings a nullity. For the said proposition, a strong reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of A.P. v. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao (3 supra). 22. In the said case, suit was filed for declaration that half share of the plaintiffs over the suit schedule property is not subject to any public or charitable trust or endowment or provisions of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 and orders passed by the Government is void and for consequential reliefs. The trial court dismissed the suit. The judgment of the trial court has been confirmed by the High Court. The trial court dismissed the suit. The judgment of the trial court has been confirmed by the High Court. On further appeal, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal observing as follows: (5) The normal rule of law is that civil Courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except those of which cognizance by them is either expressly or impliedly excluded as provided under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure but such exclusion, is not readily inferred and the presumption to be drawn must be in favour of the existence rather than exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to try civil suit. The test adopted in examining such a question is (i) whether the legislature intent to exclude arises explicitly or by necessary implication, and (ii) whether the statute in question provides for adequate and satisfactory alternative remedy to. a party aggrieved by an order made under it. In Ohulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1968) 3 SCR 62 : ( AIR 1969 SC 78 ), it was noticed that where a statute gives finality to the orders of the special Tribunals jurisdiction of the civil Courts must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil Courts would normally do in a suit and such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. 23. From the narrative facts, it is apparent the plaintiffs have purchased the property after finalization of the surrender proceedings and the mortgagee-bank obtaining permission for sale of property to the vendors of the plaintiffs. 24. Admittedly, the plaintiffs and their vendors are claiming their rights through mortgagee-bank, which obtained a mortgage decree. On accepting the surrender of the land surrendered by the declarants, the Land Reforms Tribunal, while following the procedure prescribed particularly under Section 10 of the Ceiling Act, issued notice to the State Bank of India mortgagee bank asking it to file its objections, if any, for accepting such surrender. On issuing the notice by the Primary Tribunal, the Bank filed LRA Nos. 328, 329 and 330 of 1976 (Exs.A-75, 76, 74 respectively) before the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad. On issuing the notice by the Primary Tribunal, the Bank filed LRA Nos. 328, 329 and 330 of 1976 (Exs.A-75, 76, 74 respectively) before the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad. The Appellate Tribunal allowed the appeals and remanded the matter to the Primary Tribunal with a direction to give sufficient and reasonable opportunity to the Bank to file its objections and decide the same according to law. After remand, the Primary Tribunal having heard the objections filed by the Bank, by a common order dt. 22-7-1977 (Ex.A-83 and Ex.B-16) while holding that the acceptance of surrendered land adjudicated previously on 24-2-1976 holds good observed that when the Bank has once consented to receive the compensation amount towards the dues, the subsequent inconsistent request that the acceptance in total to be deferred would be out of question. Dissatisfied with the orders passed by the Primary Tribunal dt. 22-7-1977 the bank preferred three LRAs, namely, LRA Nos. 773, 774 and 775 of 1977 and all the declarants together filed LRA No. 746 of 77. The Land Reforms Appellant. Tribunal, Medak at Sangareddy by its order dated 9-1-1977 (Ex.A-34) while confirming the finding that the land owned by the declarants has to be included in the holdings of the declarants as they do not cease to be the owners of the land in question allowed the appeals permitting the bank, in the first instance, to proceed against the properties which are not surrendered and which are still in the possession of the declarants and if the same does not satisfy the claim of the bank, then the bank is at liberty to proceed by bringing the surrendered land to sale for realizing the balance of amount due to it. 25. In D. Ramakrishna Reddy v. Add1. Revenue Divisional Officers (2 supra), on which strong reliance is placed by the counsel for the petitioners, the case of the petitioners was that the forest land, though a part of the surplus land in their hands had not vested in the State Government and they were entitled to cut and remove the trees standing on the said land before handing over possession of the land to the State Government. The further case of the petitioners was that long before the land was declared surplus with them, they had moved the competent authority of the Forest Department for grant of transit permits to them for cutting and removing the standing trees. The