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2009 DIGILAW 839 (AP)

Polavarapu Nagamani v. Parchuri Koteshwara Rao

2009-11-24

B.N.RAO NALLA, V.V.S.RAO

body2009
JUDGMENT :- V.V.S. Rao, J. (1) Introduction: These two miscellaneous appeals are being disposed of by this common order as they arise between the same parties out of two separate interlocutor}' orders in the same suit. The appellants are plaintiffs and respondents are defendants. They are referred to as such In this order. (2) Be it noted that initially this Court suspended the order in J A No.412 of 2009 where under the Court below directed police protection to defendants. Then they moved an application to vacate the interim suspension. At that stage itself, with the consent of the Counsel for both the sides, the matter is heard finally, (3) These two appeals involve an important question with regard to power of civil Court to direct the police to give police protection to plaintiffs or defendants to safeguard the subject property in the suit pending adjudication. What arc the remedies available to a party when an order of injunction is violated or there is a threat of such violation? When a party to the suit alleges violation of an order of ad interim injunction granted by civil Court, what is the standard of proof required for the Court to exercise its inherent powers under Section 154 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) and direct the police to give protection to safeguard the property and whether the Court can ignore the specific provisions contained in CPC and exercise powers under Section 151 of CPC. These and others are the questions that arise for consideration. Before taking up these issues, the background facts may be noticed as summarized in the ensuing paragraphs. Brief fads of the case (4) Plaintiffs 1 to 3 are legal heirs / representatives of one Polavarapu Nageswara Rao and plaintiff No.4 is legal representative of Mandava Ramaiah. These four persons instituted OS No.29 of 2009 on the ; file of the Court of the Special Judge for : Trial of Offences under Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act cum - V Additional District and Sessions Judge, Medak at Sanga Reddy, against 118 defendants for partition, separate possession and cancellation of as many as 24 sale deeds executed by some defendants in favour of 40 defendants in the suit. In the suit, the plaintiffs prayed for a preliminary decree partitioning plaint schedule properties admeasuring Acs, 1,357.52 guntas comprised in as many as 74 survey numbers (74 fields) of Hakimpet fields of Yeldurthy Mandal in Medak District (hereafter called, plaint schedule property). The plaintiffs alleged that their predecessors and 31 others purchased a total extent of Acs.2,054.32 guntas of land in Hakimpet Village from successors of Syed Ahmed AH Khan under registered sale deed dated 24,6,1960, that considering the declarations filed by the vendees the Land Reforms Tribunal under Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, declared 14 of them as surplus land holders to the extent of Acs. 5 74.22 guntas, it was taken over by the Government, that the Government of Andhra Pradesh acquired Acs.231.68 for the purpose of submergence of Haldivagu project after paying the compensation, that all the 33 owners filed OP No.211 of 2005 on the file of the Court of Principal District Judge, Medak, seeking enhancement of the compensation, which was allowed and that EP No.91 of 2007 filed by them by executing the decree in O.P. No.211 of 2005 is pending. They further alleged that the remaining extent of Acs.1,357.52 is in joint and common possession of all the purchasers, that the shares are already decided as per the contribution to the total sale consideration, that as many as 21 original purchasers died leaving behind their successors (who are defendants to the suit) that some of the purchasers sold the property under various sale deeds and that some of the defendants are claiming their right under the Wills executed by some purchasers and that in spite of demands made by plaintiffs in second week of January, 2009, defendants 1 to 48 and defendants 100 to 118 postponed the partitioning of the plaint schedule property. They further allege that in March, 2009, defendant No. 16 tried to dispossess the plaintiffs who are cultivating the land which had been in possession and therefore, they lodged a complaint with Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP), Toopran, who advised the plaintiffs to approach the civil Court. They also allege that defendants are trying to further alienate the property to third parlies and especially land in survey No. 120 which contains potential mineral of white quartz and is very valid. They also allege that defendants are trying to further alienate the property to third parlies and especially land in survey No. 120 which contains potential mineral of white quartz and is very valid. Some of the defendants, namely, defendants 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 22, 27 to 31 and 38 filed written Statements contesting the suit. Their case is that the entire plaint schedule land was partitioned during the period of Pvlavampu Nageswara Rao, who was heading the village, under unregistered document which was acted upon and therefore, they denied the plea of joint possession and ownership. They also allege that plaintiffs are claiming re-partition dishonestly though all the original purchasers or their successors were in possession of their respective shares and cultivating the lands separately. (5) Along with the suit, the plaintiffs filed two applications, I.A. No.206 of 2009 was filed seeking ad interim injunction restraining defendants from interfering with the plaintiffs' possession. This application is pending before the lower Court. IA No.207 of 2009 was filed seeking ad interim injunction restraining defendants from changing the nature of land or digging or milling in the plaint schedule property. On 9.4.2009, the Court below passed an ex parte ad interim injunction restraining the defendants from changing the nature of the suit land in any manner until further orders. The defendants then filed a counter- affidavit in first week of June, 2009, praying for dismissal of interlocutory application being I.A. No.207 of 2009. It was represented on their behalf that after obtaining an ex parte order, the plaintiffs allegedly did not allow the defendants cultivating the lands. Therefore on 28.4.2009, the lower Court disposed of LA, No.207 of 2009 clarifying that plaintiffs shall not prevent defendants from carrying out agricultural operations in the land. The said one paragraph order