ORDER 1. The third defendant in a suit for declaration of title and possession and for consequential permanent injunction is the appellant in this appeal by special leave. A suit was filed by the first respondent herein of whom Respondents 2 to 11 are the LRs. Respondent 12 herein was the second defendant in the suit. For convenience, we will refer to the parties by their rank in the suit. 2. The first defendant (Karunakaran Nadar) claimed that an extent of 14 c cents in Survey No. 1817 was allotted to him at a partition. He sold the said 14 cents in Survey No. 1817, hereinafter referred to as "the suit property", in favour of the second defendant (Solomon Nadar) under a registered sale deed dated 1-8-1946. The second defendant executed a deed of possessory mortgage dated 16-1-1947 in favour of one Syeed Kannu. According to the plaintiff, as the said mortgage was not redeemed, Syeed Kannu became the absolute owner and on his death the suit land was inherited by his son Mohammed Ali. The said Mohammed Ali sold the property to the plaintiff (Sundaram Nadar) under a registered sale deed dated 23-12-1978. The plaintiff, thus, claims to be the owner of the suit property in possession thereof. According to him, as the defendants were admitting to interfere with his possession and challenge his title, he found it fit to file OS No. 110 of c 1979 on the file of the District Munsif, Kozhithurai for declaration that he is the son and is in possession of the suit property and for consequential injunction. 3. The third defendant (the appellant herein) on the other hand contends that the sale by Karunakaran, the first defendant in favour of the second defendant on 1-8-1946 was sham and nominal. That the first defendant sold I 10 cents out of Survey No. 1817 in favour of one Dasan Nadar under registered sale deed dated 22-5-1953. That Karunakaran had also mortgaged the very same 14 cents in favour of one Muhammed Haneefa on 16-2-1953 before the sale in favour of Dasan Nadar and the said Muhammed Haneefa had signed mortgage in favour of the second defendant Solomon Nadar. That Karunakaran had also mortgaged the very same 14 cents in favour of one Muhammed Haneefa on 16-2-1953 before the sale in favour of Dasan Nadar and the said Muhammed Haneefa had signed mortgage in favour of the second defendant Solomon Nadar. The second defendant had executed a release deed in favour of Dasan Nadar in I regard to 10 cents purchased by him under a deed of release dated 1-8-1966 and this Dasan Nadar became absolute owner of 10 cents. 4. It is also claimed that Dasan Nadar had also purchased 2 cents in Survey No. 1817 under sale deed dated 1-8-1966 executed by Kanmakaran and his wife Ammukutty and thus became the owner of 12 cents of land. It is alleged that the 2 cents of land comprised of residential house where Karunakaran and Ammukutty were staying and Dasan filed an eviction suit against them and obtained possession of the house situated on the 2 cents of land under decree dated 21-9-1974. The third defendant claims that Dasan Nadar thus became the owner in possession of 12 cents of land and executed a deed of sale dated 22-8-1977 in favour of the third defendant and thus the third defendant became the absolute owner in possession of 12 cents of land. 5. The third defendant contended that the sale deed dated 1-8-1946 in favour of Solomon Nadar was void and as a consequence the mortgage by Solomon Nadar in favour of Syeed Kannu and sale by Syeed Kannu, son in favour of Sundaram Nadar was invalid. The trial court upheld the contention of the plaintiff. It held that once Karunakaran had sold the 14 cents of land in favour of Solomon Nadar under sale deed dated 1-8-1946, he had no saleable or other interest in the suit property and consequentially the mortgage dated 16-2-1953 in favour of Muhammed Haneefa, sale dated 22-5-1953 in favour of Dasan Nadar as also another sale deed dated 9-7-1955 in favour of Gopalakrishna Pillai were all inconsequential and ineffective. The trial court, therefore, granted a decree as prayed for. 6. Feeling aggrieved, the third defendant filed an appeal. The first appellate court accepted the contention of the third defendant that the sale deed dated 1-8-1946 was sham and nominal primarily for three reasons which we will refer to a little later. The trial court, therefore, granted a decree as prayed for. 6. Feeling aggrieved, the third defendant filed an appeal. The first appellate court accepted the contention of the third defendant that the sale deed dated 1-8-1946 was sham and nominal primarily for three reasons which we will refer to a little later. As a consequence of its finding that the sale deed dated 1-8-1946 by Karunakaran Nadar in favour of Solomon was sham and nominal, it found that the plaintiff had made out title from Solomon Nadar to Syeed Kannu and Syeed Kannu to Mohammed Ali and Mohammed Ali to Sundaram Nadar. On the other hand, the first appellate court held that the third defendant had made out title with reference to sale deed dated 22-5-1953 executed by Karunakaran Nadar in regard to 10 cents of land and sale deed dated 1-8-1966 executed by Karunakaran and his wife in regard to 2 cents and, therefore, reversed the decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit. 7. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff filed a second appeal. The High Court allowed the second appeal. It found that the three circumstances that were given by the first appellate court to hold that the sale deed dated 1-8-1946 was sham and nominal was absolutely without any basis and consequentially it could not be said that the sale deed dated 1-8-1946 was sham and nominal. If the sale deed dated 1-8-1946 was not sham and nominal, it was valid and binding which would mean that the title of the plaintiff was made out and the third defendant could not have got any title on the basis of documents executed by Karunakaran Nadar. The second appeal was, therefore, allowed and the trial court judgment was restored. The said judgment is under challenge. 