authorities sat over the matter and did not issue the requisite permit. The learned single Judge divided the writ petitioners into three categories. Though notice in Form No. IX was served on the petitioners, the petitioners have not surrendered the land in the first and second category of petitioners but in the third category petitioners, neither notice in Form IX had been issued nor served on the party. Learned single Judge of this court held that the surplus land vests in the Government free from all encumbrances from the date of order to take possession which is stated in Form IX notice. Therefore, in the case of categories 1 and 2 i.e., writ petitioners 1, 2 and 5, the surplus land had vested in the State in the year 1979 itself, the forest growth on the said land too vested in the State along with the land and no separate compensation or amount is payable on account of such forest growth. In respect of third category of writ petitioners 3 and 4, learned single Judge held that the lands proposed to be surrendered by them have not yet vested in the State and in such a situation there can be no valid objection by the authorities of the Forest Department for issuing transit permits. On further appeal being filed by the Conservator of Forests, the Supreme Court held that the surplus land which is surrendered or deemed to have been surrendered shall vest in the State on communication of the order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer to take over possession of such land to the owner/holder/occupier of the said land .....Vesting of the surplus land in the State is not dependent on taking over physical possession of the land which may be immediately after the vesting or sometime subsequent thereto. 26. 26. The Supreme Court in para 22 further held that in the absence of any provision in the Act or Rules for payment of any sum for the trees (other than fruit bearing trees) or any other forest produce on the vested land, no claim for compensation for the trees or other forest produce standing on the surplus land surrendered or deemed to have been surrendered arises under the provisions of the Act or the Rules. The tribunals are creatures of the Act and it is not open to them to travel beyond the provisions of the 18 statute, and held that the judgment of the Division Bench confirming the judgment of the learned single Judge that forest produce did not vest in the Government and that the landholders are entitled to compensation is unsustainable. Consequently, direction to the State Government to determine and pay the compensation for the forest growth is also unsustainable. 27. In view of the same, the orders passed by the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal, Medak at Sangareddy in LRA No.746 and 773 to 775 of 1977 permitting the bank to sell the property is beyond its jurisdiction. The effect of allowing the appeals will not render the order passed by the Tribunal declaring the declarants as surplus landholders as invalid and the same will not be wiped out since it is not the subject matter of appeal. The above appeals, as such, were filed only questioning the surrender proceedings by the Manager of the declarants 1 to 3. Allowing of the appeals, if any, will have the effect of setting aside the surrender proceedings but not the proceedings preceded to it i.e., declaring the declarants as surplus landholders. Suffice it to say, the plaintiffs want to enforce the orders passed by the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal in LRA Nos. 746 and 773 to 775 of 1977 seeking declaration that orders passed by the Tribunal declaring surplus land of the declarants will not vest in the State on surrendering the land. Learned counsel for the respondents plaintiffs strenuously contended that the Manager of the declarants 1 to 3 is not an agent and he cannot surrender the land and any surrender made by him as accepted by the Land Reforms Tribunal is a nullity and the declarants as well as the Bank are not bound by such surrender. Learned counsel for the respondents plaintiffs strenuously contended that the Manager of the declarants 1 to 3 is not an agent and he cannot surrender the land and any surrender made by him as accepted by the Land Reforms Tribunal is a nullity and the declarants as well as the Bank are not bound by such surrender. We do not see any force in the submission for the simple reason that Harichand Singh, employee of the declarants, appeared before the Land Reforms Tribunal and before finalization of the declaration on behalf of the declarants he pleaded to exclude Ac.3-73 acres from S.Nos. 449, 459 and 470 due to laying of road. After giving necessary deduction total area of the declarants was determined at Ac.121-90 acres in CC No.2325/S/75 filed by Mahinder Kaur under EX.B-4. Enquiry report dt. 19-8-1975 made by Special Deputy Tahsilder (Land Reforms) Sangareddy also disclosed that Harchand Singh's statement was also recorded on behalf of the declarants. Therefore, it is fallacy to contend that he was not authorized to surrender the land, which objection has not been taken by the declarants themselves. In that view of the matter, it is not open for either