reads as under. ORDER The advocate for some respondents represents that the interim order of this petition "not to change the nature of the land" is being misused by the petitioners and not permitting the respondents to cultivate the land. It is hereby clarified by the advocate of the petitioners that the respondents can do agricultural operations except alienating the suit land. Therefore, it is hereby ordered that the petitioners shall not prevent respondents from carrying out agricultural operations in the land pending disposal of the suit. Accordingly, this petition is disposed off. It is hereby clarified by the advocate of the petitioners that the respondents can do agricultural operations except alienating the suit land. Therefore, it is hereby ordered that the petitioners shall not prevent respondents from carrying out agricultural operations in the land pending disposal of the suit. Accordingly, this petition is disposed off. (6) The above order is in appeal being CM A No. 1128 of 2009. The other appeal being CMA No.1021 of 2009 is filed against IA No.412 of 2009. This application was filed by 9 defendants (defendants 3, 5, 7, 10, 15, 16, 22, 107 and 110) under Section 151 read with Order XXXIX Rule 2A of CPC, praying the lower Court to direct police authorities of P.S., Yeldurthy, to render protection to them to help, maintain possession and cultivation in respect of which they are in possession according to pahanis and pattadar pass books and title deeds (PPBs/TDs) and that the plaintiffs may be prevented and bound over for keeping peace and not to prevent the agricultural operation of the petitioners pending disposal of the suit. The Court below by an order dated 11.9.2009 directed P.S., Yeldurthy, to give police protection. Aggrieved by which, the plaintiffs -as mentioned supra; are in appeal before this Court. Submissions (7) Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs / appellants submits that the lower Court was in error in appreciating the scope of Order XXXIX Rule 2A read with Section 151 CPC. He would contend that when the 9 defendants who moved application did not give the boundaries of the lands, the Court ought not to have passed such an order as it would amount to permitting the police to interfere in the civil dispute pending in the Court. He would urge that IA No.412 of 2009 is not maintainable in law and that when IA No.206 of 2009 filed by plaintiffs is still pending, such an order could not have been granted and that trial Court was in error in granting police protection in a routine manner. He placed reliance on Food Corporation of India v. Sukha Deo Prasad, 2009 (4) ALD 68 (SC) = AIR 2009 SC 2330 , Kannatti alias Ramasamy Gounder v, Anai Gounder, AIR 2005 Mad. 461 , Abdul Sukhure Bhai v. Durai Kuppuswamy, AIR 2006 Mad. 186 and Vadlakonda Narender v. SHO, P.S., Atmakur, Warangal District, 2009 (5) ALD 641 . He placed reliance on Food Corporation of India v. Sukha Deo Prasad, 2009 (4) ALD 68 (SC) = AIR 2009 SC 2330 , Kannatti alias Ramasamy Gounder v, Anai Gounder, AIR 2005 Mad. 461 , Abdul Sukhure Bhai v. Durai Kuppuswamy, AIR 2006 Mad. 186 and Vadlakonda Narender v. SHO, P.S., Atmakur, Warangal District, 2009 (5) ALD 641 . (8) Learned Counsel for concerned defendants/respondents 1 to 9 herein made the following submissions. There cannot be any difficulty in identifying the land of the parties as his clients sought relief of police protection in respect of the land in their possession according to pahanis and PPBs/ TDs. The contesting respondents made out a case before the Court below that the plaintiffs along with anti social elements damaged the crop by tractor ploughing, in spite of directions from the Court not to interfere with agricultural operations. The plaintiffs did not plead a proper case for partition of plaint schedule properties and there was already a partition, in furtherance of which all the parties obtained PPBs / TDs and therefore, the suit itself is without any merits. The plaintiffs damaged the crop raised by contesting respondents forcing them to give a complaint to DSP, and then approached the trial Court seeking protection. When the trial Court exercised the power keeping in view the law and order, the same is not vitiated by any error apparent on the face of record. Principles of Law. (9) Every Court exercising civil jurisdiction is empowered to try all suits of civil nature unless it is barred from doing so. Remedies that can be given by civil Court or in correlation to the legal right and the legal injury, it could also be redressal for breach of contract or for declaration of a pre-existing right Civil judicial process mainly prescribed by CPC includes adjudication of the causes (suits) culminating in the judgment and decree. Interlocutory redressal during pendency of the main suit is taken care of by Part III (incidental proceedings) consisting of Sections 75 to 78 and Part VI (supplemental proceedings) consisting of Sections 94 and 95. In addition to these, Order XXXVIII (arrest and attachment before judgment), Order XXXIX (temporary injunctions and interlocutory orders) and Order XIL (appointment of receivers) contain the procedure for effective exercise of powers conferred on the civil Court to deal with incidental and supplemental proceedings. In addition to these, Order XXXVIII (arrest and attachment before judgment), Order XXXIX (temporary injunctions and interlocutory orders) and Order XIL (appointment of receivers) contain the procedure for effective exercise of powers conferred on the civil Court to deal with incidental and supplemental proceedings. (10) A question often asked is what is the role of police in effective exercise of civil Court's powers to execute decrees and to give effect to and enforce its interlocutory orders passed under Part III or Part VI of CPC. Section 94 of CPC reads as under: 94. Supplemental proceedings. -In order to prevent the ends of justice from being defeated the Court may, if it is so prescribed,-(a) issue a warrant to arrest the defendant and bring him before the Court to show-cause why he should not give security for his appearance, and if he fails to comply with any order for security commit him to the civil prison; (b) direct the defendant to furnish security to produce any property belonging to him and to place the same at the disposal of the Court or order the attachment of any property; (c) grant a temporary injunction and in case of disobedience commit the person guilty thereof to the civil prison and order that his property be attached and sold; (d) appoint a receiver of any property and enforce the performance of his duties by attaching and selling his