JUDGMENT 1. THE writ petitioners challenge a decision of the respondent of February 17, 2009 by which it was notified that certain posts in the first respondent had been abolished. THE notice offered a voluntary retirement scheme to those occupying the posts that were being abolished. It further stipulated that those who did not opt for the voluntary retirement scheme would be given the benefit of an early retirement scheme. 2. WHEN the petition was received, an order was made requiring the petitioners to exercise their option without prejudice to their rights and contention that the decision reflected in the notice of February 17, 2009" was erroneous. The petitioners report that they have exercised their option. The petitioners say that in a matter relating to service, a writ petition may be maintained against the first respondent and there is a Division Bench judgment of this Court in such regard. Since the respondents have not been called upon, it is not necessary to go into the aspect of maintainability as the merits of the petitioners' claim have been considered here. 3. THE petition is based on two principal grounds. THE petitioners contend that the notice of February 17, 2009 and the decision contained therein are illegal. It is the petitioners' second, and more important, contention that the decision to abolish the posts was mala fide and that the petitioners have been identified for extraneous reasons to be victimized. 4. IN support of the first contention, that the decision itself was illegal, the petitioners say that the notice of February 17, 2009 refers to the 175th meeting of the Council of Management of the first respondent held on December 18, 2008. It is the petitioners' assertion that though a 175th meeting of the Council was held, and such meeting had been convened to be held on December 18, 2008, no business relating to the abolition of the posts was transacted on December 18, 2008 and the relevant decision was taken at an adjourned meeting. The petitioners say that in such circumstances, the reference to December 18, 2008 in the notice of February 17, 2009 is erroneous and misleading and renders the notice invalid. The petitioners say that in such circumstances, the reference to December 18, 2008 in the notice of February 17, 2009 is erroneous and misleading and renders the notice invalid. Ordinarily, if a meeting is convened to be held on a certain day, particularly of any committee, and if the meeting is adjourned to a subsequent day, it is the original date of the meeting by which the meeting is referred to. In any event, the notice of February 17, 2009 referred to the 175th meeting of the Council of Management. It is not the petitioners' case that there was no meeting of the Council or that the decision was not taken at the 175th meeting. The petitioners quibble over the minor detail that the date on which the relevant decision was taken was not on the original date but when the meeting had been adjourned to a subsequent date. There is no merit in the first limb of the petitioners' attack regarding the legality of the notice. The second aspect of the challenge on account of illegality is that the members present at the Council meeting on December 18, 2008 were not present on the adjourned date. The petitioners rely on the minutes of the meeting of the Council, a copy whereof is appended to the affidavit of the first respondent. It appears from the minutes that on December 18, 2008 ten members were present but on the adjourned date only seven were present. However, the petitioners are unable to show that there was any rule that required the original members to be present on the adjourned date or, in the absence of the original members, the business transacted on the adjourned date would be invalid. 5. THOUGH the petitioners complain of some representatives of the Central Government not being present on the adjourned date of the 175th meeting of the Council, again the petitioners cannot bring any rules of business to demonstrate that unless a decision is taken in the presence of the nominees of the Central Government or some specified nominees, the resolution relating thereto would not be valid. 6. THE third and final aspect of the challenge as to the legality is founded on Rule 5 of the Memorandum of Association and Rules and Regulations of the first respondent as amended upto April 6, 1992. 6. THE third and final aspect of the challenge as to the legality is founded on Rule 5 of the Memorandum of Association and Rules and Regulations of the first respondent as amended upto April 6, 1992. THE petitioners refer to the fifth clause which stipulates that no addition, alteration or amendment shall be made to the Memorandum of Association or the Rules and Regulations of the respondent association without prior consultation with the ministry of the Central Government granting funds to the first respondent-association. THE rule does not imply that posts cannot be abolished without Central Government concurrence. THE rule merely implies that the rules and regulations of the first respondent and its memorandum cannot be altered without the nodal ministry being informed and its approval obtained. THE challenge in the present petition is not to the amendment of any memorandum or rules or regulations. THE challenge is to the abolition of certain posts in the first respondent which were held by the petitioners. THE posts are not specified either in the Memorandum of Association or in the Rules and Regulations of the respondent association. As to the petitioners' challenge on the ground of mala fides, the law requires a high onus to be discharged. The petitioners say that they were involved in trade union activities and had been at the vanguard of the protests made on behalf of the employees of the first respondent for the pitiable working conditions and emoluments. The petitioners contend that it is for such reason that they have been singled out and harsh measures imposed on them. The petitioners refer to the first respondent having subsequently invited applications for other posts. It is the petitioners' case that in the garb of abolishing certain posts, the first respondent or those in the management thereof have done away with persons towards whom they were not favourably disposed and have specifically sought to fill up the same posts by changing the nomenclature of the posts. The petitioners refer to advertisements published on the website of the first respondent. The copies of the relevant material find place in the affidavit-in-reply filed on the petitioners' behalf. At pages 30 to 33 of the petitioners' reply, there are extracts from the first respondent's website inviting applications for the posts of Assistant (Store and Purchase), Administrative Officers, Developer, Assistant Librarian, Technical Officers and Technicians. 