the Bank or the plaintiffs to contend that the surrender proceedings are invalid. Under the Ceiling Act, a separate mechanism has been provided for going into the above contentions and the civil court cannot-decide whether surrender proceedings are validly undertaken or not and the effect of allowing the appeals etc., in view of the bar contained under Section 26 of the Ceiling Act. In view of the same, the suit filed for declaration to declare that the surplus land has not been vested in the State is not maintainable and the civil court will not have jurisdiction to go into the same. 28. Point No.2: Admittedly, the order passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal declaring the declarants/D-1 to D-3 are surplus landholders has become final. On accepting the surrender, State Bank of India was served with a notice on 16-2-1976 accompanied by Form No.8 requiring to put forth its objections, if any, concerning the proposed surrender of lands within 15 days. Having issued such notice, the Tribunal passed an order on 24-2-1976 before expiry of 15 days period. Therefore, Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad by its order dt. 12-4-1977 allowed LRA Nos. Having issued such notice, the Tribunal passed an order on 24-2-1976 before expiry of 15 days period. Therefore, Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad by its order dt. 12-4-1977 allowed LRA Nos. 328, 329 and 330 of 1976 (Exs.A-75, 76 and 74) filed by the State Bank of India and set-aside the proceedings of the Land Reforms Tribunal accepting the surrender and remanded the matter to the Primary Tribunal. On such remand, the Land Reforms Tribunal, Sangareddy Division by its order dated 22-7-1977 (Ex.A-83 and Ex.B-16) upheld its earlier order accepting surrender of land which was adjudicated on 24-2-1976. The Primary Tribunal recorded its finding that when the Bank consented to receive the compensation amount towards the dues the subsequent inconsistent request that the acceptance in total to be deferred would be out of question. Aggrieved by the same, the Bank filed LRA Nos. 773, 774, and 775 of 1977 and the declarants filed LRA No.746 of 1977 before the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal, Medak at Sangareddy. The Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal by its order dt. 9-11-1977 (Ex.A-34) allowed the appeals setting aside the order accepting surrender, and negativing the contention of the Bank that the lands are liable to be exempted under Section 23 (f) of the Ceiling Act and held that the declarants/D-1 to D-3 does not cease to be the owners of the land in question. 9-11-1977 (Ex.A-34) allowed the appeals setting aside the order accepting surrender, and negativing the contention of the Bank that the lands are liable to be exempted under Section 23 (f) of the Ceiling Act and held that the declarants/D-1 to D-3 does not cease to be the owners of the land in question. The Appellate Tribunal while recording that the learned counsel appearing for the Bank and also for the declarants have agreed that they have no objection for getting the lands which are not surrendered by the declarants in the first instance, for the realization of the amount due to the State Bank of India and if from the sale of the said lands which are not surrendered and which are in possession of the declarants do not satisfy the claim of the Bank, then the Bank will be at liberty to proceed by bringing the surrendered lands to sale for realizing the balance of amount due to it, which course in our opinion is in consonance with the scheme of the Act," allowed the appeals directing the Bank to proceed in the first instance against the properties which are not surrendered and which are still in possession of the declarants and if the sale proceeds does not satisfy the claim of the Bank, then alone the Bank shall proceed against the lands that are surrendered by the declarants to the Government for realizing the balance of the amount due to the Bank from the declarants. As already held the order of the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal permitting the bank to sell the land is beyond its jurisdiction, hence it cannot be presumed that the same will confer a right on the bank to sell. At the worst, even if we accept the contention of the learned Senior Counsel, it only will invalidate the surrender proceedings, but declaring the declarants/D-1 to D-3 as surplus landholders still holds good. Taking advantage of such illegal order, the judgment debtors filed E.A.No.51/81 seeking permission to sell away the surrendered land by private negotiations, which was allowed on 21-7-81. On coming to know of the same, the Government filed an application, E.A.No.68 of 81, to set-aside the order of the executing Court. After considering the entire evidence, the executing court, by its order dated 7-8-1981 set-aside the sales made by private negotiations. On coming to know of the same, the Government filed an application, E.A.No.68 of 81, to set-aside the order of the executing Court. After considering the entire evidence, the executing court, by its order dated 7-8-1981 set-aside the sales made by private