property; (e) make such other interlocutory orders as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient. (11) The power to issue warrant to defendant to compel him to give security, to commit civil prison, to direct to furnish security, to grant temporary injunction and in case of disobedience commit the person to civil prison and attach and sell his property, to appoint receiver and/or to make such other interlocutory order as may appear to the Court just and convenient. Therefore, "to prevent the ends of justice from being defeated" the civil Court can pass any orders as specifically mentioned in Section 94(a) to (d) and is also empowered to make any order which it appears to be just and convenient to meet the ends of justice. Therefore, "to prevent the ends of justice from being defeated" the civil Court can pass any orders as specifically mentioned in Section 94(a) to (d) and is also empowered to make any order which it appears to be just and convenient to meet the ends of justice. Section 95 is intended to prevent abuse of power of Court and makes a party obtaining temporary injunction or an order of arrest or an order of attachment without sufficient grounds, liable for compensation at the behest of the party who suffers arrest/attachment or temporary injunction. It is settled law that ordinarily no Court can pass an interlocutory order if it lias effect or tend to be susceptible of an inference of prejudging some important or sensitive issue in the main matter. Therefore, there cannot be any doubt that if need arises to enforce an order of temporary injunction a civil Court can always pass an order under Section 94(e) of CPC (besides Section 151 of CPC) directing the local police to give protection to the party who is threatened in spite of the Court order. But, in all cases filed under Section 151 of CPC or cases filed invoking Section 94(e) of CPC, the civil Court cannot grant an order directing the police to give protection to safeguard the property, which is subject matter of the suit. (12) At this stage, we need to refer to Chapters III and VII of Specific Relief Act, 1963 deal with preventive relief and injunctions. Preventive relief is granted at the discretion of the Court by injunction, temporary or perpetual. As per Section 37(1) thereof, temporary injunctions may be granted at any stage of the suit. As per Section 37(2) thereof, perpetual injunctions can only be granted by decree where under the defendant is perpetually enjoined from the assertion of right or from the commission of an act, which would be contrary to the rights of the plaintiff. Section 37(1) lays down that temporary injunction can be granted at any stage of the suit and shall continue until further orders of the Court and are regulated by CPC. Sections 38 and 39 enumerate the conditions under which perpetual injunction and mandatory injunction respectively can be granted and Section 40 speaks of entitlement of the plaintiff to claim damages in addition to or in substitution of claim for injunction. Sections 38 and 39 enumerate the conditions under which perpetual injunction and mandatory injunction respectively can be granted and Section 40 speaks of entitlement of the plaintiff to claim damages in addition to or in substitution of claim for injunction. In view of these provisions, though the relief of perpetual injunction and temporary injunction as preventive relief are treated as specific relief, the grant of temporary injunctions is regulated by CPC in Order XXXIX. Rule 1 of Order XXXIX of CPC indicates cases in which temporary injunction may be granted and Rule 2 thereof deals with injunction to restraining repetition or continuation of breach of contract or other injury of any kind. When a temporary injunction is grated by civil Court and there is a complaint of breach or disobedience of an order of injunction, what are the remedies available to the party obtaining injunction and what are the powers of the civil Court which granted injunction? Before dealing with this aspect, we may briefly point out the method and manner of executing the decree for perpetual injunction. (13) Sub-rule (1) of Rule 32 of Order XXI of CPC provides that where a party against whom a decree for injunction has been passed, wilfully failed to obey it, the decree may be enforced by his detention in civil prison or by attachment of property or by both. If an order for temporary injunction is disobeyed, what is the remedy? Order XXXIX Rule 2A of CPC provides that in the case of disobedience of a temporary injunction or breach of any terms on which injunction was granted, the Court may order the property of the person, guilty of disobedience or breach, to be attached and may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding three months. To our mind, Order XXI Rule 32(1) and Order XXXIX Rule 2A of CPC provide for similar consequences in the event of disobedience / breach. We may read these provisions in juxta position. Order XXI Rule 32(1) Order XXXIX Rule 2A 32. To our mind, Order XXI Rule 32(1) and Order XXXIX Rule 2A of CPC provide for similar consequences in the event of disobedience / breach. We may read these provisions in juxta position. Order XXI Rule 32(1) Order XXXIX Rule 2A 32. Decree for specific performance for restitution of conjugal rights, or for an injunction.-(1) Where the party against whom a decree for the specific performance of a contract, or for restitution of conjugal rights, or for an injunction, has been passecf,has had an opportunity of obeying the decree and has wilfully failed to obey it,the decree may be enforced [in the case of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights by the attachment of his property or, in the case of a decree for the specific performance of a contract, or for an injunction] by his detention in the civil prison, or by the attachment of his property, or by both. 2-A. Consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction.-(1) In the case of disobedience of any injunction granted or other order made under Rule 1 or Rule 2 or breach of any of the terms on which the injunction was granted or the order made, of the Court granting the injunction making the order, or any Court to which the or suit or proceeding is transferred, may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached, and may also order such not person to be detained in the civil prison for a term exceeding three months, unless in the meantime the Court directs his release (2) No attachment made under this rule shall remain in force for more than one year, at the end of which time, if the disobedience or breach continues, the property attached may be sold and out of the proceeds, the Court may award such compensation as it thinks fit to the injured party and shall pay the balance, if any, to the party entitled thereto ] NB: Similarities in both the provisions are highlighted. (14) A plain, literal and textual reading would show that the consequences that follow the disobedience of a decree for an injunction and the consequences that follow the case of disobedience of temporary injunction are the same, There cannot be any dispute that even a temporary injunction can be executed (enforced) by filing appropriate application under Order XXI Rule 32(1) read with Order XXXIX Rule 2A of CPC. From this it follows that if a complaint is made by the patty obtaining an order of temporary injunction that the party against whom an injunction order is made has disobeyed, the remedy is an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A and an application under XXI Rule 32(1) is also not barred. Logically, if an allegation that an order of temporary injunction is disobeyed by other party, the remedy is not to grant police protection, it is only an application of Order XXI Rule 32(1) of CPC. Elaborate reason and rationale need not be attempted behind these two provisions made by the Parliament. In all civilized societies, the civil disputes are resolved by adversary adjudicatory process mandated by the law in a civil Court and not by the police. Indeed, the Supreme Court has on quite few occasions laid down the dicta that police cannot interfere in civil disputes (See S. Masthan Saheb v. P.S.R. Anjaneyulu, 2002 (2) ALD (Crl.) 706 (AP)). Therefore, the Parliament intentionally avoided conferring explicit power on the civil Court to direct police protection in the case of complaint of breach of an order of temporary injunction. (15) The civil Court, however, is not, as already observed supra, precluded from exercising its power under Section 94(e) of CPC to pass any interlocutory order to be just and convenient including an order directing the police to provide protection to the party obtaining an order of injunction to enjoy the benefits under such an order. The question, however, is regarding the stage at which the civil Court granting an order of injunction can direct police protection? We proposed to deal with this aspect after noticing the relevant case law in this regard. In Goswami Goddhanlalji v. Goswami Maksudan Ballabh, AIR 1918 All 152 -1LR 40 All 648, the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court probably for the first time considered the matter arising under Order XXXIX Rule 2(3) of CPC as it then existed. We proposed to deal with this aspect after noticing the relevant case law in this regard. In Goswami Goddhanlalji v. Goswami Maksudan Ballabh, AIR 1918 All 152 -1LR 40 All 648, the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court probably for the first time considered the matter arising under Order XXXIX Rule 2(3) of CPC as it then existed. It was held therein that the civil Court has no power to order police to interfere the matter when there is alleged disobedience of injunction. It was also held that if the defendants disobey the order of the Court they are liable to the penalties mentioned in Order XXI Rule 32 and the Court could not order police to see that the decree holders enjoyed their rights without interference on die part of the judgment debtors. If any breach of the peace was apprehended, that was a matter for judicial Magistrate and the Police and not for the civil Court. (16) In Rayapati Audemma v. Pothineni Narasimham, AIR 1971 AP 53 , a Division Bench of this Court on a reference by learned Single Judge, considered the question as to whether a civil Court has jurisdiction or power to direct police to render aid for implementation of the order of the civil Court. The plea that civil Court has no jurisdiction under CPC to grant police aid with respect to implementation of the orders of the injunction was not accepted by Division Bench. Placing reliance on Section 151 of CPC which saves the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or prevent abuse of process of Court. Disagreeing with Allahabad High Court's view in Goswami Goddhanlalji's case (supra), the Division Bench held as under: "Order XXXIX Rule 2(3) provides only for punishment by attachment of the property or by detention in civil prison of the person who committed breach. But it does not farther provide for implementation of the order of injunction itself. Order XXX(X Rule 2(3) cannot be said to be an express provision with respect to implementation of the order of injunction, but is only a provision which provides penalty for disobedience of the order. But it does not farther provide for implementation of the order of injunction itself. Order XXX(X Rule 2(3) cannot be said to be an express provision with respect to implementation of the order of injunction, but is only a provision which provides penalty for disobedience of the order. In such a case there being no other express provision in the code for enforcement of the order, it is not only proper but also necessary that the Courts should render all aid to the aggrieved party to derive full benefits of the order. Though the order of injunction under Order XXXIX of Civil Procedure Code is only interim in nature, still it clothes the person who obtained the order with certain rights and he is entitled to enforce the aforesaid right against the party who is bound by the order. No doubt in such a case, the aggrieved party himself could approach the police authorities to prevent obstruction to the enforcement of the order or to the exercise of the right which he derives under the order of Court. But we do not see why when the same person brings to the notice of the Court that enforcement of the order is sought to be prevented or obstructed, die Court should not exercise its inherent power under Section 151, Civil Procedure Code and direct the police authorities to render all aid to the aggrieved party in the implementation of the Court's order. Yet again it was held: If the police authorities are under a legal duty to enforce the law and the public or the citizens are entitled to seek direction under Article 226 of the Constitution for discharge of such duties by the Police Authorities we feel that the civil Courts can also give appropriate directions under Section 151 Civil Procedure Code to render aid to the aggrieved parties for the due and proper implementation of the orders of Court. It cannot be said that in such a case the exercise of the inherent power under Section 151, Civil Procedure Code is devoid of jurisdiction. There is no express provision in the code prohibiting the exercise