7. The copies of the relevant material find place in the affidavit-in-reply filed on the petitioners' behalf. At pages 30 to 33 of the petitioners' reply, there are extracts from the first respondent's website inviting applications for the posts of Assistant (Store and Purchase), Administrative Officers, Developer, Assistant Librarian, Technical Officers and Technicians. 7. IF it is the petitioners' case that merely the names of the abolished posts were tinkered with, it was for the petitioners to establish that those who were sought to be brought in as assistants or administrative officers or technicians or the like possessed the same qualifications as the petitioners and that the subsequent advertisements were only to fill up the posts that fell vacant upon the earlier posts being abolished. There is no attempt in the petition to establish this nexus or discharge the high burden that such case of mala fides would have required the petitioners to do. 8. THERE may yet be some basis to what the petitioners say. However, a Writ Court in exercise of its power of judicial review would scarcely sit in judgment over a policy decision. The petitioners admit that the matter of abolition or creation of posts would be a policy decision and the Courts would not ordinarily interfere therewith unless a case of mala fides was made out. In support of such contention the petitioners refer to a judgment reported at 1976 (2) SCC 844 and another at 2008 (2) SCC 65. Both at paragraph 7 of the earlier judgment at paragraph 17 of the more recent judgment, the legal position has been summarized as to when the Court would intervene to come to the aid of a complaining party who had suffered the ignominy of his post being abolished. It is undeniable that the power to create or abolish a post rests with the employer. Even if it is the government or any authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution which is the employer, it is for such employer to determine whether a particular post is necessary as its perception of the exigencies of the situation and administrative necessity would guide the decision. The matter of creation or abolition of posts is a matter of policy and the right to do so inheres in an employer, including an Article 12 authority, in the interest of administration. The matter of creation or abolition of posts is a matter of policy and the right to do so inheres in an employer, including an Article 12 authority, in the interest of administration. Ordinarily, Courts would not sit in judgment over such policy decision and only if it were established that the authority acted dishonestly would the Court step in once a charge of mala fides- legal or factual- was accepted. A charge of mala fides is established upon adequate material being brought; a mere insinuation or even a suspicion of the Court in that regard would not suffice. 9. THE petitioners refer to another judgment reported at 2006 (4) SCC 132 and cite paragraph 59 thereof. THE petitioners say that such decision had been relied upon in the judgment reported at 2008 (2) SCC 65. In the 2006 case it was noticed by the Supreme Court that the State of Rajasthan had acted as a model welfare authority in providing alternative employment to the complaining petitioners therein and it was on such consideration that the abolition of the posts was not found to be mala fide. THE petitioners contend that the first respondent should have provided for alternative employment and, in the absence of any alternative appointment, the decision of February 17, 2009 has to be viewed as oppressive and arbitrary. THE conclusion that the petitioners draw does not follow from the decision or even from the subsequent conduct of inducting others to certain new or other posts. It could be that an employer, be it an authority within the meaning of Article 12 or otherwise, did not need certain posts and yet needed certain other new posts. THE fact that some posts were abolished and other new posts were created subsequently or simultaneously would not, ipso facto, amount to arbitrariness. THE petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the new posts were merely a reincarnation of the abolished posts by a subterfuge. 10. THE high tests that are to be met by a party complaining that the abolition of a post was for the purpose of victimizing such party have not been met by these petitioners. There does not appear to be any apparent illegality or arbitrariness in the first respondent notifying the decision reflected in its letter of February 17, 2009. 10. THE high tests that are to be met by a party complaining that the abolition of a post was for the purpose of victimizing such party have not been met by these petitioners. There does not appear to be any apparent illegality or arbitrariness in the first respondent notifying the decision reflected in its letter of February 17, 2009. THE abolished posts do not appear to have been reintroduced pursuant to the advertisement issued by the first respondent which finds mention in the petitioners' affidavit-in-reply. There is no merit in the petition and W.P. 3680 (W) of 2009 is dismissed without any order as to costs. 11. URGENT certified photostat copies of this order, if applied for, shall be given to the parties subject to compliance with all requisite formalities.