negotiations. Questioning the same, the judgment debtors (declarants) filed CR.P.No.3364 of 1981 before this court (Ex.A-36). This court by order dt. 21-4-1982 allowed the revision and remanded the matter to the lower court (executing court). On remanding the matter, the executing court by its order dt. 19-12-1984 set-aside the private sale made by the judgment debtors. Aggrieved by the same, the vendors of the plaintiffs and others filed CR.P. No.495/85 before this court. Justice K. Rama Swamy dismissed the revision petition confirming the orders passed in E.A.No.6 of 84 which was filed by the District Collector, Medak, which has become final. Therefore, the executing court will not have jurisdiction to issue sale certificates in favour of the vendors of the plaintiffs. Therefore, the order dt. 21-2-1989 will be non-est in the eye of law. Meanwhile, when the Land Reforms Tribunal passed an order dt. 9-4-1992 in CCNos.2325 to 2327/5/75 directing the Mandal Revenue Officer, Sanga Reddy to prepare appropriate proposals and to get the proposals approved and to give physical possession to the beneficiaries. The plaintiffs and others filed L.R.A.No.34 of 92, which was allowed on 7-2-1994 (Ex.A-31) setting aside the order passed by the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal d t. 9-4-1992. Questioning the same, the defendants 11 to 13 preferred CR.P.No.4627 of 1997 before this court. This court by order dt. 2-7-1998 allowed the revision dismissing the appeal preferred by the plaintiffs and others. In the result, the order of the Primary Tribunal dt. 9-4-1992 directing the Mandal Revenue Officer to get the proposals approved and to give physical possession to the beneficiaries has been restored. The plaintiffs have unsuccessfully challenged the order passed by this court in CR.P.No.4627 of 1997 before the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.1881 of 99. The Honourable Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by an elaborate order holding that the executing court held in its order dt. The plaintiffs have unsuccessfully challenged the order passed by this court in CR.P.No.4627 of 1997 before the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.1881 of 99. The Honourable Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by an elaborate order holding that the executing court held in its order dt. 7-8-1981 that the land was not liable to be sold as it was surplus land at the hands of the declarants and it vested with the Government and that order was not set-aside in any subsequent proceedings and the said order was further fortified by the order passed in CR.P.No.495 of 1985. In spite of the same, issuing sale certificates by the executing court in favour of the plaintiffs is erroneous though the order issuing sale certificates was unsuccessfully challenged by the State. But in the absence of the valid title having been acquired in law by the purchasers over the surplus land, the whole proceedings pursuant to the court auction are vitiated, which has rightly been set-aside by the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal. The Supreme Court further in exercise of its equitable jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution held that entire proceedings in this have to be viewed in the backdrop of the power conferred under Article 136 including the discretionary power to step in and to remedy the injustice resulting from in correct interpretation of law. Even if the learned single Judge exceeded in his jurisdiction in passing the impugned judgment in C.R.P.No.4627 of 1997, the same is not a ground to interfere since setting aside the judgment of the learned single judge would result in resurrection of a series of other illegal orders passed by the Subordinate Courts. 29. From the above discussion, it is clear that the sale certificates issued in favour of the purchasers of the plaintiffs have been set-aside and order passed by the executing curt setting aside sale has unsuccessfully been challenged by the vendors of the plaintiffs in C.R.P.No.495 of 85. 30. It is apt to quote Section17 of the Ceiling Act, which prohibits alienation of holding. 30. It is apt to quote Section17 of the Ceiling Act, which prohibits alienation of holding. It reads as under: 17 Prohibition of alienation of holding:- ., (1) No person whose holding, and no member of a family unit, the holding of all the members of which in the aggregate, is in excess of the ceiling area as on the 24th January, 1971 or at any time thereafter, shall on or after the notified date, alienate his holding or any part thereof by way of sale, lease, gift exchange, settlement, surrender, usufructuary mortgage or otherwise, or effect a partition thereof, or create a trust or convert an agricultural land into non agricultural land, until he or the family unit, as the case may be, has furnished a declaration under Section 8, and the extent of land, if any, to be surrendered in respect of his holding or that of his family unit has been determined by the Tribunal and an order has been passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer under this Act taking possession of the land in excess of the ceiling area