of such a power and the Court can give appropriate directions at the instance of the aggrieved parties to the police authorities to render its aid for enforcement of the Court's order in a lawful manner. There is no express provision in the code prohibiting the exercise of such a power and the Court can give appropriate directions at the instance of the aggrieved parties to the police authorities to render its aid for enforcement of the Court's order in a lawful manner. In our opinion, the exercise of such power is necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process and the civil Court has ample jurisdiction to pass such orders under Section 151 CP. C." (17) In Satyanarayana Tiwari v, S.H.O., P.S., Santhoshnagar, AIR 1982 AP 394 , a Division Bench of this Court considered the power of the High Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India to issue a writ or direction to police to enforce the orders of the civil Court to provide protection in furtherance of an order of injunction. Referring to Audemma's case (supra), the Division Bench observed: The legal position as observed by the learned Single Judge does not admit of any doubt that the orders of the Civil Court prevail on the question of possession. Any anterior or subsequent enquiry and finding of the police or any other authority cannot nullify the finding of the civil Court especially when that finding has been upheld by this Court by dismissing the Civil Revision Petition. The only authority that can vary that finding is the Supreme Court. None of the parties in this case have moved the Supreme Court questioning the dismissal of the Civil Revision Petition. That being the position, no authority in the State, revenue or police, can ignore the finding of the Civil Court or Tefuse to take steps to see that the order of the Civil Court is implemented and the party, in whose favour there is the order of the Civil Court, gets all help to maintain the law and order and not allow the other party to contravene the injunction order and create law and order problem. (18) In J. Jagannath Reddy v. Smt. L. Laxmi Devi, 1998 (1) ALD 453 = 1998 (1) ALT 461 , a learned Single Judge of this Court held that when temporary injunction is rejected on the ground that plaintiff failed to show his present possession, grant of police aid under Section 151 CPC to the defendant to protect the alleged possession would be illegal and that violation of order of injunction has to be dealt with either under Order XXT Rule 32 of CPC or under Contempt of Courts Act. The reasons given by learned Judge are as under: Moreover, the entry of the police into the affairs of the parties after they approached the Civil Court is alien to civil law. If there is a finding as to possession of the property and if anybody complains to the police that some other persons arc trying to trespass into their property or committing any offence in relation to the possession of the property belonging to a particular individual, possibly, the police will take action according to law. If there is an order in the nature of injunction positively to protect the possession of a party to die case which if becomes executable can be dealt with in accordance with law under Order XXI Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure to deal with the violators either by attachment of property or by keeping any such persons in Civil Prison. The worst is such an order which is disobeyed or violated may amount to contempt of Court regarding which the procedure contemplated is totally different. Granting police protection under Section 151 C.P. C. in such a situation or in any other situation is never known in law. It is true that Section 151 C.P.C is a codification of civil justice in itself where the Court has got inherent Power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of the Court. Unless a situation depicts that the Court has to exercise such a power for the justice or to prevent the abuse of process of the Court, no order to ensure the ends of justice can be passed. The police protection for a person in possession or said to be in possession of a properly in a civil proceeding can never be the beginning or the end of justice. The police protection for a person in possession or said to be in possession of a properly in a civil proceeding can never be the beginning or the end of justice. As every right determined will be capable of execution or enforcement according to procedure only or otherwise whenever there was a decree becomes in executable for various reasons, then, under Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, the order could have become enforceable with the police aid. Rule of Law Is the Role of Law and for the ends of justice. Any violation is the negation of justice, particularly when there was no order in favour of the respondents as to file possession to maintain positively, granting of police help under Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure was an absurd legal result flowing from immaturity in the understanding of the matter and impropriety in me exercise of the power. Not only it amounts to excess exercise of power but also an incurable illegality. No inherent power under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be exercised where there are specific provisions in the Code and in view of Order XXI, Rule 32 CP C and the Contempt of Court Act, no such order under Section 151 CP C could have been passed, even assuming that there was a negative order in favour of the respondents which could be positively enforced or executed. (19) However, in P. Shanker Rao v. B. Susheela, 2000 (2) ALD 147 = 2000 (2) ALT 606 , another learned Single Judge of this Court, while disagreeing with broad observations made in J, Jagannath Reddy's case (supra), and also holding that they are in the nature of obitur, expressed the view as under: The mere fact that the action could be taken against either party for flouting the injunction under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A or under the Contempt of Courts Act docs not come in the way of the Court taking all necessary steps for ensuring obedience of the injunction order. The Court need not wait till the injunction is breached. In a fit case, the Court can undoubtedly direct police aid as a preventive measure. This power though not expressly conferred, is a power incidental or ancillary to the exercise of the power to grant injunction pending the suit. The Court need not wait till the injunction is breached. In a fit case, the Court can undoubtedly direct police aid as a preventive measure. This power though not expressly conferred, is a power incidental