8. The only question that arises for reconsideration is whether the High Court was justified in reversing the finding of fact that the sale deed dated 1-8-1946 executed by Karunakaran Nadar in favour of Solomon was sham and nominal. 9. The second appeal was, therefore, allowed and the trial court judgment was restored. The said judgment is under challenge. 8. The only question that arises for reconsideration is whether the High Court was justified in reversing the finding of fact that the sale deed dated 1-8-1946 executed by Karunakaran Nadar in favour of Solomon was sham and nominal. 9. The first reasoning assigned by the first appellate court is that Karunakaran Nadar had executed a sale deed dated 9-7-1955 in regard to the very same land in favour of one Gopalakrishna Pillai and that sale was challenged by Karunakaran's minor son represented by Karunakaran's wife Ammukutty in OS No. 701 of 1955 and in that suit Solomon,Nadar was arrayed as defendant by describing him as mortgagor and the said suit was decreed ex parte and in execution of the said ex parte decree possession of the property was given to Ammukutty representing her minor son through delivery receipt. From this it was inferred that Solomon Nadar was never in possession and consequentially neither Syeed Kannu nor Mohammed Ali nor Sundaram N adar were in possession. The High Court has explained how this finding is without any basis and contrary to the facts. 10. Firstly, in as No. 701 of 1955, possession was not sought from Solomon Nadar. Possession was sought from Gopa1akrishna Pillai. After the property had already been sold and possession delivered to Solomon Nadar, j obviously the question of Gopalakrishna Pillai having possession of the land did not arise. Gopalakrishna Pillai did not contest the suit. The said property is vacant land in regard to which possession follows title. Therefore, if the paper possession has been taken from Gopalakrishna Pillai in a suit filed against Gopalakrishna Pillai, it cannot be said that Solomon' Nadar lost possession of the property. Therefore, the suit filed by Karunakaran against Gopalakrishna Pillai and delivery receipt executed therein in no way affected or related to the title or possession of Solomon and, therefore, the said circumstance could not have been used against Solomon or against the plaintiff. 11. Therefore, the suit filed by Karunakaran against Gopalakrishna Pillai and delivery receipt executed therein in no way affected or related to the title or possession of Solomon and, therefore, the said circumstance could not have been used against Solomon or against the plaintiff. 11. The second circumstance that is mentioned by the first appellate court to hold that the deed was sham and nominal is that after the sale deed dated (1-8-1946 in favour of Solomon, Karunakaran had mortgaged the very same land in favour of Muhammed Haneefa and Solomon Nadar had taken the assignment of the said mortgage from Muhammed Haneefa under the assignment deed dated 27-4-1964. The reasoning of the first appellate court is if Solomon was already the owner in pursuance of the sale deed dated 1-8-1946, there was no need for him to take the assignment of subsequent ( mortgage which did not affect his title. This inferred that because he took assignment, the earlier sale deed in his favour, namely, sale deed dated 1-8-1946, must have been a sham and nominal one. 12. What is lost sight of by the first appellate court is that the sale deed dated 1-8-1946 in favour of Solomon related to 10 cents in Survey No. 1865, 17 cents in Survey No. 1817 and 12 cents in Survey No. 2142, and 10 cents E in Survey No. 1869. On the other hand, the assignment deed relates to as many as sixteen properties. It is possible that what was mortgaged in favour of Muhammed Haneefa and subsequently assigned to Solomon did not refer to the land which was sold to Solomon under the sale deed dated 1-8-1946 or that by oversight or error Karunakaran had included in the mortgage in favour of Muhammed Haneefa the land which was already sold to Solomon. What is relevant for our purpose is that the mere fact that Solomon had taken the assignment from Haneefa cannot be considered as a circumstance to hold that the sale deed dated 1-8-1946 in favour of Solomon was sham and nominal. 13. The third circumstance that is mentioned is the sale by Karunakaran and Ammukutty in regard to 2 cents in favour of Dasan Nadar 'and the f subsequent eviction petition filed by Dasan Nadar against Karunakaran and Ammukutty and taking possession thereof. 13. The third circumstance that is mentioned is the sale by Karunakaran and Ammukutty in regard to 2 cents in favour of Dasan Nadar 'and the f subsequent eviction petition filed by Dasan Nadar against Karunakaran and Ammukutty and taking possession thereof. It is evident from the decree in as No. 251 of 1970 (eviction suit) that the suit related to a house property which was situated in 2 cents of land. On the other hand, the suit property i.e. 14 cents in Survey No. 1817, did not relate to any house property at all but related to 17 cents of vacant land. It is, therefore, quite possible that f Karunakaran was in possession of some land in Survey No. 1817 which was not the subject -matter of the sale deed dated 1-8-1946 and, therefore, the sale of the house in favour of Dasan Nadar had nothing to do with it. At all events, the fact that after the sale deed dated 1-8-1946 in favour of Solomon, Karunakaran went on executing different deeds, namely, a mortgage deed dated 16-2-1953, sale deed dated 22-5-1953, sale deed dated 9-7-1955 are not indications that the first sale deed was sham and nominal but were indications that Karunakaran was an unreliable person. That sale in favour of Solomon is sham and nominal was, therefore, totally unwarranted. 14. The High Court has focussed on the crucial issue and found that the findings of the first appellate court that the deed dated 1-8-1946 is sham and nominal was totally without basis. Consequently, it rightly interfered with the said finding as wholly unwarranted. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the judgment of the High Court. The appeal is dismissed.