and a notification is published under Section 16; and any alienation made or partition effected or trust created in contravention of this section shall be null and void and any conversion so made shall be disregarded. (2) For the purpose of determining whether any transaction of the nature referred to in sub section (10 in relation to a land situated in this State, took place on or after the notified date, the date on which the document relating to such transaction was registered shall, notwithstanding anything in Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908, be deemed to be the date on which the transaction took place, whether such document was registered within or outside the State. (3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply to any transaction of the nature referred to therein in execution of a decree or order of a civil court or of any award or order of any other authority. 31. (3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply to any transaction of the nature referred to therein in execution of a decree or order of a civil court or of any award or order of any other authority. 31. Once the order passed by the Primary Tribunal declaring the declarants/D-1 to D-3 as surplus landholders has become final, even if the surrender proceedings have been set-aside as contended by the learned Senior Counsel, any sale of land which is subject matter of declaration until an order has been passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer under the Act for taking possession of the land in excess of the ceiling area and a notification is published under Section 16 will be null and void and any contravention so made shall be disregarded, and the bar contained under Section 17(1) shall apply to any transaction of the nature referred to in sub-section (1) in execution of a decree or order of a civil court or of any award or order of any other authority. Indisputably the bank filed the suit OS.No.27 of 1973 and obtained preliminary decree on 29-08-1975 in which final decree was passed on 05-08-1976. Sub-section (3) of Section 17 makes it clear that bar contained under Section 17(1) shall apply to any transaction of the nature referred therein in execution of the decree or order of civil court. In view of the above legal fiction, the decree obtained by the bank cannot be enforced by way of execution where the land was declared surplus. Therefore, any order passed in execution to enforce the decree will be null and void. If that be the case, the sale certificates issued in favour of the vendors of the plaintiffs are deemed to be null and void by operation of law, hence the vendors of the plaintiffs will not derive any title over the suit schedule property. Once it is accepted that the vendors of the plaintiffs who admittedly are auction purchasers from the bank in execution of the mortgage decree and the plaintiffs who stepped into the shoes of their vendors, they will not acquire any better title to the suit schedule property than their vendors. The Bank has not questioned the proceedings declaring the declarants as surplus landholders on obtaining mortgage decree. The Bank has not questioned the proceedings declaring the declarants as surplus landholders on obtaining mortgage decree. Right of mortgagor of redemption is extinguished, namely, defendants 1 to 3, on passing a final decree for foreclosure and after final decree for sale has been passed, the remedy of mortgagor is under Order 34 Rule 5 CPC. At that stage he cannot sue for partial or total redemption under Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, even if the appeal filed by the declarants, namely, 0-1 to 0-3 i.e., L.R.A.No.746 of 77 has been allowed setting aside the order accepting surrender of excess land along with other appeals preferred by the mortgagee bank, right of declarants, where they agreed for sale of mortgaged property before the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal, which resulted in passing an order in L.R.A.Nos.773 of 775 of 77 (Exs.A-34) will not confer any jurisdiction on the executing court to issue sale certificates in favour of the vendors of the plaintiffs who obtained permission of sale from the Land Reforms Appellate [ribunal by fraudulent consent to defeat :he provisions of the agrarian reforms and ;ame will not confer any title on the plaintiffs vendors. 32. For the foregoing reasons and conclusions reached by us, it is held that the plaintiffs' vendors have not acquired any valid title over the suit schedule property. In view of the bar contained under Section 17 of the Ceiling Act, the plaintiffs who purchased the said property are not entitled to any declaration as prayed for. Therefore, it is unnecessary, for us, to have a copious discussion with regard to the various judgments referred to in the written submissions. Point No.2 is accordingly answered. 33. In the result, the appeal is allowed setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the District Judge, Medak at Sangareddy dt. 15-4-2004 in O.S.No.14 of 2003 with costs of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty thousand only). Consequently, O.S.No.14 of 2003 shall sand dismissed.