or ancillary to the exercise of the power to grant injunction pending the suit. With great respect, I am not in a position to record my concurrence with the broad observations made by (he learned Judge that the civil Court cannot direct police aid for execution of its order - interlocutory or final and that the party should only have recourse to the procedure laid down under Order XXI, Rule 32 or the Contempt of Courts Act, (20) In the above judgment, a reference was made to another decision of learned Single Judge in Vinedale Distilleries Limited v. Sanman Distributors Limited, 1993 (2) APLJ 5 (SN), wherein it was held: In the instant case the temporary injunction is still in force and it is operative. It is the duty of the Court to see that it is implemented. Otherwise, there will be no meaning for it and it will remain as an empty formality. For implementing the temporary injunction the Court can grant police aid under its jurisdiction. Therefore, whenever any interference is caused by the respondents to the petitioner's peaceful possession, it is open to the petitioner to make a complaint to the police station. If any such complaint is made the Station House Officer is to give the necessary police aid to the petitioner for implementing the temporary injunction orders. (21) The decision in Audemma's case (supra), was rendered when the amendments to CPC by Central Act No.104 of 1976 were not even contemplated. In 1976, Rule 2A (extracted herein above) providing for consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction was inserted. In our view, whether or not the civil Court would be justified to direct police protection for enforcement of an order of injunction, even though there was Order XXXIX Rule 2(3) (which has now been omitted by Act 104 of 1976), after the Parliament inserted Rule 2A in Order XXXIX, in our opinion, Audemma 's case (supra) no more holds the field. We have carefully perused the other decisions of three learned Single Judges of this Court, We are convinced that the view taken Court in Jagamrath Reddy's case (supra) is correct. We have carefully perused the other decisions of three learned Single Judges of this Court, We are convinced that the view taken Court in Jagamrath Reddy's case (supra) is correct. The observations in Vinedale Distilleries's case (supra) and Shanker Rao's case (supra) should be confined to the facts of those cases and cannot be construed as laying down the law to deal with two different consequential situations after an order of injunction is passed. Our reasons for this conclusion are as follows. (22) When a civil Court grants an order of ad interim injunction or ex parte injunction, the complaints by the opposite party can be twofold. It may be complained that there are attempts by the opposite party to contravene and disobey the order of injunction or alleging threat of violation of injunction. In a second situation, there may be an allegation by the opposite party that the opposite party has violated the order of injunction either by dispossession, by alteration of nature of the property, by demolition of structures or by positive act or transaction contrary to the order of injunction and/or causing legal injury ignoring the Court order. In the first situation where threat of violation or disobedience is alleged by the party obtaining a prohibitory order, the Court has power to direct the police to prevent such violation and disobedience by providing necessary protection to enforce the order of injunction. Such police protection order when there is threat of disobedience is justifiable under Section 94(e) read with Section 151 of CP C. Be it noted that as held by the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527 (para 18), when there was no express provision to do justice, the Court can rely on Section 151 and pass appropriate orders, which are not specifically prohibited by Section 94 or other provisions of C PC. (23) In a second situation, as envisioned above, where a complaint is made that the order of injunction granted by the Court restraining or prohibiting the opposite patty from interfering with possession, from changing the nature of land, from demolishing or constructing any structure on disputed land or interfering with the enjoyment of the land like cultivation and/or preventing the commission of positive act in breach of injunction order, the civil Court cannot pass police protection order in exercise of powers under Section 94(e) or 151 of C PC. The power of this Court to pass police protection order to prevent the disobedience of injunction order is different from the power of the Court to deal with actual disobedience. In such cases, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to file execution petition under Order XXI Rule 32 read with Order XXXIX Rule 2A of C PC because as per Section 141 of the Code, all provisions of CP C, the procedure in regard to suit is applicable to all interlocutory proceedings and even an order of temporary injunction is executable. The aggrieved party can also file an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of C PC alleging contempt of injunction order of Court and seek imprisonment of the violator or attachment of his property. Which course is to be followed by civil Court depends on the nature of allegations made by the aggrieved in the application made to the Court seeking intervention of the Court. If the procedure is not followed and in every case an application is moved for grant of police protection and the same is granted by the Court, it would render Order XXXIX Rule 2A as well as Order XXI Rule 32 of CPC otious. The civil Court cannot pass any order ignoring the specific provisions of CPC. (24) Of late, this Court has noticed that the number of suits for injunctions (classified as title suits) in all the Courts is on increase. It is not without truth to say that more often than not frivolous suits of injunction arc tiled only to bring the defendants around the plaintiffs view and accept some via-media arrangement to avoid long drawn, expensive and time consuming proceedings in the Courts, during which the defendants would not be able to enjoy the property with peace. It is not without truth to say that more often than not frivolous suits of injunction arc tiled only to bring the defendants around the plaintiffs view and accept some via-media arrangement to avoid long drawn, expensive and time consuming proceedings in the Courts, during which the defendants would not be able to enjoy the property with peace. In all such cases, ordinarily, urgent motion is moved before the civil Court, an order of ex parte injunction is obtained and waiting for a period of fortnight or so, immediately application is moved under Section 151 of CPC seeking police protection, instances are not rare where defendants are subjected to harassment after obtaining order of injunction. The Courts in India have repeatedly held that the police have no role in civil adjudication, and therefore, the Courts should be very cautious and vigilant not to introduce police intervention in civil adjudication in indirect manner at the instance of a clever and resourceful plaintiffs. In view of this, we direct all the civil Courts in the State of Andhra Pradesh to exercise abundant caution in dealing with interlocutory applications filed by the party obtaining an order of injunction seeking police protection. For the guidance of all the civil Courts, we hold and lay down as under. (i) When the allegations are made by the party obtaining an order of injunction, that the said order has been violated, an application seeking police protection would not lie. The aggrieved party has to necessarily file execution petition under Order XXI Rule 32 or an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of C PC seeking attachment and/or arrest of the violator for contempt of the Court. (ii) When a petition is filed seeking police protection, whether or not to exercise of power under Section 94(e) or Section 151 of C PC, the facts alleged or pleaded, an order for police protection cannot be passed in a routine manner. (m) If an application is filed by the person obtaining ad interim injunction alleging that there is a threat of breach, disobedience or violation of the order of injunction, subject to proof, the Court has power to order police protection imposing necessary conditions not to interfere with the life and liberty, and rights of the opposite party. (m) If an application is filed by the person obtaining ad interim injunction alleging that there is a threat of breach, disobedience or violation of the order of injunction, subject to proof, the Court has power to order police protection imposing necessary conditions not to interfere with the life and liberty, and rights of the opposite party. (iv) The standard of proof required in the case of threat of disobedience of injunction or alleged breach, disobedience or violation of an order of injunction should be very high and it should be in between the standard of beyond reasonable doubt and a standard of balance on probabilities. Be it noted, as held by Supreme Court in Chottu Ram v. Urvashi Gulati, (2001) 7 SCC 530 and Anil Ratan Sarkar v, Hirak Ghosh, (2002) 4 SCC 21 , in all cases of contempt the plea should be proved applying the very high standard of proof and not mere affidavits or self-serving statements of the parly seeking the intervention of the Court. (25) We now propose to apply the above principles to test the validity of the order impugned in IA No.412 of 2009, dated 11.9.2009 which is impugned in C MA No.1021 of 2009. (26) The trial Court passed an order or 9.4.2009 in IA No.207 of 2009 restraining the defendants from changing the nature of the suit land in any manner until further orders. The defendants filed counter and argued for modification of the said order alleging that the plaintiffs prevented them from carrying on agricultural operations. Convinced with their plea, the trial Court modified the order on 29.7.2009 clarifying that the defendants can do agricultural operations except alienating the suit land and also ordered that plaintiffs shall not prevent defendants from agricultural operations in the land pending the suit. Within three weeks thereafter, 9 defendants (respondents 1 to 9 herein) filed IA No.412 of 2009. In the affidavit filed by defendant No. 16 (respondent No.6 herein) on behalf of others, it is alleged as under: ... Originally, the plaintiffs have obtained an ex parte order not to change the nature of the land and thereby taking advantage of the said order, they were preventing the petitioners and other co-owners from cultivating the suit lands. The petitioners and other co-owners have got the same rights of ownership over the land as that of the plaintiffs in both the suits. The petitioners and other co-owners have got the same rights of ownership over the land as that of the plaintiffs in both the suits. The plaintiffs are entitled to the extent of their share and to protect their share in the partition and get the same allotted to them, to that extent suit is filed but they have no right to spoil seedlings and planted standing crops. The plaintiffs 1 to 4 are encouraged by the said C.V. Balakrbhna Rao and his associates taking advantage of the anti-social elements brought tractor and other people and brought paddy seeds of other parties and they have sprinkled in the agricultural lands sown by the petitioners and plantation made by the petitioners and thereby damaging the quality of seeds and also damaged the crop by tractors and ploughing irregularly, illegally damaging the crop by the 5th respondent particularly who brought the tractor from Medak. ... It is submitted that the petitioners have also submitted an application to the Superintendent of Police, Medak, Dy. Supdt. of Police, Circle Inspector of Police and Sub-Inspector of the area concerned bringing all the facts. The police after examining the case stated that it is a civil matter and they cannot interfere in the civil matter more particularly when same is pending before the Court, (emphasis supplied) (27) A copy of the application referred to in their affidavit was not before the trial Court. As directed, the same is produced before this Court along with the receipt issued by Medak District Police. As directed, the same is produced before this Court along with the receipt issued by Medak District Police. In the said complaint, the contesting respondents alleged as under; On 28.7.2009 when the undersigned were in the Gopalakrishnapuram Village, looking after our fields, (1) Sri C.V. Balakrishna Rao, husband of Smt. C. Vijaya Sree, R/o Gopalakrishnapuram; (2) Sri M. Saibaba Bhaskara Koteswaru Rao, S/o late M. Venkateswara Rao, R/o Gopalakrishnapuram and (3) Sri Surapaneni Moulaiah, S/o late S. Ranga Rao, R/o Gopalakrishnapuram, (4) Sri Boppudi Rama Koteswara Rao, S/o late B. Gopala Rao, R/o Gopaiakrishnapuram, (5) Sri Boppudi Narsimha Rao, S/o late B, Kurma Rao, R/o Gopalakrishnapuram and 10 others from Masaipct Village came in tractor and trespassed into the fields of (Y)Kotti Seetharama Rao with the tractor of Narsimha Rao, the five accused persons above and spoiled the entire paddy seed sown already for seed purposed by M/s. Bayer Bioscience Pvt., Ltd., Hyderabad, to whom (1) Sri Kolli Seetharama Rao gave on lease the land covered by Sy.Nos.l31/U and 132/U measuring Acs.4.11 guntas and Acs.3.29 gunlas and spoiled the land of (2) Smt Ghama Sarojinamma, W/o late Ghanta Koteswara Rao who is the palladar of Sy.Nos.l30/E and 131/A measuring Acs.2.34 and Acs.0.32 guntas respectively, (3) Parchuru Koteswara Rao who is the pattadar in the same survey numbers measuring Ac.0.27 guntas and Ac. 1,5 guntas; (4) Nekkalapuri Subba Rao (died) rep. by his sons N. Rambabu and A', Nageswara Rao in the survey numbers measuring Ac.0.16 guntas and Ac.2.24 guntas; (5) Kuchipudi Shy am Prasad in Sy.No. 131 measuring Ac.0.20 guntas and (6) Sri Boppudi Richit Kumar in Sy. No.130 measuring Acs.4.37 guntas. (emphasis supplied) (28) From the allegations made in the application given to police officials and in the affidavit accompanying the IA No.412 of 2009, it becomes very clear that the alleged incident happened on 28,7.2009, a day prior to the modified order in LA No.207 of 2009, dated 29.7.2009. Paragraphs 2 and 4 extracted hereinabove do not specifically mentioned the date of alleged trespass by fifteen persons from Masai pet. Therefore, the allegation that plaintiffs damaged the seed beds or trespassed into defendants' lands is false. It is also highly improbable because admittedly all the plaintiffs are ladies. Paragraphs 2 and 4 extracted hereinabove do not specifically mentioned the date of alleged trespass by fifteen persons from Masai pet. Therefore, the allegation that plaintiffs damaged the seed beds or trespassed into defendants' lands is false. It is also highly improbable because admittedly all the plaintiffs are ladies. Further first plaintiff is a woman of seventy years and second plaintiff aged forty years, who are residents of Hakimpet and plaintiffs 3 and 4 are residing in Bangalore and Krishna District respectively. In the complaint given to police as well as the counter-affidavit, the defendants alleged that C. V. Balakrishna Rao, husband of third plaintiff was behind the alleged high handed action. If such allegation is true, mere mention of the name of the husband of third plaintiff would not be sufficient without giving details as to when he came to Village from Bangalore and when after the injunction order, he violated the same. (29) In the impugned order, dated 11.9.2009 in IA No.412 of 2009, the trial Court observed as under: The plaintiffs along with the suit filed IA No.206 of 2009 in which this Court passed an interim order not to alienate the suit land until further orders. Thereafter, in IA No.207 of 2009, it is ordered that the petitioners shall not prevent respondents from carrying out agricultural operations for the land in respondents' possession. Admittedly, the Hon'ble Court also ordered status quo in respect of the suit land. Taking into consideration all these orders, it is clear that all the parties whoever is cultivating which ever part of the suit land should cultivate and enjoy the land and other party should not interfere into the said land. So all these orders together amount to injunction order particularly to safeguard the possession of each petitioner and respondent over the suit land. Moreover, in a suit for partition plaintiff and defendant are on same footing. Therefore, to protect the possession, if the petitioners sought for police help, it can be provided so that they can protect possession from the interference of other respondents. This order will continue pending disposal of lANo.206 of 2009. (30) From the above, it becomes clear that the trial Court did not assign any reasons for exercising drastic power to order police protection. This order will continue pending disposal of lANo.206 of 2009. (30) From the above, it becomes clear that the trial Court did not assign any reasons for exercising drastic power to order police protection. The trial Court surmised and assumed that after the order in IA No.207 of 2009 dated 29.7.2009, the plaintiffs disobeyed the order of injunction. On the showing of defendants, the husband of third plaintiff and others trespassed into defendants' land on 28.7.2009, and there was no specific allegation that they threatened the defendants after the injunction order was passed. There was also no allegation that there was a threat of breach or disobedience of the order passed by the Court on 29.7.2009. Further more, when the application filed by plaintiffs being IA No.206 of 2009 seeking ad interim injunction restraining the defendants from interfering/dispossessing the defendants from the suit schedule property is pending, the trial Court ought not to have passed the impugned order grating police protection especially when no such case is made out by defendants. As noticed supra, even if some credence is given to the allegation of the defendants that the husband of third plaintiff and others violated order of injunction, it is certainly not a case for ordering police protection but it is a case wherein the defendants can move an execution petition under Order XXI Rule 32 or an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of CPC. For these reasons, we hold that the order passed by the Court below in IA No.412 of 2009, dated 11.9.2009 is unsustainable as it is vitiated by error of law. (31) Insofar as CMA No.1 128 of 2009 filed against IA No.207 of 2009, dated 29.7.2009 is concerned though initially trial Court directed defendants not to change the nature of the land, subsequently having regard to the fact that the plaint schedule land is under cultivation for more than three decades and directed that the defendants can do agricultural operations. The same, in our considered opinion, would meet ends of justice because any order restraining the defendants from changing the nature of land does not mean that they can be prevented from enjoying the land by cultivating the same. Therefore, we do not find any reason to interfere with the same. The same, in our considered opinion, would meet ends of justice because any order restraining the defendants from changing the nature of land does not mean that they can be prevented from enjoying the land by cultivating the same. Therefore, we do not find any reason to interfere with the same. (32) Accordingly, CM A No. 1021 of 2009 is allowed and the order of the Court below in IA No.412 of 2009 dated 11.9.2009 is set aside. The CM A No.1 128 of 2009 is dismissed confirming the order of the Court below in IA No,207 of 2009 dated 29.7.2009. We direct the Court below to dispose of the suit as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of six months by conducting trial on day to day basis, from the date of receipt of copy of this order. There shall be no order as to costs.